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Abstract 
 
This study asks if a strategic approach to the management of communication can 
assist and support the overall operational commander in effectively managing a major 
emergency situation. Communication in this regard includes important strategic-
tactical functions that need consideration when the community faces significant loss 
of life or damage, and incorporates tasks such as media management, public 
information, the raising of public awareness, internal communication, public affairs, 
community relations, and survivor and victim relations. Encompassing these 
functions are a number of overarching principles that, when adopted, allow the entire 
process to be approached from a strategic rather than a tactical viewpoint. The study 
demonstrates how an efficient, strategically focused communication team can assist 
the operational commander in managing a major emergency situation. 
 
The dissertation explores principles and practices for strategic communication 
management for major emergencies. It recommends a particular framework that is 
underpinned by six strategic communication principles. The framework was 
developed taking into account relevant theories and models of strategic 
communication and management, augmented by detailed primary and secondary 
qualitative deductive research. Research in this regard included reading not only the 
academic literature but also a broad range of official Irish and other documentation, 
including reports, manuals, guidance materials and legislation. Original primary 
research was undertaken to ascertain how a number of countries, regarded as leaders 
in this field, approach this subject and detailed interviews were conducted with 
responsible officials in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. As 
relatively little data exists on the subject of major emergency strategic 
communication in the Irish context, in-depth interviews were also conducted with key 
individuals involved in major emergency management in Ireland.  
 
The study demonstrates that the strategic communication function is increasingly a 
critical success factor in major emergency management internationally. It also shows 
that, while major emergency communication initiatives have been undertaken in 
Ireland, the Irish approach is somewhat fragmented and tactical in nature. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Mankind has always faced the threat of large-scale death and destruction from 
disastrous situations. Mention of Pompeii, Krakatoa, Chernobyl, Banda Aceh and 
New Orleans evokes powerful images for many people. Despite all the advances in 
technology, disasters affect, and will continue to affect, whole communities in many 
significant ways. Research indicates that the number of people at risk from extreme 
events continues to grow at an alarming rate (Bouwer et al. 2007: 753). This includes 
threats not only from traditional geophysical events such as earthquakes and floods, 
but also from anthropogenic major emergencies such as the release of toxic 
substances, major transport accidents and terrorist related incidents. For example, in 
early May 2008, two significant disasters occurred in Asia leaving many thousands 
dead and even more homeless. On May 2nd, in Mynamar, Cyclone Nargis struck the 
Irrawaddy Delta region causing the deaths of approximately 80,000 people (BBC 
2008(a)). On May 12th, in the Sichuan province of China, a massive earthquake killed 
more than 55,000 people (BBC 2008(c)). It is not surprising to find societies devoting 
attention to major emergency preparedness and planning, and training frontline 
agencies to respond effectively. This involves providing planners and responders with 
requisite skills in a number of critical competencies, including leadership, strategic 
management and planning, risk management, logistics, mitigation, information 
management, information and communications technology (ICT), and business 
continuity management.  
 
In recent times, major emergency planners have identified an additional key 
competency that is increasingly recognised as a critical success factor in major 
emergency management, ‘the strategic risk and crisis communication function’. It is 
recognised that the public requires a level of awareness and knowledge regarding life-
threatening risks that they face on a daily basis. Their involvement in decisions that 
are taken in order to protect them against these risks can be beneficial. Once a major 
emergency occurs, the public requires immediate and clear warnings and alarms to 
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allow them to take adequate precautions. Sometimes these warnings are not possible 
and the events are so shattering that affected publics need effective, clear and 
compassionate information and reassurance in order to help them to cope and to begin 
to build a sense of order and understanding in their lives. Such major emergency 
communications are at the heart of this dissertation.  
 
1.2 The research question 
 
The principal research question at the heart of this study asks if a strategic approach 
to the management of communication is of benefit throughout a major emergency 
situation. The dissertation seeks more particularly to determine whether a 
communication team, following particular strategic principles of communication 
management and adopting a strategic approach, can assist and support the overall 
operational commander in effectively managing a major emergency situation. The 
substantive study centres on the relevant sub-fields of communication and 
specifically on strategic communication management. However, in order to answer 
adequately the research question, an analysis of the literature relating to two 
additional fields of endeavour is conducted, major emergency risk and crisis 
management, and strategic management and planning.  
 
In addressing the research question, the concepts, theories and models of the 
relatively recent discipline of major emergency risk and crisis management will be 
examined. Of considerable interest in this regard is how communication flows within 
and throughout major emergency response organisations and how communication 
assists and supports the various major emergency management functions. Central to 
this research is an analysis of the theories, principles and models of communication 
and their relationship to the major emergency context. Additionally, the study 
involves an analysis of communication management itself, including the planning, 
execution and evaluation of an organisation’s communication with external and 
internal publics, in order to determine its role in a major emergency situation. As the 
substantive study centres on the strategic aspects of communication management, it is 
important to comprehend the theory and principles of the well-established discipline 
of organisational strategic management and planning. An analysis such as this allows 
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for a greater understanding of how this discipline has evolved over the past fifty 
years, together with a rationale for these changes. Additionally, it is important to 
determine whether the theory of strategic management and planning has an 
application within the context of major emergency communication, and to identify a 
number of key strategic principles that can be used in the development of a core 
conceptual major emergency communication framework. These are presented in 
Chapter 5.  
 
1.2.1 Conceptual strategic major emergency communication framework 
As will be seen throughout the dissertation, the study of major emergency 
communication management is supported by a significant amount of literature. 
However, much of this literature is somewhat fragmented, in that particular works 
address specific aspects of the overall area. This means that it has proven impossible 
to identify a single comprehensive, integrated strategic major emergency 
communication framework that can serve as a guide, both strategically and 
operationally, for practitioners during all stages of a major emergency event. 
Consequently, one of the objectives of this study is to propose a core conceptual 
framework that can be of value as a guidance tool for practitioners, not least in the 
Irish context, and that can, additionally, serve as a basis for academics engaging in 
further research in this field.  
 
The framework, as presented later in Chapter 5, is considered from two distinct 
perspectives, one strategic and the other strategic-tactical. It is intended to represent 
the strategic level using a number of overarching principles that are designed to 
encompass, underpin and guide the many communication functions undertaken by the 
practitioner throughout the three stages of the major emergency life cycle. In addition 
to the strategic benefits of doing so, it is intended that the conceptual framework 
should serve as a useful operational guide for communication practitioners 
throughout a major emergency event. Consequently, the conceptual framework 
includes a strategic-tactical level, involving a series of steps that should be considered 
in order to manage effectively the communication function throughout the three 
stages of a major emergency.  
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The proposed core conceptual major emergency framework guiding the substantive 
study is drawn from an analysis of the literature from the relevant sub-fields of 
communication, strategy management and major emergency risk and crisis 
management, and supported by data acquired from Irish and international experts in 
the field of major emergency management and communication. These international 
experts are chosen from countries that are considered leaders in the field of major 
emergency management and communication practices. 
 
1.2.2 Best-practice and best-international-practice 
The terms ‘best-practice’ and ‘best-international practice’ are employed occasionally 
throughout this dissertation to refer to the use of a communication methodology and 
repeatable procedures and practices that appear to optimise all elements of the major 
emergency communication function. In using the terms to identify practices that are 
at present adopted by relevant authorities in some democratic states that have 
considerable experience in emergency planning and management (Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the USA particularly), the author recognises that such terms are 
relative. Thus, the term ‘best-practice’ should not be understood to imply that major 
emergency communication management has reached a level that cannot be improved 
upon. Recent major emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, have 
demonstrated that major emergency communication management is far from perfect 
and that lessons continue to be learned. Practice continues to evolve and improve.  
 
Countries that engage in best practice major emergency communication management 
provide resources to accumulate and apply knowledge, thereby determining more 
likely than otherwise what is working and not working in different situations and 
contexts. In order for their major emergency communication management to be 
considered as best practice, it is necessary for government agencies to seek to 
improve it through the continuing process of learning, feedback, reflection and 
analysis. Other key areas examined are as follows. 
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1.2.3  The approach taken by the Irish government 
This study will determine the extent to which the Irish government is approaching 
major emergency communication management from a strategic perspective. It 
analyses the structures and guidelines that have been put in place to progress and 
support the major emergency management effort and the supporting communication 
agenda. The research examines the attitudes of senior major emergency planners 
towards adopting a strategic communication approach and their understanding of the 
principles in this regard. It also considers both the major emergency communication 
initiatives that are currently underway as part of the Major Emergency Development 
Plan (2006-2008) and those being planned, in order to ascertain the extent to which 
they are strategic in their approach. 
 
1.2.4  Link to tactical major emergency communication management 
As this dissertation is one of only a few comprehensive studies of major emergency 
communication management that examines the subject from both a strategic and a 
practical perspective, it is considered useful for practitioners of the discipline, and 
scholars who wish to undertake further research in this area. The proposed framework 
in this study places significant emphasis on communication at a strategic level. 
However, it also creates a link to the tactical (practical) level by introducing a series 
of strategic-tactical steps that communication practitioners can follow for each stage 
of the major emergency life cycle, while still adhering to the strategic principles.  
 
1.2.5 Reveal the available literature 
As this dissertation will demonstrate, it is difficult to source useful literature in 
Ireland on the subject of major emergency communication and related disciplines. 
Hence, it is considered beneficial to introduce the reader to as broad a base of 
literature as possible within each of the diverse subject areas examined as part of this 
research. Consequently, key subject areas are supported with more citations that one 
might otherwise expect, together with an expansive bibliography. This provides a 
useful reference list for further research in this subject area. 
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1.3 Scope and limitations of the study 
 
As stated earlier, this study examines the strategic communication management 
process throughout all three stages of a major emergency life cycle – pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis. In this regard, the term ‘communication’ does not refer to technical 
communication systems or processes, such as response organisations’ radio 
equipment. While the free flow of data through such systems is an extremely 
important factor for successful major emergency communication, it is outside the 
scope of this research and mentioned in passing only. 
 
In this study, the emphasis is on the communication management process for a major 
emergency situation, and for more serious events such as disasters and catastrophes. 
Consequently, an analysis of routine adverse events managed by response agencies, 
such as localised fires and road traffic accidents, is outside the scope of this research. 
Additionally, the subject of organisational crisis communication is excluded.  
 
The subject of risk communication is an extremely complex and specialised field of 
endeavour that includes sub-disciplines such as the psychology of risk, and social and 
cultural aspects of risk perception. While this subject is described in some detail at 
different stages in the dissertation, a comprehensive analysis of the subject is outside 
the scope of the research. 
 
Additionally, in order to introduce the reader lucidly to as many of the diverse 
concepts and elements associated with strategic major emergency communication 
management as possible, it was thought prudent to present the dissertation in a report 
format rather than in a less formal free-flowing narrative style. This format was 
agreed with the supervisor. 
 
1.4 Significance and contributions of the study 
 
This dissertation is important as it contributes greatly to the limited number of studies 
on the subject of strategic major emergency communication management. The study 
will show that very few comprehensive frameworks dealing with this discipline exist, 
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particularly ones that incorporate both strategic and practical levels. This dissertation 
provides a greater understanding of this complex subject for practitioners of the 
discipline. It is the first research to be conducted into the area of strategic major 
emergency communication in the Irish context. 
 
Consequently, it is hoped that this research will be of interest to the Irish government 
and to Irish major emergency planners and communication practitioners who are 
currently engaged in progressing a redevelopment of the entire emergency planning 
function. The results of this study will also be useful to scholars of communication 
and to practitioners of risk, crisis and major emergency communication 
internationally.  
 
1.5 Terminology and definitions   
 
An examination of both communication and major emergency literature reveals two 
related disciplines, replete with terminology and definitions, many of which are used 
interchangeably. Some terms are also part of everyday discourse. This can result in 
members of the general public and certain stakeholders legitimately adopting a 
different understanding and usage of particular terms. Inconsistencies in major 
emergency language are likely to create a certain amount of confusion for the major 
emergency responder and communication practitioner.  
 
In order for major emergency communication to be successful, it is important that 
relevant terminology is clearly understood by all and that it is applied consistently in 
both theory and practice. According to Quarantelli  (1995: 224): 
 
A main reason why we need clarification is because otherwise 
scholars who think they are communicating with one another are 
really talking of somewhat different phenomena. 
 
1.5.1  Crisis terminology and definitions 
In common parlance, the misuse of the terms ‘crisis’, ‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’ does 
not create any significant problems. However, the imprecise use of these terms by 
major emergency responders can result in either an inadequate, or else an excessive, 
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response. It is important to be able to differentiate clearly between the categories of 
crisis-related events in order to allow response agencies to know exactly the type of 
situation that they are dealing with. Those delivering the MSc in Risk, Crisis and 
Disaster Management at the University of Leicester state: 
 
The failure to distinguish between emergencies, crises and disasters 
also raises questions about the validity of any synthesis between 
theory and practice (Scarman Centre 2004: 2-10). 
 
Additionally, Drabek and Hoetmer (1991: xviii) emphasise the importance of being 
able to establish the progression from incident to crisis to emergency to disaster for 
the purpose of potentially ‘scaling up’ a response.  
 
For simplicity sake, the following terms are categorised with regard to their position 
in the crisis life cycle, beginning with the period prior to the actualisation of a crisis 
event, the pre-crisis stage. Descriptions of terms are also given in ascending order of 
seriousness, from the least serious to the most serious in terms of potential death and 
damage. While the term ‘crisis’ appears on the less serious end of the spectrum, it is 
also used as a generic noun to describe all categories of negative events that are in the 
process of occurring or have actually happened. Consequently, major emergencies 
and disasters can also be considered crisis events. However, using the term crisis as a 
generalised typology does not provide adequate clarity for effective response agency 
action and will be used to a minimum throughout this dissertation. Terms defined 
below will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Prior to a crisis event occurring 
A ‘hazard’, according to Coppola (2007: 2), is: 
 
A source of danger or an extreme event that has the potential to 
affect people, property and the natural environment in a given 
location.  
 
Closely associated with a hazard is ‘risk’, which refers to the awareness that a latent 
(conceivable but long-term), potential (statistical in the sense that its probability has 
been calculated) or acute (imminent) threat or hazard exists and may result in events 
that adversely impact on individuals, groups or society at large (Nordlund 1994: 11). 
 
Following the occurrence of a crisis 
At the least serious end of the spectrum of seriously damaging events is an ‘incident’ 
which, according to Coombs (1999: 3), is ‘a minor, localised disruption that does not 
disrupt the organisation’s routine’. At the next level of seriousness is a ‘crisis’. Millar 
and Smith (2002:1) describe a crisis as ‘…a significant disruption of an 
organisation’s normal activities that stimulates extensive media coverage and public 
scrutiny’. Nohrstedt believes that ‘crises’ can be defined on both an individual or 
collective level (2000: 137).  
 
An event that is more serious than a crisis can be termed an ‘emergency’. Drabek and 
Hoetmer (1991: xvii) define an emergency as: 
 
A routine adverse event that does not have community wide impact 
or does not require extraordinary use of resources or procedures to 
bring conditions back to normal.  
 
An ‘emergency’ generally affects only a small portion of the community and 
response organisations do not need to draw on outside resources or help to respond. 
However, when an emergency situation ‘overwhelms society’s problem-solving 
resources and devastates the day-to-day lives of a great many people’, Darrell (2003: 
6) describes this as a ‘major emergency’. The management of a major emergency 
situation is most likely beyond the normal capabilities of the response organisation in 
the affected area and requires the activation of additional procedures to ensure an 
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effective, coordinated and integrated response (Government Task Force on 
Emergency Planning (2006(b): 13). 
 
When a ‘major emergency’ is especially serious it can be considered a ‘disaster’. A 
disaster is defined as: 
 
A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing 
widespread human, material or environmental losses, which exceeds 
the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own 
resources (DHA 1992: 15).  
 
Disasters are often classified according to their source, natural or man-made. By their 
very nature, disaster situations are likely to require either national or international 
external assistance. 
 
While many theorists, including Nohrstedt (2000: 137) and Lindell, Prater and Perry 
(2007: 2), equate ‘disaster’ situations with ‘catastrophes’, Drabek and Hoetmer 
(1991: xviii) describe a catastrophic situation as even more serious than a disaster. 
They characterise a ‘catastrophe’ as a ‘disaster’ that ‘affects an entire nation and 
requires extraordinary resources and skills for recovery’ – some of which must come 
from other nations. It is in this latter, narrower, sense that the term ‘catastrophe’ will 
be used by the author of this dissertation. 
 
Examples of the misuse of terminology 
Emergency services themselves differ in how they interpret types of emergency 
situation. For example, both the 1980 Buttevant rail crash (a rail crash that occurred 
in Buttevant, Co. Cork on August 1st 1980, resulting in the deaths of 18 people) and 
the 1981 Stardust fire (a fire that occurred on February 14th 1981 in Artane in Dublin 
in which 48 people died), are incorrectly described as ‘disasters’. Both of these 
devastating incidents are better termed ‘emergency’ situations. As Nohrstedt (2000: 
137) points out, terms such as ‘disaster’, ‘crisis’, ‘catastrophe’ and ‘major 
emergency’ have a particular meaning and ‘are not synonymous or interchangeable’. 
Drabek and Hoetmer (1991: xviii) explain: 
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In a sense, therefore, what constitutes a disaster depends on the 
community itself: the jurisdiction’s size, its resource base, and its 
experience with a particular hazard. 
 
1.5.2 Other terms 
Stakeholders, public and publics 
Grunig (1992: 127) describes the general public as ‘a contradiction in terms’ because 
different groups form in response to particular problems that seldom affect everybody 
in the population. One of these groups is termed ‘a stakeholder’, which is a party that 
affects, or can be affected by, the actions of an organisation. As a widespread major 
emergency, such as influenza, can affect the entire population, it may be said that all 
members of the public are potential stakeholders for major emergency situations. 
Certain stakeholders can decide to engage in communication with the organisation as 
a unified collective and are termed ‘publics’ (Broom and Dozier 1990: 32).  
 
1.5.3  Communication terminology and definitions 
Communication and communications 
The use of the terms ‘communication’ and ‘communications’ can be confusing. 
According to Theodorson and Theodorson (1969: 83), communication is the 
transmission of information, ideas, attitudes, or emotion from one person or group to 
another (or others) primarily through symbols (many more definitions of 
communication will be offered later in Chapter 3). James Grunig clearly differentiates 
the term communication from communications when he states: 
 
To some people, perhaps to you, managing communications is only 
the management of messages and does not include such activities as 
research, counselling of management, and participation in strategic 
management. In the plural, ‘communications’ refers to messages. 
The singular ‘communication’ however, refers to a process (Grunig 
2006: personal communication). 
 
Throughout this dissertation the term ‘communication’ will be favoured over 
‘communications’. This term is more relevant to the core subject matter of this study, 
which is the process of strategic communication management. 
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Communication management and public relations 
Two further terms that generate considerable confusion are ‘communication 
management’ and ‘public relations’. As is demonstrated later in Chapter 3, many 
theorists consider both disciplines to be equivalent. According to James Grunig 
(2006: personal communication):  
 
The distinction between public relations and communication 
management is arbitrary… both involve the management of 
communication to cultivate relationships with strategic publics. 
 
Consequently, throughout this study, both terms are considered equivalent and 
interchangeable. Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency, the term ‘communication 
management’ is adopted wherever possible. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
1.6.1 The model 
The methodology adopted for this study involves both a detailed review of 
international data and primary qualitative deductive research. According to Denzin 
(1978: 28):  
 
No single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal 
factors as each method reveals different aspects of reality…multiple 
methods of research must be employed.  
 
Consequently, this study utilises a process of data ‘triangulation’ (Quinn-Patton 2002: 
247), in which multiple research methods are employed. Central to this research is a 
considerable amount of document review. In the review of documents, a broad range 
of relevant texts, together with available official literature, including reports, 
manuals, guidance materials and any relevant legislation extant, are examined. This 
includes documentation from the US, the UK, Sweden and Ireland. The detailed 
document review is then supported by primary data gleaned from in-depth interviews, 
elite interviews, e-mail and telephone interviews, and a detailed questionnaire. 
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As little data exists on the subject of major emergency communication in the Irish 
context, primary research proved of critical importance to this study. In this regard, 
two distinct categories of primary research were employed. Firstly, detailed in-depth 
and elite interviews were conducted with key individuals involved in major 
emergency management in Ireland. Secondly, comprehensive self-administered 
questionnaires were completed by three international major emergency 
communication practitioners and supplemented by follow-up telephone and e-mail 
interviews. In the choice of both categories of participants for the primary research, 
criterion sampling was the preferred sampling method, where individuals are chosen 
who meet some specific criterion - in this case expertise in particular areas of major 
emergency operations or communication management. There is a small number of 
such personnel in Ireland. Choosing participants in such a manner ‘provides validity 
and depth to the research’ (Quinn and Patton 2002: 243). In deciding the appropriate 
sample sizes for both categories of primary research, Quinn-Patton provides guidance 
stating: 
 
The validity, meaningfulness and insights generated from qualitative 
inquiry have more to do with information richness of the cases 
selected than with sample sizes (Quinn-Patton 2002: 245). 
 
From information-rich cases ‘one can learn a great deal about matters of importance 
and are therefore worthy of in-depth study’ (ibid: 242). According to Broom and 
Dozier, ‘in-depth interviews take considerable time to conduct…as such they are 
generally limited to small, purposive samples’ (1990: 146). Consequently, fourteen 
individual ‘information-rich’ interviews took place with nineteen people in Ireland, 
and comprehensive self-administered questionnaires were completed with single 
participants in the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
 
1.6.2 Ireland 
In selecting the list of participants for interview in the Irish context, it was useful first 
to examine the membership of both the major emergency National Steering Group 
(NSG) and the National Working Group (NWG). Both of these groups have been 
centrally involved in driving the major emergency planning effort in Ireland since 
2006.  Consequently, it was decided to conduct in-depth interviews with the heads of 
major emergency planning in the Garda Síochána (GS) and the Health Services 
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Executive (HSE), the head of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) and the 
Government Press Secretary. Additionally, in-depth and elite interviews were 
conducted with the Minister for Defence, an Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DEHLG) an Assistant Secretary 
of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF), and the Deputy Chief 
of Staff (Operations) of the Irish Defence Forces (DF). 
 
In addition to the criterion sampling method, it was deemed useful to engage in some 
emergent sampling (Quinn-Patton 2002: 244), where new leads emerged during 
fieldwork. This sampling method was pursued to the ‘point of redundancy’, at which 
stage further interviews resulted in no new information forthcoming (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985: 202). Interviews in this regard took place with the Director of the 
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII), the Director of Communications 
for the Garda Síochána, and an additional interview with a member of the Health 
Services Executive. 
 
In order to gain a perspective external to the official major emergency planning effort, 
it was decided to conduct in-depth interviews with an independent risk and crisis 
management consultant, a former member of the Office of Emergency Planning, and 
also with the managing director of one of Ireland’s leading public relations firms. 
These three interviewees have considerable knowledge of major emergency planning 
and management (for details of all of the interviews conducted see Appendix A). 
 
The comprehensive interviews for the Irish participants were based around semi-
structured questionnaires, where the pre-determined order, or wording, of the 
questions could be changed to suit the role of the particular interviewee and the 
situation. According to Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007: 30): 
 
In order to best obtain the perspectives from the participants, using 
reasonably open-ended questions, the researcher focuses on a single 
concept or phenomenon at one time and learns about this 
phenomenon in depth.  
 
The framework for each individual questionnaire was structured around the different 
critical strategic elements of both the major emergency management and the major 
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emergency communication process. Pursuing this type of framework, and opting for a 
qualitative dialectical form of research, it was envisaged that points could be 
expanded, issues debated and ‘elaboration probes’ pursued during the interviews 
(Quinn-Patton 2002: 375). However, cognisance was given to Broom and Dozier’s 
(1990: 145) warning that, ‘…great care needs to be taken to ensure that any directing 
of the interview does not lead the interviewee away from his or her frame of 
reference’. However, as some of the interviewees displayed a limited knowledge of 
certain aspects of strategic major emergency communication management, it was 
occasionally necessary to expand on questions in the course of the interview, and to 
introduce ‘neutralised prompts’ (Deacon et al.1999: 64).  
 
It was necessary to carefully evaluate the answers given. Campbell, cited in Bulmer, 
(2004: 215), discusses the problem of ‘unfulfilled objectives’ where the interviewee, 
for any number of reasons, attempts to ‘evade’ the desired answer. In order to ensure 
validity and confidence in the findings multiple data sources were summarised, 
collated and synthesised, including the data acquired from the two external 
consultants. 
 
All of the interviews were recorded with the stated permission of the participants. The 
recorded information was then transcribed and edited. The edited text was sent back 
to the interviewees in order to ascertain that it fairly reflected their views. In some 
cases, requests were received for minor amendments to be made.  
 
The analysis stage involved categorising the interview results into distinct segments 
based on the key elements under review. Once this process was completed, the data 
was transferred to a mind-mapping tool and a ‘colour-coding’ process employed in 
order to cross-reference inter-related elements. This process made it possible to 
develop themes that appear throughout the different categories of responses. Shank 
(2006: 148) describes this process as ‘thematic analysis…which involves searching 
for patterns in data’. According to Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007: 29), the themes 
are then interrelated to form broad generalisations thereby allowing conclusions to be 
drawn. Analysing data such as this, according to Morse (1994: 25): 
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Is a process of piecing together data and of making the invisible 
obvious, of recognising the significant from the insignificant and of 
linking seemingly unrelated facts. 
 
1.6.3 International comparison 
In order to compare the practices of strategic major emergency communication 
management in Ireland with best-international-practice, detailed research of 
international literature was undertaken. This included reference to relevant sub-fields 
such as emergency risk and crisis management, the multi-disciplinary fields of 
communication studies and management studies. The information from this 
secondary research was supported and confirmed by information gleaned from 
comprehensive self-administered questionnaires that were completed by three 
international major emergency communication practitioners and supplemented by 
follow-up telephone and e-mail interviews. In choosing the three participants, 
criterion sampling was the method used. In this regard, three countries were chosen 
that appear to be leaders and innovators in the development of major emergency 
theory and practice. Countries engaging in best international communication practice, 
as defined earlier in Section 1.2.2, include the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Canada, and Australia. 
 
Contact was established with the government agency responsible for major 
emergency management in each country, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) in the US, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), 
and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the UK. Each of these agencies 
proposed a senior communication practitioner to participate in the research.  
 
In order to elicit adequate information from each of the countries it was decided to 
send a comprehensive self-administered questionnaire to the three participants, Daryl 
Madden in FEMA, Malin Modh in SEMA and Carol McCall in Cabinet Office 
Communications (COC) (see Appendix C). This allowed the participants time to 
consider their responses, and overcame any possible language barrier for the Swedish 
participant. Additionally, it was noted that Gibson and Hawkins, cited in Bulmer, 
(2004: 84), believe ‘a questionnaire may produce substantially the same results as in-
depth interviews at a much smaller cost’.  
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The questionnaire was of considerable length (80 questions). However, the three 
participants were informed well in advance that it would take approximately one hour 
and thirty minutes to complete. None of them expressed any reservations in this 
regard. In the construction of the questionnaire, it was deemed prudent to use both 
open and closed answer formats to ‘take advantage of the specific benefits of each 
and to avoid any particular limitations’ (Deacon et al. 1999: 76). As each participant 
was obliged to consider and answer questions across a number of critical areas, the 
closed response questions proved quicker to answer, thereby saving the respondent 
time. In order to make the respondent think about each question in turn, and to 
prevent a uniform and undifferentiated response, a number of different types of 
closed-response questions formats were utilised, including Likert scales, semantic 
differential formats, checklists, and ranking formats. Other open-response questions 
were posed for particular subject areas in order to ‘elicit richer, more sensitive 
insights into the views and activities of the respondents’ (Robson 2002: 291).  
 
The three questionnaires were dispatched in March 2007. Two of the completed 
questionnaires were received at the end of May 2007 and the third received in January 
2008. Following receipt of individual questionnaires, two follow-up phone calls were 
made to each of the participants in order to clarify a number of their answers and also 
to probe a number of issues further. These phone calls were limited to twenty minutes 
each and the interviews recorded with the permission of the participants. The 
information was then transcribed and compared with the data gleaned from the 
questionnaires. Additionally, a number of e-mails were exchanged with the 
participants in order to address specific points. 
 
1.6.4 Other research 
In the course of the research it proved useful to make personal contact with a number 
of highly regarded theorists in the field of strategic communication. This allowed for 
the gathering of additional information, the clarification of theoretical concepts and 
the reception of expert opinion. Consequently, e-mail communication was established 
with theorists such as Peter Sandman, Jody Lanard, James Grunig, Baruch Fischhoff, 
and Birgitta Darrell. In addition, some Irish academics were contacted by e-mail to 
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explain particular events, including Dr John Tyrrell (typhoons) and Prof. Mike 
Williams (big freezes). The detail of these personal communications is contained in 
Appendix A. 
 
1.7 Overview of review of the literature 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the methodology adopted for this study 
involves a considerable amount of secondary research, utilising a broad range of 
literature. This is considered important because in order to examine thoroughly the 
subject of strategic major emergency communication management, it is necessary not 
alone to have a comprehensive knowledge of the literature that supports this 
important subject but also to explore a number of analogous disciplines, including 
major emergency management, communication theory and strategy management. 
Consequently, it is necessary to analyse a number of forms of literature for each of 
these related disciplines, including text books, academic journals and papers, relevant 
legislation, guidance documents, protocols, reports and manuals, major emergency 
websites, and media reportage. Relevant documentation relates to a number of 
countries, including most particularly the USA, the UK, Sweden, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, India, Cuba, and Ireland.  
 
It will be shown that some of the disciplines, such as communication theory and 
strategic management, are well served by an abundance of useful and informative 
literature. However, other important disciplines, including strategic major emergency 
communication management - particularly within the Irish context – do not have a 
solid base of literature to support them. The libraries of Dublin City University 
(DCU) and Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) stock a number of useful texts on 
the subject of communications theory, while those of Trinity College Dublin and 
DCU include texts on risk and emergency management. However, generally 
speaking, holdings in Ireland on some aspects of the most relevant disciplines were 
limited both in nature and in number. Consequently, it was necessary to order or 
acquire especially quite a few works from abroad that could not be found already in 
Irish libraries. A visit to the United Kingdom Cabinet Office’s library at the 
Emergency Planning College in Easingwold, York, proved a rich source of material 
for both major emergency management and major emergency communication. 
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For the sake of presentation, this chapter is divided as follows, major emergency risk 
and crisis management, communication theory, organisational strategy and strategic 
communication management, and strategic major emergency communication 
management both internationally and within the Irish context. A critique of the most 
useful literature available and of how it contributes to the study is also provided. 
Additionally, gaps in the literature will be discussed. 
 
1.8 Organisation and structure of the thesis 
 
In order to deal with the research question adequately, this dissertation firstly reviews 
the literature from three core areas throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of much of the available literature that deals with the 
subject of major emergency management. The chapter begins with a review of major 
emergencies and how they can be categorised in terms of life cycles. There follows a 
description of the shifts that have taken place in the management of major emergency 
situations over the past three decades. Central to the entire chapter is a consideration 
of the different stages of major emergency management and the critical steps that 
managers have to take within each stage in order to deal with the adverse situation. 
As a detailed analysis of the discipline of major emergency management throughout 
all three stages is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is important to focus on 
providing a broad overview of the elements of each stage. However, as a central focus 
of this study is strategic communication planning and preparation, particular 
emphasis is placed on the pre-crisis stage of major emergency management. This 
includes a description of the risk management process, which is an important factor in 
determining how major emergencies are perceived by members of the public. 
 
Chapter 3 provides the reader with an understanding of communication theory, 
including the models and elementary concepts that underpin the communication 
process. Such information provides the reader with a useful basis for comprehending 
the principles of strategic major emergency communication management. The chapter 
begins with an examination of the different categories of communication and follows 
by discussing traditional components such as message, sender and receiver. An 
important element of major emergency communication is then discussed, concerning 
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the use of communication in influencing perception, attitude and behaviour. Included 
in this section is a consideration of the influence of culture on receiver behaviour. 
Chapter 3 then examines how communication has evolved since the early twentieth 
century and in particular discusses the influence of propaganda and persuasion 
techniques, developmental communication, and relational or dialogical 
communication. The chapter concludes with an introduction to risk and crisis 
communication theory. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of strategic communication management. In 
particular, emphasis is placed on the differences between strategic and tactical 
communication management. Using a seminal model offered by James Grunig, each 
of the critical elements of strategic communication management is discussed in turn. 
The chapter builds on the previous two chapters to address in some detail the 
practical relationship between strategy, strategic management and communication. It 
concludes with an introduction to the core subject of this dissertation, strategic major 
emergency communication management and introduces the reader to a number of 
models of strategic major emergency communication. This serves as an introduction 
for a more detailed analysis of the subject matter throughout Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
 
Chapter 5 sets out a broad best-practice conceptual framework of strategic 
communication management during major emergency situations centred on six key 
strategic communication principles. At the outset, the conceptual strategic framework 
is introduced in diagrammatic format. Each of the six principles is then discussed in 
turn and involves a discussion of major emergency communication in the context of 
the culture and structure of the organisation, ongoing and meaningful dialogue, 
adopting a scientific approach towards communication, employing stragegic 
communication processes, integrating all elements of communication, and building 
strong relationships and trust with stakeholders and the public. 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 describe the series of strategic-tactical steps of major emergency 
communication management and how they are guided and underpinned by the six 
strategic principles discussed in the conceptual framework.  
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Chapter 6 details the important operational steps that should be taken by the MECIT 
in order to prepare and plan all aspects of the communication function prior to the 
occurrence of a major emergency situation - the pre-crisis stage. In this regard 
communication is considered at two distinct levels, a higher-level and a tactical-level. 
The higher-level pre-crisis communication strategy steps describe a series of 
decisions and actions that senior management in the lead response organisation need 
to consider in order for the tactical-level major emergency communication process to 
get underway. This includes selecting the senior major emergency communication 
manager, selecting the members of the MECIT and setting preliminary 
communication goals. Following this, the series of tactical-level communication steps 
are discussed, focusing specifically on the key functions of communication 
prevention and preparation. 
 
Chapter 7 describes a series of strategic-tactical steps that the major emergency 
communication and information team (MECIT) undertakes when managing all 
aspects of an effective and compassionate communication response once a major 
emergency actualises - the crisis stage. Throughout the chapter, each of these steps is 
dealt with individually. This involves examining the communication function in the 
context of early identification of major emergency situations, recognising that a major 
emergency situation has actually occurred, the communication response actions that 
the MECIT needs to take, and how the MECIT should communicate with members of 
the public. 
 
Chapter 8 undertakes an analysis of the important communication functions in the 
post-crisis stage of a major emergency situation. The chapter begins with an 
examination of communication with stakeholders and affected communities in the 
aftermath of a major emergency situation. Following this, the thesis examines briefly 
the role of communication in business continuity management. Chapter eight then 
examines how communication needs to be evaluated and lessons learned in order to 
improve the overall process. The chapter finishes with a discussion of how the 
communication function, during the post-crisis stage, does not end at that point but 
links immediately to the pre-crisis stage of the next major emergency situation.  
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Chapter 9 is an assessment and comparison of how three leading countries (the US, 
the UK and Sweden) approach their respective strategic major emergency 
communication efforts. As already stated, this is based partly on original field 
research undertaken especially for this dissertation.  
 
Chapter 10 considers how the Irish government manages its strategic communication 
function by examining a broad range of official literature, newspaper reportage and 
guidance documents. Additionally, using original field research, this chapter provides 
a detailed account of the attitudes and views of key emergency planners in Ireland to 
strategic communication management. 
 
Chapter 11 draws conclusions and provides recommendations that may be of value to 
major emergency communication theorists and practitioners, especially in Ireland. 
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2 THEORY OF MAJOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Despite advances in risk management, many major emergencies occur without 
warning and their outcomes can be utterly destructive to society. The ability to deal 
with these events successfully is an extremely important management skill that can 
save lives and prevent much suffering. Up to the early 1990s, there was a limited 
amount of literature that dealt with this important subject. A number of significant, 
high profile disasters resulted in a comprehensive reappraisal of how major 
emergencies should be planned for and handled. Consequently, a whole field of 
theory has evolved, centred on major emergency management, together with 
academic courses, journals, web sites and textbooks related to the subject. The United 
States, the United Kingdom and Sweden are among the countries leading research 
and development in this expanding field. 
 
However, notwithstanding great advances in major emergency management and the 
significant resources allocated to the discipline, countries still struggle to provide an 
adequate response to major emergency situations. For example, the US government 
was criticised heavily for its response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in which 1,000 
people died and 200,000 houses were damaged beyond repair (Padgett 2005: 18). 
This is despite the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) having 
2,600 employees and an annual budget of $5bn (FEMA 2008(a)). Following this 
major emergency, the US Government undertook a thorough review of its 
preparedness and response capabilities. In a hard-hitting report (Townsend 2006), 
many of FEMA’s structures and protocols changed. Additionally, many of the major 
emergency response processes changed, such as the flows of communication within 
the Joint Information Centre (JIC) (NRT 2000: 2-1). This fact highlights the complex 
nature of, and inherent difficulties associated with, the management of major 
emergencies. It also highlights how major emergency practice evolves over time. As 
mentioned earlier, and as will be seen throughout this chapter, the methodologies 
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adopted by countries for major emergency management have changed over the past 
fifty years. Consequently, best-international-practice in this field of endeavour can be 
considered only as a temporary quantum, which is likely to evolve over time.  
 
2.2 Overview of major emergencies 
 
In order to analyse comprehensively the theory of major emergency management, it is 
important to have an appreciation of what constitutes a major emergency.  
 
2.2.1 The social construction of major emergencies 
The occurrence of a major emergency situation is fundamentally dependent on 
prevailing economic and social conditions, where vulnerable societies and 
environments need to be exposed to a major hazard. As mentioned at 1.5.1 above, 
Coppola (2007: 2) usefully defines a hazard as, ‘A source of danger or an extreme 
event that has the potential to affect people, property and the natural environment in a 
given location.’  
 
Therefore, if human or environmental systems are not actually, nor perceived to be, 
threatened, a major emergency situation does not exist. For example, McEntire (2005: 
207) emphasises, ‘a tornado touching down in uninhabited plains is not a disaster’. 
Salter believes that the impacts of major emergency situations are social products, or 
‘manifestations of vulnerable communities’ (cited in Ingleton 1999: 112). In this 
regard, vulnerability relates to the degree of susceptibility and resilience of the 
community and environment to resist major disruption or loss (Smith 1992: 22). 
However, Salter emphasises: 
 
Vulnerability is differential – we are not all equally vulnerable. Within 
any group some are more vulnerable than others… to specific hazards 
(Salter, cited in Ingleton, 1999: 112). 
 
Mileti (1999: 3) concurs with this sentiment stating: 
 
Many disaster losses – rather than stemming from unexpected events – 
are the predictable result of interactions among three major systems: the 
physical environment; the social and demographic characteristics of the 
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communities that experience them; and the buildings, roads, bridges, 
and other components of the constructed environment. 
 
Therefore, the interaction of people with their environment can attenuate, but in 
certain circumstances amplify the risk of major emergencies occurring within 
communities (Royal Society 1992: 114; Beck 1992: 14). For example, developments 
within the floodplains surrounding New Orleans have been cited as a contributory 
factor towards the 2005 floods in that region (Mansnerus 2006: 12). Changing 
demographic patterns arising from social and economic necessity generate further 
vulnerability within communities. For example, of the 17,000 people who died during 
the massive 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India, many were social migrants living in 
sub-standard housing (Shaw and Sinha 2003: 39). Beck (1992: 20) describes how the 
social production of wealth by governments and industry is systematically 
‘unleashing destructive forces’ on society. As regards preparation and planning for 
major emergencies, one needs to consider people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and 
feelings in relation to significant risk and hazards as well as considering the physical 
manifestation of major emergency events. 
 
2.2.2 Categorisation of major emergencies 
Many theorists have attempted to categorise major emergencies. However, this has 
proven extremely difficult due to the amorphous nature of these destructive events 
and the varied and unpredictable contexts in which they occur.  
 
The aetiology of major emergencies identifies a number of physical hazards that are 
often used in the categorisation of such events. These include natural hazards such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunami and insect infestation; technological or 
anthropogenic hazards such as leaks from nuclear power plants and damaged levees; 
and social classes of hazards that are associated with terrorist and crowd related major 
emergencies (Hewitt 1997: 101).  
 
Toft and Reynolds (2004: 14) consider that anthropogenic hazards, such as those 
described above, should be termed ‘socio-technical’, as many major emergencies 
occur due to breakdowns in ‘systems’ that are often the result of human interaction. 
Hazards that occur due to the interaction of natural and socio-technical processes can 
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be termed ‘hybrid’ disasters (Shaluf, Ahmadun and Said 2003: 25). An example of a 
‘hybrid’ disaster is the widespread flooding that occurred in New Orleans following 
the disinclination of the US Administration to provide funding to repair the levees in 
the region, prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall (Sandman 2005: 4).  
 
Major emergencies are often considered across a number of key dimensions, thereby 
allowing them to be categorised from a range of different perspectives. The ‘impact’ 
dimension allows major emergencies to be categorised in terms of their ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ consequences on people, the community, the environment and the economy 
(Trim 2004: 219). The ‘scale’ or ‘magnitude’ of a disastrous event provides another 
useful method of categorisation, which can be measured in terms of deaths, injuries, 
property damaged, or economic cost (Boin and Lagadec 2000: 186). Closely 
associated with ‘scale’ is the ‘geographical impact’ of a disastrous event, which 
relates to the physical size of the impact area (Rubin, cited in Ingleton, 1999: 81). The 
‘predictability’ of a major emergency is another key consideration (Hodgkinson and 
Stewart 1991: 36). Consequently, major emergencies can be categorised as: ‘sudden’, 
such as earthquakes; ‘creeping’, such as landslides; ‘foreseeable’, such as melting ice-
caps; ‘deliberate’, such as war; or ‘accidental’, including technological disasters 
(Benthall 1993: 12).  
 
2.2.3 Major emergency life cycles 
According to Coombs (1999: 9), major emergencies have ‘an identifiable life cycle’. 
This is a consistent theme ‘that permeates’ contemporary emergency management 
theory. Recognising the major emergency in terms of a life cycle allows management 
to sub-divide the entire process into distinct stages. This allows the lead response 
organisation to comprehend the patterns that exist within a major emergency 
situation, the key elements involved in each distinct stage and an understanding of 
how each stage fits within the entire major emergency management framework, 
thereby ensuring a more effective response. 
 
Theorists have identified a number of life cycle models, including three-, four- and 
five-stage variants. Managing major emergencies in individual stages is often referred 
to as ‘a systems approach’ to major emergency management; a paradigm that has 
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been adopted by many leading countries including the USA, Australia, the UK, 
Canada and Sweden. As a relatively recent phenomonen, the ‘systems approach’ 
requires rigorous analysis throughout a range of different categories of major 
emergency situations before it can be deemed best practice. Richardson (1994: 63) 
and Coombs (1999: 14) identify three distinct stages in a major emergency situation: 
a ‘pre-crisis stage’, involving the critical disciplines of hazard identification, 
planning, and preparation for an impending disastrous event; the ‘crisis’ stage that 
occurs once a significant hazard actualises and involves the speedy initiation of 
warnings, alarm and response actions; and finally a ‘post-crisis’ stage that involves 
the disciplines of relief and recovery efforts, together with strategies to help society to 
return to normality.  
 
A number of four-stage models exist, such as those adopted by Fink (1986: 20), 
Coppela (2007: 8) and Alexander (2002: 6). The four-stage approach generally 
involves the following phases: mitigation, preparation, response and recovery. 
Adopting a five-stage model, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
describe a major emergency life cycle using the following stages: pre-crisis, initial, 
maintenance, resolution, and evaluation (Reynolds 2002: 7).  
 
While each model differs in the number of stages involved, intrinsically no significant 
difference exists between the ranges of functions that need to be conducted to manage 
a major emergency situation. For the sake of simplicity, the three-stage major 
emergency life cycle is the model chosen for the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
2.3 Major emergency management 
 
Major emergency management is defined as the discipline of applying science, 
technology, planning and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or 
kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and disrupt 
community life (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991: xvii). Effective major emergency 
management is predicated on detailed cooperation and integration of plans and 
resources at all levels of government, public services and non-governmental and 
voluntary organisations. Many terms have been used to characterise the process of 
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major emergency management and include, ‘proactive and flexible’ (EPS 1998: 7), 
‘sequential and dynamic’ (Heath 1995: 17), ‘coherent and integrated’ (McEntire 
2005: 206), and ‘coordinated’ (Iwan 1999: 10). Foster, cited in Alexander, (2005: 
160), warns that ‘any inefficiency in major emergency management will be paid for 
in avoidable casualties and damage’. 
 
2.3.1 Theory of major emergency management 
Traditional major emergency management theorists placed considerable emphasis on 
one critical function, the capability of emergency responders to restore normality 
following the impact of a major emergency. According to O’Brien and Read (2005: 
353), this approach stems from the 1950s when people were anxious about one 
category of major emergency, a nuclear attack, which they considered at that time to 
be inevitable. Recognising shortcomings in this limited approach, Wildavsky (1988) 
analysed the problem of how to prepare better for major emergency situations. He 
identified two contrasting strategies, ‘anticipation’ and ‘resilience’ (Comfort 1994: 
174). Both of these strategies have been used over the past number of years as a basis 
for developing differing approaches towards major emergency management. 
 
2.3.1.1 Anticipation 
According to Wildavsky (1988: 77), anticipation involves a proactive approach to 
major emergency management by a centralised decision-making function. It also 
involves a careful assessment of vulnerability in the community in order to limit 
obvious dangers. He described it as ‘…a mode of control by a central mind…a 
coordinated effort…made to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage is 
done (ibid.)’. 
 
Effective anticipatory measures include predicting hazards and risk assessment (ibid: 
78), actions designed to limit the magnitude and frequency of potential hazards 
(Burton, Kates and White 1993: 113), and improved risk communication (Hood and 
Jones 1996: 18). However, a number of theorists do not support the precautionary 
anticipation approach, claiming that the majority of major emergencies can ‘be 
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anticipated only with the benefit of hindsight’ and is suitable only for particular 
categories of major emergency situations (Royal Society 1992: 156). 
 
2.3.1.2 Resilience 
In contrast to the anticipatory approach, Wildavsky (1988: 224) defined resilience as, 
‘the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest…learning to bounce back’. While anticipation focuses on being able to 
detect and protect against hazards, resilience emphasises taking action against their 
impact. This can be achieved through processes such as effective emergency 
warnings, alarms and response; search and rescue; relief and recovery efforts; and 
ensuring that publics have adequate insurance (Cuny 1983: 53). Supporting the 
process, Geis (2000: 153) states that resilience ‘provides the best means’ for 
developing the most effective disaster and emergency management programmes. 
 
Theorists such as Arjen and Lagadec (2000: 188) explain that the process of 
resilience is ‘an old fashioned way’ of dealing with major emergencies. McEntire 
(2005: 209) states that the approach ‘does not capture the social, political, and 
economic realities of disasters’ as there is no great emphasis on meaningful dialogue 
with publics, thereby allowing a full assessment of their individual needs and 
concerns. 
 
2.3.1.3 Contemporary approaches to major emergency management 
Wildavsky (1988: 186) recognised shortcomings in both the anticipation and 
resilience approaches. Consequently, he proposed achieving ‘a balance between 
anticipation and resilience’ in order to effectively manage major emergencies. This 
balanced approach spawned the ‘integrated emergency management’ (IEM) model, 
which has been used widely in both the US and the UK since the mid-1980s. The 
IEM model ensures that all response agencies work together to provide a coordinated 
approach to major emergency situations. The model incorporates critical functions 
such as major emergency anticipation, assessment, detection, mitigation, prevention, 
preparation, response and recovery (HM Government 2005(a): 4). While traditional 
approaches to major emergency management concentrated on single categories of 
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hazards, the IEM approach is focused on a broad spectrum of major emergencies 
categories – termed the all hazards approach (Comfort, Sungu and Johnson 2001: 
145; Boin and Lagadec 2000: 188; CCS 2007: 15).   
 
Since the 1990s, the IEM has evolved, or shifted, further to incorporate many holistic 
elements within major emergency management, including improved levels of 
communication with, and participation by, ‘non-expert’ members of the public 
(McEntire 2005: 210; Von Kotze, cited in Ingleton, 1999: 149). A number of other 
key changes have been identified in the shift from the traditional practice of major 
emergency management to the more holistic and contemporary practice. Once again, 
these shifts in major emergency management are relatively recent developments and 
as such require rigorous analysis and testing in order to determine their efficacy. 
While they are considered by many countries to be currently best-international-
practice, it is likely that these processes will evolve further in order to provide newer 
and more effective methods of managing major emergency situations. These shifts 
can be viewed graphically in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Shifts in major emergency management 
 
Source: (Salter, cited in Ingleton, 1999: 111) 
 31
2.4 The major emergency management cycle 
 
The entire major emergency management process is considered as a series of 
repetitive events that exist within a comprehensive cyclical model. According to 
Alexander (2005: 160), major emergency management is a continuous process ‘that 
may become rapidly dysfunctional if allowed to become static’. Consequently, 
contemporary response organisations adopt a ‘systems approach’ and carry out 
specific functions within each distinct stage of the major emergency life cycle. While 
most major response agencies have their own specific variant of the major emergency 
management cycle, the key elements are intrinsically similar within a three-, four-, or 
five-staged approach.  
 
Adopting a model based on work by Alexander (2002: 6) and Coombs (1999: 14), it 
is possible to outline a composite cyclical model of major emergency management 
that depicts the key stages of a major emergency situation and the critical functions 
that need to be considered within each of those stages. This composite major 
emergency life cycle is presented in Figure 2.2 over. 
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Figure 2.2: Composite major emergency life cycle 
Source: (Based on Alexander 2002: 6 and Coombs 1999: 14) 
 
2.4.1 Pre-crisis stage 
This first stage of the major emergency management life cycle involves all of the 
essential functions that must be considered and acted on prior to the occurrence of a 
serious damaging event. In particular it involves the mitigation and readiness phases 
(in green) of Figure 2.2.  
 
2.4.1.1  Mitigation 
An entire field of science has evolved centred on the subject of mitigation, which 
involves all long-term efforts to anticipate, assess, and prevent the possibility of a 
hazard actualising, or to reduce the effects of a subsequent major emergency should 
prevention measures fail. Mitigation efforts include putting in place structural 
measures such as building floodgates and seismic retrofitting buildings; and non-
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structural measures such as effective land planning and enhancing community 
awareness about potential hazards.  
 
The possibility of a major emergency occurring is commonly known as ‘risk’ and it 
‘denotes a presumed or possible threat of danger’ (Nohrstedt 2000: 137). In order to 
reduce the risk to life, property and the environment posed by hazards, it is important 
to engage in an effective risk management process, which is an intrinsic element of 
the mitigation phase. Risk management can be defined as: 
 
The process whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed 
risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or 
probability of its occurrence (Royal Society 1992: 5). 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a risk management framework and can be useful as a standard 
process for assisting risk mitigation efforts. 
 
Figure 2.3: Risk management framework 
 
Source: (Shaw and Sinha 2003: 44)  
     
The first stage of the risk management process involves establishing the context, or 
recording the general characteristics of an area or process, including social political, 
economic, environmental, and infrastructure elements (Jeynes 2002: 18). Following 
this, a comprehensive risk assessment process is carried out. Risk assessment is 
defined as: 
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Technical studies that assess the risks and benefits of various risk 
options and provide information to decision-makers - who then make 
risk management decisions (Price 1989: 37). 
 
The process consists of three distinct sub-elements (shaded in orange in figure 2.3 
before). This first of these sub-elements involves the identification of hazards and 
risks that are likely to result in major emergencies, utilising tools such as hazard 
mapping (Alexander 2002: 28), safety audits, hazard surveys, and operability studies 
(Jeynes 2002: 15). The second sub-element of risk assessment, within the risk 
management process, involves conducting a comprehensive risk estimate of 
important conditions such as the potential magnitude of a particular category of major 
emergency, and its probable impact on populations or ecosystems. Useful tools for 
risk estimation include ‘event’ and ‘fault-tree’ analysis (Royal Society 1992: 17), 
scenario planning (Ringland 1998: 2), and the use of scales such as the Modified 
Mercali Scale (Mercali Intensity Scale 2008; Magnusson 1987: 386). The third and 
final sub-element of the risk assessment process involves the process of risk 
evaluation. This is defined as: 
 
The establishment of a qualitative or quantitative relationship between 
risks and benefits, involving the complex process of determining the 
significance of the identified hazards and estimated risks to those 
organisms or people concerned with or affected by them (WHO 2008). 
 
A common criticism of the risk assessment process is a tendency for risk managers to 
engage in an overly quantitative and reductive focus, to the detriment of considering 
qualitative issues within risk. This can often result in important, non-quantifiable or 
inaccessible information, such as a person’s perception of a hazard, being ignored. In 
order to conduct an effective risk assessment, it is necessary to understand that 
different people perceive, and will react to major emergencies, in many different 
ways, based on scientific information that is available to them and their psychological 
and cultural circumstances. This is an extremely important factor that needs to be 
considered when developing major emergency communication strategies and 
programmes.  
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As described earlier, a number of social scientists believe that risk is socially 
constructed. Consequently, the probability of events occurring in the future cannot be 
measured simply by conducting scientifically-based quantified assessments (Adams 
1995: 10; Toft and Reynolds 2004: 2). Slovic (2000: 5) describes how the process of 
conducting risk assessment is subjective ‘due to a dependence on value judgements at 
every stage of the process’. Adams (1995: 7) emphasises that risk cannot be 
considered simply in terms of ‘objective’ or ‘real’ risk. Gherardi (1998: 81) concurs 
and believes that ignoring qualitative factors results in ‘…a way of not seeing; it is a 
collective blindness to important issues’. Consequently, contemporary theorists have 
started to examine the qualitative elements of risk situations, including psychological 
and psychometric influences (Fischhoff 2004; Covello, Wojtecki and Hyde 2001; and 
Sjoberg 1998), and cultural factors (Gherardi 1998). Linking cultural and 
psychometric traditions and research, Wildavsky and Dake (1990: 48) state that 
‘…cultural biases best predict risk perception findings...individuals choose what to 
fear (and how to fear it), in order to support their way of life’. While Ball (2006: 5) 
highlights the fact that insufficient weight is sometimes attached to science in the risk 
decision process, he emphasises that not all theorists dispense with the ‘technical 
component’ of risk decision-making. Consequently, this latter category of theorist 
supports the scientific ‘analytic paradigm’ (ibid.).  
 
Once the risk estimation and risk evaluation processes have been fully completed, the 
results are then recorded in a risk assessment matrix. This tool allows particular hazards 
to be compared and assessed with respect to probability and severity (Alexander 2002: 
57). A ‘risk characterisation’ is also useful and provides decision makers with ‘a 
summary or translation of the results of the technical analysis for use by the decision 
maker’ (Stern and Fineberg 1996: 1).  
 
The final stage in the risk management process, as described in Figure 2.3, involves 
treating risks. Alexander (2002: 59) states that this final stage is the ‘applied side of 
risk assessment’ and involves making decisions and taking action based on the results 
of that assessment. The Royal Society (1992: 5) defines this stage as: 
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The process whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed 
risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or 
probability of occurrence. 
 
Decisions can be reached using a number of methods, both scientific and non-
scientific. The use of tools such as the risk assessment matrix, multi-criterion decision 
analysis (Royal Academy of Engineers 2002: 11), and cost-benefit analysis (Toft and 
Reynolds 2004: 8) can be of assistance. Contemporary approaches to risk 
management emphasise the involvement of a broad range of participants in the risk 
decision-making process. Meaningfully engaging a broad representative sample of 
the public in the decision-making process provides a greater depth of knowledge to 
the process, can assist in reaching better quality decisions, and lessens the chance that 
the decision will be ultimately rejected (Price 1989: 152). It also engenders public 
trust and credibility in the responsible agency (ibid: 151). The public engagement 
process is an important subject within this dissertation, and is discussed in detail later 
in this dissertation. 
 
While a risk-based society cannot expect to prevent all emergencies or serious 
accidents from occurring, once decisions have been discussed and agreed, mitigation 
measures can be put in place in an attempt to treat the hazard and prevent it 
actualising. This can involve actions such as vaccinating against H5N1 Avian Flu 
virus (Walsh 2005: 26), developing tsunami warning systems (McWilliams 2004: 
10), and managing floodplains (Mileti 1999: 7). As can be seen in Figure 2.3, 
supporting the entire risk management process are the critical ongoing functions of 
risk communication, consultation, monitoring and review. Throughout Chapters 5,6,7 
and 8, it will be demonstrated that each of these functions is an essential element of 
the strategic major emergency communication management process, which in turn is 
a critical factor in the success or failure of the entire major emergency effort.  
 
2.4.1.2 Readiness stage 
In the event that mitigation efforts fail, and a major emergency is imminent, readiness 
and preparedness of major emergency plans, equipment, personnel and procedures in 
order to effectively respond to a disastrous event are essential to prevent injury, loss 
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of life and damage to the environment. Key elements in this stage include major 
emergency planning and preparedness at both individual and societal levels. 
 
2.4.1.2.1 Major emergency planning 
The purpose of major emergency planning is to provide protocols and procedures in 
order to ‘inform, instruct and direct participants’ once a situation occurs (Alexander 
2002: 99). HSE UK (1999: 1) highlights that comprehensive plans should, ‘address 
all aspects of the response required during every phase of the major emergency, both 
the immediate needs and the longer-term recovery’. Planning precludes response 
agencies having to consider routine tasks once a major emergency occurs and 
facilitates a systematic and effective reaction, thereby helping to contain an incident, 
prevent loss of life and limit damage (Scarman Centre 2004: 8-16). One of the 
principal criticisms levelled at major emergency planning is its inability to deal with a 
broad range of different categories of potential major emergencies. However, many 
theorists emphasise the importance of developing a generic plan that can be adapted 
to meet the needs of all types of disastrous events (Coombs 1999: 62). As already 
described, this approach to planning incorporates the ‘all hazards’ approach to major 
emergency planning (EMA 2003: 6; Ridge 2004(b): 2). As Hodgkinson and Stewart 
(1991: 70) write: 
 
Clearly, it may not be possible to plan for every disaster scenario. 
However, the real meaning of preparedness is not about being ready for 
every possible scenario but to develop core preparedness for different 
emergencies. 
 
Consequently, it is advisable to develop and maintain both generic and high-risk 
plans (HM Government 2005(a): 50). These plans should deal with all of the distinct 
stages of the emergency life cycle, including plans for ‘scaling-up’ the major 
emergency (ibid.). Included within the planning process should be the development of 
plans to deal with the secondary impacts of major emergency situations. Examples 
include public order emergencies, involving widespread rioting and shooting, as 
occurred in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (Gold 2005: 10). An essential 
component of a major emergency plan is a comprehensive communication plan. 
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Major emergency communication planning is comprehensively analysed below in 
Chapter 5. 
 
According to London Resilience (2005: 17), major emergency plans should be multi-
agency based, fully recognising the input of the principal response agencies, various 
professional organisations such as medical practitioners, voluntary groups and the 
private sector. However, this requires a mutually agreed strategy, clear protocols and 
procedures for working together, and considerable planning and coordination in 
relation to information-gathering, sharing and dissemination. Additionally, some 
theorists emphasise how roles and responsibilities should also be clearly defined 
within the plan (Riley and Meadows 1997: 354; London Resilience 2005: 14). CCS 
(2007: 5) emphasises how senior management, at the highest level, should fully 
endorse and support the planning effort. 
 
According to HSE UK (1999: 10), it is essential that major emergency plans are 
viewed as ‘living documents’ and should be considered a process rather than a static 
goal to be achieved. This requires that the plan be continuously tested and revised 
(Alexander 2002: 126). All potential responders should be fully conversant with the 
contents of the plan and this should be practiced continuously and progressively, as 
plans should be allowed to grow and adapt to changing circumstances (ibid: 95). 
Jeynes (2002: 93) notes that, ‘it is also important that adequate resources and 
financial provisions be in place to support the major emergency plan’. 
 
2.4.1.2.2 Major emergency preparedness 
In addition to adequate major emergency planning, in order to ensure a requisite level 
of major emergency readiness, all individuals and organisations need to be 
appropriately prepared. This requires that they have ‘a clear understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the wider picture’ (HM Government 
2005(b): 7; Payne 1999: 112). Central to major emergency preparedness are the 
functions of selecting suitable response and recovery staff, and providing them with 
appropriate and realistic training and exercises for dealing with a range of difficult 
situations (CCS 2007: 5). Front line agencies obliged to deal with the impact of 9/11 
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claim that their training limited their response capability as it ‘did not prepare them 
for managing situations outside their particular skill set’ (EMA 2003: 9). 
Consequently, training must be realistic and ‘scenario based’, providing responders 
with the necessary skills to deal with a range of diverse and escalating situations 
(ibid: 10). 
 
Once intensive training has been completed, major emergency exercises should be 
conducted in order to allow the lead response organisation to assess the success of the 
training programmes and also to validate all major emergency plans. At the most 
fundamental level, response and recovery personnel can engage in ‘paper-feed’ and 
‘table-top’ exercises. These can then be augmented by ‘simulation’ exercises where 
important aspects of crises can be simulated in order to represent reality and where 
personnel can act out their response roles accordingly. However, full-scale ‘live’ 
exercises provide the best means of comprehensively training and exercising 
responders (HSE UK 1999: 35). All major emergency exercises can either be ‘on-
site’ or ‘off-site’ and can be conducted at an individual level or combined (Payne 
1999: 114). A lack of integrated realistic exercises was cited as a principal reason for 
the inadequate response to the Kobe earthquake in 1995 (Heath 1995: 23). 
 
A number of other functions are of significant importance during the major 
emergency preparedness stage, including, amongst many others: developing and 
implementing adequate public alert and warning systems and conducting public 
disaster drills, which can be considered a matter of ‘life and death’ in the first hours 
of a major emergency (Morge 2000: 3); providing public education and awareness 
campaigns in order to enhance knowledge and to generate higher levels of interest 
(Quarantelli 1984: 5); convening meetings with interested and affected parties for the 
purpose of sharing major emergency information and reaching consensus; and 
providing the media with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of issues 
related to major emergencies (Ridge 2004(b): 4).  
 
Emphasising the shifts in major emergency management, as described earlier in 
Salter’s (Figure 2.1) model, response agencies in many countries are working much 
closer with communities in order to provide them with the necessary skills and 
resources to protect themselves in the event of a major emergency situation. This 
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includes providing printed materials such as leaflets and brochures, together with 
videos and posters. Additionally, in some countries, wider communication and 
educational programmes are becoming more evident. For example, in Australia, EMA 
is becoming more involved with communities at risk from bushfires. In this regard 
they are helping these communities to prepare strategies and plans in order ‘that they 
are better prepared and understand their own responsibilities’ should their community 
be faced with a catastrophic bushfire (Rohrmann 2000: 14; Salter 1996: 9). The 
Australian government recognises that within an environment of limited resources, 
particularly in remote indigenous areas, young people capable of assisting their 
communities in times of major emergency need to be trained as part of a volunteer 
emergency service (Hocke and O’Brien 2003: 62). According to EMA: 
 
In Australia, emphasis is now being placed on the building of community 
capacity through the development of social and human capital within 
communities. Collaboration between governments and non-government 
agencies, communities and individuals to build on the current assets that 
exist within communities is required (ibid: 65). 
 
As will be discussed later in this dissertation, the communication function has an 
important role to play in assisting programmes such as these. 
 
2.4.2 Crisis stage 
Should all mitigation and prevention measures fail to thwart a major emergency 
from occurring, responders begin to focus on the next stage of the major 
emergency life cycle, the crisis stage. The crisis stage can occur suddenly and 
without warning, such as the May 2008 earthquake in the Sichuan province of 
China, which resulted in the deaths of over 50,000 people (Cloonan 2008: 13). 
Similarly, the crisis stage can be considered a ‘rising tide’ or ‘smouldering’ 
crisis (Millar and Smith 2002: 3) such as an influenza pandemic, about which 
experts state ‘it is almost inevitable that another influenza pandemic will occur’ 
(Pandemic Influenza Expert Group (Ireland) 2007: 1). Once a major emergency 
actualises, the priority for all concerned is to ensure basic safety and survival 
(Reynolds 2002: 26), to contain the event, and to protect critical infrastructure 
(Ridge 2004(b): 43). The essential elements of a major emergency response 
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include warning and alarming the public, and mobilising necessary resources in 
order to deal with the situation.  
 
The first stage of the response process involves recognising that a major 
emergency has occurred (Coppela 2007: 254). Once this is complete the next 
step involves ‘declaring’ the major emergency. This process may include 
simultaneous issues of alerts, warnings and instructing information, which may 
include evacuation orders (Morge 2000: 5). Throughout this process the need 
for timely prediction is important. Close liaison with the scientific community 
provides a useful method of hazard forecasting and prediction. Following this 
stage, the lead response organisation will have to mobilise all necessary 
resources required to deal with the major emergency. This should be supported 
by an adequate system of command, control and coordination in order to 
optimise the utilisation of these resources (Ridge 2004(b): 17; HM Government 
2005(b): 21). The core of the external response to a life threatening major 
emergency is generally provided by the principal response agencies, including 
organisations such as the fire, police, and health/ambulance services, the coast 
guard, and local authorities. Key support teams are generally required to assist 
the principal response agencies in many diverse areas, including incident 
response, evacuation, specialist interests, media affairs, and casualties (Scarman 
Centre 2004: 8-23). In order to manage the response effectively, these services 
will establish ‘on-site’ and ‘off-site’ control centres from where they will 
implement their respective major emergency plans (HSE UK 1999: 13-22). The 
primary objectives during the response phase are to save and protect life; 
establish control (thereby containing the emergency); relieve suffering through 
search and rescue and effective casualty management; maintain critical services 
and restore normality as soon as possible; protect property and safeguard the 
environment; and finally to facilitate possible investigations and inquiries (CCS 
2007: 17). 
 
A number of guiding principles have been identified for responding to major 
emergencies, including the need for adequate preparedness, especially in terms of 
planning and ensuring clarity of roles and responsibilities through a comprehensive 
 42
major emergency plan (London Resilience 2005: 14); principal response agencies 
should respond to major emergencies through a continuation of their ‘normal’ day-to-
day roles, albeit at a greater tempo and on a larger scale; all response agencies should 
exercise effective coordination between, and within themselves and affiliate 
organisations (Hodgkinson and Stewart 1991: 88); and good communications and 
telecommunications should be maintained at all times, which are ‘at the heart of any 
effective response’ (HM Government 2005(b): 31).  
 
An extremely important guiding principle of major emergency response involves 
ensuring the effective sharing of information and establishing two-way 
communication between all responding agencies and across multiple jurisdictions 
(Toft and Reynolds 2004: 84; Ridge 2004: 6). A major criticism levelled at the 
response effort during the tsunami in South East Asia, in 2004, was the lack of 
information sharing between agencies. The reason cited was ‘…intense rivalry 
between agencies, competing to spend unprecedented budgets, which did not 
encourage information sharing’ (Walter 2005: 98).  
 
Effective information management systems and a two-way exchange of 
communication between all interested and affected parties will greatly enhance an 
effective decision-making process (Price 1989: 151).  
 
2.4.3 Post-crisis stage  
The principal function in the post-crisis stage is recovery management (or relief 
management). This is the process of restoring and rebuilding the community in the 
aftermath of a major emergency and involves critical functions such as rescue, relief 
and business continuity management. The CCS (2007: 6) notes: 
 
Recovery management encompasses the physical, social, psychological, 
political and financial consequences of an emergency…the need to plan, 
manage and undertake those activities that will provide as rapid a return to 
normality as soon as possible – for both the community and responders. 
 
Many theorists propose that the recovery stage starts within 48-hours of the end of the 
response stage (ibid.). Others propose that the response and recovery stages ‘do not 
occur sequentially’ and that recovery should be part of the combined response effort 
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and planned accordingly (HM Government 2005(b): 4). Nevertheless, it is important 
that there is a seamless, structured transition from response to recovery. 
 
The period of initial recovery is generally characterised by a series of needs that 
require immediate attention. This involves, according to Shaw and Sinha (2003: 40), 
‘focusing on the provision of basic necessities to victims of the major emergency and 
restoring social equilibrium’. As the recovery effort involves a large number of relief 
agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, a comprehensive coordinated 
plan is essential in order to avoid duplication of effort or leaving gaps in the relief 
role. Following the tsunami in Banda Aceh in 2004, Alan Vernon of the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees stated: 
 
We have four different structures: the military airlift operation, the 
government’s own big efforts, the community’s efforts and the agencies’ 
work. The problem is they all run parallel to each other. There is simply 
no structure to bring them together (cited in Walter 2005: 90). 
 
Consequently, the foundation for any relief and recovery programme should be 
developed prior to the disastrous event occurring and placed within the overall major 
emergency plan. Alexander (2002: 269) believes that this will ‘…improve the 
efficiency of the recovery process and reduce suffering in the aftermath of the disaster 
when conditions will be chaotic and time will be at a premium and demands will be 
relentless’. 
 
The recovery phase requires considerable effort from many organisations. However, 
it is likely that the local authority will take the lead role in the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the community. This may involve many diverse tasks such as: the 
provision of adequate supplies and service support, including food, water, shelter and 
medical supplies (Shaw and Sinha 2003: 42); managing resources (Home Office 
2008: 2); the restoration of basic facilities and services, including electricity, water 
and telephones (Alexander 2002: 273); preventing communicable diseases (Waring 
and Brown 2005: 41); assisting in the physical and emotional recovery of victims 
(Hodgkinson and Stewart 1991: 105); supporting the families and friends of victims 
through the provision of information, assistance and counselling (EPS 1998: 23); 
cleaning up damaged areas and landfill sites (London Resilience 2005: 1-6); the 
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planning of, and reconstruction of housing and basic infrastructure (ibid.: 276); 
returning evacuees to their homes following contamination or danger (Porfiriev 1999: 
77); managing the financial implications and supporting the long-term recovery of 
affected communities, including their economic development (Walter 2005: 111); 
disbursing public donations (Home Office 2008: 9); implementing programmes to 
mitigate vulnerability to future events (Ridge 2004(a): 5); analysing legal 
considerations and implementing public inquiries (Home Office 2008: 21); ensuring 
that ‘equity’ exists in the response effort (Coppela 2007: 325); and, significantly, 
restoring trust and credibility in the responsible agency (Fournier 2005: 10). This 
final function was extremely important for the US Administration in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina when its reputation as an effective organisation was seriously 
damaged (Bertrand and Lajtha 2002: 188).  
 
A central element of the post-crisis stage is the implementation of a business 
continuity plan. This is a validated and rehearsed logistical plan that allows certain 
essential businesses to recover and restore, either partially or wholly, critical 
functions that are necessary to supply the community. This includes essential 
businesses such as producers and suppliers of electricity, gas, food, water and 
prescription drugs. 
 
In summary 
Chapter 2 has described how major emergencies are categorised and socially 
constructed. The chapter also highlighted how major emergency management 
evolved considerably over the past four decades. It was shown how this shift results 
in a more pro-active than reactive approach from major emergency managers, with a 
greater focus on risk management and mitigation rather than ensuring a mere 
response capability. As part of this evolution, response agencies concentrate less on 
planning and communicating for communities, and provide increased focus on 
communicating with communities through engagement and dialogue. Consequently, 
the role of the communication practitioner is becoming more important in this regard. 
Significantly, major emergencies are now viewed as identifiable life cycles, and 
major emergency management is seen as a continuous process requiring specific 
functions to be conducted within each distinct stage. Similarly, communication, in 
support of the major emergency management function, needs to be considered as an 
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ongoing life cycle. The importance and evolution of communication management will 
be discussed in the next chapter.  
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3 THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The theory of communication can be confusing due to the existence of a multitude of 
inter-related and often overlapping concepts and definitions. A principal reason cited 
for this confusion is that communication encompasses a very wide-ranging field of 
study (Price 1996: 1). ‘Communication’ comes from the Latin word communicare, 
meaning ‘to make common’ or ‘to share’ (Pearson et al. 2006: 9). In its simplest 
format, Redmond (2000: 4) defines communication as ‘acting on information.’ 
Theodorson and Theodorson (1969: 83) view communication as ‘the transmission of 
information, ideas, attitudes, or emotion from one person or group to another (or 
others) primarily through symbols’. Watzlawick, Beavin-Bavelas and Jackson (1967: 
49) note, ‘no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate.’  
 
3.2 Categories of communication 
 
To comprehend such a broad-ranging subject as communication theory, scholars have 
categorised the subject in a number of different ways. One of the most common 
categorisations involves a ‘traditional bifurcation of communication’, whereby the 
subject is subdivided into ‘mass (public) communication and human (speech) 
communication’ (Salwen and Stacks 1996: xii). While many theorists regard ‘mass 
communication’ as an intrinsic form of ‘human communication’, the subdivision is 
considered useful for the purpose of analysis (ibid.). Mass communication occurs 
when a small number of people, in particular the mass media, send messages to a 
large, anonymous, and usually heterogeneous, audience through the use of specialised 
communication media (Stiff 1994: 230).  
 
Human communication, on the other hand, is described as ‘a special form of 
communication that occurs between and among people’ (Redmond 2000: 6). Human 
communication can be ‘actional’, where humans communicate either intentionally or 
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unintentionally using a one-way process, and react to one another without a reciprocal 
effect (Scott and Powers 1978: 43); ‘interactional’, where participants to the 
communication process react to the other’s actions in sequence (Watzlawick et al. 
1967: 129; Mortensen 1997: 93); and ‘transactional’ where participants involved in 
communication react to each other simultaneously (De Vito 1997: 28; Johnson-Cartee 
and Copeland 2004: 52). Based on the scale of participants in the process, human 
communication can also include ‘intra-personal’ communication. This involves 
individuals who engage in the process of thinking, reflection or ‘day-dreaming’ 
(DeVito 1997: 6; Williams 1992: 31; Price 1996: 76). Human communication can 
also involve ‘interpersonal communication’, which Redmond (2000: 18) describes as 
‘…dyadic communication where two or more people transactionally influence one 
another, or have a mutual and simultaneous effect on one another’. Finally, it can be 
classified as ‘group communication’, which Berger and Chaffee (1987: 339) describe 
as, ‘a set of persons with close long-term ties of association and communication’. 
These ‘groups’ can be further sub-classified into groups that are formal, informal, 
voluntary, involuntary, small or large (Price 1996: 77). 
 
3.3 Components of communication 
 
Each of the categories of communication mentioned in Section 3.2 share some 
generic components. An understanding of these components assists in a greater 
comprehension of the communication process as a whole, which is turn is essential in 
order to analyse the subject of strategic major emergency communication 
management. 
 
Discussing the first of these components of communication, DeVito (1997: 8) states 
that each category of communication must take place within a ‘context’. He identifies 
three dimensions within which communication can be contextualised, ‘physical, 
social psychological, and temporal’(ibid.). These dimensions, ‘interact with each 
other, influence and are influenced by each other’ (ibid.). Offering a second key 
component, McQuail and Windahl (1993: 5) emphasise the importance of a ‘source’ 
or ‘sender’ of information who ‘encodes’ information prior to transmission. 
‘Encoding’ refers to the translation of purpose, intention, or meaning into symbols 
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and codes (Severin and Tankard 1988: 51). A further essential component of 
communication is a ‘receiver’. This is someone who attends to and ‘decodes’ a 
message transmitted by a ‘sender (O’Sullivan et al. 1994: 283). Receivers ‘decode’ a 
message when they attribute meaning to what they have perceived (ibid.). Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt (1997: 441) describe a fourth generic component, ‘…signals being 
transmitted between senders and receivers – that is, about messages and the media 
through which they get communicated’. 
 
These units of information, or messages, travel through pathways that are known as 
‘channels’ and include interpersonal modes such as sound, touch, light; or mass 
media channels such as television, radio, internet, and short messaging service 
(Severin and Tankard 1988: 207). Redmond (2000: 6) describes how the connection 
made amongst humans through communication, ‘…involves the use of spoken 
symbolic language (verbal communication)…as well as non-verbal cues such as 
gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice’. Price (1996: 9) describes other ways 
in which messages are communicated, including written and graphical/symbolic 
forms. In addition, Cohn (2000: 38) adds visual forms of communication to the mix. 
 
3.4 Uses of communication 
 
Theorists have identified many uses for communication. For example, Price (1996: 
16) emphasises the ‘instrumental’ use, where communication content is transmitted in 
order to achieve or obtain something. Closely related to this is the ‘persuasive’ 
function, which refers to ‘control’ or ‘manipulation’ of cognitions in order to attain 
advantage (ibid: 17). Miller, cited in, Berger and Chaffee (1987: 451) identifies the 
‘social influence’ of communication. This is where communication is used to modify 
behaviour in one of three ways: changing existing responses, reinforcing existing 
responses, or by shaping new responses. However, according to Tierney, Lindell and 
Perry (2001: 29) in order to modify behaviour in a desirable way, individuals must 
hear the information, understand it, and perceive its relevance, a central element of 
the major emergency communication process throughout all three stages of a major 
emergency life cycle. 
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3.4.1 Attitudes, beliefs, and values 
Rokeach (1968: 112) defines attitude as ‘a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs 
around an object or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential 
manner’. According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 257), ‘attitudes are formed and 
modified as people gain information about attitude objects’. Rokeach (1968: 112) 
considers that attitudes are ‘relatively enduring’ and difficult to change. Closely 
related to attitudes are beliefs. Stiff (1994: 11) defines a belief as ‘a single 
predisposition about an object or a situation’. He also states that, ‘an attitude is an 
organisation of beliefs’ (ibid.). A number of theorists, including Walter Lippmann 
and Harold Lasswell during the earlier part of the twentieth century, examined how 
communication, through techniques such as propaganda and persuasion, was used to 
shape public opinion and consequently attitudes. This will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
A third element of a receiver’s predisposition involves values. Grunig (1992: 603) 
describes a value as a deep-rooted conceptual response about the worth or importance 
of something. Hofstede (1980: 25) states that values are not rational, ‘as they are 
imbued into individuals very early in their lives’. They involve ‘strongly held 
personal beliefs along with moral and ethical principles’ (Susskind and Field 1996: 
154). Consequently, ‘values provide the foundation upon which our attitudes are 
constructed’ (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2004: 91).  
 
3.4.2 Behavioural change 
Behaviour is defined as ‘a manifestation of one’s fundamental values and consequent 
attitudes’ (Becker and Connor 1979: 37). Much research has been conducted in order 
to determine the link between the values, beliefs and attitudes of an individual or 
group, and how they will behave. Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (2004: 92) note, ‘the 
motivation for people’s behaviour is an interesting interplay of needs, values, and 
beliefs’. Redmond (2000: 320) discusses how it is more feasible to change a 
receiver’s beliefs than their values, and how one is even more likely to succeed in 
changing their attitudes. Goldenbeld, Levelt and Heidstra (2000: 66) identify three 
broad classes of behaviour, reasoned or planned behaviour, impulsive or emotional 
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behaviour, and habitual behaviour. They describe how negative habitual behaviour is 
the most difficult of the three classes to change (ibid: 76). To achieve long-term 
desirable behavioural change, communication strategies need to be put in place in 
order to positively influence not only receivers’ attitudes, but also their beliefs and 
values. In this regard, theorists such as Grunig (1992), Dozier, Grunig and Grunig 
(1995), Coombs (1999) and Daugherty (2003) emphasise the importance of engaging 
in a strategic rather than a tactical approach towards communication. It will be seen 
later in this dissertation how many contemporary major emergency communicators 
favour a participative or dialogical approach in order to influence positively public 
attitudes and behaviours. Proponents of this approach believe that dialogue generates 
an environment where decisions can be taken in an objective way, thereby allowing 
publics to protect themselves prior to or during a major emergency situation. These 
include decisions relating to mitigation and protection measures such as retrofitting 
houses in earthquake areas or preparing personal emergency supplies. It will also be 
shown that the dialogical approach is a relatively recent development that requires 
rigorous testing in order to determine whether it constitutes best-practice in relation to 
major emergency situations. 
 
3.4.3 Behavioural change and perception 
Theorists have identified a number of factors that determine the strength of the 
attitude-behaviour relationship and consequently influence the process of behavioural 
change. This is an extremely important consideration for major emergency risk and 
crisis communication practitioners who attempt to influence how the public will react 
and behave in the face of great danger. According to Shaw, Shiwaku and Kobayashi 
(2004: 41), behaviour is influenced by the perception of the receiver at the time that 
messages are transmitted. 
 
Cohn (2000: 49) states that a receiver’s perception is a good indictor of future 
behaviour. According to Otway and Pahner, cited in Dowie and Lefrere, (1980: 15), 
the perception of the receiver’s environment is a crucial factor in forming attitudes, 
beliefs and values, describing how ‘people respond to a situation based upon what 
they perceive it to be’. However, perception of a risk and hazardous situation is 
difficult to comprehend as it is ‘multidimensional’ - requiring an individual to be able 
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to hear, understand, believe and be able to personalise the dangerous situation 
(Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichenstein 1982: 241; Tierney, Lindell and Perry 2001: 30).  
According to Cohn (2000: 33): 
 
Public opinion is formed by perception, not reality. Regardless of what is 
really happening internally, the way the public perceives a situation 
becomes the reality. 
 
Accordingly, perception plays an important role in communication as, ‘…no 
communicator can assume that people will react to the same message in the same 
way…and [perception] is influenced by peoples’ wants, needs, attitudes and other 
psychological factors’ (Severin and Tankard 1988: 120).  
 
According to Bostrom and Lofstedt (2003: 243), the same risk communication ‘can 
evoke fear in some people and anger in others’. Many theorists highlight how non-
scientists often perceive risks in a way that is different from how scientists perceive 
them (Slovic 2000: 224; Rowe and Wright 2001: 341; Ball 2002: 540). A number of 
factors affect this diverging perception, including how the receiver perceives the 
‘source’ of a communication. The perceived expertise, trustworthiness, credibility 
and attractiveness of a message source are relevant (Miller, cited in Berger and 
Chaffee, 1987: 464). Personal characteristics of the receiver at the time of the 
communication are also considered important. These include an individual’s direct 
experience or knowledge, values, and vested interest in relation to the subject matter 
of the communication (Stiff 1994: 58; Slovic 2000: 226). Other personal 
characteristics include an individual’s self-esteem, mood, and frame-of-mind (Severin 
and Tankard 1988: 184); attitude (Sjoberg 2000: 9), generation/age (Ahearne 2000: 
763); their gender (Gustafson 1998: 805), how they cognitively evaluate messages, 
(such as their selective processes, whereby receivers avoid communication or parts of 
messages that are not in agreement with their existing attitudes or beliefs) (Roloff, 
cited in Berger and Chaffe, 1987: 505; Price 1996: 117; Severin and Tankard 1988: 
128); insufficient concern (Ball 2002: 535); and, significantly, the social and cultural 
predispositions of the receiver (Chess, Burger and Hughes-McDermott 2004: 270; 
Fiske 2004: 26; Sjoberg 2000: 6).  
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3.4.4 Perception, behaviour and cultural theory 
Cultural theorists believe that risk is a social construction that is influenced by 
people’s involvement in their everyday interaction with family, friends and peers. 
Consequently, an individual’s perception of, and likely behaviour in, a hazardous 
situation should be regarded in terms of the strength of that individual’s relationship 
to social groups and the social structure or nature of such groups. Some cultural 
theorists claim that, from an anthropological perspective, there are two dimensions by 
which all cultures can be classified. The first of these is the ‘grid’ dimension that can 
be defined as the ‘total body of rules and constraints that a culture imposes on its 
people in a particular context’ (Mars and Nicod 1983: 124). The second dimension is 
‘group’, which refers to ‘the extent to which an individual is coerced by others, 
through being a member of a bounded face-to-face unit’ (ibid:125). Depending on the 
extent to which a person is oriented to either a ‘grid’ or ‘group’ position, four 
universal predispositions can be identified that describe an individual’s perception 
and likely response to a risk or major emergency situation. These are ‘hierarchical’, 
‘individualistic’, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘fatalistic’ predispositions (Dake 1991: 63). The 
cultural approach to risk and major emergencies recognises the fact that different 
people, based on these four dispositions, view dangers in entirely different ways and 
that there are no simple right or wrong answers to this complex subject.  
 
Additionally, cultural theory proposes that in communicating with different 
individuals and societies, communication practitioners in order to succeed will have 
to: 
 
…sensitize themselves to the cultural heterogeneity of their audiences. In 
the process, they not only will be called upon to tailor their activities to the 
cultural idiosyncrasies of their publics, but may also have to change 
certain techniques to suit different cultures (Sriramesh and White, Cited in 
Grunig 1992: 611). 
 
As a consequence, major emergency strategies and ideas that work well in one 
country may lose effectiveness when introduced in another (Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky 1990: 84; Frosdick 1995: 45; Trompenaars 1993: 5). The importance of 
acknowledging that different nation states are likely to require a different approach to 
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major emergency communication management from their respective governments, 
will be discussed later in the dissertation. 
 
While cultural theory provides a useful insight into understanding how individuals 
and different societies perceive danger and are likely to behave in the face of life-
threatening events, its approach has been criticised as too reductionist and as 
oversimplifying the complexities surrounding major emergency situations in the real 
world. 
 
3.5 Developments in communication theory 
 
McCroskey and Richmond, cited in Salwen and Stacks, (1996: 235) emphasise that 
the study of communication is not a recent phenomenon and assert that ‘the oldest 
essay ever discovered was written about 3,000 BC and consisted of advice on how to 
speak effectively’. According to Bryant (2004: 390), scholars in Ancient Greece, 
about the fifth century BC, continued research into spoken communication and are 
credited with developing the ‘rhetorical tradition’. Schramm (1997: 6) describes 
ancient scholars such as Cicero, Aristotle, Homer and Quintillian as the ‘forefathers 
of the forefathers’ of modern communication. Their approach to communication 
provided a foundation for developments in communication theory and research 
throughout the twentieth century (Price 1996: 240).  
 
According to Willey and Rice (1933: 216), communication in society during the early 
part of the twentieth century, developed ‘without plan or aim’. Despite this, a number 
of US theorists were actively studying important elements of communication. Due to 
the post-war reconstruction efforts in Europe and the lack of funding available in their 
universities, the communication field ‘was largely open for the invasion of American 
ideas’ of communication theory and methods of enquiry at this time (McQuail et al. 
2005: 1). 
 
One of the earlier US communication theorists, Charles Cooley (1864-1969), in his 
text Social Organization: a Study of the Larger Mind (1909: 61), defines 
communication as ‘…the mechanism through which human relations exist and 
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develop—all the symbols of the mind, together with the means of conveying them 
through space and preserving them in time’. Cooley in his writing emphasised, at an 
early stage, the centrality to society of human communication. A little later, Walter 
Lippmann (1889-1974), following up on Cooley’s work, was one of the first theorists 
to consider communication in terms of human perception and reality - an important 
element, it will be shown, of major emergency communication. He examined how 
‘individual opinions can differ from those that are expressed in the outside world’ 
(Lippmann 1922: 3). Lippmann also described the phenomenon of agenda-setting, 
whereby democracy, in his opinion, is ‘controlled’ by educated elites (Lippmann 
1925: 197). Identifying barriers that exist between the public and an event, Lippmann 
examined how the media can manipulate events or present limited information to the 
public in order to shape opinions (Lippmann 1922: 28). In this regard, Lippmann was 
one of the earliest theorists to examine the formation of public opinion, the concepts 
of social influence, and in particular the study of persuasion and propaganda 
(Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2004: 3; Berger and Chaffee 1987: 457). Studies such 
as these provided a good foundation for later research into risk and major emergency 
communication. These will be discussed later in this dissertation. In his studies of 
democracy and communication, John Dewey (1859-1952) argued that 
‘communication can alone create a great community’(1927: 142). Dewey’s work 
provided a good foundation for later theorists, analysing social communication that is 
an important concept in the development of resilient communities. This concept will 
also be discussed later. 
 
However, it is today generally accepted that the study of communication was 
established as a science following ‘brief forays’ into the subject by a number of social 
scientists in the 1930s and 1940s. This work was undertaken principally through 
academic institutions such as Columbia University and the University of Chicago 
(Salwen and Stacks 1996: 400). During this period, in an attempt to develop an 
empirical foundation for the subject, scholars began to introduce scientific 
techniques, such as quantitative analysis and the use of surveys, into communication 
research (Jensen and Jankowski 1991: 49; Czitrom 1982: 122). At the forefront of 
this communication research, at this time, were a number of notable scholars 
including Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Lewin and Hovland, whom Schramm (1997: 6) 
described as the ‘forefathers of contemporary communication study’. As proponents 
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of Critical Theory, which originated in the Frankfurt School, these theorists 
‘…borrowed from the intellectual tradition that had been growing up in the hard 
sciences and the social sciences…they studied human communication…and were 
keenly aware of the relationship of mass media to the problems they were studying’ 
(ibid). Of particular interest to these theorists, during this time, were the effects of 
communication in life. In this regard, Lewin focused on communication in groups; 
Lazarsfeld closely analysed the mass media and its effects on people; Hovland used 
controlled experiments to study attitude change through broadcast media; while 
Lasswell afforded considerable attention to content analysis and the effects of 
propaganda. Each of these areas of research, it will be shown later in this dissertation, 
provides an important basis for many of the techniques employed by major 
emergency communication practitioners over the past twenty years. 
 
3.5.1 Building on the rhetorical tradition – propaganda and persuasion 
Of particular interest in the 1940s and 1950s, principally as a result of the Second 
World War and the subsequent Cold War, were the fields of propaganda and 
persuasion; two techniques firmly rooted in the rhetorical tradition of communication. 
Actively researching both propaganda and persuasive techniques, many behavioural 
scientists at this time were ‘…observers of, and active participants in, defining the 
meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to a portrait of the enemy that both 
reflected and fuelled ideological strains within the American body politic’ (Robin 
2001: 15). Throughout this time the US government expanded its support and use of 
academics including social scientists, psychologists, and communicators in order to 
promote overtly American interests through propaganda and persuasion techniques 
(Parry-Giles 1994: 449). During this period, scholars such as Lasswell, Blumer and 
Waples formed a temporary working group called ‘the committee on communication 
and public opinion’. This committee essentially served as an academic and 
educational adjunct of the Federal Government and was closely linked to the Office 
of War Information. The establishment of the committee reflected the increasing 
interest in communications of the US government. 
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3.5.1.1 Propaganda 
Propaganda, according to Laswell, cited in Severin and Tankard, (1988: 103) and 
Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (2004: 7), involves the crafting of messages that are 
designed to exert influence on group members, thereby shaping their perceptions or 
impressions. Ellul (1965: 61) defines propaganda as:  
 
A set of methods employed by an organised group that wants to bring 
about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of 
individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulation 
and incorporated into a system. 
 
While similar in many respects, propaganda differs from persuasion in its purpose. 
According to Grunig (1992: 288), ‘communication by propaganda is manipulation’. 
While Lippmann (mentioned earlier) was actively writing propaganda, Harold 
Lasswell (1902-1978) was undertaking an empirical analysis of the field. Lasswell 
studied the propaganda techniques of different nations during the First World War 
and sought to determine the most effective methods. Lasswell’s study was based on a 
quantitative content analysis of German school texts at that time, in which he 
examined the use of terms such as ‘national superiority’, ‘foreign inferiority’ and 
‘military heroes’ (Rogers 1994: 213). This study proved of considerable interest to, 
and gained prominence in, the US military-intellectual complex (Robbins 2001: 56). 
While many German sociologists and American revisionist historians considered 
propaganda technique ‘a vicious social evil to be detected and combated’ (Smith 
1994: 219), Lasswell viewed propaganda as ‘the study of power in society’ (Schramm 
1997: 34). In his work, Lasswell analysed how ‘isolated individuals are exposed to 
powerful media institutions engaged in reinforcing or changing social behaviour’ 
(Hardt 1992: 89). He also analysed how propaganda could be utilised to shape public 
opinion within a democratic system. Propaganda according to Lasswell is ‘the new 
instrument for welding millions into one amalgamated instrument’ (Schramm 1997: 
35). 
 
Lasswell believed propaganda to be ‘no more moral or immoral than a pump handle’ 
(Robin 2001: 65). He believed that all governments in an age of mass communication 
used propaganda techniques in order to ‘promote their policies’ and that propaganda 
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had become ‘a natural function of politics’ (Smith 1994: 219). Many governments 
used propaganda techniques to communicate important major emergency messages 
throughout the 1960s, particularly concerning nuclear safety issues. While these 
messages contained much useful information, many of the messages contained strong 
political undertones. Additionally, as the propaganda technique was a one-way 
process of communication, which did not allow a mechanism for receiver feedback or 
for organisational learning, its effectiveness as a communication approach was 
considered limited. 
 
3.5.1.2 Persuasion 
Persuasive strategies include ‘rational appeals’ that are based on logic and reason, and 
‘emotional appeals’ that are based on an individual’s beliefs, attitudes, fear, outrage, 
or sympathy (Stiff 1994: 120; Berlo 1960: 12; Miller and Steinberg 1975: 12). One of 
the earliest investigations concerning the technique of persuasion was conducted by 
LaPiere (1934). He concentrated on people’s attitudes and subsequent behaviours. 
Persuasive communication became popular during the Second World War, as the US 
Army wanted academics to provide them with practical guidance concerning its 
instructional messages. Consequently, important work by Hovland and his associates 
identified the short- and long-term attitudinal and behavioural effects on audiences, 
including the sleeper effect, as a result of viewing army training films. Hovland 
identified a number of characteristics that affect the persuasion process including 
source credibility, expertise and trustworthiness (Stiff 1994: 90). However, it took 
until the 1980s for the first substantive persuasive model to be developed, which was 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1981) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Petty and 
Cacioppo hypothesised that one factor affecting people’s willingness to scrutinise the 
content of a persuasive message is their involvement with the message topic. 
Consequently, when message receivers are highly involved with the message topic, 
such as publics in the immediate path of a major hurricane, message characteristics 
such as high quality supporting evidence and organisational credibility can greatly 
influence attitude change (Stiff 1994: 109). Research on persuasion remains 
extremely germane to major emergency communication today, as will be discussed 
later. 
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A guiding model of social influence that helped to shape the study of propaganda and 
persuasion was Lazarfield and Katz’s ‘two-step flow of communication’. The theory 
divides the population into ‘active’ and ‘passive’ participants, or ‘opinion leaders’ 
and ‘followers’ according to their interest and activity in relation to an issue, the 
media and their messages (Servaes cited in Casmir, Fred L. 1991: 55). The theory 
examines the process intervening between the media’s direct message and the 
audience’s ultimate reaction to that message. It highlights the importance of opinion 
leadership and personal influence while channelling important media messages to the 
public. Opinion leaders in the context of major emergencies can include medical 
practitioners, the police, academics and elected representatives. 
 
3.5.1.3 Other contributions of Lasswell, Lazarsfeld and Schramm 
Lasswell 
One of Lasswell’s most significant contributions to the work of contemporary major 
emergency communication was his early identification of three social functions of 
communication through the news media, government and schools. The first of these 
Lasswell described as ‘surveillance’. It involves the collection of information that 
society should know about and refers to the needs, threats and opportunities to which 
a society should respond. Secondly, ‘correlation’ involves society’s response to this 
information, including its organisational and behavioural response. Finally, Lasswell 
identified ‘transmission’, which involves the passing on of knowledge and values to 
society (Lasswell 1948: 276). Each of these three functions remains pertinent to the 
development of major emergency communication strategies today. 
 
In addition, Lasswell’s research contributed greatly to the overall study of 
communication. One noteworthy aspect was his ‘convenient way to describe an act of 
communication’, involving not only the elements of the communication process such 
as communicator, message, medium, receiver, and effects, but also integrated 
evolving fields of communication such as research, media and audience analysis, and 
effect analysis (Lasswell 1948: 37).  
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Lazarsfeld 
Lazarsfeld recognised that ‘freedom of speech is now a three-cornered proposition 
between the government, the communications industry and the individual citizen’ 
(Lazarsfeld and Field 1946: 74). In this way, Lazarsfeld identified that a separation of 
powers exists between these important entities and recognised the importance of 
individuals having control of their own political destiny. In this regard, Lazarsfeld 
helped to lay the seeds for a dialogical approach towards communication that will be 
discussed later in this Chapter. 
 
Schramm 
However, it is Wilbur Schramm who is considered by many to be ‘the true founding 
father’ or ‘driving force’ of communication studies (Griffin 2003: E-1; Wahl-
Jorgensen 2004: 560; Rogers 1994: 1). Reardon and de Pillis, cited in Salwen and 
Stacks, (1996: 400) describe how Schramm developed communication studies as a 
‘crossroads discipline’ to complement the five established social sciences of 
psychology, sociology, political science, economics and anthropology. Schramm 
argued that the mass media has the potential to widen horizons, to focus attention, to 
raise aspirations, and to create a climate for development. Significantly, he took 
cultural linkages into account, acknowledged the resistance to change and urged an 
‘understanding participation’ (Kumar cited in White 1994: 82). While Schramm’s 
principal interest in this regard was developmental communication, the principles are 
equally important for major emergency communication management. 
 
3.5.1.4 Developmental communication 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, communication was used in order to 
promote development and to bring about positive social change, through a 
‘modernisation paradigm’, particularly in ‘third-world’ countries (Jacobson cited in 
White 1994: 67). This form of communication theory, known as developmental 
communication, became recognised as an academic discipline in the 1950s, 
principally through the work of Schramm and other theorists such as Lerner and 
Rogers. Developmental theorists believed that the problems of underdevelopment or 
‘backwardness’ could be solved by ‘a mechanical application of the economic and 
political systems of the Western countries’ (Servaes et al. 1996: 31). Consequently, 
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many of the propaganda and persuasion techniques that dominated the Cold War 
period were utilised in the early stages of developmental communication. However, 
these techniques were criticised, particularly by theorists such as Beltan and Dagron 
in the undeveloped nations. They considered developmental communication to be 
principally a one-way process where messages simply passed from sender (western 
governments) to receiver (the poor of developing nations), involving processes of 
‘explanation and teaching…rather than knowledge sharing’ (Jacobson cited in White 
1994: 67; Servaes et al. 1996: 33).  
 
3.5.1.5 Participatory communication 
Believing developmental communication to be ‘outdated’, theorists began to look at 
alternative, more inclusive approaches to communication during the 1960s. 
Consequently, a form of communication evolved that became known as ‘participatory 
communication’, which centred on two-way, dialogical forms of communication. In 
this regard, ‘what was said became secondary to how it was said and to the way it 
affected others’ (Griffin 2003: 25) and relationships became more important than 
message content. Servaes, cited in Dervin and Voight, (1989: 225) reinforces this 
point, stating: 
 
The former hierarchical, bureaucratic, and sender-oriented communication 
model has been replaced by a more horizontal, participative and receiver-
oriented approach…based fundamentally on interactive, participatory, and two-
way communication on all levels of society.  
 
Amongst the leading exponents of the participatory approach to communication at 
this time were Jurgen Habermas and Paulo Friere. Friere (1983: 76) incorporated 
concepts such as the cultural identity of communities and participation at all levels. 
Habermas proposed communication as a basis for the exercise of legitimate power, 
which can only occur through ‘a process, which is at base a fair or consensual dialog 
among participants and citizens’ (Jacobson cited in White 1994: 70). This horizontal 
communication approach differed from the developmental communication approach, 
which was principally top-down by nature. This approach to participatory 
communication provides the basis for contemporary thinking towards the 
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management of major emergency communication, which has evolved from the 
rhetorical tradition to a more ‘relational’ approach.  
 
3.5.1.6 Move towards relational communication 
Whereas the ‘rhetorical approach’ focuses on social influence that can be considered 
‘interactional’, the ‘relational tradition’ examines communication from a 
‘transactional’ viewpoint (Salwen and Stacks 1996: 234). In this approach two or 
more people or groups coordinate their communication in order to reach a shared 
perspective that is likely to be satisfactory to all. All sides acknowledge the concerns 
of the other sides, focus on building long-term relationships, act in a trustworthy 
manner, and meaningfully involve a broad range of participants, both expert and non-
expert, in the decision-making process. 
 
Many theorists consider ‘relational’ communication more ethical than the ‘rhetorical’ 
approach and have produced theories and models supporting the concept. These 
include Cutlip, Center and Broom’s (2000: 249) ‘co-orientation model’, Susskind and 
Field’s (1996: 37) ‘mutual gains approach’, and Stern and Fineberg’s (1996: 160) 
‘broad-based analytic-deliberative process’. The ‘relational’ tradition of 
communication is gaining many supporters in the context of strategic major 
emergency communication management. This is in keeping with the shift towards 
working with communities rather than for communities, described by Salter earlier in 
Chapter 2. This subject will be discussed in detail later in this dissertation. 
 
3.5.1.7 1990s -  
In the 1990s, Putnam (2001: 40) believes that communication theory ‘lacked 
cohesion…with a splintering of basic concepts and theories that developed into self-
contained enclaves…offering a period of fragmentation’. Many diverse and pluralist 
sub-specialities of communication were developed during this time, including within 
them the consideration of communication in the organisation. In particular, Grunig 
(1992: 539) describes the efforts that were directed towards ‘channels, flows, and 
networks of communication throughout the organisation…and how communication 
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defines the organisation as a whole’. Other specialist fields of communication that 
developed during this period include research into how race, class, age, sexual 
orientation and ethnicity influence the communication process (Jones 1999: 149). 
Communication scholars in the 21st century have focused much of their attention on 
the issue of the ‘digital divide…the gap between those who have access to technology 
and those who do not’ (Besser 2004: 1). In particular, theorists are interested in 
examining how income and education can preclude lower socio-economic groups 
from having access to important public service communications (Bryant 2004: 394; 
Besser 2004: 1). 
 
The study and practice of risk and crisis communication is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, with a growing volume of literature extant since the 1980s (Royal 
Society 1992: 118; Price 1989: 17). Palenchar and Heath (2002: 129) discuss how 
‘iconic incidents’ such as those at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Bhopal in 1984, 
resulted in a manifest interest in the subject of risk and emergency communication 
theory and practice. Much of the effort during the 1980s and 1990s was directed 
towards preparing communication plans for environmental disasters. However, the 
so-called 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and the London and Madrid train 
bombings have focused contemporary risk and emergency communication theorists’ 
attentions on terrorist related incidents. 
 
3.6 Communication management  
 
Gamble and Gamble (2005: 7) describe how ‘communication is the deliberate or 
accidental transfer of meaning’. In order for deliberate communication to be effective, 
it should be managed. Kaye (1994: 12) defines communication management as ‘the 
process of coordinating the interpretations or meanings construed by interacting 
people’. Therefore, the process involves both ‘understanding and negotiating the 
meanings of two or more individuals’ (ibid.). Managing communication is 
particularly important within organisations. Consequently, Grunig and Hunt (1984: 6) 
describe communication management as: 
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The overall planning, execution, and evaluation of an organisation’s 
communication with both external and internal publics – groups that 
affect the ability of the organisation to meet its goals. 
 
A school of thought is emerging, including theorists such as Grunig, Dozier and 
Daugherty that emphasises the importance of managing communication strategically. 
This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, in the true ‘relational tradition’, Hutton 
(1999: 200) describes how the new paradigm of communication management 
involves ‘building relationships with publics’. Van Ruler and Verčič (2004: 3) state: 
 
That – in Europe at least – public relations researchers find it difficult 
to distinguish between communication management and building 
relationships. 
 
The effectiveness of communication management performance can be measured by 
identifying positive effects among clearly defined target publics (Grunig 1992: 188), 
protection of the organisation’s reputation (Huang 2004: 337), and the strength of the 
organisation-public relationship (Susskind and Field 1996: 41). 
 
3.6.1 Models of communication management 
Most models of communication management focus on the different approaches 
adopted by practitioners of the science. In one of the earlier models, Thayer (1968: 
56) offered two contrasting concepts. The first of these, ‘synchronic’ communication, 
describes how practitioners attempt to synchronise the behaviour of the public with 
that of the organisation, thereby allowing the organisation to carry on its activities in 
an uninterrupted manner. ‘Diachronic’ communication, on the other hand, describes 
attempts to agree a situation that is acceptable to both the organisation and its publics. 
Using Thayer’s work as a basis, James Grunig developed four seminal models of 
communication management involving two distinct variables, direction and purpose. 
Grunig (1992: 289) explains these variables as follows: 
 
Direction describes the extent to which the model is one-way or two-
way. One-way communication disseminates information; it is a 
monologue. Two-way communication exchanges information; it is a 
dialogue. Purpose describes whether the model is asymmetrical or 
 64
symmetrical. Asymmetrical communication is imbalanced; it leaves 
the organisation as is and tries to change the public. Symmetrical 
communication is balanced; it adjusts the relationship between the 
organisation and public. 
 
Culbertson and Chen (1996: 4) provide succinct descriptions of Grunig’s four models 
of communication management. They categorise the first two models as ‘one-way’ 
processes of communication. Organisations practicing ‘one-way’ communication 
management do not engage in research or any attempt to understand their publics, nor 
do they engage in any dialogue or attempt to receive audience/publics feedback. 
Consequently, Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002: 64) consider ‘one-way’ models 
‘unethical’. They term the first of the ‘one-way’ models ‘press-agent’ or ‘publicity’ 
models, wherein emphasis is placed on achieving publicity for the organisation, and 
minimal attention is afforded to ensuring accuracy or truth in communicated 
messages. The second ‘one-way’ model, is termed a ‘public information’ model, and 
involves the dissemination of positive information about the organisation by 
‘journalists in residence’, through ‘controlled media’ (Grunig 1992: 18). Once again 
no research or evaluation is conducted. However, unlike the ‘press agent’ model, the 
‘public information’ model involves some attempts to disseminate information that is 
both accurate and truthful. 
 
Grunig’s final two models involve ‘two-way’ communication processes. In the ‘two-
way asymmetric’ model, practitioners conduct extensive research of their key publics. 
This is done in order to optimise persuasive strategies, with a view to changing public 
attitudes and behaviour in a way that best suits the organisation (Grunig 1992: 289). 
This model and the two ‘one-way’ models mentioned above are associated with 
‘rhetorical’ approaches to communication, already described in Section 3.6.1.  
 
The fourth model, ‘two-way symmetric’, which is associated with ‘relational 
communication’ previously described in Section 3.6.2, involves the organisation 
entering transactions with publics as equal partners. In an effort to avoid or manage 
conflict, the communication process should involve, ‘…argumentation and 
debate…however dialogue, listening, understanding and relationship must also take 
place’ (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002: 32). This is particularly effective when 
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communicators play an active role as advocates of the publics’ interests in strategic 
decision making. Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 13) believe that: 
 
Two-way symmetrical communication is a way to develop “win-win” 
solutions for conflicts between organisations and publics…where both 
involved can win as a result of negotiation.  
 
Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002: 11) emphasise that ‘organisations get more of what 
they want when they give up some of what they want’. A number of other theorists 
advance the ‘two-way symmetrical’ model as an optimum approach to managing 
communication, including, amongst many others, Deetz, cited in Griffin, (2003: 288), 
Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000: 3), Salwen and Stacks (1996: 465), and Heath 
(2001: 523). 
 
However, not all scholars are in agreement with the views of these theorists, and 
many consider the ‘two-way symmetrical’ model as ‘unrealistic and overly idealistic’ 
(L’Etang and Pieczka 1996: 154), ‘naïve and utopian’ (Maloney 1997: 140), ‘an 
attempt to make an inherently evil practice look good’ (L’Etang and Pieczka 1996: 
105), and a mere ‘tacit or latent strategic act rather than a communicative one in the 
Habermassian sense’ (Nohrstedt 2000: 144).  
 
While recognising merits in the ‘two-way’ symmetrical model, Murphy (1991: 118) 
suggests that organisations should pursue communication management using a 
‘mixed-motives’ approach. She emphasises the importance of organisations 
attempting to satisfy their own needs and interests, while simultaneously trying to 
help publics to satisfy their best interests. Consequently, Murphy proposes a fifth 
category of communication management model, the ‘mixed-motives’ model. This is 
based on a combination of Grunig’s ‘two-way asymmetrical’ and the ‘two-way 
symmetrical’ models where the ideal position for both the organisation and the 
audience/publics is within the ‘win-win’ zone. The relationship between the ‘mixed-
motive model and both of the ‘two-way’ models is explained by Murphy 
diagrammatically in Fig. 3.1. over. 
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Figure 3.1: Mixed-motives model of communication 
 
 Source: (Murphy 1991: 118) 
 
3.7 Risk and crisis communication theory 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there exists a somewhat fragmented body of literature in 
relation to risk and crisis communication theory. This is in no small way due to a 
limited convergence between scholarly literature, official guidance documents and 
protocols, and praxis within institutions with responsibility for developing risk and 
crisis communication policy. Consequently, much of the terminology, such as the 
meaning of ‘risk communication’ and ‘crisis communication’, often becomes 
interchangeable and confusing. In the previous chapter, Figure 2.2 described a model 
of a major emergency life cycle and the chapter recommended steps that planners 
should take in order to prepare for, and to anticipate, life threatening events, thereby 
allowing for an effective response. A critical factor that is central to the success or 
failure of effective preparedness, anticipation and response is major emergency 
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communication management, which encompasses the functions of risk and crisis 
communication management.  
 
3.7.1 Risk communication 
Risk management is a subject that was dealt with in some detail in Chapter 2. The 
important role that communication plays in risk management was clearly highlighted. 
Sandman (2002) emphasises that, ‘risk communication involves communicating with 
publics about things that might go wrong’. It can be defined as: 
 
An interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among 
individuals, groups, and institutions…involving multiple messages 
about the nature of risk (Price 1989: 21). 
 
Offering a more practical definition, the United States National Academy of Sciences 
(2002: 1) describes risk communication as the provision of ‘timely and credible 
information to the public in order that appropriate protective actions can be taken’. 
The US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (Reynolds 2002: 6) explain how the risk 
communicator, ‘…hopes to provide the receiver with information about the expected 
type (good or bad), and magnitude (weak or strong), and probability of an outcome, 
from a behavior or exposure’. 
 
Price (1989: 26) believes risk communication is successful when: 
 
It raises the level of understanding of relevant issues or actions and 
satisfies those involved that they are adequately informed within the 
limits of available knowledge. 
 
Many theorists have identified key pre-requisites for successful risk communication, 
including source credibility (Alesch et al. 2004: 162), using understandable language 
(Nordlund 1994: 13), demonstrating openness and competence (Darrell 2003: 21); 
and being consistent in disseminated messages (Reynolds 2002: 11). 
 
As the communication about risk issues takes place prior to the actualisation of a 
crisis situation, Reynolds (2002: 5) highlight that risk communicators should be under 
no great time pressures for the development, testing and dissemination of optimum 
risk messages to publics. 
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3.7.2 Crisis communication 
Crisis communication relates to negative events that are occurring, or have just 
occurred, often unexpectedly, and the urgent need to communicate about that crisis to 
stakeholders and the public (Fearn-Banks 1996: 2). This form of communication is 
undertaken during the ‘crisis stage’ of a crisis lifecycle, described earlier in Figure 2.2 
Sandman (2002) notes that crisis communication ‘deals with things that have already 
gone badly wrong’. It differs from risk communication in that the event is occurring 
or has already occurred, and publics and the media are awaiting a response. The 
benefits of effective crisis communication include, the provision of essential 
information regarding the crisis to stakeholders, assisting the crisis management team 
with its decision making (Hale, Dulek and Hale 2005: 113), displaying the 
organisation’s authority and capability to deal with the crisis, and utilising the media 
in order to effect an optimum response and recovery (Fernandez and Merzer 2003: 7).  
 
Due to the ‘urgent and unexpected’ nature of a crisis, and the lack of control over the 
timing of the event, Reynolds (2002: 5) emphasises that communication managers 
will face considerable time pressures, with less time to develop, test and disseminate 
optimum crisis messages. 
 
3.7.3 Crisis and emergency risk communication 
This is a hybrid form of communication that is sometimes neglected by theorists and 
emergency planners. It occurs during the ‘crisis’ and ‘post-crisis’ stage of a crisis life 
cycle and involves the need to communicate information relating to the existence of 
further risks following a crisis situation. A safety warning relating to the possibility of 
water contamination following the tsunami in South East Asia in 2004 is a relevant 
example (Walter 2005: 109). Crisis and emergency risk communication allows 
publics to make best possible decisions about their well-being following a serious 
life-threatening event and within very narrow time constraints. 
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3.7.4 Evolution of risk and crisis communication 
Fischhoff describes how risk and crisis communication has evolved through 
developmental stages or ‘focal communication strategies’ since the mid- 1970s. The 
stages are as follows: 
 
 All we have to do is get the numbers right 
 All we have to do is tell them the numbers. 
 All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers. 
 All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past 
 All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them. 
 All we have to do is treat them nice. 
 All we have to do is make them partners. 
 All of the above. 
 
Source: (Fischhoff 1995: 138) 
 
The five models of communication management, discussed earlier in Section 3.7.1, 
closely reflect Fischhoff’s eight developmental stages described above. Leiss and 
Powell (1997: 35-38) summarise these eight stages, and in doing so identify three 
distinct periods during which risk and crisis communication management has 
evolved. The first period, which occurred between 1975-84, witnessed considerable 
emphasis being placed on source-orientation, message content, and in particular, 
quantitative expressions of risk estimates and scientific validity (Palenchar and Heath 
2007: 122). During this time, the public’s understanding of issues of science and risk 
was ‘conceived as a deficit…and scientists were presumed to be in possession of the 
truth’ (Dora 2006: 167). Additionally, risk and crisis communication practitioners 
tended to view with scepticism any research into areas such as risk perception and 
stakeholder segmentation, and pursued instead strategies based on the ‘one-way’ 
model of communication. Lofstedt, Ikeda and Thompson (2000: 157) termed their 
chosen strategy ‘decide-announce-defend’. Communication practitioners, at this time, 
hoped these strategies would ‘do the trick’ in terms of communicating with their 
publics (Fischhoff 1995: 138). Palenchar and Heath (2007: 122) describe how this 
period was dominated by a ‘scientific positivism, whereby data and methodologies of 
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scientists dominated how the public assessd risk issues. Dora (2006: 167) terms the 
paradigm adopted during this period as ‘a technocratic approach’ within which a 
bottom-up communication process ‘had no place’. It was believed during this period 
that ‘science provided not just a necessary but also a sufficient basis for policy 
decision-making’ (ibid: 168). 
 
The second period occurred between 1985-94 and saw communication practitioners 
place greater emphasis on factors such as source credibility, simplicity and clarity of 
message, and an effective use of message channels. Unlike during the first period, 
practitioners began to recognise the importance of receivers’ perception of risk and 
crisis situations. Technical aspects of risk during this time were communicated in one 
direction from experts to government and then to the public. Communication 
practitioners in this regard focused on persuasive techniques in order to achieve their 
objectives. However, some elements of a ‘two-way asymmetrical’ model of 
communication management were introduced, whereby public attitudes were taken 
into consideration once experts had delivered their authoritative conclusions (Dora 
2006: 170). Theorists such as Slovic and MacGregor (1994: 46) highlight the limited 
effectiveness of this type of risk and crisis communication approach and attribute a 
perceived lack of trust in a message source as a key consideration. Other theorists 
highlight how the ‘two-way asymmetrical’ approach utilised at that time generated a 
lack of real understanding of risk and crisis issues amongst concerned publics, 
resulting in the development of a ‘knowledge gap’ between ‘experts’ and ‘non-
experts’ (Cohn 2000: 166; Nohrstedt 2000: 140; Price 1989: 69; Gough and Hooper 
2003: 2). Palenchar and Heath (2007: 122) describe the dominant view during this 
period as ‘constructivism/relativism’ where everybody’s opinions are considered to 
have equal value. The paradigm adopted during this period is described by Dora 
(2006: 170) as ‘a decisionist approach’. 
 
Leiss and Powell’s description of the third, post-1994, period identifies many of the 
shortcomings with both the ‘dominant’ and ‘decisionist’ approaches and highlights 
how contemporary practitioners now place considerable emphasis on organisation-
publics dialogue, relationship and consensus building, transparency, meaningful 
participation and interaction in risk and crisis decision-making. The approach adopted 
during this time correlates closely with Grunig’s ‘two-way’ symmetrical model and 
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Murphy’s (1991) ‘mixed-model’, previously described in Section 3.7.1., and is 
described by Dora (2006: 172) as ‘a deliberative approach’, which is a ‘relational’ 
form of communication and described earlier in Section 3.5.1.6. This approach is 
similar to Fischhoff’s (1995: 138) final stage described earlier (p68). Theorists 
supporting such an approach include Sandman (1992: 3), Susskind and Field (1996: 
37), Coombs (1999: 45), Reynolds (2002: 16), Price (1989: 179), and the Scarman 
Centre (2004: 3-28). Palenchar and Heath (2007: 122) state that this period is 
dominated by ‘dialogue’ where collaborative decision-making allows scientific 
opinion to become integrated into policies that are ‘vetted by key public’s values’. 
According to Dora (2006: 173): 
 
A key element of the ‘deliberative’ approach is that risk communication is 
not treated entirely as an object of policy - it is not an exercise ‘bolted on’ at 
the end of a conventional, specialist-led process…instead it needs to involve 
dialogue about the definition and analysis, as well as the evaluation of any 
particular risk issue. 
 
While the ‘deliberative’ model offers a useful approach to risk and crisis decision-
making and communication efforts, many theorists are not convinced of its efficacy 
and highlight its shortcomings together with a number of inherent difficulties that 
need to be considered. For example, the need to incorporate pluralist views and 
cultural factors involves basing risk and crisis decisions, to a greater extent, on 
beliefs, values and ways of categorising the world rather than on objective 
information. Consequently, bias will unavoidably be encountered (Adams and 
Thompson 2002: 32; Ball 2002: 530). According to Seedhouse (1997: 77), a number 
of typologies of bias need to be taken into consideration, otherwise the ‘deliberative’ 
approach to risk communication can be undermined. These include biases such as 
‘necessary prejudice’, ‘blinkered prejudice’ and ‘reasoned prejudice’. Adams and 
Thompson (2002: 32) believe that ‘sooner or later prejudice has to enter into any risk 
management decision process…because decisions are about facts but also about 
beliefs and preferences…therefore, whatever decision is made, there will always be 
grounds for dispute.’ The cultural interaction of organisations and publics is likely to 
pose a further difficulty. Elliot and Smith (1993: 210) describe six factors in a 
‘cultural web’ that the communication practitioner needs to consider. These are 
rituals/myths, symbols, power structures, organisational structures, control systems 
and routines. As will be discussed later in this dissertation, these six factors are used 
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to explain why apparently good risk and crisis ideas, management, communication or 
messages fail to transfer effectively across cultural borders. A further difficulty is 
highlighted by Stern and Price (1989: 115), who describe how the different 
participants in the risk communication process may have unequal access to key 
information as a result of knowledge deficits or cost factors. Finally, consideration 
has to be given to potential difficulties for the communication manager in relation to 
the dispersion of responsibility and accountability following decisions taken using a 
‘deliberative’ or ‘dialogical’ approach to risk and crisis communication (Stern and 
Price 1989: 112).  
 
Taking the shortcomings of all three paradigms, described in Section 3.7.4, a number 
of theorists emphasise ‘a middle road’ strategy when deciding on an effective 
approach to risk and crisis communication issues. According to Adams and 
Thompson (2002: 34), people are as much exercised by practical and economic 
aspects of societal concerns as they are by engrained values. Ball (2007: 562) warns 
of the dangers of policy-making based solely on ‘open discourse’ to the exclusion of 
what can also be learned from quantitative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Consequently, risk communication practitioners should be cognisant that while the 
dialogical approach has clear benefits in terms of empowering members of the public, 
gleaning useful information, and achieving better ‘buy-in’ for decisions taken, the 
‘expert’ opinion has a particularly important role in the risk communication process. 
Ball (2007: 562) cautions in the context of the ‘dialogical’ approach that, ‘the 
processes by which such issues are incorporated into decision processes are still 
experimental and very few have been subject to rigorous evaluation’.  
 
Many of the issues discussed in this section are equally germane to major emergency 
communication management and as a consequence will be discussed later in Chapter 
5. 
 
3.7.5 Models of risk and crisis communication 
The study of risk communication has evolved from a number of theoretical models 
that have been proposed and describe how humans perceive and react to risk. 
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Included amongst these models is Renn’s (1998) model that specifies the different 
criteria employed in order to analyse and prioritise risk taking into account a number 
of major theoretical approaches (Renn 2008: 24). Additionally, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1992) offer a model that measures risk based on two key parameters, systems 
uncertainties and decision stakes. The type of communication approach adopted 
would be chosen based on where the risk lies on their model. 
 
The ‘risk perception model’ developed by Covello, Wojtecki and Hyde (2001: 386), 
describes the complexity of assessing the perceptions surrounding the risk of death or 
serious injury. Coombs’ (1999) normative, three-staged risk and crisis 
communication model describes the critical elements, both strategic and tactical, that 
communication practitioners need to consider for each stage. Hale’s layered ‘crisis 
communication architecture’ model (1997: 238) describes six functions that are 
necessary in order to effectively support crisis response communication. Finally, 
Covello, Wojtecki and Hyde (2001: 388) ‘trust determination model’ highlights the 
key trust determination factors that are essential for effective risk and crisis 
communication. 
 
These models provide a useful basis for an analysis of the theory and models of major 
emergency communication that are examined in detail throughout Chapters 5,6,7 and 
8. However, these models do not offer much of an insight into the principles of 
strategic communication management. Consequently, in Chapter 4, a concise analysis 
is provided into this subject, which is a useful introduction to the discipline of the 
core subject of this dissertation, strategic major emergency communication 
management.  
 
In summary 
Chapter 3 thus demonstrates that communication theory is a relatively recent field of 
endeavour that continues to evolve. While the work of theorists such as Lippmann, 
Lasswell and Schramm, in the earlier part of the twentieth Century, provides a useful 
foundation for contemporary major emergency communication, the rhetorical-based, 
one-way, top-down approach is shown to be deficient in many respects. In keeping 
with contemporary theories of major emergency management, described in the last 
chapter, where response agencies plan and communicate with rather than for 
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communities, the relational-based, horizontal, dialogical approach to communication, 
which originated from developmental and participatory communication theory, is 
preferred. As Fischhoff (p65) says, ‘all we have to do is make them partners’. 
Theorists such as Grunig and Murphy propose the two-way dialogical approach as 
their preferred models of communication management. However, a number of 
theorists have also identified a number of shortcomings in this two-way, dialogical 
approach also and consequently further testing and evaluation is required. When 
considering communication and communication management from a strategic 
perspective, it will be shown in the next chapter that theorists consider the dialogical 
approach an important element of the strategic process. 
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4 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNICATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Organisations do not exist within a vacuum but are obliged to co-exist, interact and 
survive with their external environment. Many changes within contemporary society 
require organisations to make sense of a turbulent, complex and sometimes 
threatening world. Because of this, organisations are well advised to devise systems 
for anticipating and solving the ‘wicked’ problems with which they are confronted on 
a daily basis (De Wit and Meyer 2004: 28). Organisational survival is based on its 
effective ability to monitor, interpret and respond to the many and diverse problems 
that threaten its survival. Since the 1950s, organisations have engaged in a process of 
strategic management in order to help them to survive in rapidly changing 
environments and also to succeed in achieving their goals. The processes of strategic 
management have evolved and expanded to include other diverse areas such as 
communication. In this chapter, it will be shown that a growing base of literature 
exists supporting the pursuit of strategic communication management. With the ever-
increasing numbers of post-graduate courses available in Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) and Masters of Business Science (MBS) at third level 
institutions in Ireland, sourcing textbooks on strategy management is straightforward.  
 
Lindeborg (1994: 5) emphasises the link between ‘excellent’ communication and 
strategy, stating:  
 
Excellent communication is communication that is managed strategically, 
meets its objectives, and balances the needs of the organisation and the 
needs of key publics with two-way symmetrical communication.  
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4.2 Overview of strategy and strategic management 
 
4.2.1 Strategy 
The term strategy derives from the Greek word strategia, meaning ‘generalship’. Sun 
Tzu’s The art of war, written in 500 BC, is regarded by many ‘as the first treatise on 
strategy’ (Grant 2008: 14). As an academic field of endeavour, however, the subject 
of strategy is relatively new. According to Kleiner (1996: 43), researchers during 
World War II spent considerable effort attempting to provide solutions for dealing 
with complicated environments. At the end of the war, these researchers brought 
strategy theory into the business environment. Their strategy skills came to good use 
in the 1950s and 1960s when senior executives were experiencing increasing 
difficulty in controlling and coordinating businesses that were expanding rapidly in 
terms of size and complexity. To overcome these difficulties, elite business schools in 
the US, such as Harvard, developed models of strategy and strategic corporate 
planning that were quickly adopted by large businesses. As a consequence, many 
useful texts started to appear.  
 
Steiner (1969: 23) considers strategic planning as a plan, ‘tangible evidence of the 
thinking of management’. However, during the 1980s shortcomings were identified in 
the strategic planning approach, in particular a belief that it resulted in an overly rigid 
mindset. According to Hill and Jones (2001: 22), organisations began to recognise 
that many successful realised strategies can emerge through a process of ‘serendipity 
rather than through a planned process’. Consequently, organisations began to adopt a 
strategic management approach, rather than merely relying on a strict planning 
model. Today, large organisations place considerable emphasis on the external 
environment, business ethics, competing for standards and strategic innovation (Grant 
2008: 18). However, despite the change of focus from the concept of strategic 
planning to strategic management, according to Hill and Jones (2001: 23), 
‘…planning is an essential element of the strategic management process; even its 
most vocal critics concede that it has an important role to play’.  
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Strategic management is the process of ‘making and implementing strategic 
decisions’ (Asch and Bowman 1989: xiii). Mintzberg and Quinn (1991: 5) describe it 
as a pattern or plan that ‘integrates the organisation’s major goals, policies, and action 
sequences into a cohesive whole’. According to Grant (2008: 17) strategic 
management is the ‘means’ by which individuals or organisations achieve their 
objectives. This includes ‘the plans, policies and principles that guide and unify a 
number of specific actions…not just the detailed actions’ (ibid.).  
 
4.2.2 The strategic management process 
The strategic management process has been discussed in detail in a great number of 
texts over the past two decades. Many of the texts studied as part of this research 
provide relevant and self-explanatory diagrammatical models. In particular, by DeWit 
and Meyer (2004) and Grant (2008) use clear diagrams in order to explain concepts 
such as the strategy process, strategy formation and the common elements in 
successful strategies. Additionally, a number of texts were consulted in order to chart 
the evolution of strategy from World War II to the present day. 
 
When it comes to strategic management, ‘two words seem to pervade the literature, 
mission and environment’ (Grunig 1992: 119). Mission is defined as, ‘…a statement 
of purpose - what the organisation hopes to achieve over the long term…a pointer to 
the overall direction’ (Grant 2008: 21). Robbins describes the environment as ‘those 
institutions or forces that affect the performance of an organisation, but over which it 
has very little control’ (Robbins 1990: 150). Van der Hiejden (1996: 33) introduces a 
third important element of strategy, ‘uncertainty about the future’ and says it is one of 
the main reasons why strategic management is needed. Finlay (2000: 9) describes 
uncertainty as an organisation’s ‘residual lack of knowledge…including the knowable 
and the intrinsically unknowable’. Schoemaker (1993: 193) believes that uncertainty 
can be positive as ‘…it stimulates reinvention, challenges traditional approaches, and 
fosters advanced anticipation, flexibility in strategies and continuous monitoring’. 
 
As a result, the process of strategic management was developed in order to deal with 
the issues surrounding an organisation’s mission, environment and uncertainty. As 
will be shown throughout this dissertation (particularly in Sections 4.3 and 4.4), a 
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growing body of evidence exists supporting the premise that a well conceived and 
implemented strategic communication programme can greatly assist the organisation 
to interact with its environment, particularly during times of uncertainty. 
 
Mintzberg and Quinn (1991: 15) emphasise that the strategic management process is 
a framework, as distinct from a hierarchical and structured plan. The process allows 
an organisation to ‘get from where it is, to where it wants to be’ (ibid.). For the 
purpose of analysis, this framework is best discussed in terms of sequential stages. 
These stages have been identified in models by a number of theorists, including 
Thompson and Strickland (1995: 3), Grant (2008: 7) and Johnson, Scholes and 
Whittington (2008: 12). These theorists propose a number of sequential steps that 
should be taken by strategy managers and include the provision of a long-term 
direction or mission, converting the mission into specific measurable objectives, 
crafting a strategy and plan, implement the chosen strategy, and evaluating the 
performance and correcting elements as necessary. What is noticeable about many of 
these models is that the type and sequence of steps proposed are quite similar. 
 
In their strategic model, De Wit and Meyer (2004: 7) describe three distinct aspects of 
the strategy process: strategic thinking, strategy formation and strategic change. 
According to the authors, strategic thinking involves identifying what the problem is, 
diagnosing the nature of the problem, conceiving how best to address the problem, 
and implementing actions to be taken. Friend and Hickling (1997: 10) describe how 
decision-making is made more difficult by particular uncertainties that exist in the 
both the internal and external environment. To overcome these problems, they 
emphasise that organisations needs more information through ongoing research and 
analysis; more coordination through liaison and planning; and that goals and 
objectives need to be clearly stated.  
 
In relation to the second element of De Wit and Meyer’s model, ‘strategy formation’, 
this process is considered from two distinct perspectives. Firstly, ‘strategy 
formulation’ where intelligence is gathered and analysed and transformed into a 
definite plan or ‘intended strategy’ (as Mintzberg (1994: 31) terms it the ‘grand 
strategy’). Secondly, a process for dealing with unplanned actions that arise because 
of forces in the environment and uncertainty and causes the intended strategy to 
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‘emerge’ into an actual or ‘realised strategy’ (De Wit and Meyer 2004: 105). The 
main ‘strategy formation’ activities as described by De Wit and Meyer are shown in 
Figure 4.1 as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Strategy formation activities 
 
 Source: (De Wit and Meyer 2004: 106) 
 
Taking the different elements of De Wit and Meyer’s model in sequence, mission 
setting involves outlining the purpose that the organisation wishes to serve or what it 
wants to achieve. Agenda setting helps the organisation to focus on specific strategic 
issues. An assessment of the external environment helps to identify opportunities or 
threats from outside the organisation and is generally done through research and 
analysis. Tools such as a ‘strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats’ (SWOT) 
model, a ‘political/legal, economic, socio-cultural, and technological analysis’ 
(PEST) model (Bowman 1990: 35), a ‘Boston consulting group matrix (BCG) (De 
Wit and Meyer 2004: 299), and a ‘quantitative strategic planning matrix’ (David 
1993: 12), prove useful in this regard. Assessing the internal environment is a process 
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of analysing the capabilities and functioning of the organisation. The actions of 
option generation and selection involve going through a process of strategic thinking 
and decision-making, and then choosing an optimum course of action. Action taking 
involves implementing intended actions in order to achieve realised actions. This 
includes the strategic planning process, which is described as: 
 
The systematic process through which strategic thinking is formalised 
and plans devised to support the strategy implementation (Finlay 2000: 
16). 
 
The implementation of performance controls involves evaluation of the implemented 
actions and assessment of success or failure of the realised strategy. It will be shown 
that the strategy formation process is an extremely important function during the 
preparedness and planning stages for major emergency situations. 
 
De Wit and Meyer’s third aspect of the strategy process is strategic change. This 
involves changing the configuration of the organisation and the way it operates in 
order to meet the challenges posed by its environment. This can involve changes to 
the organisation’s structure, processes and culture (De Wit and Meyer 2004: 166). 
 
4.2.3 Strategic versus tactical approaches 
Tactics relate to the actions contained within a strategic plan that are employed to 
make the plan a success, and to assist the organisation in accomplishing the designed 
strategy. Tactical planning is an integral part of strategic planning and as such both 
should work in harmony. Highlighting the benefits of implementing a strategic 
approach rather than a tactical approach, Grant states: 
 
Strategy is the overall plan for deploying resources to establish a 
favourable position; a tactic is a scheme for specific action. While 
tactics are concerned with the maneuvers [sic] necessary to win battles, 
strategy is concerned with winning the war (2008: 7). 
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4.2.4 Strategic management and cultural theory 
While a growing body of evidence supports the strategic management process, it 
needs to be considered within the context of cultural theory as discussed earlier in 
Section 3.4.3. Johnson and Scholes (1988: 113) acknowledge the significance of the 
cultural and political systems of an organisation and highlight ‘the growing awareness 
of the central importance of these issues in understanding strategy formulation and 
independence’. Additionally, they identify a ‘cultural web’ of factors ‘which preserve 
and sustain commonly held core-beliefs – the recipe’ (ibid: 41). The recipe includes 
factors such as power structures, control systems, rituals and myths, symbols, routines 
and organisational structures, and is considered a set of subconscious basic 
assumptions and beliefs, shared by everyone within the organisation, which defines 
how business is conducted. According to Johnson (1992: 208), an analysis of factors 
in the web allows managers to ‘discover’ the nature of their organisation, the strategy 
that they are following and why it may fail to transfer across cultural borders. This is 
an important consideration in the context of major emergency communication 
management and will be discussed later in this dissertation. 
 
4.3 Strategic communication management 
 
Unfortunately, the literature referring to strategic communication management is not 
as well developed as that relating to organisational strategic management. What is 
noticeable is the predominance in the field of collaborations by a relatively small 
group of theorists, including James and Larissa Grunig, David Dozier, Glenn Broom, 
Scott Cutlip, Allen Center and Denis Wilcox. 
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.1, many organisations are obliged to operate and 
fulfil their missions and goals in very turbulent environments together with a great 
deal of uncertainty as to their future. This is particularly relevant when dealing with 
‘strategic constituencies’ that are described as: 
 
Elements of the environment whose opposition or support can threaten 
the organisation’s goals or support or help to attain them (Grunig and 
Grunig 2000: 306). 
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Theorists and practitioners in strategic management have developed many models in 
order to assist organisations to deal with, and overcome, their difficulties. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, communication management provides an effective means of 
positively interacting with and influencing an organisation’s internal and external 
environments. Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000: 6) describe how communication 
management can ‘establish and maintain a mutually beneficial relationships between 
an organisation and the publics on whom its success or failure depends’. Grunig and 
Grunig (2000: 310) discuss how communication management plays a critical role in 
strategic management by helping the organisation to identify the most important 
constituents in the environment and building good relationships with them through 
communication. However, as will be discussed in Section 4.4, communication 
management is more effective when the process itself is managed strategically, 
thereby allowing optimum support to the organisation in achieving its mission. 
However, according to many key theorists, in order for communication management 
to be fully supportive and optimal, the senior communication practitioner must be at 
the centre of decision-making within the organisation (Grunig 1992: 155; Plowman 
2005: 131; Darrell 2003: 20; Cutlip, Center and Broom 2000: 170). 
 
Consequently, strategic communication management can be defined as: 
 
A deliberate, planned, sustained and systematic series of communication 
programmes that supports the organisation’s strategic management 
efforts (Wilcox and Cameron 2005: 23).  
 
According to Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 85), communication becomes 
strategic when it ‘…assists top management in managing the pursuit of its purpose 
and direction, coincident with managing relationships with key publics in the 
organisation’s environment’. 
 
Plowman (2005: 132) believes the ‘strategic’ part of strategic communication 
management means ‘accomplishing goals and solving complex communication 
problems’. Webster (1990: 18) concurs, stating that in order to be considered 
strategic, communication management must at a minimum be ‘…aligned with the 
corporate vision or mission and substantially contribute to achieving the 
organisation’s objectives’. However, it must be acknowledged that there may be 
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conflict between the goals of the organisation and its stakeholders and publics. This 
creates an additional challenge for the communication practitioner. Significantly, 
Grunig and Grunig (2000: 308) emphasise that strategic communication management 
involves much more than a mere ‘set of communication tactics supplied by 
communication technicians’. Plowman (2005: 133) agrees stating:  
 
Participation with strategic management elevates public relations from 
its typical tactical role of reacting to events to a more proactive, 
responsive role of anticipating and reducing emerging conflicts. 
 
Other important elements and functions of strategic communication management 
include boundary spanning the open systems environment with strategic stakeholders, 
strategic thinking, taking a long-range view of the effects of organisation actions and 
encouraging joint fact finding and intelligence sharing (Plowman 2005: 132). 
 
4.3.1 Tactical communication management 
In many organisations the communication practitioner is often relegated to that of a 
tactical or functionary role. This relates to a role that is considered non-strategic, 
described by Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 54) as that of a ‘communication 
technician…where the practitioner merely implements the decisions of others…a 
received role’. Grunig (1992: 121) proposes that communication managers who 
operate at the tactical level are restricted to the ‘application of technique rather than 
the formulation of policy’.  
 
A tactical approach to communication management involves pursuing the planning of 
narrow short-term advocacy techniques and the implementation of individual 
programmes. Tactical communication managers rarely engage in any strategic 
research or evaluation (Daugherty 2003: 21). Consequently, they have no basis for 
understanding fully the perceptions, opinions, needs and behaviours of publics, or of 
the determination of subsequent message effects (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002: 
255). Communication programmes adopting this approach may be ‘missing any sense 
of purpose…lacking in a sense of direction’ (Dozier, Grunig and Grunig 1995: 59).  
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Certain theorists have cited particular reasons why practitioners adopt tactical 
approaches towards communication management rather than strategic ones. These 
reasons include amongst others, the practitioners lack of knowledge or experience to 
play the strategic communication managers role (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002: 
255); an absence of formal communication education (Carrington 1992: 45; Grunig 
1992: 439); the culture and attitude towards communication within the organisation, 
particularly by senior decision-makers (Dozier, Grunig and Grunig 1995: 148); and 
the relative ease and comfort of routinely pursuing a ‘historicist’, or ‘the way we have 
always done things here’, approach (Steyn, Green and Grobler 2001: 8). 
 
4.3.2 A model of strategic communication management 
One of the most comprehensive normative models of strategic communication 
management was developed by Grunig and Repper through their ‘Excellence Study’ 
(Grunig 1992: 124). This model is significant in that it integrates and highlights the 
role of communication within the wider strategic management context. For example, 
the model demonstrates how communication is critical in identifying stakeholders, 
publics and issues that can impact on the organisation’s survival or reputation. 
Significantly, the model also places particular emphasis on the role of communication 
in the ongoing monitoring and subsequent understanding of the organisation’s 
external environment. It thereby provides critical information that can allow the 
overall mission to be adjusted if necessary. As will be demonstrated in Sections 
6.4.1.1 and 7.3, environmental scanning and information-gathering is extremely 
important for the effective identification and management of major emergency 
situations.  
 
The model consists of three distinct stages, the ‘stakeholder stage’, the ‘public stage’ 
and the ‘issues stage’. At the ‘stakeholder stage’, the organisation and the 
stakeholders have a particular relationship. The behaviour of one to the other will 
have an influence on how each is likely to act and possible decisions that may be 
taken by either side. According to Repper, the organisation needs to understand who 
these stakeholders are, and should engage in continuous research and environmental 
scanning in order to assess the consequences of its decisions on these stakeholders. 
Objective actions such as these can assist the organisation in identifying and 
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evaluating issues of mutual or conflicting consequences between it and its external 
environment. It will be shown later in this dissertation, in Sections 5.3.2, 7.5, and 8.3 
that the lead response organisation needs to be able to identify, understand and 
engage in meaningful two-way dialogue with its stakeholders and publics in order to 
efficiently prepare for and respond to a major emergency situation. 
 
At the second stage of the model, ‘the public stage’, the goal of strategic 
communication management is to segment these publics in order to allow individual 
groups, supporters, neutral or opponents, to be clearly identified. Thereafter the 
strategic communication practitioner should involve the identified publics in 
meaningful dialogue surrounding the decision-making process in order to mitigate 
potential conflict. This is similar to the broad-based deliberative process that will be 
shown to be an extremely important element of strategic communication 
management.  
 
At the third stage, the ‘issues stage’, publics organise and create issues out of 
problems they perceive. In relation to major emergency situations, an example of a 
potential issue is the reported lack of sufficient anti-viral drugs to treat the entire 
population in the event of an influenza pandemic. This is likely to provoke protests by 
certain members of the public should a pandemic become imminent, thereby creating 
‘publics’ (mentioned earlier in Chapter 1). The role of strategic communication 
management is to anticipate these issues and manage the Irish Health Service 
Executive’s (HSE) response to them. As issues develop, the media play a more 
significant role in their generation and promulgation. The use of communication 
research is important at this stage. In order to deal with different categories of 
publics, the strategic communication manager may require the use of different 
approaches, such as inter-personal communication using dialogue and negotiation to 
deal with activist publics, and the use of the mass media to reach the wider public. 
 
Repper, cited in Grunig (1992: 124) emphasises that communication programmes 
need to be developed for different categories of stakeholders and publics at each of 
the three stages. Other critical elements included in the model are: the setting of 
formal goals and objectives for the communication function; planning formal 
programmes and campaigns to accomplish each objective; and conducting evaluation 
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in order to assess the effectiveness of programmes in terms of meeting their 
objectives and in the reduction of conflict produced as a consequence of effective 
decision-making. Each of these elements will be discussed in greater detail 
throughout the dissertation. 
 
Offering a revised version of this model, Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002: 145) 
incorporate an important additional element, the ‘interconnectedness’ and 
interdependence that exist between decisions taken and outcomes. The model 
describes management’s decisions and how these are likely to generate specific 
‘consequences’ on the likely ‘behaviour’ of stakeholders and publics alike. Their 
process can result in a feedback loop to management from stakeholders in order to 
allow a revision of the original decision. However, if the decision is poorly handled, 
the subsequent stakeholder ‘behaviour’ is likely to generate ‘issues’ and possibly 
‘crises’ that can impact on the organisation. At this stage of the cycle, how these 
‘relationships’ are managed will affect and influence the ‘reputation’ of the 
organisation and is likely to impact on whether or not the organisation achieves its 
‘goals’. It will be seen later that decisions taken by major emergency planners, such 
as failing to protect levees in New Orleans, generated ‘issues’ for certain stakeholders 
who provided feedback to the authorities. Eventually, the decision not to protect the 
levees resulted in a full-blown crisis, the flooding of New Orleans. This model is 
presented in Figure 4.2 over 
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Figure 4.2: Strategic communication management framework 
 
 
 Source: (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002: 145) 
 
4.4 Key elements involved in strategic communication management 
 
Through studies such as the ‘Excellence Study’ (Grunig 1992) and later work by  
theorists such as Larissa Grunig, David Dozier and Glen Broom, a number of key 
elements have been identified that can be associated with excellent communication 
management. These key elements provide the basis for a number of strategic 
principles that underpin strategic communication management. It will be 
demonstrated that these principles also underpin the strategic management of major 
emergency communication, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The key 
principles of strategic communication management are described below. 
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4.4.1 Culture and organisational structure  
The underlying culture, structure and world-view of an organisation will have a 
significant bearing on the approach taken towards the management of its 
communication process. Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles (2006: 110) describe 
communication as ‘a vein that runs through every tier of the organisation’. According 
to Grunig (1992: 591), societal culture can impose a particular world-view on an 
organisation and generate presuppositions about the way communication should be 
managed. In order to implement an ‘excellent’ communication management process, 
it may be necessary, in the first instance, to consider the cultural environment within 
which the organisation operates. This was briefly discussed earlier in Sections 3.4.3 
and 4.2.4, and it is recognised that the task may not be as simple as it appears. 
Cultural differences between individuals and societies may result in similar 
information being received and processed in different ways, resulting in varying types 
of behaviour. Consequently, theorists such as Smiramesh and White (cited in Grunig 
1992: 610) and Dozier (cited in Dozier, Grunig and Grunig 1995: 170), describe how 
communication practitioners in one country may require a different approach than 
their counterparts in other countries. Secondly, according to Frosdick (1995: 55), 
exploring cultural differences provides useful explanations as to why apparently good 
strategies sometimes fail and ‘encourages an appreciation of the validity of alternative 
points of view’.  
 
Additionally, as a result of the nature of the culture and structure of the organisation, 
changes may be required. Important changes that can be brought about in this regard 
include, the way that information flows both vertically and horizontally throughout 
the organisation, how decisions are reached, and a willingness to engage in scientific 
communication techniques such as research and evaluation. A change in 
organisational culture or structure, such as this, can facilitate the development and 
implementation of a genuine two-way symmetrical-model, or mixed-model of 
communication, between the organisation and its external environment (ibid.). 
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4.4.2 Management-by-objectives 
The process of ‘management-by-objectives’ (MBO) involves senior decision-makers 
establishing and agreeing a series of goals and objectives within the organisation. 
This creates a focus for management of achieving stated aims and attaining the best 
possible results from available resources. MBO also provides a useful means of 
evaluating managers’ abilities to achieve specific organisational goals within certain 
timeframes and operating budgets (Hill and Jones 2001: 429; Seitel 2004: 81). 
Theorists identify four steps that need to be taken in the MBO approach for strategic 
management: The establishment of overarching objectives; the development and 
issuing of particular assignments, plans, procedures and protocols; establishing clear, 
specific, and measurable objectives for tactical activities; and documenting results to 
measure performance in order to instigate corrective action (Nordlund 1994: 17; 
Reynolds 2002: 20; Ridge 20049(c): 6).  
 
According to Cutlip, Center and Broom (2000: 375), when organisations employ 
MBO to guide the strategic communication management process, the focus shifts 
from producing communications, or focusing merely on the communication process, 
to achieving results or impact. This makes the strategic communication practitioner 
more accountable for achieving their aspects of organisational goals and ensures that 
the focus of the strategy is to achieve overall effectiveness as well as efficiency 
(Lindeborg 1994: 5).  
 
A number of theorists, including Hon (1998: 105), Pieczka (2000: 213) and Grunig 
(1992: 262) have stressed that communication goals must be clearly aligned to the 
overarching goals of the organisation. Temple (2002: 33) agrees and describes the 
alignment of goals as a ‘clear tight-fitting nexus’. Alignment of the communication 
and operational goals and objectives will ensure that the communication process 
assists, supports and complements the overall vision of senior decision-makers, rather 
than operating as a stand-alone function. Communication goals and objectives must 
also be clearly defined and understood by all, be operationally attainable, be 
quantitatively measurable, and be oriented toward overall improvement.  
 
 90
4.4.3 Strategic communication planning 
Many theorists such as Higgins (1979: 9) and Daugherty (2003: 21) emphasise that 
strategic communication planning is an important element of, and complementary to, 
the overall strategic communication management process. According to Dozier, 
Grunig and Grunig (1995: 85), ‘senior management engage in strategic 
communication planning when they make strategic decisions in a proactive manner’. 
Temple (2002: 32) believes, ‘…sound strategic communication planning is the 
critical success factor in developing effective crisis communication strategies – and 
must never be neglected’. Fearn-Banks (1996: 24) contends that the value of strategic 
communication planning derives largely from the detailed analysis and strategic 
thought that surrounds the process rather than the end product. Daugherty (2003: 21) 
believes that care must be taken, as the process of strategic communication planning 
is often overly ‘structured and hierarchical’ and can therefore hinder positive action 
during events that have not been planned for. 
 
Many theorists, including Smith (2005: 220) and Cutlip, Centre and Broom (2000: 
341) propose models that describe the strategic communication planning process. The 
process generally follows a distinctive phased pattern, with a series of steps outlined 
for each particular phase. While the content of each model is remarkably similar, the 
sequence and timing of steps may vary from model to model. These steps generally 
include: defining the communication problem using research and analysis; using 
techniques such as ‘brainstorming’ to develop plans and programmes to deal with 
each communication problem; allocating adequate resources and budgets for each 
element of the plan; deciding on appropriate deadlines and a clear delineation of 
responsibilities for each particular element of the plan; implementing the plan through 
action and communication; and finally, the strategic evaluation of each of the 
communication programmes in order to determine its success of failure. 
 
Central to a successful communication planning process is the ability to make 
decisions strategically. This involves choosing an optimal course of action from a 
range of possible alternatives. According to Clemen and Reilly (2001: 6), when 
making important communication decisions, decision-makers can utilise modelling 
tools such as decision trees in order to aid analysis. Important variables such as 
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uncertainty need to be factored into the process. Other tools, such as probability 
analysis, can assist in this regard. 
 
Many barriers exist to the conduct of effective strategic communication planning. 
These include a lack of strategic communication knowledge or experience, 
inadequate consultation and deliberation, a failure to agree clear goals and objectives 
for the implementation of the programme, inadequate or unrealistic time frames, 
unsuitable processes of internal clearance, a lack of coordination, and the absence of 
flexibility (Temple 2002: 32). 
 
4.4.4 Strategic communication research 
According to the Price (1989: 13), one of the key characteristics that differentiates 
strategic communication management from tactical management is that practitioners 
undertake ongoing, systematic and strategic communication research. Broom and 
Dozier (1990: 85) define this type of research as ‘…the controlled, objective and 
systematic gathering of information for the purposes of describing and 
understanding’. According to Ehling (1985: 236), any communication management 
that is not based on strategic research is likely to be ‘flawed’. 
 
Many theorists have identified a number of different approaches to communication 
research. Using a continuum, Broom and Dozier (1990: 14) describe one category of 
non-strategic communication practice that utilises the ‘no-research-approach’ or 
‘seat-of-the-pants’ approach. This approach is considered to be individualistic, 
subjective and personal, ‘with little use for social or behavioural research’ (Grunig 
1992: 162). Further along the continuum, Austin, Pinkleton and Dixon (2000: 82) 
describe ‘informal research’ where programmes are developed using an unscientific 
or unrepresentative approach to the discipline. At the optimal end of the continuum, 
Grunig (1992: 162) describes a ‘scientific management’ approach to communication 
research. Using this method, strategic practitioners engage in different types of 
communication research, that includes ‘formative’, ‘programme’ and ‘summative’ 
research. 
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Adopting a scientific approach to research, the strategic communication manager can 
obtain much vital information necessary to make complex decisions in relation to 
goal setting, programme direction, message emphasis, and budget allocation 
(Simpson 1992: 27). Strategic communication research also allows decision-makers 
to have greater confidence that their findings reflect reality, not just decision-makers’ 
perceptions of reality (Broom and Dozier 1990: 4).  
 
Significantly, conducting strategic research allows communicators to identify and 
segment the general public into groups ‘whose members are bound by mutual 
interests, concerns and characteristics’ (Fearn-Banks 1996: 13; Wilcox and Cameron 
2005: 130). According to Grunig (1992: 127) this is extremely important as the 
general public ‘is a contradiction in terms’ as it cannot be considered a homogenous 
mass. Many contemporary theorists are in agreement that strategic communication 
research should be conducted early, and thereafter should be sustained throughout all 
stages of the communication life cycle.  
 
4.4.5 Strategic communication evaluation 
Rossi and Freeman, cited in Cutlip, Center and Broom, (2000: 432) define strategic 
communication evaluation as: 
 
A systematic application of social research in order to assess the 
conceptualisation, design, implementation and impact of communication 
programmes.  
 
Theorists such as Lindenmann, cited in Hon, (1998: 112), Coombs (1999: 136), and 
Reynolds (2002: 7) contend that strategic evaluation should not be conducted merely 
at the end of a communication programme, but should be carried out ‘regularly and 
systematically throughout all stages’. The strategic evaluation of any communication 
programme involves three distinct stages. These include, ‘preparation evaluation’ 
where critical preparatory tasks, such as the process of defining the communication 
problem and planning the communication programme, are evaluated (Cutlip, Center, 
and Broom 2000: 440). Once communication plans have been developed,  
‘implementation evaluation’ allows a detailed assessment to takes place with regard 
to the implementation of prepared communication plans and how the communication 
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processes are effected (Pieczka 2000: 214). Finally, communication practitioners can 
conduct an ‘impact evaluation’ where a comprehensive assessment of the outcomes 
and the impact of implemented communication programmes take place (Hon 1998: 
106). However, in order to properly evaluate the effectiveness of a strategic 
communication programme, goals and objectives should firstly be established in 
order to provide a benchmark to work against (Hon 1998: 105; Daugherty 2003: 26).  
 
4.4.6 Building relationships 
Many of the definitions of strategic communication management relate to the 
development and maintenance of good relationships between an organisation and its 
external environment. According to Ferguson (1984: 1), the relationships between 
organisations and their publics ‘should be the central unit of study for strategic 
communication managers’. Many theorists, such as Alesch et al. (2004: 2) and 
Covello and Sandman, cited in Wolbarst, (2001: 171), emphasise the importance of 
building and maintaining good relationships with groups that make up the external 
environment, especially the media.  
 
In order to ensure good relationships between an organisation and its publics, it is 
necessary that the relationships be strategically managed (Lindenmann 1998/99: 19). 
This can be achieved through a number of critical steps beginning with the 
establishment of ‘process objectives’ (ibid.). This step involves the identification of 
stakeholders and publics and developing specific programmes in order to build and 
manage the relationship with each group (Ledingham 2000: 46). The establishment of 
‘outcome objectives’ is the next key step where the quality of the relationship is 
measured following the implementation of the specific communication programmes 
(Hon 1998: 129; Grunig Grunig and Dozier 2002: 550). The perception of the 
strength of the relationship is also considered important and should be measured 
(Broom, Casey and Ritchey 1997: 95). According to Grunig (1992: 82), few 
communication managers ‘study or measure the quality of relationships sufficiently’, 
therefore the strength of the relationships is difficult to determine and improve. 
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4.4.7 Broad based deliberation 
A growing body of literature highlights how a strong participative culture and 
meaningful dialogue can greatly enhance communication flows from an organisation 
to its external environment, thereby improving levels of openness, transparency, trust 
and credibility. This ‘dialogical’ approach has been discussed earlier in Section 3.7.4. 
As will be discussed throughout this dissertation, particularly in Sections 5.3.2 and 
9.4.4, enhanced dialogue and engagement is an important strategy for dealing with 
crisis and major emergency situations (Grunig 1992: 17; Stern and Fineberg 
1996:118; Mileti 1999: 9; Susskind and Field 1996: 231; ILGRA 1998: 8).  
 
This critical process has been described in a number of ways by a variety of theorists, 
including ‘deliberative’ approach (Dora 2006: 172); ‘dialogical’ approach (Palenchar 
and Heath 2007: 122); ‘full participation theory’ (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002: 
383); ‘mutual gains approach’ (Susskind and Field 1996: 37); and ‘bridging social 
capital’ (Putnam 2000: 19). Where members of the public are meaningfully engaged 
in complex issues where scientific analysis and input is required, the process is 
known as a ‘broad-based analytic-deliberative approach’ (Stern and Fineberg 1996: 
71; Ball 2005: 25). 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, in situations where complex or technical risk issues 
exist, communication practitioners are often reluctant to engage meaningfully with 
their stakeholders and publics in the ‘broad-based analytic-deliberative’ process when 
it is considered that the latter lack technical expertise and cannot be held accountable 
for decisions that they take (Kweit and Kweit 1984: 32). However, a balanced 
approach, described as ‘a middle road’ strategy (Adams and Thompson 2002: 34), is 
one where the views of the scientific community, including quantitative risk 
assessments and cost-benefit analysis, are taken into consideration together with the 
views and opinions of ‘non-expert’ stakeholders. As the process of engaging the 
public in dialogue is somewhat recent in the context of major emergency 
communication management, the theoretical and practical process will need to be 
rigorously tested in order to prove its efficacy. The dialogical approach to major 
emergency communication management will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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4.4.8 Strategic communication knowledge: (Formal education and 
experience)  
Many theorists, including Grunig (1992: 439), Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 7), 
and Rose (2002: 15) place considerable emphasis on communication practitioners 
possessing requisite communication knowledge and experience in order to engage in 
excellent strategic communication management. According to Dozier, Grunig and 
Grunig (1995: 11), ‘…at the core of the sphere of strategic communication excellence 
is the knowledge base of the communication practitioners’. As mentioned earlier, one 
of the key elements that differentiates the role of strategic communication managers 
from that of tactical communication managers is the knowledge and experience to 
undertake the function of strategic communication manager. Without strategic 
communication knowledge, it is unlikely that the communication manager will be 
able to undertake important functions such as: implementing different models of 
communication (one-way, two-way and mixed-models); have the ability to contribute 
meaningfully to strategic policy decisions; provide communication programme 
alternatives; guide senior management through logical problem-solving processes 
(Dozier, Grunig and Grunig 1995: 39; Grunig 1992: 460); conduct strategic research, 
planning and evaluation throughout all stages of the communication life cycle (Stern 
and Fineberg 1996: 155); or manage communication in a society with rapidly 
changing demographic profiles (Rose 2002: 15; Fearn-Banks 1996: 10). Theorists 
such as Grant (2008: 159) and Dranove and Marciano (2005: 191) emphasise the 
importance of academic courses for gaining indepth knowledge in order to benefit the 
organisation. 
 
4.5 Strategic communication management during a major emergency 
situation 
 
A comprehensive examination of the literature dealing with the subject of strategic 
major emergency communication management reveals that the most useful data 
emanates from communication sections within government departments or agencies. 
Amongst the most notable contributors are the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and National Response Team 
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(NRT) in the US; the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), Inter-Departmental 
Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA) and the Emergency Planning Society 
(EPS) in the UK; the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in Sweden, 
Emergency Management Australia; Public Safety Canada; and the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. 
 
By their nature, major emergencies are characterised by uncertainty, rapid change, 
confusion and doubt, where ‘central values are threatened, and established authority 
structures are called into question’ (Nohrstedt 2000: 139). It is sometimes questioned 
whether the theories, models and approaches of strategic communication 
management, mentioned throughout this dissertation, can be of any benefit when 
dealing with the complexities of major emergency situations. However, according to 
the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), implementing a strategic major 
emergency communication management process in the short-, medium-, and longer-
term: 
 
…will put you back in control…map out how you operate…increase 
certainty amongst stakeholders through information…reduce isolation, 
develop allies…and identify resources required (Reynolds 2002: 45).  
 
Additionally, Dyer (1995: 41) emphasises that a good major emergency 
communication management strategy ‘can result in saving human lives’.  
 
With the exception of a small number of guidance documents, very few texts exist 
that provide a comprehensive examination of major emergency communication 
management, from a strategic viewpoint, throughout all three stages. Much of the 
existing literature associated with the discipline consists of quasi-strategic models, 
together with tactical guidelines and checklists for the communication practitioner, 
particularly for the crisis / response stage of the major emergency life cycle. Despite 
this, a small number of theorists have provided reasonably comprehensive models 
that have proven valuable during this research.  
 
One of the most useful models examined is one developed by Barbara Reynolds for 
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (CDC) based in Washington, 
D.C. (Reynolds 2002: 7). This model is based on a five-staged approach and 
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comprehensively describes the key communication requirements throughout all 
stages of a major emergency life cycle.  
 
Figure 4.3: Major emergency communication management life cycle 
 
 Source: (Reynolds 2002: 7) 
 
Offering a useful normative model of strategic major emergency communication 
management, UK Resilience (2005: 28) incorporates the cyclical elements of strategic 
communication planning, along with many key aspects of the management process. 
Of significance within this model are the communication flows at different stages 
throughout the process, including the receipt of information at the problem 
formulation stage and two-way flows of information at the planning and decision-
making stage. Additionally, the model emphasises approaching major emergency 
communication using a scientific perspective, making full use of communication 
research and evaluation. Such strategic approaches assist the major emergency 
practitioner to solve simultaneous complex problems in very difficult circumstances. 
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Nordlund’s (1994) descriptive ‘Triangle Drama’ model provides a very useful 
framework in order to analyse the interaction between three of the key participants 
involved in a major emergency situation, the government, its publics, and the media. 
The model provides a very comprehensive and useful description of the key 
communication functions that should take place throughout all stages with particular 
emphasis on research, evaluation, setting clear goals and objectives and developing a 
communication plan. Nordlund also analyses the key characteristics of the 
communication message and medium. In this regard he places particular emphasis on 
the importance of the media throughout a crisis. 
 
In summary 
Chapter 4 describes how the strategic management process was developed in order to 
allow organisations to interact effectively within an uncertain environment and to 
survive during turbulent times. The strategy process for organisations, as outlined in 
De Wit and Meyer’s model, involves a number of critical actions including 
identifying problems and establishing goals, assessing the internal and external 
environment, establishing courses of action, taking objective action and evaluating 
progress and results. In the early 1990s, a number of communication theorists, 
including James Grunig and David Dozier, recognised the value of this process to the 
communication management function and developed models accordingly. They 
proposed that without such a strategic approach, the communication practitioner is 
obliged to engage in tactical communication, involving a narrow, short-term focus on 
individual programmes. A strategic approach, on the other hand, allows the 
communication manager to achieve aims in the longer-term, aligned to the overall 
corporate vision, and to deal with a range of complex problems simultaneously. It 
also provides a basis for the communication manager to understand fully the 
perceptions, needs, opinions and behaviours of key publics, through communication 
research and evaluation. Adapting the strategic communication model to the major 
emergency life cycle, theorists such as Reynolds and Nordlund propose models that 
can guide the communication function throughout the uncertainty and turbulence of a 
major emergency situation. While these models are useful, they are deficient in 
certain respects. Consequently, building on the strengths of each of the models 
discussed in Chapter 4, and considering data gleaned from the literature, a proposed 
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framework for strategic major emergency communication management will be 
proposed in Chapter 5. 
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5 STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES AND THE MAJOR EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, a number of models of strategic major emergency 
communication management were discussed. They provide a useful basis for 
understanding communication flows during a major emergency. Taking cognisance 
of the information contained within these models, together with other useful sources, 
a strategic major emergency communication management framework is proposed in 
Chapter 5. This framework provides the reader with a comprehensive guidance model 
in order to manage the communication function during all three stages of a major 
emergency life cycle. Such a detailed all-encompassing strategic model has 
heretofore been difficult to source. In the development of this framework, 
consideration has been given to many of the deficiencies that have been noted in 
existing strategic communication models. The proposed framework demonstrates 
how many of the critical strategic communication principles, drawn from 
organisational strategy, can guide the tactical functions of communication throughout 
all three stages.  
 
This chapter identifies and analyses six strategic principles that underpin the 
management of communication throughout the three stages of the major emergency 
life cycle. It is shown that these communication principles encompass the entire 
framework and are ongoing and iterative, thereby creating ideal conditions within 
which an exceptional major emergency communication strategy can be developed and 
managed. Each strategic principle is discussed in turn and in no particular priority. In 
relation to one of the strategic principles, integrated communication, it is considered 
beneficial to examine both the strategic and tactical elements in this chapter, 
particularly as these functions span all three stages of the major emergency life cycle.  
 
Before delving into the strategic principles, a brief description of the practitioners 
responsible for the communication function within the lead response organisation and 
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the structure of the major emergency communication and information team (MECIT) 
is given. 
 
5.2 The major emergency communication and information team 
(MECIT) 
 
Coombs (1999: 63) describes the crisis communication team as ‘a cross-functional 
group of people’ that has been designated by the organisation to lead the strategic 
communication function throughout all stages of a major emergency. In an ideal 
situation, this team’s central role is the co-ordination and management of both 
communication and information flows. Consequently, throughout this dissertation 
this team is referred to as the major emergency communication and information team 
(MECIT). In a major emergency situation, each of the other supporting response 
agencies should also provide their own communication teams. Depending on the 
scale of the major emergency, the MECIT from the lead response organisation may 
be obliged to establish a central location in order to coordinate the actions of each of 
the other MECITs involved. This central location is termed a communication and 
information management centre (CIMC) throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation. The CIMC is discussed in greater detail later in Section 5.2.12.6. 
 
At the head of the lead MECIT is an experienced and knowledgeable major 
emergency communication practitioner, who should be a senior executive within the 
lead response organisation. A number of theorists, including Coombs (1999: 91), 
Marra (1998: 8), Daugherty (2003: 21), and Grunig (1992: 103) emphasise the 
importance of involving the lead communication practitioner of the MECIT in the 
strategic decision-making function at the highest level of the lead response agency. 
This ensures a prominent role for communication within the overall operational 
function and guarantees the setting of communication policy by communication 
experts rather than a mere implementation of others’ policies.  
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5.3 Six strategic major emergency communication principles 
 
Figure 5.1: Proposed framework for strategic major emergency communication 
management - overview. 
 
In order to underpin and guide the strategic major emergency communication 
management process, five of the overarching strategic principles (represented in blue 
in Figure 5.1) should be applied to each of the three stages of the major emergency 
life cycle. The five strategic communication principles have no particular precedence 
within this framework and are represented accordingly in a circular manner. 
However, a sixth strategic communication principle, ubiquitous and continuous 
dialogical communication (represented by a green background in Figure 5.1), is 
afforded a prominent position in relation to the other five overarching strategic 
principles. Ongoing dialogue should not alone underpin the entire major emergency 
communication process, but also provide a basis for how communication should be 
approached when considering the other five strategic principles in turn. 
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It is important that each of the six strategic principles is implemented early in the 
preparation and planning process and should be adopted consistently throughout all 
three stages of the major emergency life cycle. It is essential that all of the tactical 
communication functions during a major emergency situation are guided 
meaningfully by these principles, in as much as is realistically possible. However, the 
degree to which these strategic principles will be observed is likely to depend on the 
stage within the major emergency life cycle and the amount of time available. It is 
extremely important that those responsible for decision-making at the highest level in 
the lead organisation, are favourably disposed to the adoption of all six strategic 
communication principles. This may require a considerable amount of persuasive 
action by communication practitioners in the MECIT, in collaboration with senior 
management of the lead response organisation.  
 
5.3.1 Structural and cultural factors 
Section 4.4.1 earlier described the importance of considering structural and cultural 
factors when developing and implementing a strategic communication management 
process. This may be considered from two distinct perspectives; firstly from that of 
the internal culture and structure of the organisation, and secondly, from that of the 
cultural environment within which the strategy is developed and subsequently 
implemented. Both of these perspectives are equally important when considering the 
development of a major emergency communication strategy. As mentioned earlier in 
Section 4.2.4, the organisational communication strategist needs to consider a 
‘cultural web’ which can potentially result in the acceptance or rejection of the 
developed strategy. Likewise, the major emergency communication practitioner needs 
to consider cultural factors such as power structures, control systems and 
organisational routines.  
 
In the countries examined during this research for this dissertation, major emergency 
planning, preparation and decision-making are the responsibility of public service 
organisations that are part of, or closely aligned to, government departments - or that 
report directly to government. By their nature, public service response organisations 
generally have hierarchical, closed structures, with clear protocols regarding 
interaction with the media, stakeholders and the public. In effect, communication 
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within these organisations is most likely to move from top to bottom. Additionally, 
according to ILGRA (1998: 4), many governments often consider the communication 
function as a mere ‘bolt on’, where the process is ‘institutionalised…and the art of 
listening is seldom applied’. This can result in communication practices that are 
overly bureaucratic and restrictive, as evidenced within many post-disaster reports 
produced by leading countries over the past ten years. These reports are replete with 
references to communication difficulties that have arisen due to bureaucratic ‘red-
tape’, hierarchical communication flows, and communication practitioners being 
forced to implement the decisions of others. Darrell (2003: 17) agrees and states: 
 
In times of major emergencies, the usual hierarchical decision-making 
models are often unable to function, and that time-consuming normal 
bureaucratic systems may need to be simplified. 
 
For example, the US government accepts that the response to Hurricane Katrina was 
inadequate and cites ‘failures within FEMA’s architecture and culture’ (Townsend 
2006: 12). Townsend emphasises the necessity for the federal government ‘to 
transform the way it does business…and to eliminate much of the extraordinary red 
tape’ that caused significant delays in its response (ibid: 70). Due to such ‘red tape’, 
FEMA refused to allow evacuation planes to take off without an air marshal on board, 
thereby delaying the delivery of much needed supplies and causing considerable 
suffering to the victims of the floods (Sandman 2005). Similarly, Heath (1995: 13) 
describes how the Japanese government’s ‘step-by-step, consensus led, group-think 
process’ together with a ‘strong face-saving culture’ resulted in a very poor response 
following the 1995 Kobe earthquake in that country. Closer to home, despite its stated 
commitment to open flows of information in much of its official documentation, the 
UK government has been accused of being overly secretive in its management of 
avian influenza. An editorial in the Sunday Telegraph stated: 
 
A culture of secrecy is a serious mistake in this area: it has no national 
security justification, only that of saving the government from 
embarrassment. Secrecy generates suspicion and mistrust and can 
contribute to panic. No government policy to combat an epidemic can 
succeed without the public's cooperation. That cooperation requires the 
public to trust the government. Trust is a commodity that is easily 
destroyed by secrecy (Bird Flu 2006: 20). 
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Much of the major emergency literature examined as part of this research supports the 
premise that an overly bureaucratic and rigid structure within the response 
organisation can impede the development and implementation of an effective 
communication strategy. As discussed earlier in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.7, when 
information does not flow horizontally and in two directions throughout the 
organisation, it can often hinder the adoption of a strategic communication 
management approach and the smooth two-way flow of dialogue with stakeholders 
and publics. Contemporary theorists, such as NRC (2004: 8) and Darrell (2003: 17), 
emphasise placing communication close to the highest level of decision-making, 
thereby ensuring that communication is considered at every step of the planning 
process. In order to ensure that all elements of the strategic communication approach 
are fully embraced, senior decision-makers at the highest level must fully understand 
and appreciate the value that the process can bring to the overall major emergency 
effort and provide the necessary resources required to support it. Theorists such as 
Reynolds (2002) and Nordlund (1994), discussed earlier in Section 4.5, highlight that 
no operational plan should be developed without a communication element attached. 
Consequently, communication is no longer considered to be an afterthought or ‘bolt-
on’, as described above. In keeping with Marra’s (1998: 8) opinion, if this acceptance 
of communication is pushed downwards throughout the entire major emergency 
response structure, any fears of breaking with traditional top-down and closed forms 
of communication can be reduced.  
 
It will be shown later in Section 9.4.3 that countries considered leaders in the field of 
major emergency communication believe that their response architectures are not 
overly bureaucratic, that their respective communication functions are close to the 
centre of decision-making, and that information flows both horizontally and in a two-
way direction within their own response organisations. This indicates that the 
communication structures adopted by these countries are evolving. However, there 
are sufficient examples, some of which were mentioned above, to indicate that 
problems still exist and that major emergency communication structures and flows 
within these countries remain far from perfect. Consequently, the model requires 
ongoing further rigorous testing, review and updating before it can be deemed 
optimal. 
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The culture of the organisation can also impact on the development of a major 
emergency communication strategy. Marra (1998: 8) describes how many crisis 
communication programmes are ‘destined to fail’ because the approach ‘contradicts 
the dominant and accepted communication philosophies adopted by the organisation’. 
In other words, a great major emergency communication strategy is unlikely to work 
‘if it’s not the way we do things around here’ (ibid.) - this response being otherwise 
described as a historicist approach. Shaw (2005:14) identifies a number of reasons 
why senior management may not support the strategic major emergency 
communication process and may adopt a historicist approach instead. These include 
time constraints, a lack of exposure to international trends, ‘groupthink’, fear of 
taking responsibility for the outcomes of the communication process, and a lack of 
personal communication knowledge or experience. As will be seen later in Section 
9.3, countries considered leaders in the field of major emergency communication 
constantly strive to improve their approach to major emergency communication, 
which is reflected in their strategy documents and protocols. Consequently, major 
emergency communication management in these countries is considered a living 
process and any historicist approach is unlikely to be effective.  
 
As discussed in Sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.1, any strategy must be considered within the 
context of the cultural environment which the organisation operates and the strategy 
will be delivered. This also applies to a major emergency communication strategy. 
Because of cultural factors, people are likely to perceive risk and life-threatening 
situations in a variety of ways. Additionally, people of varying cultural backgrounds 
are likely to receive and comprehend identical information in many different ways. 
Consequently, despite a noticeable convergence of major emergency communication 
theory throughout the international literature and guidance documents, as evidenced 
in Chapters 4 and 5 and also in Section 9.3, theorists such as Smiramesh, White, 
Dozier and Frosdick emphasise the importance of being prepared to tailor the 
communication strategy in order to suit the audience to which it is directed. 
Consequently, major emergency communication practitioners must avoid slavishly 
adopting strategic communication protocols and practices that are deemed best-
practice and instead develop strategies that best suit the culture within which the 
communication process will be delivered. 
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5.3.2 Ongoing and meaningful dialogue  
Fischhoff (1995: 138) describes in Chapter 3 how communication with publics has 
evolved since the mid-1970s from a crude one-way process of merely providing 
information, to a more inclusive and dialogical approach. As mentioned earlier in 
Section 3.7.4, in this contemporary approach to communication, open flows of 
information exist between the lead response organisation and its publics, information 
is shared, and publics are treated as partners and meaningfully engaged with in 
relation to major emergency decisions that are likely to affect them. Engaging with 
publics such as this equates to the ‘relational approach’ to communication 
management, described earlier in Section 3.6.2. This contemporary relational 
approach is also supported by Salter’s model that describes a more holistic view of 
major emergency management, presented earlier in Figure 2.1. The utilisation of 
ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, as discussed Section 4.4.7 provides 
the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing 
communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by 
improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility. Consequently, the 
dialogical approach to communication should be carefully considered by the 
communication practitioner prior to undertaking a strategic major emergency 
communication process. 
 
Sandman (2005) describes this process as ‘relaxing the bureaucracy…and letting the 
amateurs in’. Hughes and Henry (2003: 25) consider the involvement of ‘non-
experts’ as ‘the creation of a bridgehead that connects emergency services and the 
wider community’. Fahey (2003: 12) categorises the use of ‘non-experts’ or 
‘amateurs’ as a form of ‘social capital’ and describes how it helps to build ‘strong and 
resilient societies’. Lasker (2004: 1) emphasises that the public ‘must be involved 
directly’ in planning and preparation for serious terrorism related incidents, in order 
for plans to be effective. 
 
The benefits of opening lines of communication with publics and involving ‘non-
experts’ as partners in the decision-making and planning process for important major 
emergency decisions are many and have been discussed in some detail by theorists 
such as Fischhoff (1995: 138), Stern and Fineberg (1996: 3), Kinney and Leschine 
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(2002: 84), Rowe and Wright (2001: 342), and Coles and Buckle, cited in Norman, 
Stuart-Black and Coles, (2006: 92). While not specifically related to major 
emergency situations, Grunig, Grunig and Dozier’s (2002: 145) model of strategic 
communication management, described earlier in Section 4.3, highlights the 
importance of an ‘interconnectedness’ between management and publics, involving a 
meaningful two-way flow of communication, in order to improve relationships and to 
achieve organisational goals. However, many contemporary theorists apply Grunig et 
al’s principles to the major emergency communication context. The advantages of the 
process include: creating an environment of improved awareness and comprehension 
of important major emergency issues amongst the public (Bowman 2000: 5.1); 
tapping into community know-how and experience thereby enhancing the overall 
knowledge-base; ascertaining essential information such as media consumption 
habits, current states of knowledge and preferred channels of communication (Cottrell 
2005: 27); ensuring equity of access to emergency services, especially for 
marginalised groups (Hocke and O’Brien 2003: 63); reducing uncertainty by ensuring 
that complicated information can be imparted and received in a format that is 
understandable to diverse publics (Palenchar and Heath 2002: 131; NRC 2004: 15; 
Nohrstedt 2000: 140); making decisions more acceptable to publics through a 
heightened perception of balance, trust, fairness and transparency in the 
communication process (Stern and Fineberg 1996: 81); and reducing levels of 
potential ‘outrage’ (Wilcox, Ault and Agee 1997: 54; Sandman 2005).  
 
Failure to open such lines of communication may result in practical problems that 
could otherwise be avoided. For example, in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in Ukraine, the UK government mistakenly purchased large 
consignments of Argentinean straw rather than hay as a substitute principal fodder for 
highland sheep (sheep do not eat straw) (Irwin and Wynne 1996: 36). Additionally, 
poultry farmers in the UK have described government instructional messages 
concerning avian influenza as ‘confusing’ and ‘full of ridiculous jargon’. They also 
describe how a lack of consultation has resulted in poultry farmers receiving 
instructions that are ‘totally unfeasible’, such as entirely covering large poultry farms 
with wire netting (Harrison and Copping 2006: 13). 
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When it comes to involving the public in the management of risk issues, including 
major emergency situations, many varied opinions abound (Fahey 2003: 12). A 
school of thought exists that involving ‘non-experts’ in decisions related to hazardous 
situations can result in confusion (Fordham 1998/99: 31) or can cause needless delays 
or conflict (Stern and Fineberg 1996: 135). Rothstein, cited in Ball, (2006: 6) warns 
that ‘participative reforms’, such as involving publics in important risk decision-
making, ‘often promise more than they can deliver’. According to Kweit and Kweit 
(1984: 32): 
 
The public lack the technical expertise, are unfamiliar with bureaucratic 
routines and are emotionally involved in issues rather than being 
detached and rational. Citizens are outside the hierarchy and therefore 
hard to control. As a consequence, participation may increase the time 
needed to reach decisions as well as the level of conflict.  
 
Ball recognises advantages to strengthening inclusiveness by opening lines of 
communication and engaging with stakeholders and the public in decision-making. 
However, he states that it is ‘a much more complex task than has often been 
acknowledged’ and is ‘wide open to manipulation and exploitation’ (2006: 9).  
 
While there are clear advantages to be gained from adopting the process of dialogical 
communication for major emergency situations, its acceptance is not universal and 
many theorists highlight the fact that the paradigm is not without its inherent 
difficulties. In the first instance, the resources and effort required in order to 
undertake a ‘broad-based’ dialogical approach are likely to be substantial. This raises 
the question of whether or not these resources would be better utilised elsewhere, 
particularly while resources are likely to be scarce during the crisis and post-crisis 
stages. Consequently, response organisations need to consider a cost-benefit analysis 
of the process, taking into account how much time and effort they spend, by how 
much communication decisions are likely to improve, and the net benefits for 
stakeholders and publics. While the dialogical approach is far more democratic than 
using mere one-way propaganda, or two-way asymmetrical persuasive techniques, 
these latter techniques may be much more cost-effective, particularly where an 
apathetic public is involved. While countries examined as part of this research have 
espoused the principles of dialogical communication over the past decade, FEMA 
provided less than satisfactory responses to recent major emergencies such as 
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Hurricane Katrina and the UK government were criticised for many communication 
aspects of official responses to the London bombings of July 2005.  
 
Nevertheless, adopting a broad-based dialogical approach provides many advantages 
to the major emergency communication process, particularly the ‘non-expert’ 
information and advice that can guide the development of protocols as was described 
by Lasker. Bowman (2000: 6) emphasises that engaging stakeholders in dialogue in 
relation to major emergency communication planning and response will not of itself 
achieve a great deal. However, as part of a wider range of communication efforts, it 
can help to educate, inform, and engage the public, which may ultimately provide an 
improved public emergency response. Significantly, as mentioned earlier in Section 
3.7.4, meaningful engagement with stakeholders and publics should not exclude the 
vital role of, and crucial information that can be provided by, the scientific 
community. As the ‘dialogical’ communication process is an evolving field of 
endeavour, a careful and rigorous evaluation needs to take place before the approach 
is considered best-practice. It is not beyond reason to believe that the ‘dialogical’ 
approach could prove to be cumbersome and inefficient, and in the tradition of 
communication theory, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3, be surpassed by a new 
paradigm. Additionally, as described in Section 5.3.2 earlier, any broad-based 
dialogical strategy needs to be considered in the context of the cultural environment 
within which it is developed and implemented. While one approach may work 
extremely well in one country, it may prove less effective in others. 
 
5.3.3 Adopting a scientific approach to communication 
Approaching communication from a scientific perspective is important in order to 
ensure that the right messages are getting to the right people in the most efficient 
manner. This approach is equally important when considering a major emergency 
communication strategy. A scientific basis is central to the strategy formulation 
process, as described earlier in De Wit and Meyer’s ‘diagnosing’ phase in Figure 4.1. 
As discussed in Section 4.5, Reynolds (2002), UK Resilience (2005) and Nordlund 
(1994) in their models of major emergency communication place considerable 
emphasis on adopting a scientific approach to communication. A scientific approach 
involves a number of key elements. 
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5.3.3.1 Sound knowledge base 
Theorists such as Grant (2008), Dranove and Marcianos (2005) and Grunig (1992) 
(Section 4.4.8) suggest that possessing formal education is a very useful means of 
building a knowledge base, thereby allowing practitioners to adopt a more scientific 
approach to communication management. According to Reynolds (2002: 38), the 
need for competence and expertise requires a major emergency communication team 
to demonstrate ‘levels of formal professional education, previous experience, and 
training’. Coombs (1999: 150) agrees and goes further noting that ‘…crisis 
communication teams should be equipped for success…equipment for success 
includes possessing essential knowledge and skills’. 
 
Formal education and training 
One of the best means of improving the response organisation’s knowledge base and 
scientific approach is through formal strategic communication-related education and 
training. Price (1989: 124) concurs and states: 
 
A major element helping to determine the credibility of risk and crisis 
messages is the perceived competence of the individual or organisation 
managing the major emergency…many government agencies do not have 
sufficient staff with the necessary professional educational competencies. 
 
Darrell (2003: 22) emphasises how theoretical knowledge combined with experience 
can ‘build the credibility of the individuals managing communication’ during a major 
emergency. Iwan (1999: 24) describes how the impact of a number of natural 
disasters, such as a tsunami in Japan in 1994 and a volcanic eruption in Alaska in 
1992, could have been greatly reduced had emergency responders received the benefit 
of formal communication education and support from academic institutions. Formal 
communication education courses are best considered during the pre-crisis stage of a 
major emergency. However, less-formalised communication training and education 
can prove extremely useful during the crisis stage of a major emergency. For 
example, Grady (2005: 11) describes how doctors and nurses with experience in 
Ebola outbreaks, provided information and communication seminars for health 
workers in Angola following an outbreak of Marburg virus in the Luanda region in 
2005.  
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One element of education and training that must not be overlooked by the major 
emergency communication practitioner is that of providing education and skills to 
local communities in order that they can protect themselves. This has been discussed 
in Section 2.4.1.2.2. While many barriers are likely to exist to such a programme, 
including community apathy and competing interests such as sport, family life and 
work, if successfully implemented it is likely to provide a useful ‘force multiplier’ to 
the emergency services. This will be dealt with later in Section 6.4.2.6. 
 
Experience  
In addition to formal communication education and knowledge, ILGRA (1998: 18) 
Reynolds (2002: 39) emphasise the necessity for members of the MECIT to have 
requisite experience in handling all aspects of the communication function for all 
stages of an emergency situation. Secondment programmes, particularly to 
international relief agencies, provide a useful means for MECIT members to receive 
‘hands-on’ major emergency communication experience. In the absence of real 
‘hands-on’ experience, some communication practical knowledge can be gained 
through the use of realistic scenario-based exercises. The benefit of exercises is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many of the communication concepts described within this 
framework are derived from work undertaken by academics from the 1920s onwards. 
A theoretical derivation of the concepts of scholars such as Lippmann, Lasswell, 
Lazarsfeld, Hovland and Schramm can greatly benefit the work of major emergency 
communication practitioners, particularly in relation to understanding the attitudes 
and likely behaviours of interested and affected publics. Additionally, the work of 
these pioneering communication theorists creates an awareness for contemporary 
major emergency communication practitioners of the many benefits that can accrue 
from taking the time and effort to engage in research. This in turn can bring fresh 
communication concepts, ideas and approaches to the organisation. However, a 
careful balance must be achieved between engaging in formal education, practical 
learning and experience. In accordance with Reynolds (2002: 31) and Darrell’s (2003: 
22) view, the competent communication practitioner should possess both theoretical 
knowledge and experience. Consequently, major emergency education should 
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provide merely the foundation for communication practitioners. This theoretical 
foundation then requires testing, contextualising and enhancement through real-life or 
simulated experience. 
 
5.3.3.2 Ongoing communication research 
The conduct of ongoing and iterative communication research, throughout all three 
stages of the major emergency life cycle, is another important element of the 
scientific approach to strategic major emergency communication management. As 
previously discussed in Section 4.4.4, any strategic communication programme that is 
undertaken without research is likely to be flawed. Indeed, De Wit and Meyer’s 
(2004: 106) model, described in Section 4.2.2, identifies research as a critical 
function among the strategy formation activities. Additionally, Grunig’s (1992: 124), 
normative model of strategic communication management, described in Section 4.3.2, 
includes continuous research as an important function. Darrell (2003: 22) emphasises 
how it is essential that the response agency continues to engage in constant 
communication research. In the initial stages of the major emergency communication 
research process, Austin and Pinkleton (2000: 49) discuss the value of ‘formative 
research’. This type of research provides the MECIT with essential data to help it 
define the communication problem and to guide the strategic communication 
planning process. In this regard, formative research can be used to identify any 
potential hazards in the environment; identify the many stakeholders, publics and 
audiences that may be affected by a major emergency; determine their concerns, 
issues and needs; understand how different publics perceive risk and hazards in their 
environment; determine how different publics are likely to react to major emergency 
risk and crisis messages; discover any gaps in the state of knowledge; and determine 
how best to reach affected publics.  
 
In addition to formative research, Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002: 209) identify 
‘programme research’, which provides useful information to guide the 
implementation of the major emergency communication programme. Researching 
and testing the efficacy of communication messages and channels prior to a large-
scale major emergency public information effort is an example of programme 
research. In order to evaluate the success of a particular communication programme, 
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based on the achievement of stated objectives, Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 34) 
discusses the value of ‘summative (or evaluation) research’. Evaluation research is 
discussed further in the next section. Darrell (2003: 22) highlights the importance of 
providing adequate training to guarantee that all communication research is 
conducted strategically, and that sufficient resources are provided so that this 
important research function is carried out during all stages. 
 
While an evidence base exists that supports major emergency communication 
research, it is very time-consuming and it is likely in practice that time and resources 
will be extremely scarce for such programmes. During the pre-crisis stage, the lead 
response organisation is likely to have ample time to conduct extensive 
communication research. However, pressures generated in the immediate aftermath of 
a major emergency are likely to limit seriously the scope of any research. While 
major emergency organisations might be convinced to engage in once-off research, 
such as the Millward and Brown IMS (Department of Defence 2005(a)) survey of 
attitudes in Ireland, it may prove difficult to convince decision-makers to pursue such 
programmes on an ongoing basis. This highlights, once again, the importance of 
having the senior communication practitioner close to the centre of decision-making. 
Despite the obstacles to engaging in strategic communication research, the benefits 
can far outweigh the costs, particulary for understanding the breakdown of key 
publics, knowing their issues, needs and concerns, how best to reach them, and the 
type of message that will optimise a desired response that may ultimately save lives.  
 
5.3.3.3 Ongoing communication evaluation 
A final element in the scientific approach to strategic major emergency 
communication management involves the MECIT engaging in ongoing 
communication evaluation. De Wit and Meyer (2004: 106) (see Section 4.2.2) include 
the evaluation of implemented actions as an essential part of strategy formation. 
Additionally, Grunig (1992: 124) and Nordlund (1994: 40), in their models, 
emphasise the importance of carefully evaluating communication programmes on an 
ongoing basis as an important strategic function.  
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Reynolds (2002: 10) notes the importance of ‘…evaluating the major emergency 
communication plan performance, documenting lessons learned, and determining 
specific action to improve crisis systems or the plan’. Coombs (1999: 136) discusses 
how strategic evaluation should not be conducted merely at the end of a 
communication programme, but should be carried out ‘regularly and systematically 
throughout all stages’. This ensures that sub-optimal communication programmes or 
messages can be reviewed and revised to achieve greatest effect. MOR (2002: 58) 
describes how evaluation, or review, ensures that the major emergency 
communication programme is ‘focused and controlled, thereby ensuring continual 
progress towards the desired outcome’. Price (1989: 163) states that communication 
evaluation, when coupled to an effective feedback mechanism, ‘…is a necessary step 
in ensuring improvement in the competence of an organisation’s risk and crisis 
communication programme’.  
 
Pieczka (2000: 214) also discusses the importance of ‘implementation evaluation’ 
that assesses the extent to which the major emergency communication plan, when 
triggered, is implemented effectively. Conducting integrated major emergency 
exercises helps to evaluate the success of the implementation process of 
communication strategies and plans. In the UK, during the ‘foot-and-mouth’ 
outbreak, the use of government direct mail shots and the Department of Agriculture 
website proved, in hindsight, to be ineffective. An ‘implementation evaluation’ of the 
communication process could have highlighted that the information disseminated 
through both of those channels was consistently out-of-date and of no significant 
value to the recipient (Anderson 2002: 6). Hon (1998: 106) emphasises the 
importance of ‘impact evaluation’, which assesses the consequential impact of the 
major emergency major emergency communication plan or programme. For example, 
Handmer (1990 :139) describes the importance of evaluating the impact of flood 
warnings in the Thames Basin and how this evaluation helped to improve the systems 
of warning communication for the public in that area. 
 
While it is evident from the research that there is clear support for engaging in 
ongoing communication evaluation, in practice it is likely to prove difficult during the 
crisis and early post-crisis stages, due to inevitable demands on time and human 
resources. Consequently, the communication practitioner will have to conduct a 
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rigorous cost-benefit analysis in order to determine the amount of resources and effort 
required in the communication evaluation process. As with communication research, 
practitioners may have to demonstrate the benefits to operational commanders of 
engaging in the evaluation process, such as testing the efficacy of communication 
programmes or messages or channels, in order determine which communication 
programmes are not working and to refocus the effort. Often this is difficult to 
achieve as communication managers may be reticent to acknowledge that particular 
programmes are not working - particularly if significant time, cost and effort have 
been expended up to that time. Through a judicious use of basic tools such as 
awareness, attitude- and opinion-surveys, in-depth interviews, content analyses, 
inquiry feedback, and impression counts, a communication evaluation should not 
have to take up too much time or too many resources.  
 
5.3.4 Employ strategic processes 
An important element of the strategic major emergency communication framework 
involves consideration of the actual processes adopted by the communication 
practitioner, which by their nature need to be strategic as distinct from tactical. As 
discussed in Section 4.2.2, many management theorists such as Grant (2008), Hill and 
Jones (2001), and Mintzberg and Quinn (1991), describe the importance of 
organisations employing strategic processes in order to allow them to co-exist, 
interact and survive with their publics, particularly when the environment is 
uncertain. These concepts have been employed and supported by many 
communication management theorists such as Grunig (1992: 4), Plowman (2005: 
132) and Cutlip, Centre and Broom (2000: 6), as described earlier in Section 4.3.  
 
The major emergency environment offers additional challenges and involves dealing 
with a number of simultaneous complex communication problems in extremely 
pressurised conditions. Many contemporary theorists, such as Reynolds (2002), 
Nordlund (1994) and UK Resilience (2005), emphasise the importance of employing 
such strategic management processes while planning, preparing, and implementing 
the major emergency communication function. As described earlier in Section 4.3.1, 
by engaging in a non-strategic (tactical) approach to communication management, the 
communication practitioner is likely to ignore the detailed, integrated, longer-term 
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planning considerations required for effective communication management. This can 
result in the MECIT operating without adequate direction or a thorough 
understanding of the situation or sufficient resources or information - particularly 
when time is of the essence. Consequently, as part of the proposed framework, the 
communication practitioner should give careful consideration to the following 
strategic elements. 
 
5.3.4.1 Management-by-objectives (MBO) 
The benefits of MBO as a strategic process for effective organisational strategy and 
communication management, have been clearly outlined in Section 4.4.2, and are 
supported by theorists such as Hill and Jones (2001: 429), Seitel (2004: 81), and 
Grunig (1992: 11). The majority of major emergency literature, including that by 
Nordlund (1994: 17), UK Resilience (2005: 27) and Reynolds (2002: 20), examined 
as part of this research, provides evidence that setting clear communication goals and 
objectives is increasingly considered an important element of the major emergency 
communication process. MBO should not be an overly time-consuming process, but 
is an important stage of the strategic process in order to guide the entire major 
emergency communication effort and to ensure that it fully supports the overall 
operation.  
 
One of the most significant advantages of the MBO process is that the MECIT will 
have a clearer understanding of what needs to be achieved in the short-, medium-, and 
long-term. Darrell (2003: 24) reinforces this point emphasising that the 
communication mission statement allows everyone involved in the response effort to 
clearly understand their roles, goals and objectives.Without such clarity responders 
are likely to operate at cross purposes. In this regard, Smith (2005: 72) states that the 
major emergency communication goals and objectives should be ‘…clear and 
measurable statements based on the goals of the organisation, and written in such a 
way as to point the way toward a particular level of awareness, acceptance or action.’ 
Nordlund (1994: 17) states that communication goals and objectives should be 
developed for all stages of a major emergency life cycle. While the list of 
communication goals and objectives is likely to be extensive and diverse, the series of 
communication tactical steps outlined in the proposed frameworks in Chapters 6, 7, 
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and 8 provides the lead response agency with a useful starting point for developing 
this process. Each individual communication goal and objective should be supported 
by a clear action plan that details clearly the person responsible for completing the 
action and the timeframe within which it is to be completed. In as much as is 
possible, this management-by-objectives process should be developed during the pre-
crisis stage when time and resource pressures are less demanding. However, protocols 
should be established to allow a more condensed process of goal and objective setting 
for the communication function during the chaotic crisis and post-crisis stages of a 
major emergency. All goals and objectives need to be evaluated and reviewed on an 
ongoing basis in order to assess the likelihood of them being achieved. 
 
Significantly, in keeping with the views of UK Resilience (2005: 28) and Nordlund 
(1994: 33), the MBO process makes senior major emergency communication 
practitioners more accountable for their decisions and allows for a greater 
coordination of effort. As communication success is often difficult to measure (unlike 
many operational functions), setting clear, measurable major emergency 
communication goals and objectives creates a clearer focus for communication 
managers and provides a more transparent quantum of success or failure for their 
efforts. However, as with many of the strategic communication elements discussed as 
part of this framework, the MBO process in relation to major emergency 
communication is a relatively recent phenomenon. Consequently, the advantages 
need to be closely assessed in order to determine its usefulness and in particular its 
role in improving the quality of communication provided to stakeholders and the 
public. 
 
5.3.4.2 Close alignment of goals 
Closely associated with the MBO process, and central to the ethos of the strategic 
process, is the alignment of goals to a common purpose. Communication theorists 
such as Hon (1998: 105) and Grunig (1992: 262), discussed earlier in Section 4.4.2, 
highlight that a fully integrated and cohesive major emergency communication 
strategy requires that all communication goals and objectives are closely aligned with 
those of the overall strategic operational plan of the lead response organisation in a 
‘tight-fitting nexus’ (Temple 2002: 33). If this is not achieved the operational and 
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communication function is likely to be at cross-purposes and instead of providing a 
supportive role, the communication function could prove counter-productive to the 
response and relief effort during a major emergency. Placing the senior 
communication practitioner close to the centre of decision-making can assist in the 
alignment process. 
 
The most obvious benefit in the alignment of goals is when there is a multitude of 
diverse response organisations involved in a complex major emergency situation. The 
alignment process can assist the overall commander in coordinating and optimising 
the operational and communication efforts of organisations such as government 
departments, local authorities and ‘blue-light’ services (including police, fire and 
ambulance, armed forces, community organisations, and aid agencies). Additionally, 
such alignment of operational and communication goals across diverse organisations 
can assist in the avoidance of duplication of effort and in the optimisation of 
resources. As regards communication management particularly, the alignment 
process can assist in ensuring a consistent approach in relation to levels of openness 
and transparency. Additionally, conflicting information from different response 
organisations in the dissemination of key messages can be avoided. 
 
However, the cross-agency coordination of communication goals and objectives must 
be sustained throughout all stages of a major emergency life cycle. EMA (2003: 2), 
discussing the ‘lessons learnt’ from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, 
emphasises: 
 
The most important lesson was undoubtedly that cooperation and goodwill 
has to exist between all levels of the response team…interoperability, 
shared goals, standardised communication systems, and information 
sharing are key areas that can be enhanced to enable a coordinated multi-
agency approach.  
 
Achieving such cooperation is likely to prove a demanding task, requiring response 
organisations to overcome issues such as internal politics, power struggles and 
different levels of skill and training. Yet the benefits of such cooperation to the 
overall response effort are likely to be immense. The provision of clear protocols and 
guidelines, coupled with ongoing inter-agency training and exercises are likely to 
assist greatly in this process. A well-established and controlled communication and 
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information management centre (CIMC) can also assist in achieving the coordination 
of inter-agency communication and operational goals and objectives.  
 
5.3.4.3 Engage in strategic communication planning 
In Section 4.4.3, the importance of engaging in strategic planning as part of the 
strategic management process was discussed and supported by the arguments of 
theorists such as De Wit and Meyer (2004) and Finlay (2000). Strategic planning is 
increasingly utilised by communication practitioners in order to deal with complex 
situations. In Section 4.4.3, the benefits of engaging in strategic communication 
planning were discussed. These include providing an impetus for detailed analysis 
and strategic thought throughout the entire communication process, providing a 
mechanism by means of which an optimal course of action can be chosen, and 
generating a platform for increased levels of proactive communication. The strategic 
planning process can assist the communication practitioner throughout all stages of a 
major emergency situation and should be a central element of the strategic process. 
 
In accordance with Grant (2008: 21), the strategic communication planning process 
allows for the major emergency communication and information team (MECIT) to 
define clearly its communication problems, identify suitable approaches for 
addressing these problems, determine responsibility for achieving stated goals and 
identify resources required over the planned time period. As acknowledged by UK 
Resilience (2005: 60), Nordlund (1994: 8) and Daugherty (2003: 21) such strategic 
communication planning allows the MECIT to provide systematically a 
comprehensive communication response for all stages of a major emergency 
situation. Without such planning, the communication response is likely to be delayed 
considerably once a major emergency occurs and confusion is likely to exist as 
regards roles and responsibilities. Many communication theorists such as Bernstein 
(1987: 13), Higgins (1979: 9) and Fearn-Banks (1996: 24) have identified advantages 
in adopting a strategic approach to major emergency communication planning, 
including having the ability to anticipate problems, respond effectively, contact key 
personnel, build useful networks, prepare key generic messages and information facts 
sheets and reduce the number of unknowns overall. Additionally, bringing together 
key communication personnel as part of the strategic planning process is a means of 
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considering many diverse opinions and ideas, thereby facilitating a better 
communication response. The process also allows key communication personnel to 
work together prior to a major emergency. 
 
As described earlier in Section 4.2.1, strategic planning is an essential element of the 
overall strategic management process. In this regard, the MECIT’s communication 
planning process needs to be fully integrated into the lead response organisation’s 
overall operational plan. The output from the strategic planning process is the 
production of a comprehensive major emergency response communication plan 
(MERCP). The development of this plan is discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. While most of the communication planning is best conducted during the pre-
crisis stage of a major emergency, it is essential that the process should continue 
throughout the crisis and post-crisis stages (Reynolds 2002: 69). This is particularly 
important for the development of new communication plans and the possible 
modification and updating of existing MERCPs. This is considered essential, as the 
strategic planning process is unlikely to be able to deal with all eventualities that are 
likely to arise due to the unpredictability of major emergency situations.  
 
While the advantages of the strategic communication planning process have been 
clearly outlined above, practitioners need to ensure that they avoid intransigent 
adherence to pre-prepared major emergency communication plans, as this is likely to 
hamper the response effort. The major emergency environment is such that 
practitioners need to be able to deal with rapidly changing scenarios. Relying wholly 
on the output of strategic communication planning can result in a lack of flexibility 
when it comes to dealing effectively with rapidly changing situations. However, 
given an appropriate model of strategic major emergency communication planning, 
together with sufficient training and exercises, communication practitioners should be 
able to respond appropriately to evolving situations. Heath (2001: 487) proposes 
adopting ‘anticipatory models’ of strategic major emergency communication 
planning, including approaches such as ‘scenario planning’. Ringland, (1998: 2) 
describes such approaches as a series of possible scenarios and a number of different 
courses of action and solutions, using ‘war-gaming’ and ‘brainstorming’ techniques, 
in order to overcome identified problems. 
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5.3.4.4 Engage in strategic decision-making 
An important element of the strategic communication management process, already 
mentioned in Chapter 4, is choosing optimum courses of action through strategic 
decision-making. According to ILGRA (1998: 15): 
 
Crisis conditions demonstrate more than any others the need for well- 
developed systems, procedures and technology in order to be able to make 
consensual decisions and to communicate quickly, consistently and 
reliably with large audiences. 
 
Nordlund (1994: 43) agrees, noting how ‘…poorly conceived and implemented 
communication decisions can result in a greater chance of death or destruction in 
times of a major emergency’. In some situations, poor communication can actually 
create harm. Strategic decision-making is a central function of strategic 
communication management and includes two separate elements which are reflected 
in De Wit and Meyer’s (2004: 106) model described earlier in Section 4.2.2, as 
‘option generation’ and ‘option selection’. It is at the decision-making stage that 
leadership adds value to the entire communication function. Approaching the 
communication decision-making process from a tactical or ‘seat-of-the-pants’ 
perspective is likely to result in all available information not being utilised and all 
courses-of-action not being considered. Consequently, there are clear advantages in 
adopting a strategic approach to communication decision-making, that involves a 
series of steps including, deciding what the problem is; selecting a wide base of 
participants to the decision-making process; establishing clear protocols for actions if 
decisions cannot be reached; making all of the gathered information intelligible to all 
decision participants; discussion, negotiation and bargaining by ‘expert’ and ‘non-
expert’ participants; and selecting suitable courses of action (Stern and Fineberg 
1996: 143). This decision can then be implemented and the impact evaluated in order 
to determine the efficacy of both the decision-making process, and the impact of the 
major emergency communication decision on the intended recipients (Comfort 1988: 
185).  
 
While the traditional hierarchical decision-making model is a faster process than this 
proposed dialogical approach, the benefits of including both ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ 
opinion provide many advantages, as described earlier in Section 5.3.2. A balance 
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needs to be reached as regards the amount of both ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ 
participation in the process, particularly taking time constraints into account. 
Additionally, as part of the process, clear protocols must exist in order to deal with 
situations when decisions cannot be reached. Otherwise, in a fast-moving major 
emergency situation, important decisions may never be arrived at. Consequently, it 
may be necessary to compress many of the steps recommended above. Once again, 
continuous integrated communication training and exercising will help to identify and 
deal with many of the problems that are likely to arise. 
 
5.3.5 Integrated communication 
An analysis of the major emergency communication models, described earlier in 
Section 4.5, including those by Centers for Disease Control (Reynolds 2002: 7) and 
UK Resilience (2005: 28), highlights the absence of an integrated or joined-up 
approach towards all of the key communication functions. Each of the models deals 
with many of the individual communication functions in some level of detail, 
however, none of them offers a truly integrated and multidimensional approach. The 
strategic framework proposed in this chapter integrates all of the key communication 
functions, under the control of the lead response organisation’s MECIT, including 
public information management, information management, internal communication, 
media management, and community outreach and victim liaison. 
 
Each of these key communication functions is a subject of significant research in its 
own right. However, due to the scope of this dissertation it is impossible to deal with 
each function in any great detail. Consequently, some of the functions are dealt with 
in significant detail during this chapter, while other functions, such as public 
information management, receive more detailed attention throughout the next three 
chapters. As both the information management and media management functions are 
particularly important throughout each of the three stages, it is prudent to deal with 
them in detail within this chapter. 
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5.3.5.1 Public information management 
The public information management role involves researching, developing and 
testing major emergency risk and crisis messages, and information, and disseminating 
this to stakeholders, different publics and to the public at large. The purpose of this 
important role is to inform and educate these people and to adequately prepare them 
to deal with, and respond to, major emergency situations, thereby saving lives. This 
function is viewed by many theorists as being central to the MECIT’s role and is 
equally important in all three stages of a major emergency life cycle. It is therefore 
appropriate to deal with this subject in considerable detail throughout the next three 
chapters, particularly Chapter 7. 
 
5.3.5.2 Information management 
Closely related to the public information management role, but often a function that is 
not viewed frequently as a communication manager’s role, is that of information 
management. According to Jacobs (1990: 1332), in a major emergency situation, 
accurate information ‘is a priceless and at times decidedly rare commodity’. A very 
likely problem faced by the lead response organisation once a major emergency 
actualises is a dearth of useful information. Cohn (2000: 186) mentions that the 
period immediately following a major emergency is characterised by ‘little 
information and lots of chaos’. Coombs (1999: 115) agrees and highlights how an 
‘information void or vacuum’ can occur as the crisis situation unfolds due to 
inadequate information management systems. Tumelty (1990: 16) highlights the poor 
information flows that existed during the North Sea Piper Alpha oil-rig explosion in 
1988, which resulted in the deaths of 167 workers. 
 
The initial problem, which has been reflected in other disasters, was the 
sheer chaos, confusion and lack of information. The last of these led, 
almost inevitably, to a welter of rumours moving into the vacuum. 
 
Paradoxically, another problem that may arise for senior decision makers during a 
major emergency involves a profusion of incoming unfiltered raw data to the 
emergency operations centre (EOC). This may result in decision-makers spending 
much valuable time attempting to prioritise and make sense of vast amounts of 
information. It may also result in the information officers within the MECIT ‘cherry-
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picking’ conspicuous elements of the data, resulting in important decisions being 
made based on this unfiltered information which is often compounded by their 
personal experience and historical case-studies. 
 
Information management cannot be considered as a stand-alone function but must be 
part of, closely associated with, and guided by the strategic communication function.  
Consequently, the efficient management of data by communication officers 
throughout a major emergency situation ‘is a priority’ (Hodgkinson and Stewart 
1991: 109). Bernstein (1987: 21) and Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 99) discuss how 
the lead response organisation must have the capability to immediately collect, 
compile, confirm, assess and disseminate ‘hard’ information as it becomes available 
following a major emergency in order to provide a sound basis for decision-making 
and communicating effectively with publics. This is important as ‘uncertainty can 
often run high due to poor information flows’ (Bernstein 1987: 21).  Despite the 
intellectual challenge associated with this function, the lead response organisation 
requires an information management system within the MECIT that is intrinsically 
simple and fully integrated with the operations function together with other 
communication functions. Granger (2000: 20) offers a useful model describing four 
distinct phases of an information management cycle, including information direction, 
collection, processing and dissemination.  
 
Taking on board communication management lessons learned following Hurricane 
Katrina, the US government is now in the process of fully integrating each of the key 
communication functions, including information and media management, within its 
revised Joint Information Centre structure (NRT 2000: 2-1).  
 
5.3.5.3 Internal communication 
An extremely important communication function that is often overlooked in major 
emergency planning, preparation and response, is the management of internal 
communication. This important communication function involves the communication 
of important messages and information to government departments and other 
response agencies, and critically, to members of response teams and their families. 
Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 153) emphasise the importance of communicating with 
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individual responders and their families. They describe how families of responders 
would ‘prefer to hear any important news from their employer than from the press or 
through the rumour machine’. Darrell (2003: 18) mentions how effective 
communication with this critical class of stakeholder is often overlooked. Ganley 
describes how many on-call fire fighters heard of the 9/11 incident through channels 
of communication such as television news and phone calls from relatives, rather than 
through official channels (Ganley 2008). Bernstein (2002: 23) describes how the 
families of fire fighters, who were killed in the 9/11 attacks, learned of their deaths 
through the media rather than through formal internal communication channels. 
Chong (2006: 10) remarks how efficient internal communication systems are 
particularly essential during health epidemics when medical and nursing personnel, 
themselves, are extremely vulnerable to becoming victims. Reynolds (2002: 14) 
stresses the importance of keeping this internal audience informed by such means as 
electronic communications and personal visits. Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 154) 
include channels such as teleconferences, toll-free phone lines and written letters.  
 
This extremely important function should be a key role of the MECIT throughout all 
three stages of the major emergency. This is a relatively easy task in the pre-crisis 
stage. However, as many major emergency situations occur and pass very quickly, 
there may not be sufficient time to communicate in any great detail with responders 
and their families in the crisis stage, aside from operational updates. In the post-crisis 
stage the internal communication channel must operate efficiently. This subject 
receives further attention in the next two chapters. 
 
5.3.5.4 Media management 
Media management is another critical task that is central to the strategic major 
emergency communication management function. It is extremely important that the 
lead response organisation works closely with the media throughout all three stages 
of a major emergency situation. During such events, the media are often considered a 
hindrance to the smooth running of the major emergency operation. However, the 
media can prove to be a very useful communication channel for important 
information and can significantly influence the public’s perception of the response 
effort. 
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According to Susskind and Field (1996: 211), the overriding goals of the media are to 
inform, educate, entertain, reflect a broad spectrum of views, provide a public forum 
for ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ dialogue, and to explain the content of public debate. In 
addition, Scammell and Semetko (2000: 10) consider the role of the media as an 
independent ‘critical watchdog’ – whereby they are tasked with the monitoring and 
reporting on the actions of public bodies, including response agencies – as important. 
Modh (2003: 5) considers the role of the media as a ‘dedicated provider of 
information and news’ as ‘crucial’ prior to and following a major emergency. 
Effective fulfilment of this media role, she states, can help to save lives, alleviate 
suffering, prevent rumours and reduce uncertainty. Reynolds (2002: 129) concurs and 
emphasises the important role that the media plays in communicating the nature of a 
disaster situation, warnings, alarms, and the appropriate actions that citizens should 
take in order to mitigate morbidity and mortality. Nordlund (1994: 43) adds:  
 
Whenever citizens experience an acute need for information and 
knowledge, the role the media choose to play becomes crucial. 
 
Berge (1990: 69) emphasises the importance of the media in ‘providing useful 
information to the public in simple everyday language’. Kreps, cited in the National 
Research Council, (1980: 46) highlights how the provision of accurate media 
information, such as casualty lists and instructing information, can help to alleviate 
pressure on emergency help-lines.  
 
At a strategic level, the involvement of the media in major emergencies can result in 
influencing and setting critical agendas. According to Tierney, cited in Alesch et al., 
(2004: 170): 
 
The mass media has a tremendous ability to increase or decrease the 
salience of policy issues both within the public and among influential 
groups. 
 
Media interest in major emergency situations 
During the pre-crisis stage, when the occurrence of a potentially ruinous situation is 
remote, the lead response organisation is likely to have to deal with a media that 
displays little interest in major emergency issues. Consequently, this impacts on any 
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attempts by the MECIT to raise public awareness and knowledge about such issues 
through media channels. According to Auf der Heide (1989: 20), ‘disasters are low-
probability events…as such they compete for attention with the priorities of daily 
living’. Walter (2005: 129) blames this circumstance on journalists’ ‘commercial 
imperative to get ratings’ - and stories relating to major emergency preparation and 
planning ‘are not likely to sell copy’.  
 
On the other hand, once a major emergency actualises a significant level of media 
interest can be expected. Howarth agrees with this and states: 
 
Disasters, crises and emergencies can strike suddenly and unexpectedly, 
anywhere at any time. The causes may be sudden and unpredictable. One 
factor, however, is certain. The news media will be close behind (Howarth 
1999: Foreword). 
 
Reynolds (2002: 129) believes a heightened interest will take place particularly if the 
negative situation is considered to be ‘exotic, catastrophic, or the first of its kind’. 
Nordlund (1994: 31) concurs and surmises that news media tend to be totally 
preoccupied with the effects of the ‘the big bang’, or the actualisation of the major 
emergency.  
 
In the post-crisis stage, a major emergency often tends to become extended and 
drawn-out. As a result, the media are likely to lose interest and to look for alternative 
angles, such as identifying people to blame for allowing the situation to occur in the 
first instance, inefficiencies manifest in the relief effort, or insensitivity displayed to 
victims by response organisations.  
 
Challenges for the MECIT 
Unlike thirty years ago, major emergency communicators today are obliged to react 
more quickly in order to meet the requirements of the media. Theorists, such as 
Nohrstedt (2000: 150), describe how reportage has evolved as a result of exponential 
transformations in the media landscape, such as advances in broadcast technology 
(particularly lightweight cameras and satellite communication systems), the 
development of 24-hour rolling news, and the proliferation of media outlets. For 
example, these developments allowed a small number of reporters to gain access to 
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and broadcast images of the 2004 Tsunami from the remotest regions of Banda Aceh 
within a few hours of that major emergency occurring (Walter 2005: 83).  
Additionally, the MECIT may have to deal with particular difficulties related to 
media reportage of major emergency events, including media sensationalism of 
particular risks, hazards and major emergency situations; the trivialisation and over-
simplification of some complex emotional events following major emergencies; 
considering devastating events as quasi-entertainment rather than news; a tendency to 
invade the privacy of victims, their families, and response workers. Another 
significant problem concerning contemporary media reportage is a tendency for 
editors to focus on speed rather than accuracy. According to Reynolds (2003: 26), 
‘90% of first reports following a major disaster event contain factual errors’. 
Competition amongst media outlets is a major contributing factor to all these 
phenomena. 
 
Dealing with the media 
As a result of the many difficulties associated with contemporary media coverage of 
major emergency situations, described above, it is essential that the MECIT deal with 
reporters, broadcasters and editors in an open, balanced and regulated manner in order 
to ensure that any reportage provides important information that can save lives or 
relieve the suffering of affected publics. However, while this may be of great benefit 
to the response effort, any regulation of media reportage can impact negatively on the 
impartiality of their output if not handled appropriately. In the aftermath of the First 
Gulf War, many media organisations complained of the pressures brought to bear on 
reporters by the Allied Joint Information Centre. Many reporters believed that they 
were overly regulated through a form of tacit censorship. Consequently, any 
attempted use of the media should be approached in the interest of public safety and 
for important logistical reasons. Response agencies should avoid attempting to 
regulate media output for reasons other than these.  
 
Both Darrell (2003: 11) and Coombs (1999: 35) emphasise how the media can 
positively or negatively influence the public’s perception and image of how the major 
emergency is being handled and whether the public considers the response agency to 
be trustworthy and credible. Darrell emphasises:  
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Authorities must assume that the crisis image is as real as the crisis itself 
and that the substandard handling of the image during a crisis can result in 
the actual crisis expanding or taking a different form and direction (2003: 
11).  
 
Consequently, EMA (2003: 3) describes how an effective media plan is essential in 
order to deal with the demands of local, regional, national and international media to 
ensure the provision of accurate, timely and essential information. According to 
AKNZ and EU (2001: 50), it is important to have experienced media specialists 
within the MECIT ‘who really know how to deal with the press’.  
 
The communication and information management centre (CIMC) 
The NRT (2000: 1-1) describes the necessity for a ‘communication hub’, where 
multiple response agencies and organisations can efficiently manage information 
flows from the major emergency flash point, to a centre where it can be 
comprehensively analysed and then disseminated to all response agencies, the media, 
and interested and affected publics, in a controlled manner. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, this location is termed a ‘communication and information management 
centre’ (CIMC). The CIMC should be established and coordinated by the MECIT of 
the lead response organisation once a major emergency actualises. In this centre, 
practitioners for all of the key communication functions (described throughout 
Section 5.3.5) from the many diverse response organisations ‘…can work together to 
ensure the timely, accurate, easy-to-understand, and consistent dissemination of 
official information between themselves, to the public and the media’ (Ridge 2004(a): 
29).  
 
The CIMC is an important focal point for building, gaining and maintaining public 
trust and confidence, facilitating the control of rumours, analysing public perceptions 
to the response effort and disseminated messages, and maintaining records and 
information thereby improving the ability to carry out post-incident assessments 
(NRT 2000: 1-1 and 1-4). A properly established and run CIMC ensures an optimum 
distribution of key resources to individual MECITs, such as communication research 
and evaluation support, crucial logistics and adequate communication information 
and technology (CIT) facilities.  
 
 131
The CIMC should be co-located with the major emergency operations centre (EOC) 
to allow a smooth transfer of information between the operations and communication 
functions. Additionally, the CIMC should have available representatives from each 
operational response region, each response agency, appropriate private-sector 
industry and service utilities, critical transport organisations, government 
departments, and non-governmental organisations. Ridge (2004(a): 30) and NRT 
(2000: 1-2) describe how a single CIMC location is preferable during a major 
emergency so that resources can be better managed and duplication of effort is 
minimised. However, Ridge (2004(a): 30) also emphasises that multiple CIMCs may 
be necessary to deal with a complex situation spanning a wide geographical area. In 
some situations this involves coordination across national boundaries, which often 
requires great diplomacy. For example, following the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, 
emergency communication practitioners in India and Pakistan were obliged to 
coordinate cross-border communication and information flows (Mountain tsunami 
2005: 26). NRT (2000: 1-1) believes the CIMC structure is designed to work ‘equally 
well’ for large or small situations and can ‘expand or contract to meet the needs of the 
incident’.  
 
Regardless of the size of the CIMC, it is important that it focuses on both internal and 
external communication (ibid: 1-7). In order for the CIMC to operate efficiently and 
without interruption, it should be organised in such a way as to reduce excesses of 
ambient noise and to have restricted access. Bernstein (1987: 127) discusses the 
importance of establishing secure fixed perimeters for the CIMC. He states that ideal 
locations are schools, city auditoriums, hotels, public arenas or large outdoor tents 
(ibid.). 
 
Media centre 
A critical element of the media management process is the establishment of a well- 
equipped media centre run by a dedicated media coordinating group of the lead 
MECIT. This media centre should be established remotely from the ‘flash-point’, 
EOC and CIMC in order to reduce media interference of the overall operations 
function. According to UK Resilience (2005: 65), this media centre needs to be easily 
accessible; capable of holding a large number of journalists and their vehicles; be 
well equipped with appropriate information technology systems, faxes, and multiple 
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ISDN/Broadband and telephone lines; and be properly staffed for as long as required, 
perhaps on a 24-hour, 7-day basis. A suitable space for press conferences should also 
be available.  
 
The lead MECIT should ensure that media liaison officers (MLO) from each of the 
principal response agencies are on hand in the media centre to provide journalists 
with operational updates for respective response organisations. Reynolds (2002: 132) 
recommends providing background information to the media through ‘facts-sheets’. 
Bernstein (1987: 150) emphasises the importance of preparing ‘boiler-plate’ press 
releases and ‘holding statements’ during the pre-crisis stage that can be quickly 
adapted and released following the actualisation of a major emergency. Such tools 
and procedures assist in rapidly filling any information vacuum that may exist. The 
use of regular press briefings and conferences is a useful method of updating the 
media. The media coordinating group should also arrange media visits to the ‘flash-
point’, providing transport and media liaison officers as necessary. AKNZ and EU 
(2001: 45) suggest the establishment of ‘pooling’ or sharing arrangements, where 
necessary, thereby negating the need for media to access sensitive or dangerous sites.  
 
The lead MECIT should appoint a chief spokesperson whose role is ‘to manage the 
accuracy and consistency of the messages’ coming from the lead response 
organisation (Coombs 1999:71). This person should be well trained, fully briefed, 
accredited, and ‘on-message’. According to Mitchell (1986: 17), ‘…a poorly 
prepared, trained or unskilled spokesperson can merely exacerbate a major 
emergency situation’. The subject of media management is discussed further 
throughout the next two chapters. 
 
5.3.5.5 Community outreach and victim liaison  
Community outreach and victim liaison are further key communication functions that 
require coordination and integration by the MECIT within the CIMC. In this regard, 
both functions offer a ‘boundary-spanning’ mechanism between the lead response 
organisation and the affected community (Sturges 1994: 298). ‘Boundary spanning’ 
allows community outreach officers and victim liaison officers to keep a constant 
 133
flow of dialogue with affected publics in order to assess their needs and requirements, 
and also to gather useful information.  
 
The role of the community outreach officer is to determine the information and other 
needs of the community; to organise outreach programmes; to make contact with 
local influential persons who can provide a sense as to how the community perceives 
the major emergency response. According to Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 155), 
proactive contact should be made directly with the community itself. This role is 
often undertaken by personnel other than by communication practitioners and, as 
such, an excellent information-gathering mechanism may be lost. 
 
Liaison with victims of major emergencies, and their families, is a critical 
communication function that should be closely coordinated, or at least monitored, by 
the MECIT. This ensures that the needs and concerns of communities and victims 
become part of a larger information and communication cycle, thereby ensuring a 
more focused delivery of action. Without such a coordinated approach, affected 
publics will not receive the best possible level of care and attention and this is likely 
to impact on the reputation of the lead response organisation. In the post-crisis stage, 
the care of victims and their families becomes a particular focus of the media and 
may result in negative reportage. This subject receives further attention throughout 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
5.3.6 Building strong relationships 
An important element of the proposed major emergency communication framework 
is building strong relationships with key stakeholders. Many theorists, including 
Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002: 100), Fearn-Banks (1996: 39) and Coombs (1999: 
39) emphasise the importance of building long-term relationships with stakeholders 
and publics. Marra (1998: 7) believes that an organisation with a strong pre-crisis 
relationship with its stakeholders, ‘…may suffer less damage than an organisation 
with weak or non-existent pre-crisis relationships…while research clearly indicates a 
crisis magnifies poor or non-existent relationships’. In relation to major emergency 
situations, the objective of building strong relationships prior to the occurrence of a 
disaster situation is supported by many contemporary theorists. Salter’s (1999: 111) 
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model (Figure 2.1) acknowledges the importance of communicating with, rather than 
to, communities. Additionally, Fischhoff’s (1995: 138) model (Figure 3.7.4) 
emphasises the importance of ‘making partners’ by building up strong relationships 
with stakeholders. All three major emergency models described earlier in Section 4.5, 
involve building strong relationships during the pre-crisis stage. Reynolds (2002: 7) 
supports the ‘fostering of alliances’, while UK Resilience (2005: 28) and Nordlund 
(1994: 13) propose ‘building relationships’. Building strong relationships takes 
considerable time and effort, but the majority of major emergency literature provides 
clear evidence of supporting that task. Susskind and Field (1996:41) note how the 
cost of building strong relationships with stakeholders, ‘…may not be obvious in the 
short term…but if you care about your credibility focus on building strong long-term 
relationships’. 
 
Lindenmann (1998/99: 19) emphasises that building relationships with stakeholders 
needs to be managed strategically. Coombs (1999: 45) describes a number of strategic 
approaches that can be pursued in order to build strong relationships with 
stakeholders, including staying close through regular contact and two-way dialogue, 
developing organisational trust and credibility, and consistently meeting stakeholder 
expectations. 
 
A further important strategic approach is the use of stakeholder maps and networks in 
order to allow the key stakeholders to be readily identified and contacted. A 
comprehensive stakeholder network identifies and maps key stakeholders, together 
with relevant information explaining why these groups are stakeholders, their 
relationship with the lead response organisation, who to contact in the group and how, 
and details of who in the MECIT is responsible for contacting them (Coombs 1999: 
53; Darrell 2003: 19). Reynolds (2003: 38) emphasises that relationships must be 
built with all categories of stakeholders, irrespective of their position vis-a-vis the 
lead response organisation, and includes ‘advocates, adversaries and ambivalent’.  
 
Conkey (2004: 44) believes that a major strength of the stakeholder network ‘is that a 
small number of people can effectively coordinate the communication efforts of a 
large group’. He describes how the Australian government has established an 
effective stakeholder network in order to communicate critical information to key 
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people, who will in turn disseminate this information to others, in the event of a 
potential ‘foot-and-mouth’ outbreak in that country. The stakeholder map and 
network gives the MECIT the ability to contact opinion leaders or spokespersons 
within particular stakeholder and publics groups quickly and efficiently when seeking 
to engage in two-way dialogue or to impart important information to them. Coombs 
(1999: 54) emphasises that, ‘…once established, the stakeholder map and network 
must be maintained…as neglect of the network leads to eventual problems’. 
 
According to Breakingnews (2004), following the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia, 
key personnel within the Indian government did not learn of the disaster until it was 
broadcast on television news. This was due to a failure to maintain and update its 
stakeholder network and contact details. A senior government aide reportedly stated, 
‘it looks as if they forgot to update their records’ (ibid.). 
 
Of equal importance, according to Darrell (2003: 58) and Norman, Stuart-Black and 
Coles (2006: 111), is the importance of building strong relationships with the media. 
Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 30) recognise that building good relationships with the 
media takes time but in so doing ‘can pay dividends in ensuring accurate reporting of 
the response efforts.’ Stronger relations with the media can be built by having regular 
meetings and briefings, providing consistent speedy responses to their queries, and 
involving the media in major emergency training and exercises.  
 
Strong relationships, with both stakeholders and the media, are best built during the 
pre-crisis stage of a major emergency. Marra (1998: 7) states, ‘organisations can’t 
build or repair relationships once a major emergency occurs’. Once built, it is 
extremely important to maintain and further develop these relationships. This can 
only be achieved through regular contact, particularly personal contact. Coombs 
(1999: 146) emphasises the importance of including the rebuilding of damaged or 
strained relationships as part of the post-crisis major emergency communication 
strategy. 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, building relationships with stakeholders and publics 
needs to be considered in the cultural context of the environment within which the 
communication strategy is being developed and implemented. The purpose and the 
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strength of the relationships may vary from country to country. Additionally, the 
benefits may differ from one country to the next. 
 
5.3.6.1 Developing and maintaining trust and credibility 
A key principle that requires careful consideration when developing the major 
emergency communication framework involves striving for the development and 
maintenance of trust and credibility amongst key stakeholders and the public. 
According to Trumbo and McComas (2003: 343), ‘credibility and trust are precious 
commodities’ for communication practitioners throughout major emergency 
situations. Darrell (2003: 20) believes that the most important precondition for 
successfully handling a major emergency is that the lead response organisation has 
considerable public trust and credibility. Otherwise, decisions, recommendations and 
messages produced by the lead response organisation are likely to be met with some 
scepticism. Nordlund (1994: 13) goes further and states that communication from an 
untrustworthy response organisation ‘may give rise to anger and resentment, or 
arouse bitter indignation’ amongst the public. 
 
O’Brien (2006:14) emphasises that ‘the trust of the public is easy to lose, and harder 
to regain…recovering it is fraught with difficulties’. PR Coalition (2003: 9) insists 
that rebuilding trust and credibility is ‘a long-term undertaking’. Baker and Martinson 
(2002: 149) believe that high ethical standards are crucial in order to build and 
maintain trust and credibility.  They identify five guiding principles for ensuring an 
ethical approach: truthfulness, authenticity, respect, equity and social responsibility. 
Deviation from any of these principles can lead to an erosion of public trust and 
credibility in the lead response organisation. 
 
For example, in an attempt to reduce public concerns following the 9/11 attacks on 
the ‘Twin Towers’, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that 
‘no significant levels of asbestos in the air had been recorded’ (Hidden Killer 2006: 
32). However, in February 2006, a Manhattan judge ‘blasted the EPA for misleading 
the public into believing the air was safe’ (ibid.). The collapsing tower, she stated, 
released ‘hazardous substances, including fibreglass, freon, mercury and asbestos into 
the air’ (ibid.). The EPA had known within twenty-four hours that asbestos levels 
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were four times higher than the acceptable danger threshold. While short-term 
exposure to asbestos is not dangerous, lies such as this can seriously undermine 
public trust and credibility in a hitherto trusted organisation.  
 
In diagrammatic format, CDC provides a useful summary of the significance of 
source credibility and trust during the major emergency communication process. 
 
Figure 5.2: The importance of trust and credibility to major emergency 
communication. 
 
Source: (Reynolds 2002: 39) 
 
From a strategic viewpoint, PR Coalition (2003: 10) describes the importance of 
measuring levels of trust ‘in order to show you where you are in the continuum of 
change’. Useful tools such as focus groups, surveys, media monitoring, blog-
monitoring, and qualitative research can assist in this process. 
 
While it is accepted that building public trust and credibility is an important function 
that should be carried out during all stages of a major emergency situation, most of 
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the effort in that regard is likely in practice to take place during the pre-crisis stage. 
However, in many countries, government agencies are simply not trusted, particularly 
amongst certain sectors of society. For example, Lasker (2004: 13) notes that 
African-Americans place greater trust in community and family groups than in the 
authorities. Building up trust and credibility is a very difficult task and can only be 
achieved over the longer-term by the demonstration of ongoing ethical probity, 
openness, accuracy of information and the matching of positive words with deeds. 
Additionally, trust and credibility can be quickly and easily lost (as FEMA discovered 
during their response to Hurricane Katrina). Consequently, response agencies need to 
have a communication strategy in place for situations where no trust and credibility 
exists, or where this is lost. This need is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, 
which addresses communication during the pre-crisis stage of a major emergency. 
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6 COMMUNICATION DURING THE PRE-CRISIS STAGE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The pre-crisis stage of a major emergency life cycle is the period when governments 
and lead response organisations must take action in order to prevent and prepare for, 
potentially life threatening situations. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine whether a comprehensive and sophisticated major 
emergency risk and crisis communication strategy can assist response organisations 
in dealing with these situations. In chapter 5, a number of overarching strategic 
principles that should guide the major emergency communication function were 
proposed. With these strategic principles in mind, this chapter proposes a series of 
strategic-tactical steps that the major emergency communication and information 
team (MECIT) should consider when preparing and planning all aspects of 
communication during the pre-crisis stage. 
 
In this regard, the MECIT needs to consider communication from two distinct 
viewpoints: planning comprehensive communication programmes that can assist the 
lead response organisation in preventing major emergencies from occurring, and 
preparing all aspects of the communication function in order to support the response 
effort should a major emergency occur. The management of these two distinct but 
complementary strands of communication should be considered at two distinct levels, 
a higher-level and tactical-level.  
 
6.2 Major emergency communication in the pre-crisis stage 
 
The development of a comprehensive communication strategy and framework for the 
pre-crisis stage of a major emergency situation needs to be considered and analysed at 
two distinct levels, the higher and the tactical. The synergy that exists between the 
series of strategic-tactical (yellow) pre-crisis major emergency communication steps 
 140
and the overarching strategic communication principles (blue) is evident in Figure 6.1 
below. 
 
Figure 6.1: Major emergency communication management – pre-crisis stage. 
 
6.3 Higher-level pre-crisis major emergency communication 
management 
 
The pre-crisis stage higher-level involves inceptive but essential strategic-tactical 
steps that need to be taken by senior decision-makers of the lead response 
organisation in order to initiate the preliminary stages of the major emergency 
communication strategy. The higher-level strategy involves three distinct steps. 
 
6.3.1 Selection of senior communication manager/leader of the MECIT 
Careful selection of the senior communication manager is critical to the success of 
developing, implementing and leading the entire major emergency communication 
strategy. In Section 5.2 the importance of empowering and involving the senior 
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communication manager at the highest level in the overall decision-making process 
was discussed. Coombs (1999: 65) offers a useful table that identifies some of the key 
knowledge, skills and traits that are desirable for the leader of the major emergency 
communication and information team (MECIT), including having a co-operative 
disposition, a tolerance for ambiguous situations, and the ability to handle stress. 
Berge (1990: 44) includes additional desirable traits such as the capability to make 
swift decisions and to communicate effectively with others. According to Schoenberg 
(2005: 3), the senior communication manager requires integrity, strategic thinking, 
persuasive skills, and decisiveness. Additionally, the MECIT leader must possess 
requisite formal strategic communication knowledge and, ideally, first-hand 
experience of the role.  
 
Consequently, the choice of the person to lead the MECIT will be determined by the 
culture and structure of the lead response organisation. However, the choice of a 
suitable person can greatly influence thereafter how communication is perceived 
amongst senior decision-makers in the organisation. One of the critical roles of the 
senior communication manager is that of ‘boundary-spanning’, acting as a link 
between the external environment and the senior decision-makers in the lead response 
organisation. 
 
6.3.2 Selection of the MECIT 
The next step of the pre-crisis higher-level strategic communication process involves 
identifying and selecting suitable members for the MECIT. Coombs (1999: 63) 
describes a team such as this as ‘a cross-functional group of people’ that has been 
designated to handle the communication function throughout an emergency situation. 
In the pre-crisis stage of a major emergency, it is prudent that each individual 
response organisation develops its own MECIT. It is important that these teams, 
particularly the lead MECIT, possess a strong mix of creative thought, specialist 
knowledge, and experience. During the pre-crisis stage, it is likely that the MECIT 
will consist of a more restricted core group of participants that is augmented and 
expands as a major emergency becomes imminent or actualises. 
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Many theorists, including Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 57) and Bernstein (1987: 21), 
have described the different skill-sets that should be represented within the MECIT, 
including leadership, communication, media handling, information management, 
legal, human resources, community liaison, information and communications 
technology, finance, risk management, operations and logistics. The MECIT should 
also have access to expertise in areas such as safety, environmental science, critical 
incident stress debriefing (CISD) and security. A number of key support staff are also 
required in the MECIT, including researchers, photographers, switch operators, media 
monitors, log keepers, website managers, communication and information technology 
technicians, and copywriters. At a strategic level, the leader of the MECIT should 
ensure that the overall operational commander understands the value that this diverse 
pool of skills can provide to the entire response effort and provides the necessary 
resources accordingly. 
 
6.3.3 Preliminary goal setting. 
Once established, an important higher-level task for the MECIT, at the very outset, is 
to conduct an exploratory analysis of the communication environment and to set 
preliminary goals and objectives. All preliminary communication goals should be 
closely aligned with the preliminary operational goals of the lead response 
organisation.  
 
A key preliminary communication goal for the MECIT is the adoption of an 
appropriate approach and model to guide all aspects of communication with internal 
and external stakeholders. This goal should stipulate how transparency and openness 
is to be achieved and how communication should flow throughout the lead response 
organisation. The MECIT also needs to set a clear goal stipulating that the decision-
making process involves the use of both ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ participants. All 
preliminary goals and objectives are likely to evolve and be refined as the major 
emergency communication strategy develops. This is likely to occur following a 
process of continuous communication analysis, deliberation, feedback, evaluation and 
revision, which are key elements of approaching the discipline strategically.  
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6.4 Pre-crisis stage tactical level 
 
Once the higher-level pre-crisis communication process is complete, the MECIT can 
begin to develop and implement each of the tactical-level communication steps-, 
which involves two fundamental functions. Firstly, developing a communication 
process that can assist the lead response organisation in preventing a major 
emergency from happening, or at least to minimise its impact. Secondly, to develop 
communication processes in order to prepare stakeholders and publics to best deal 
with the effects of a major emergency situation, and also to prepare the actual 
communication processes and plans themselves.  
 
6.4.1 Prevention during the pre-crisis stage 
Major emergency communication management is working at an optimum when it 
assists the lead response organisation in its risk management and mitigation efforts, 
thereby preventing major emergency situations from occurring. Coombs (1999: 39) 
states that the goal of major emergency prevention is ‘to defuse the crisis by attending 
to warning signs and risks’. The Cabinet Office (2004: 28) in the UK emphasises how 
the communication function can assist in the major emergency prevention role by, 
‘…providing the right people with the right information at the right time in a form 
that they can understand, assimilate and act upon’. 
 
The MECIT can assist the lead response organisation in preventing major 
emergencies from occurring by undertaking a number of distinct tasks, including the 
early warning detection role, the development of stakeholder networks, the building 
of strong relationships and the fostering of alliances. The final two elements were 
dealt with in some detail in Chapter 5. 
 
6.4.1.1 The early warning detection role 
Through the efficient use of communication, the MECIT can establish a process 
whereby it can provide the lead response organisation with early warning of hazards 
that could potentially develop into major emergency situations. Fink (1986: 21) 
describes how crises can be avoided by recognising ‘prodromes’ or early warning 
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signals. Dozier, Grunig and Grunig (1995: 199) and Darrell (2003: 18) discuss how 
the process of environmental scanning, ‘a systematic and ongoing analysis of the 
outside world’, can provide important intelligence in relation to hazards, thereby 
giving the lead response organisation adequate time to optimise the decision-making 
process. However, according to Iwan (1999: 32), this early warning information must 
be provided in a format that is understandable and of use to the end decision-makers.  
 
Adopting a scientific approach to communication, effective early warning systems 
can be developed using tools such as stakeholder maps and networks, analysis of the 
media, focus groups, attitude surveys and opinion polls (Cohn 2000: 114). Grunig, 
Grunig and Dozier (2002: 550) suggest cyber-scanning, which provides a systematic 
means of researching potential risks on the internet, as a useful early warning method.  
 
Despite the early identification of serious hazards by the MECIT, many early warning 
signals tend to be ignored by major emergency managers. Following the Hillsborough 
soccer stadium disaster in Liverpool in 1989, in which 95 people died, Lord Justice 
Taylor in his summation to the inquiry highlighted that ‘many of the deficiencies in 
the stadium had already been envisaged’ (Taylor 1990: 32). Other examples of 
warnings being ignored include a devastating famine caused by locust attacks in 
Niger in 2004, where ‘villagers were forced to scavenge anthills hoping to find stray 
grains of food’. This is despite the receipt of early warning signals of locust attacks 
on cereal crops in 2003 and ‘alarm bells going unheeded’ (Walter 2005: 61). 
Additionally, Thompson (2003: 142) highlights how the US government failed to 
pick up early warning signals from postal officials prior to the ‘anthrax attacks’ in 
2001. Consequently, the MECIT needs to ensure that any warning signals provided 
through the environmental scanning programme are acted on by the lead response 
organisation. 
 
6.4.1.2 The building of strong stakeholder relationships and the fostering 
of alliances. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, building strong stakeholder/public relationships and 
fostering alliances can help the lead response organisation to prevent certain 
categories of major emergencies from actualising, or at least to reduce their impact 
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when they do occur. For example, in terrorist related incidents, members of the public 
are more likely to be aware and to pass on warning signals if relationships are strong. 
Similarly, members of the public are more likely to heed instructing information 
given by response organisations if time and effort is spent building relationships. This 
is an important communication function and involves the MECIT identifying useful 
stakeholders and publics, developing comprehensive stakeholder networks and maps, 
building credibility and gaining stakeholders and publics trust, engaging in 
meaningful two-way symmetrical dialogue with them, and ensuring an efficient 
information management system is in place in order to gather, analyse and action 
information emanating from the dialogue. 
 
The building of a network of relationships among internal teams at this time is also 
very important. This helps to ensure that the lead response organisation’s ‘internal 
systems of processes and people remain in place and don’t collapse under stress’ 
(Schoenberg 2005: 4). 
 
6.4.2  Communication preparation during the pre-crisis stage of a major 
emergency 
Despite all of the best efforts of the MECIT and the lead response organisation at 
prevention, major emergencies will inevitably happen. Coombs (1999: 59) warns 
major emergency managers that, ‘…they should not fall victim to hubris [pride] and 
assume that their preventative measures will protect them from harm’. Consequently, 
the MECIT needs to assist the lead response organisation to prepare both themselves 
and stakeholders in order to deal with the effects of a major emergency situation. 
Effective preparation for a major emergency involves considerable attention to the 
series of steps contained within the second element of the pre-crisis tactical-level 
communication strategy. These steps are described below. 
 
6.4.2.1 Conduct a detailed major emergency communication analysis 
The MECIT can provide significant assistance to the lead response organisation in 
carrying out an overall operational analysis in the pre-crisis stage. In this regard, the 
MECIT effectively utilises many communication tools and functions such as the 
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stakeholder network, ‘boundary spanning’, and information-gathering and analysis. 
On completion of the operational analysis, the lead response organisation should be 
capable of identifying potential major emergencies that are considered most likely, 
and prioritise each of them across such dimensions as ‘likelihood of occurrence’ and 
‘extent of impact’. Thereafter, in order of priority, the lead response organisation 
should set clearly defined operational goals and objectives in order to deal with each 
identified potential major emergency, and put in place measures to protect its 
stakeholders and publics.  
 
Taking advantage of the information provided through the operational major 
emergency analysis, and aligning itself with the goals and objectives set by the lead 
response organisation, the MECIT should conduct its own detailed major emergency 
communication analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to assess all available 
information and to assess the strengths, weaknesses and gaps within the 
communication management function vis-á-vis each identified and prioritised major 
emergency. The communication information gathered can be analysed using a 
number of tools such as the ‘assessment worksheet’ prepared by Berge (1990: 36). 
Van Houts (1996: 20) provides an adaptation of the classical ‘strengths, weakness, 
opportunity and threats’ (SWOT) model. Using the adapted ‘SWOT’ model, the 
MECIT can determine the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that exist 
in terms of communication in both the internal and external environment. Adhering to 
both scientific and strategic principles, the execution of a communication analysis 
such as this provides the MECIT with the requisite building blocks to develop 
individual communication strategies and plans for dealing with identified major 
emergencies.  
 
6.4.2.2 Prepare comprehensive communication goals and objectives 
Once the detailed major emergency communication analysis is complete, the next 
stage in the preparation process is to establish comprehensive communication goals 
and objectives. These are in addition to, and more detailed than, the setting of the 
preliminary higher-level goals and objective described earlier in Section 6.3.3. These 
tactical-level communication goals and objectives should be closely aligned to the 
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operational goals and objectives of the lead response organisation, following its 
detailed analysis of the major emergency environment.  
 
One of the most important goals to be established relates to the choice of 
communication approach with stakeholders, whether this is reactive or proactive, 
open or closed. Goals and objectives also need to be clearly set in relation to building 
public trust and credibility, segmenting strategic publics, developing strategic 
communication programmes in order to overcome any apparent knowledge gaps 
identified during the communication analysis, preparing the major emergency 
communication response plan (MERCP), preparing template communication forms 
and generic background information, procuring necessary equipment for the CIMC, 
and training and exercising the MECIT. A final important goal that needs to be 
clearly stated relates to the involvement of publics in important decision-making 
concerning major emergency communication management.  
 
6.4.2.3 Establishing communication approach parameters 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, major emergencies are considered low probability, 
high consequence events (Flynn 2003: 85), that often occur with a ‘big bang’ effect 
(Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles 2006: 5). Consequently, how the MECIT decides to 
communicate with its publics throughout all stages of a major emergency must be 
given significant consideration. Many factors can determine the particular approach 
adopted, including the culture and structure of the lead response organisation, its 
commitment to approaching the communication function from a strategic and 
scientific perspective, the stage within the major emergency life cycle, the category of 
event that society is facing, the duration of lead-in time to impact, and the attitude 
adopted by the media.  
 
Nohrstedt (2000: 146) highlights the difficulties faced by the MECIT when deciding 
on the choice of an appropriate approach to major emergency communication. In 
particular he identifies the ‘need for information paradox’ and the ‘reassure-but-warn 
paradox’ as two major dilemmas that communication managers face when 
communicating about major emergency situations. This relates, in the first instance, 
to a sense of apathy displayed by many members of the public when a major 
 148
emergency is not imminent. However, on the other hand, once a major emergency is 
looming there exists an insatiable desire for information. On both ends of a spectrum, 
major emergency managers can decide to provide information that may cause 
unnecessary alarm to the public or can choose instead to understate the danger in an 
attempt to reassure the public. Bernstein (1987: 82) notes that communicating about 
risk in major emergency situations ‘is never emotionally neutral…it either reassures 
people or it alarms them’. As shown in Section 2.4.1, a number of diverse factors 
affect how people perceive risk and danger. 
 
Many contemporary writers, including Covello and Allen (1988: 4), propose that 
major emergency communication in the pre-crisis stage should involve open, frank, 
honest and transparent dialogue with publics. Sandman (2004(a)) concurs and stresses 
that the MECIT should not attempt to over-reassure publics in relation to the potential 
hazards of major emergencies and instead should ‘err on the alarming side’ and 
should aim to avoid ‘zero fear’. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the US is 
also in agreement and states that the MECIT should ‘stop trying to allay panic’ 
(Reynolds 2002: 24). For example, it was reported that officials in Indonesia 
‘covered-up’ avian flu and tried to ‘deal with it quietly’ for two years in order to allay 
public fear and panic. However, this delay ‘merely allowed it to spread among 
poultry flocks and to people’ (Sipress 2005: A01). Sandman (2004(b)) believes that 
the MECIT should tell people ‘what to really expect’ in relation to major 
emergencies. He promotes the principle of engaging in, 
 
…anticipatory guidance…telling people what to expect does raise some 
anxiety, especially if you’re predicting bad news. But being forewarned 
helps us to cope, it keeps us from feeling blindsided or misled, and it 
reduces the dispiriting impact of sudden negative events. 
 
Tierney, cited in Alesch et al., (2004: 159) agrees with Sandman and proposes any 
approach that helps to ‘…overcome public apathy’.  
 
However, while Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 115) highlight the importance of 
transparency and openness, they place equal emphasis on an approach that involves 
‘calming the public…and not unduly alarming them’. This involves a balanced 
approach and according to the theorists should ensure optimum results for 
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communication managers. However, the timing within the major emergency life 
cycle will be a key deciding factor. If a major emergency is not imminent, such as a 
‘rising tide’ category of major emergency, the MECIT can afford to adopt a more 
‘persuasive’ approach. On the other hand, for a sudden ‘big bang’ category of major 
emergency, such as an imminent cyclone, the MECIT may be obliged to use a more 
alarmist approach in order to save lives. While engaging in ‘scare tactics’ is beneficial 
in gaining the public’s attention, constantly over-emphasising the risks and dangers of 
hazards may diminish the credibility of the lead response organisation and its 
message. Many commentators have accused the Bush administration of ‘crying wolf’ 
in relation to terrorism in the US since 2001 in order to secure adequate funding for 
the president’s policies. In the context of establishing communication approach 
parameters strategically, the MECIT can use scientific communication tools and 
techniques, such as surveys, focus groups and dialogue, in order to assist them in this 
important task. 
 
6.4.2.4 Redetermine relevant stakeholders and publics 
Once the MECIT has completed its detailed major emergency communication 
analysis, described earlier (p129), there may be a requirement to re-evaluate, and 
perhaps revise, the stakeholder map and network (as discussed in Chapter 5). Such an 
ongoing and iterative process emphasises the strategic approach to major emergency 
communication management. The MECIT should develop an individual stakeholder 
map and network for each of the identified potential major emergency situations. 
These maps and networks should contain details of those people involved in, 
interested in, or affected by a potential major emergency, and those with specific 
knowledge or information that may be of use to the decision-making process. Details 
should also exist of points-of-contact amongst the different stakeholder groups and 
communities and how best to contact these people. At this stage, stakeholders can be 
used to identify other potential stakeholders, thereby building an augmented network 
and map using a multiplier effect. Additionally, for this process to be undertaken at a 
nationwide level, the lead MECIT should co-ordinate the actions of all regional and 
local MECITs in order to develop a comprehensive and integrated stakeholder map 
and network. Useful electronic tools, such as mind mapping, can greatly assist in this 
process.  
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6.4.2.5 Message and information formulation 
Once communication goals and objectives have been established for each of the 
prioritised potential major emergency situations, and the parameters for an 
appropriate communication approach agreed, the MECIT should then begin the 
process of preparing, testing, evaluating and revising key messages and information 
to be eventually disseminated to stakeholders. This process allows the MECIT to 
inform, advise, instruct, reassure and meaningfully involve all relevant stakeholders 
and publics in relation to identified major emergency situations.  
 
During the pre-crisis stage of a major emergency, two distinct categories of key 
messages should be considered. Firstly, ‘risk communication messages’ can be 
developed and communicated in order to assist publics to overcome apathy, lack of 
understanding of major emergency issues, and lead response organisation distrust. 
Risk communication messages can also inform publics about specific major 
emergencies that may occur and how they should prepare for these potentially life-
threatening events. Secondly, a number of ‘boiler-plate’ [generic] crisis 
communication messages can be developed and tested for each potential major 
emergency scenario. These ‘boiler-plate’ messages are then held within the MERCP 
for dissemination should that particular category of major emergency occur. The 
messages can be ‘position key messages’ that convey the government’s or lead 
response organisation’s position on what has just occurred, or ‘instructional key 
messages’ that are designed to direct stakeholders and publics to take particular 
action (Fernandez and Merzer 2003: 115). An example of an ‘instructional key 
message’ is ‘go in, stay in, tune in’ that is likely to be issued in the event of a 
radioactive leak (OEP 2008: 16). The subject of message development will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
6.4.2.6 Educating stakeholder groups 
A critical preparedness function during this stage is the requirement for the MECIT to 
educate key stakeholders and publics about major emergency situations and to raise 
levels of awareness about personal and collective roles and responsibilities. In the 
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event of a major emergency occurring, such preparedness measures encourage 
publics to behave in a desirable way, thereby promoting the concept of resilient 
communities. The importance of educating stakeholders in this regard has been 
emphasised by theorists such as Nielson and Lidstone (1998: 16), Reynolds (2002: 8), 
Nordlund (1994: 20) and Tarrant (1997: 20). Nussbaum (2005:40) describes the 
importance of central funding for public education campaigns to prepare for major 
emergencies, such as extreme terrorist attacks. This would involve ‘having a real 
conversation with the public and that hasn’t been done yet.’  
 
The education of stakeholder groups involves important incremental steps by the 
MECIT that should culminate in getting individuals and communities involved in 
voluntary preparedness action. In this regard, typical matters that the MECIT should 
consider during the pre-crisis stage include: educating householders and publics in 
relation to the types of major emergencies that are most likely and the characteristics 
of each and immediate protection measures that need be taken; informing them of the 
actions that have been taken by the lead response organisation to protect the 
community against different categories of likely major emergency; assessing the 
types of early warning systems that have been in place and actions to be taken on 
receipt of a warning or alarm; understanding the various evacuation and shelter 
procedures in place; the best way to request emergency assistance, information or 
relief; the means whereby householders can prepare for and protect against major 
emergencies and survive without assistance for a short period following a major 
emergency; the best way to deal with psychosocial difficulties such as shock, anger, 
and post-traumatic stress; and the means whereby householders can assist the lead 
response organisation and their local communities, particularly in relation to 
providing voluntary manpower and helping vulnerable individuals. While the benefits 
of publics possessing this type of information during a major emergency may be 
clear, there are many difficulties faced by practitioners in disseminating this type of 
data. In the first instance, the public is exposed to many educational messages, 
through a range of channels, on subjects including road safety, fire and personal 
health. These messages are likely to be cognitively prioritised by the individual, 
based on the relevance and proximity of a message to a particular person at a 
particular time. Consequently, educational content for major emergency preparedness 
needs to be relevant to an individual’s relationship with a particular emergency 
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situation. It can be argued that an apathetic public is unlikely to embrace generic 
major emergency education. However, targeted educational programmes for citizens, 
such as those run by FEMA to prepare communities for hurricanes (ICMA 1991:186), 
may provide a positive correlation between the individual’s needs and what is 
required to survive the first 72 hours of a major emergency. This includes teaching 
families to have in place survival kits containing water, dried food and a battery-
operated radio.  
 
Education and local resilience 
As members of the public are likely to be the first to arrive at the scene of a major 
emergency, prior to the arrival of first official responders, it is important that they do 
not place themselves in unnecessary danger and are available to be deployed to best 
advantage if deemed necessary by the response agencies. However, this possibility 
has to be considered within the context of extreme and unprecedented situations, 
scarce resources, and the need to provide community responders of adequate training, 
personal protective equipment (PPE), and insurance. At the most fundamental level, it 
would be ideal if members of communities who decide to respond to major 
emergencies have some knowledge of what is required and have a basic structure in 
order to optimise manpower quickly, thereby providing a ‘force multiplier’ effect. As 
discussed earlier in Section 2.4.1.2.2, many countries are working closer than 
previously with their communities in order to train them to protect themselves. For 
example, in Australia, EMA organises emergency training for young people in remote 
indigenous communities as part of a government youth strategy (Hocke and O’Brien 
2003: 62). In Honduras, members of the community are trained to read simple flood 
meters in order to measure river levels and provide early warning for severe flooding 
(Walter 2005: 46). Partnerships could be developed with a number of voluntary and 
community groups and training may be provided through organisations such as the 
Civil Defence and the Red Cross. In Ireland, partnerships could be forged with local 
football clubs that might readily provide an able-bodied response structure to the 
community. On the basis of the different teams within the club, command and control 
issues could be easily overcome and groups could be readily deployed on different 
response tasks.  
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Through such partnerships, information may be passed to other community members 
regarding how best to develop resilience within the community, how to respond in a 
structured way, and how to assist less able-bodied members. Feedback mechanisms 
for major emergency planners could also be provided in order to improve response 
systems and to provide local ‘non-expert’ information.  
 
Major emergency educational tools 
Public education for major emergency preparedness can be achieved through many 
diverse channels such as information booklets and DVDs, information stands in 
public places, advertising, media editorial, and greater engagement with the education 
system. Following detailed research, prolific organisations such as the UNDRO 
(1987: 22) emphasise the benefits of disaster education in educational institutions. 
Shaw et al. (2004: 39) highlight the importance of major emergency education in 
schools in order to develop ‘…a culture of disaster preparedness, which in turn will 
urge them to take right decisions and actions as an adult’. Fitzgerald (2000: 1) 
describes how a culture of major emergency prevention can be built ‘…through 
education channels so that the youth of today can play an active role in reducing the 
impact of disasters in the future’. By the careful choice of programmes such as FEMA 
for kids (FEMA 2008(b)), creating awareness amongst children can be both 
entertaining and educational and need not involve unnecessary alarm or fear amongst 
this target group. 
 
Theorists, such as Nielson and Lidstone (1998: 16), discuss the importance of lifelong 
learning for the individual and for society as a whole. They note when children are 
educated, parents through their participation in homework and project assignments on 
the subject of major emergencies can themselves become educated. Additionally, by 
educating children in this important subject at an early stage, society as a whole is 
educating its adults of the future. Despite the many demands placed on schools by 
different interest groups, such as road safety and environmental protection groups, an 
adequate education of publics in relation to major emergency preparedness has 
particular merit. 
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6.4.2.7 Major emergency response communication plan (MERCP). 
By their very nature, many categories of major emergency situations, such as tsunami 
and earthquakes, are very difficult to predict. Consequently, the MECIT requires a 
robust series of protocols and procedures in order to initiate effective communication 
processes, thereby helping to save lives. Accordingly, an extremely important pre-
crisis tactical-level preparation stage function involves the development, by the 
MECIT, of a comprehensive major emergency response communication plan 
(MERCP). This plan should systematically address all of the roles, lines of 
responsibility and resources in order to manage all elements of communication 
throughout all stages of a major emergency situation. According to Reynolds (2002: 
69), the major emergency communication plan, ‘…more than anything is a resource 
of information – the go-to place for must-have information’. 
 
Theorists such as Coombs (1999: 60), Pearson and Mitroff (1993: 53), Fearn-Banks 
(1996: 18), and Fink (1986: 42) describe how many major emergencies possess 
mutual characteristics. Consequently, a generic plan can be developed, subsequently 
modified and then adapted to suit a particular major emergency situation, thereby 
offering a good starting point in order to deal with unforeseen situations. According 
to Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991: 70): 
 
Clearly, it may not be possible to plan for every disaster scenario. 
However, the real meaning of preparedness is not about being ready for 
every possible scenario but the development of core preparedness for 
eventual crisis situations. 
 
The MERCP should be ‘meticulously crafted before a major emergency happens’ 
(ibid: 87). The plan should be a ‘manageable and easy-to-read document’ (Fearn-
Banks 1996: 24). Significantly, the MERCP needs to be fully integrated into, and 
‘cross-referenced’ with, the lead response organisation’s overall operational plan, and 
additionally with the communication plans of other response agencies (Millar and 
Smith 2002: 37). According to Reynolds (2002: 69), ‘a good communication plan 
will reflect that co-ordination’. Once developed, the generic MERCP must be 
continuously updated and revised. In this regard, Coombs (1999: 83) emphasises that 
‘it must remain a living document’. Additionally, each member of the MECIT must 
have immediate access to condensed versions of the MERCP for easy reference 
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(Millar and Smith 2002: 48). Appendix B contains a proposed major emergency 
response communication plan (MERCP) structure. 
 
6.4.2.8 Major emergency communication exercises and training 
According to Drabek and Hoetmer (1991: 184) ‘…having a plan does not in itself 
enable an effective response to a major emergency’. In order to ensure that all 
members of the MECIT, supporting communication teams and associated responders, 
fully understand all elements of the MERCP, a comprehensive and ongoing 
programme of integrated communication training and exercising should take place 
during the pre-crisis stage. In the UK, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) 
(2007: 32) describes how ‘training and exercising must underpin planning and 
embrace the activities of all staff’. According to Fearn-Banks (1996: 25) and 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 48), crisis team training should involve both individual-
level and group-level knowledge and skills.  
 
Major emergency communication training involves ‘equipping people with relevant 
knowledge and communication skills’ to undertake the roles expected of them (CCS 
2007: 32). This includes familiarising all staff, particularly new members, with 
communication protocols, procedures, equipment and systems (Norman, Stuart-Black 
and Coles 2006: 53). Coombs (1999: 70) believes that training should be specific and 
that ‘people should only be trained in those areas in which they are deficient’. This 
specific training is particularly important for the spokesperson in order to ensure that 
he/she appears credible and acceptable to audiences. Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 
74) emphasise the importance of training the entire MECIT ‘especially in media 
relations, including practice interviews and press conferences’. The integration of 
other communication functions in realistic ‘scenario-based’ training and exercises is 
also essential, including information managers, internal communicators, community 
outreach officers, and victim liaison personnel. It is extremely important also to 
involve the lead response organisation’s operational commander in such integrated 
training with key communication personnel and different response agencies. This 
allows any lack of synergy between the operational and communication function to 
be identifed, and also allows the commander to gain an understanding of how best to 
utilise the MECIT. The provision of appropriate formal courses of training, either in-
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house or external, is also extremely important in order to continuously augment the 
knowledge-base of the MECIT. Suitable, realistic, and practical training materials 
must be provided by the lead response organisation for this purpose (EPS 1998: 14). 
 
Major emergency communication exercising, on the other hand, is concerned with 
‘testing plans and procedures’ in order to see if they will work in an actual major 
emergency (CCS 2007: 32). Millar and Smith (2002: 48) state that by exercising 
communication plans, the MECIT ‘can test to see if the plans actually work’, to 
determine ‘if they fit together’ and to see if those expected to make the plan work 
‘understand its content’. Payne (1999: 112) describes how major emergency 
communication exercises, ‘…allow contingency plans to be validated…ensuring that 
all responders are familiar with the contents of both generic and specific plans, 
together with their own respective roles in those plans’.  
 
Major emergency exercises should be incremental and progressive. At the most basic 
level, personnel can engage in ‘paper-feed’ and ‘table-top’ major emergency 
communication exercises. These can then be augmented by ‘simulation’ exercises, in 
which important aspects of major emergencies can be simulated in order to represent 
reality and where personnel can respond accordingly. However, full-scale ‘live’ or 
‘incident-based’ exercises provide the best method of training and exercising (HSE 
UK 1999: 35). For example Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 75) describe the benefits of 
‘role-play exercises with the media’. Exercises can also be ‘on-site’ or ‘off-site’ and 
can be designed around an individual agency or can involve a more complex multi-
agency approach (Payne 1999: 114). Additionally, communication exercises can be 
‘announced’ or ‘unannounced’, thereby building in an element of surprise for the 
MECIT and other responders (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991: 189). All major emergency 
communication exercises must be carefully planned and an exercise outline produced. 
Additionally, a thorough evaluation should take place and an objective report be 
produced at the end of each exercise in order to improve communication procedures 
and processes. 
 
Adhering to the series of strategic pre-crisis steps, outlined in this chapter, allows for 
a more effective communication response during the crisis stage of a major 
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emergency situation. The major emergency response by the MECIT will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
 158
7 COMMUNICATION DURING THE CRISIS STAGE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The crisis stage of a major-emergency life cycle is the period that occurs once an 
identified significant hazard actualises, becomes a reality, or when affected publics 
perceive this to be the case. This is the stage that all lead response organisations and 
supporting response agencies hope to avoid. However, if the authorities are well 
organised and prepared, a series of strategic steps will have been undertaken during a 
pre-crisis stage to prevent a major emergency from occurring, or at least to reduce its 
impact. Unfortunately, these steps are often insufficient and the major emergency 
enters the crisis stage, resulting in unpredictability, surprise, confusion, fear, great 
stress, lack of control, an insatiable desire for information, a lack of information, and 
huge media interest (Marra 1998: 6; Coombs 1999: 3; EPS 1998:7; Nohrstedt 2000: 
138).  
 
Central to the success of any major emergency response effort is the crucial role of 
strategic communication management. In this regard, Chapter 7 describes a series of 
strategic-tactical steps that the major emergency communication and information 
team (MECIT) undertakes when managing all aspects of an effective and 
compassionate communication response during the crisis stage. These strategic-
tactical communication steps involve many crucial functions, including helping the 
lead response organisation to identify and recognise that a major emergency has 
occurred; the provision of an immediate and effective communication response by the 
MECIT, which involves the triggering and implementation of the major emergency 
communication response plan (MERCP); effective communication by the MECIT 
with stakeholders and affected publics, which includes disseminating warnings and 
alarms in order to save lives.    
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7.2 Major emergency strategic communication in the crisis stage 
 
Following the approach taken for the pre-crisis stage, a strategic framework is 
proposed to guide the actions of the MECIT throughout this extremely demanding 
phase, the crisis stage. This framework demonstrates how the six overarching 
strategic communication management principles (in blue & green), described earlier 
in Chapter 5, underpin and guide the actions of the MECIT during each of the four 
strategic-tactical steps (in orange) that are necessary in order to effectively manage 
communication during this stage.  
 
Figure 7.1: Major emergency communication management – crisis stage 
 
 
7.2.1 Early identification of imminent major emergencies  
The first strategic-tactical step taken by the MECIT during the crisis stage of a major 
emergency involves putting in place communication processes that can assist in 
confirming that a significant negative event is imminent and is likely to cause 
considerable death and destruction, and to get this information rapidly to senior 
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decision-makers in the lead response organisation. This phase of the crisis stage of a 
major emergency is closely related to, and is the final task in, the early warning 
detection role described earlier in Section 6.4.1.1. By adhering to the overarching 
strategic communication principles described in Chapter 5, such as engaging in 
ongoing communication research, coordinating across all functional departments and 
agencies, integrating all key elements of communication such as community liaison 
and information management, and engaging with ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’ in an 
information-gathering capacity, the MECIT can put in place an effective process that 
can both acquire data in relation to an imminent major emergency, and rapidly impart 
this information to the appropriate decision-maker.  
 
Central to the early identification of imminent major emergencies is an efficient 
information-gathering and analysing capacity within the MECIT, as already described 
in Chapter 5. By coordinating with technologically advanced affiliate organisations, 
the MECIT can ensure that data from the most sophisticated information-gathering 
tools such as satellite imaging, global positioning systems, remote sensing and 
meteorological satellite systems, is gathered and processed in order to identify the 
onset of a major emergency situation. When Hurricane Charley struck Cuba in 2004, 
more than 70,000 houses were destroyed. Despite the strength of that hurricane, and 
the subsequent damage caused, only four people died. A significant contributory 
factor to the preservation of life, in this instance, was Cuba’s world-class 
meteorological service which works in close cooperation with the US National 
Hurricane Centre, providing major emergency communication teams with necessary 
information for the early identification and tracking of storms (Walter 2005: 41). 
 
The MECIT can also employ more basic tools such as the use of stakeholder 
networks in order to identify imminent major emergencies. Good communication 
flows with diverse sectors of society can prove very beneficial in providing early 
signals that a major emergency is about to occur. The primitive tribes of the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands recognised the onset of the 2004 tsunami from the behaviour of 
the birds and animals, and the appearance of the sea. They survived by fleeing from 
the costal areas to higher ground (Walter 2005: 15). In order to save lives, the MECIT 
needs to establish a process by which it can tap into this type of information, thereby 
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providing senior decision-makers in the lead response organisation with information 
of imminent dangers to the public.  
 
Once a major emergency occurs the MECIT should ensure that they continue with the 
early identification process in order to detect subsequent secondary crises. As the 
MECIT may be totally preoccupied in dealing with the primary major emergency, it 
may not have sufficient resources to undertake a detailed early identification process 
for secondary crises. A rapid identification of these secondary major emergencies 
may help to alleviate greater levels of suffering for already affected communities. The 
United Nations quickly identified a secondary major emergency situation following 
the earthquake in Kashmir on October 8th 2005. A senior UN official warned that 
90% of the tents given to earthquake survivors were not equipped for the harsh 
Himalayan winter. The UN also recognised that the most serious risk was posed to 
those survivors still remaining in mountain villages rather than in the refugee camps. 
Early identification of this secondary crisis is reputed to have saved many lives and 
reduced much suffering (Owen 2005: 4). 
 
7.3 Major emergency recognition 
 
The process of major emergency recognition is closely related to the identification 
function discussed in the last section. Major emergency recognition involves being 
able to report to an appropriate senior decision-maker within the lead response 
organisation that a major emergency is imminent, or has just occurred, and that this 
fact is recognised, accepted and positive action taken. This process may involve the 
MECIT having to prove to the senior decision-maker that a major emergency 
situation exists.  An efficient integrated communication and information management 
system established by the MECIT can greatly assist the lead response organisation in 
recognising that a major emergency has just occurred. 
 
Unfortunately, the recognition process is not as straightforward as it seems. In some 
instances a major emergency may have been identified and reported, but for different 
reasons it has not been received by the appropriate person or office and therefore 
cannot be recognised and acted on. For example, in Thailand, the government-run 
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Earthquake Bureau failed to open an e-mail sent from the tsunami alert centre in 
Hawaii at 9.04 am, identifying the impending 2004 tsunami. This would have given 
the authorities one hour’s notice thereby allowing them time to send a warning alarm. 
Unfortunately, major emergency recognition was arrived at only after many lives 
were lost (Drummond 2005: 6). Some major emergencies are easier to recognise than 
others. For example, ‘big-bang’ major emergencies, as described by Norman, Stuart-
Black and Coles (2006: 5), are very obvious and recognisable due to the fact that the 
devastation happens almost immediately. In cases such as these, the identification and 
recognition process occur simultaneously. The Kobe earthquake in 1995 that caused 
the deaths of 6,000 people, injured more than 50,000, and destroyed approximately 
100,000 homes, was quickly identified and simultaneously recognised by authorities 
as a major emergency. 
 
However, Coombs (1999: 89) notes that all major emergencies are ‘not so obvious’ 
and may not be readily recognised by lead response organisations for a variety of 
reasons. This failure to recognise that a major emergency has occurred may prevent 
an adequate crisis response, thereby jeopardising efforts to protect affected publics. 
Describing a not-so-obvious major emergency, Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles 
(2006: 5) identify a ‘rising-tide’ category of major emergency, where the problem 
‘creeps up gradually and has no clear starting point’ (ibid.). This category is difficult 
to recognise and the point when it becomes a major emergency may only become 
clear in hindsight. According to Kamer (1996: 64), a lead response organisation ‘may 
not even know that it has reached the crisis stage of a major emergency’. In the case 
of influenza pandemic, confirmation of the fact that it has arrived in a particular 
country may be difficult to ascertain and it may take some time before it is deemed a 
major emergency. 
 
Some lead response organisations may recognise the existence of a major emergency, 
but may wish to deny that it exists. The Indonesian government recognised the 
existence of ‘bird flu’ in its country. However, in order to allay panic amongst its 
publics, it chose to deny its existence for two years (Sipress 2005: A01). In some 
instances a major emergency of significant impact may have occurred but due to 
inexperience, lack of training, or denial the authorities may fail to recognise its 
impact.  
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Additionally, media attention can create widespread recognition of a major 
emergency and act as a catalyst for appropriate action. According to the International 
Red Cross, in January 2005 the dire situation in Darfur, Sudan, had still not been 
recognised as a major emergency by the International Community (Flanagan 2005: 
2). Walter (2005: 137) states: 
 
There was no massacre aftermath video on the scale of the Nyarabuye 
church in Rwanda in 2004 where 20,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
slaughtered…however the harassment, the beatings, the robbery, the rape, 
the murder continue on a daily basis and unfortunately it continues well 
below the radar screen of the international media and of the international 
diplomatic machine…by the time we’re absolutely sure what’s happening 
in Darfur is genocide, it will be too late. 
 
However, intervention by Hollywood stars such as George Clooney, who ‘made an 
impassioned plea for action in Darfur’ to the United Nations Security Council in 
September 2006, created much badly needed recognition that a major emergency 
exists in that country (BBC 2006). 
 
As with the early identification process, the MECIT should have an ongoing and 
systematic communication process in place in order to collect and process data that 
can assist the lead response organisation to recognise that a major emergency has 
occurred. According to Coombs (1999: 89), the MECIT can contribute to the major 
emergency recognition role by, 
 
…collecting data, converting the raw data into usable information, storing 
the information, and relaying the necessary information to internal and, 
perhaps, to external organisational stakeholders – especially expert and 
government organisations. 
 
As major emergency recognition involves an accurate and detailed report reaching an 
appropriate senior decision-maker to the effect that a disaster situation has occurred, 
it is essential that effective channels of communication exist for this information to 
flow quickly. Consequently, a comprehensive and up-to-date internal communication 
network must exist from the lowest response level to the highest, which must be 
operational at all times. This must be integrated with the external stakeholder network 
in order to allow information to be received quickly from key organisations such as 
international police, weather stations, seismic stations, and also from members of the 
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public. This is a critical role for the MECIT during the crisis stage of a major 
emergency. 
 
7.4 Major emergency communication response 
 
Much has been written on the importance of a speedy and effective communication 
response by the MECIT following the actualisation of a major emergency, including 
contributions from theorists such as Bernstein (1987: 97), Coombs (1999: 118), 
Levick and Smith (2005: 5), and Darrell (2003: 40). Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 
109) note how the lead response organisation’s handling of the first 24-hours ‘…will 
establish its reputation and credibility for managing the entire response and recovery 
operation’.   
 
Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles (2006: 117) term this 24-hour period the ‘golden-
hour’. Once the lead response organisation identifies and recognises that a major 
emergency situation is imminent, or has occurred, a number of immediate strategic-
tactical communication steps need to be taken, most of which occurs pretty much 
simultaneously. Darrell (2003: 40) states that the first immediate reaction of the 
senior communication manager should be to trigger the major emergency 
communication response plan (MERCP) and to alert and activate the members of the 
MECIT. Reynolds (2002: 90) also emphasises how the lead response organisation 
should ensure that an effective communication process is in place in order to allow it 
to inform and activate its own chain-of-command, together with those of 
partner/affiliate response organisations. A process such as this allows these response 
organisations to trigger their respective major emergency operational and 
communication plans. Bernstein (1987: 115) suggests the use of a ‘cascading 
notification system’ in order to quickly notify many people in the event of a major 
emergency. As described earlier in Chapter 5, the MECIT should quickly establish 
itself in a well-equipped and suitably secluded emergency operation centre (EOC), or 
if required a communication and information management centre (CIMC). Locations 
such as these provide a central hub for information collection, analysis and 
dissemination, and for the co-ordination of the entire communication effort. This 
provides the foundation for ‘a cohesive communication response’ (Fernandez and 
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Merzer 2003: 112). If spokespersons have not already been chosen, it is necessary to 
task a principal, together with a number of secondary spokespersons, who are 
accredited to speak on behalf of the entire response effort. The use of a small number 
of well-trained spokespersons helps to ensure consistency in any messages 
disseminated to stakeholders, publics and the media. The spokespersons need to be 
thoroughly briefed and rehearsed in all aspects of the situation and the response.  
 
Once these important initial strategic-tactical steps have been carried out, the MECIT 
must then work closely with the lead response organisation and other affiliate 
communication teams in order to begin the communication and information 
management process. This includes establishing immediate communication goals and 
objectives that are closely aligned to those of the overall response effort. This is likely 
to involve a revision and re-establishment of any pre-crisis communication goals and 
objectives described earlier in Chapter 6. As information is gathered and analysed, 
and the nature of the major emergency situation becomes clearer, the MECIT also 
needs to revise and tailor its generic MERCP in order to deal with the specific 
situation at hand. 
 
At this stage, it is also important to ensure that technical communications systems 
within the lead response organisation, and between other affiliate response agencies, 
are operational. While this function is primarily an operational/CIT task, the MECIT 
should liaise with the relevant sections in order to ensure that adequate technical 
systems exist to allow the free flow of data throughout the entire response effort. One 
of the most significant problems encountered while coordinating the responses to 
both the 9/11 and the London bombings was a breakdown in internal technical 
communications. An internal inquiry following the London Bombings reported: 
 
Police, fire and ambulance staff all used different radio systems and 
rescuers at ground level could not talk to their colleagues underground 
(BBC 2007). 
 
Consequently, many countries are moving towards implementing a unified, 
interoperable, nationwide, public safety radio system that can be utilised by the 
principal response agencies, including fire, police and ambulance services. For 
example, the ‘terrestrial trunk radio’ (TETRA) system, based on the ‘global system 
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for mobile communication’ (GSM) technology will be introduced to the emergency 
services of Norway in 2011 (Siemens 2008). UK response agencies are also 
introducing a system that will allow communication with responders operating in the 
London underground system (BBC 2007). 
 
Employing many of the overarching strategic communication principles, such as 
detailed communication research and evaluation, managing communication by 
objectives, and making important decisions by way of a public engagement process, 
may be difficult to undertake due to the intense time pressures and resource demands 
generated by the actualisation of the major emergency situation. A balance needs to 
be achieved between ensuring that communication is approached strategically and 
that action is taken promptly and decisively. The senior communication manager is 
likely to require supplementary communication personnel and equipment in order to 
enable the communication management process to be approached strategically rather 
than undertaking a mere tactical approach. Likewise, the MECIT needs to consider 
applying the strategic communication principles in a more condensed manner. 
 
7.5 Communication with stakeholders and affected communities 
 
The fourth and final strategic-tactical step that the MECIT must consider during the 
crisis stage of a major emergency is how best to communicate with stakeholders and 
affected communities. Good communication during the crisis stage of a major 
emergency involves ‘…providing the right people with the right information at the 
right time in a form they can understand, assimilate and act upon’ (HM Government 
2005(b): 31). Reynolds (2003: 6) describes five communication failures that can ‘kill 
operational success’ during the crisis stage:  
 
Mixed messages from multiple experts, information released late, 
paternalistic attitudes, not countering rumours and myths in real time, and 
public power struggles and confusion. 
 
A critical success factor in the communication process during this stage, according to 
Reynolds (2002: 89), is that the lead response organisation makes every effort to 
become the acknowledged source of information, particularl 
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y for the media and affected publics. This involves minimising any delay in making 
an official statement following the occurrence of a major emergency. Being the 
recognised source of information also requires communicating with a broad range of 
people, each requiring different types of information, with different degrees of 
urgency displaying openness and transparency where possible. The most urgent group 
in this regard is the community that is likely to be affected by the major emergency. 
According to the CCS (2007), this group ‘needs to know’ critical information such as 
basic details of the incident, the implications for their health and safety, clear advice 
and guidance on how to protect themselves, and reassurance that help is at hand. This 
group also ‘wants to know’, details of practical implications such as any effects on 
transport and utilities, a helpline number, and what is being done to rectify the 
situation (ibid.). 
 
Other important stakeholders that require communication during the crisis stage 
include cabinet ministers, national and local elected representatives, senior civil 
servants, local authorities, emergency services, fellow response workers and other 
members of the internal audience, the families of response workers, healthcare 
professionals, community leaders, trade and industry leaders, managers of essential 
public utilities and essential services, the international community, and media 
organisations. Reynolds (2003: 39) emphasises that the MECIT is also obliged to 
communicate with publics who are not supportive of the response effort or the lead 
response organisation.  
 
7.5.1 The crisis stage communication process 
Crisis communication with stakeholders and affected communities should begin as 
soon as a major emergency has been identified and recognised. ‘It is important to 
avoid the bunker effect’ (CRN 2003: 35). Any delay in communicating ‘will be 
perceived as stalling’ (Bernstein 1987: 42). The MECIT should ensure the immediate 
release of pre- prepared material or preliminary verified information, in order to be 
perceived as the first and principal source of ‘credible’ information and also to ‘fill 
the likely information vacuum’ (Fernandez and Merzer 2003: 110; Murray and 
Greenwood 1993: 52). A speedy communication response can demonstrate the lead 
response organisation’s capability in taking action and responding to the major 
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emergency (Coombs 1999: 116). According to Reynolds, (2003: 5) the MECIT leader 
must quickly decide ‘…what to release, when to release it, how to release it, where to 
release it, who to release it to, and why release it’. A strategic approach to decision 
making, as described in Chapter 5, and realistic ‘scenario-based’ exercises can greatly 
assist in this process. 
 
7.5.1.1 Communication channels 
The MECIT should ‘start quickly and open information channels’ once a major 
emergency occurs (Darrell 2003: 58). It is generally accepted that the most efficient 
means of communicating to publics is through the print and electronic media. 
Consequently, great attention should be given to optimising media output during the 
crisis stage. The development of good working relationships with the media in the 
pre-crisis stage can greatly assist in this regard. The important subject of media 
management was discussed earlier in Section 5.3.5.4. 
 
While the media is an excellent channel for reaching stakeholders and affected 
communities during the crisis stage of a major emergency, other potential channels of 
communication should be carefully considered by the MECIT. In this regard, useful 
channels of communication include advertising, mail-shots, websites, telephone, 
mobile phone, pager, short messaging services (SMS), hoardings, digital signage, 
loudspeaker, and leaflet drops. Channels such as these allow stakeholders and 
affected publics to receive key messages and critical information through as many 
different conduits as possible, thereby reinforcing and confirming the significance of 
the information to the intended recipient. Additionally, ‘interpersonal 
communication’ (as discussed in Chapter 3) with affected publics is an extremely 
important means of disseminating information following a major emergency, 
‘…particularly for certain segments of the population such as children, the infirm, the 
elderly, those who may fail to understand a particular message, or those without 
access to mass media sources’ (Rogers 1989: 25). 
 
Forms of interpersonal communication channels that are considered effective during 
the crisis stage of a major emergency include public meetings, outreach programmes, 
door-to-door contact, self-help groups, public information bureaus, and engaging with 
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publics through free-phone numbers. However, an optimum method of message 
penetration involves the employment by the MECIT of a mix of interpersonal, mass 
media, technology and other communication channels. 
A speedy communication response to stakeholders and affected communities is ever 
more important as ‘technology has accelerated the spread of information thereby 
reducing the amount of time for responding’ (Coombs 1999: 114). Brown (2003: 23), 
commenting on his experiences of dealing with Hurricane Isabel (2003) in the United 
States, agrees that a speedy communication response is essential. However he does 
recommend that the MECIT should perhaps ‘…step back and take time to think for a 
moment…especially about key messages’. 
 
7.5.2 Development of key messages and information 
7.5.2.1 Key message development 
As mentioned in Section 5.3.5.2, a significant problem faced by the MECIT is the 
development of key messages and useful information from the profusion of incoming 
unfiltered raw data to the communication and information management centre 
(CIMC). Central to the success of the entire communication process, during the crisis 
stage, is an effective system for filtering and processing information for message 
development. Chess, Calia, and O’Neill (2004: 106) recommend a process of 
‘communication triage’ whereby the MECIT clinically prioritises all information to 
be analysed, prepared and disseminated. In this regard, it must be decided, ‘…which 
populations are the most important to reach?...when?...and what information is the 
most critical to convey’ (ibid.).  
 
As described earlier in Section 6.4.2.5, much of the work involved in developing key 
messages should have been completed during the pre-crisis stage of a major 
emergency, when the MECIT has more time available for this important task. This 
allows the MECIT time to adopt a strategic approach to the task, utilising techniques 
such as ‘brain-storming’ and ‘story-boards’ to assist in the message development 
process. Additionally, in order to ensure the widest base of knowledge is employed, 
the MECIT should engage in meaningful public dialogue, thereby making use of both 
‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ opinion. This ensures that key messages, when 
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communicated, are effective and more readily acceptable to the intended recipients. 
Many theorists, including Price (1989), Stern and Fineberg (1996), Nohrstedt (2000), 
Lasker (2004), Tierney, cited in Alesch et al., (2004), Reynolds (2002) and Susskind 
and Field (1999) have written in detail on this subject. 
 
7.5.2.2 Communication research 
According to Cushman and Sanderson King (2001: 86), people only understand 
major emergencies in terms of their own experiences, ‘…and once you go outside 
people’s experiences, not only do you not communicate you cause confusion’ (ibid.).  
As seen in Section 3.4.3, different people are likely to react to distressing information 
in different ways for a number of different reasons. To gain a better understanding of 
how diverse groups are likely to react or behave, it is necessary for the MECIT to 
approach the communication management process strategically and to carefully 
segment the general public into distinct stakeholders and publics. Despite the time 
pressures and resource constraints imposed on the MECIT, Reynolds (2002: 37) 
emphasises how public segmentation and demographic considerations are especially 
relevant during the crisis stage. She identifies a number of critical factors that provide 
a useful basis for the segmentation process, including geographical location, 
experience of previous major emergency situations, education, age, gender, and 
cultural and socio-economic factors. In order to ensure that messages are relevant to 
each diverse group of stakeholders and publics, the MECIT should engage in 
thorough research and develop messages in terms that are clear, simple, 
understandable, relevant and appropriate for each identifiable segment. The MECIT 
must try to avoid the ‘selective perception’ phenomenon occurring amongst intended 
recipients, whereby parts of disseminated information only are assimilated, and any 
critical data that is perceived to be irrelevant to the recipient is ignored. Likewise, 
‘cognitive dissonance’ must be avoided, whereby the intended recipient ignores any 
information that does not fit his/her pre-conceived ideas or beliefs. Once the MECIT 
knows to whom it is communicating, it can then develop a number of categories of 
messages, including ‘position key messages’ and ‘instructional key messages’, 
already mentioned in Section 6.4.2.5.  
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7.5.2.3 Message content 
In terms of message content, Reynolds (2002: 38) emphasises the importance of 
‘…getting the facts right, repeating them consistently, and avoiding sketchy details 
early-on’. Tierney, cited in Alesch et al., (2004: 172) believes:  
 
Complete accuracy in documents and messages is key…even small or 
seemingly unimportant inaccuracies may call into doubt the reliability of 
the entire message.  
 
The London Metropolitan Police released inaccurate information concerning the 
cause of the first blast on the London Underground in July 2005. Claiming that this 
blast was caused by a ‘power-surge’ rather than a terrorist bomb, the police may have 
seriously damaged their credibility for future message dissemination (BBC 2005). 
According to Nohrstedt (2000: 143), ‘…there is nothing so destructive of confidence 
than to be caught-up in a lie…being found out in some kind of cover-up is the kiss-
of-death’. Pillittere, cited in Cushman and Sanderson-King, (2001: 93) describes how 
‘truth is not only important, but it is one of the first things upon which one will be 
judged’. Consequently, it cannot be over-emphasised the importance of accuracy, 
openness and honesty, in the development and dissemination of all messages 
throughout all stages of a major emergency. If inaccuracies have occurred in message 
content, Sandman and Lanard (2007) emphasise the importance of acknowledging 
and apologising for these errors, deficiencies and mistakes.  
 
In a situation where information content appears incomplete or inadequate, the 
MECIT leader must decide whether it is preferable to wait and not to communicate 
until more information is available. However, contemporary teaching indicates that 
some form of initial communication to stakeholders and affected communities is 
important. Additionally, this initial message should contain a caveat stating clearly 
that the information is preliminary and incomplete. Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 
110) emphasise the importance of admitting ‘I don’t know’ when major emergency 
information is not yet confirmed. 
 
 172
7.5.2.4 Testing key messages 
Despite considerable time pressures and resource constraints, and cognisant of 
approaching communication strategically, the MECIT should endeavour to test and 
evaluate all key messages prior to dissemination. The use of focus groups proves the 
most efficient method of achieving this when time is limited. These messages may 
need further brainstorming, revision and possibly another round of evaluation 
following the testing process. Adopting such a process reduces the possibility of the 
intended recipient rejecting the key message and provide a greater guarantee of them 
behaving in a desired manner. In this regard, Connelly and Knuth (1998: 650) suggest 
an ongoing communication process with diverse communities, including those of 
different races, ethnic backgrounds and incomes, in order to undertake thorough 
message research, testing and evaluation.  
 
7.5.2.5 Key message dissemination 
Once key messages have been developed, the MECIT must ensure that they are 
wholly consistent, in terms of content and tone during dissemination. According to 
Reynolds (2002: 38), ‘…consistent messages are vital…inconsistent messages will 
increase anxiety and will quickly torpedo the credibility of experts’. Nordlund (1994: 
29) discusses how messages that ‘contradict previous statements can affect the 
credibility of the lead response organisation’. Tierney, cited in Alesch et al., (2004: 
172) highlights how all messages disseminated should be consistent across time, as 
well as across different message sources and channels. Additionally, the body 
language used by spokespersons needs to be consistent with the content of the 
message being disseminated. Furthermore, Nordlund (1994: 29) describes how 
contradictory messages from sources other than accredited spokespersons can 
undermine the validity of the officially disseminated message. The necessity for 
regular briefings and updates for the MECIT, all members of the lead response 
organisation, and all supporting MECITs, is essential in order to avoid mixed-
messages. 
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7.5.2.6 Empathy for affected publics 
In the development and delivery of their key messages, the MECIT should ensure that 
the lead response organisation does not appear uncaring or remote to the plight of 
affected communities. It is extremely important that the language, content and tone of 
delivered messages do not minimise the severity of the situation for the victims, that 
sufficient concern and dedication to resolve the major emergency is displayed, and 
that reassurance is provided to the public that the lead response organisation has 
sufficient expertise and competence to handle the situation professionally (Reynolds 
2003: 11). Darrell (2003: 22) describes this as demonstrating social sensitivity, where 
there is a show of fundamental respect and empathy displayed to affected publics.  
 
Following the nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986, the Soviet authorities were 
accused of insensitivity in their communication with affected publics. Their 
administration denied that a disaster had occurred in the first instance, and then 
accepted no responsibility for the situation thereafter (Mould 1988: 11). Similarly, 
Levick and Smith (2005: 5) describe the length of time it took for President Bush to 
‘express deep sympathy for the victims’ following Hurricane Katrina. This delay, 
they claim, ‘probably increased the administration’s political isolation and public 
resentment’ (ibid.). 
 
7.5.3 The major emergency public warning process 
A crucial strategic-tactical element of the public communication process, during the 
crisis stage of a major emergency, is the issue of public warnings, warning alarms and 
instructing information. According to Norhstedt (2000: 140), the warning phase 
begins ‘…when catastrophe looms overhead…which may be followed shortly by the 
sounding of a warning alarm’. While the terms major emergency ‘warnings’ and 
‘warning alarms’ are somewhat similar and often used interchangeably, Nordlund 
(1994: 23) differentiates quite clearly between both. A warning, he describes, is ‘a 
prognosis…prior notice of something unpleasant that may be going to occur’. A 
warning alarm, on the other hand, is also as a warning, however, ‘…it is one that is 
generally accompanied by operative measures…and alerts the receiver to present 
danger or an acute situation that may exist’. 
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 Clear and detailed protocols in relation to the issue of warnings and warning alarms 
should be formally recorded in the major emergency response communication plan 
(MERCP) in order to avoid confusion at this important stage. This should include a 
decision as to which response organisation is best placed to issue the warning, and 
most importantly, who has ultimate authority to sanction this order. This important 
information should be understood by all members of the MECIT and key personnel of 
the lead response organisation.   
 
7.5.3.1 Issuing public warnings, alarms and instructing information 
Public warnings 
Nordlund (1994: 23) describes two different categories of major emergency public 
warnings that can be issued. ‘Specific warnings’, he states, refer to obvious threats 
such as a hurricane about to ‘make landfall’. ‘General warnings’, on the other hand, 
relate to broader threats such as the probable risk of a terrorist attack. Morge (2000: 
3) states that the issuing of public warnings ‘at the right time and to the right target 
group …can be a matter of life or death’. NSTC (2000: 9) concur and highlight how 
effective warnings allow people to ‘take actions that can save lives, minimise 
damage, reduce human suffering and speed recovery’. Additionally, they emphasise 
that these warnings ‘…should reach, in a timely fashion, every person at risk who 
needs to be warned, no matter what they are doing or where they are located’ (ibid: 
6). Furthermore, Nordlund (1994: 23) notes:  
 
A warning should activate previously stored preparedness information in 
the mind of the individual citizen… should conform to existing major 
emergency communication planning…should also describe the threat, 
indicate when the event will occur, and outline what people should do.  
 
Consequently, the effectiveness of a major emergency warning depends, to an extent, 
on the level of preparedness of stakeholders and affected communities and of their 
individual and collective perceptions regarding the hazard and how it is likely to 
affect them. Section 3.4.3 has already identified many variables that are likely to 
influence people’s risk perception. One of the most difficult barriers to overcome in 
relation to major emergency warnings is public apathy. An example of this relates to 
‘specific warnings’ issued prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall, when 
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Lieutenant Kevin Cowen, Press and Information Officer for the New Orleans police, 
stated:  
 
The difficulty is getting the public to believe our warnings of an incoming 
disaster, especially when these warnings come as the sun is shining. They 
just don’t believe you (Cowen 2005).  
 
The dissemination of a warning alarm or alert can help to focus the attention of any 
complacent or apathetic publics. 
 
Warning alarms 
The presence of a well-conceived alarm system provides a very efficient method of 
warning publics of the immediate onset of a potentially disastrous situation. 
Examples of warning alarms include the network of horns dispersed throughout the 
Netherlands to warn of breaches in the Polder dyke system, and in Bangladesh, where 
the use of whistles provide an efficient alarm system for imminent cyclones 
(McGuire 2004: 10).  
 
Advances in technology provide an excellent platform for the dissemination of 
warning alarms to affected publics. One of the most efficient methods of issuing a 
warning alarm is through television and radio broadcast. Walter (2005: 32) describes 
how technology, especially the Internet and mobile phones, ‘provides exciting 
opportunities’ for the issue of warning alarms and alerts. For example, the use of 
Short Messaging System (SMS) on mobile phones offers a rapid means of providing 
a warning alarm to the vast majority of people in developed countries. Landline 
telephones can also offer an efficient alarm system. The Thurston County telephone 
alert system, in the US state of Washington, provides a telephone messaging service 
every fifteen minutes to alert affected publics of impending floods in their specific 
areas (Thurston County 2006). 
 
However, warning alarm systems do not exist without inherent difficulties. Alarms 
are useful to an affected community only if they are timely. Significant problems can 
arise if publics rely on warning alarm systems and these alarms are given too late, or 
else not at all. For example, in Thailand and India, authorities issued warning alarms 
too late during the 2004 Tsunami and many deaths and much suffering followed 
(Drummond 2005: 6). Another difficulty that arises with warning alarms involves a 
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level of public complacency as a result of exposure to previous ‘false alarms’. 
According to Smelser and Mitchell (2002: 39), ‘…false alarms and misdirection of 
warnings to people not at risk tend to generate public apathy and hostility’.  
 
Following the issue of warning alarms to evacuate New Orleans during Hurricane 
Katrina, many residents decided to remain in their homes as a result of receiving 
similar ‘false alarms’ on previous occasions (Dejevsky 2005: 20). Warning alarms 
that are confusing or contradictory may also pose a significant problem. The Kemeny 
Commission that investigated the 1979 crisis at Three Mile Island nuclear power 
station in Pennsylvania stated:  
 
During the first few minutes of the accident, more than 100 alarms went 
off, and there was no system for suppressing the unimportant signals so 
that operators could concentrate on the significant alarms. Information 
was not presented in a clear and sufficiently understandable form 
(Augustine 2000: 21). 
 
The dissemination of warning alarms requires considerable attention from the MECIT 
during the pre-crisis stage of a major emergency. Issues that the MECIT need to 
consider include, choosing the most efficient alarm system that is capable of reaching 
all affected publics; putting in place authorisation procedures for triggering a warning 
alarm; developing guidelines to overcome delays in disseminating the alarm, 
particularly in relation to the establishment of service level agreements with broadcast 
media outlets and external communication and information technology (CIT) 
providers.  
 
Warning alarms are only effective if the public understand their meaning and react 
accordingly. Consequently, the MECIT needs to make its communication decisions 
employing a broad-based system of dialogue, using both ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ 
knowledge, in order to determine the most effective warning alarm system that should 
be employed. Thorough research and evaluation should also be conducted in order to 
determine how particular alarm systems can be improved and how people are likely 
to behave once an alarm is disseminated. Any system of warning alarm that is 
employed should be thoroughly tested and evaluated prior to using it for a live 
situation. This emphasises once again that the strategic communication principles are 
to the forefront during this important strategic-tactical step of the crisis stage. 
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Instructing information 
Once a warning or alarm has been disseminated, it may be necessary for the intended 
recipients to be given information by the MECIT explaining what the warning or 
alarm signifies, what consequences the imminent/occurring major emergency is likely 
to have for them, what likelihood there is that the receiver or their families are 
directly or indirectly affected, what actions they should take, where can they receive 
more information, and what is being done to protect them against harm (Nordlund 
1994: 25). This is a form of warning information and is often referred to as 
‘instructing information’. Bernstein (1987: 91) emphasises that all instructing 
information must be ‘clear and unambiguous and cannot be misinterpreted’. 
Confusing instructions were given to victims in the ‘Twin Towers’ immediately 
following the 9/11 attacks. Recordings of telephone conversations revealed that 
instructions given to victims were contradictory. According to Eggen:  
 
We were told to use damp towels to keep out the smoke, to break -- or not 
break -- windows and, in numerous instances, to simply lay low and stay 
put. Information available to the workers was often sketchy or inaccurate; 
some operators initially thought a helicopter, rather than a jetliner, had 
crashed into the North Tower (Eggen 2006: A03). 
 
In order to ensure that instructing information is not confusing, and is efficient when 
disseminated, Lasker (2004: 24) provides a useful insight into the importance of 
testing the information on people not closely involved in its development.  
 
Instructing information can also involve giving advice and instructions to members of 
the public in order to protect and provide them with relief from the effects of a major 
emergency (Sturges 1994: 300). Typical instructions include guidance in relation to 
evacuation and protection from the effects of a major emergency. For example, in the 
period immediately following the July 2005 London bombings, police issued 
instructing information to Londoners to remain at work, or at home, and to avoid all 
but the most essential journeys (Staunton 2005:1). Similarly, Walter (2005: 85) talks 
of instructing information given to the survivors of the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, in 
relation to safe drinking water. 
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7.5.4 Likely behaviour of affected publics 
Following the dissemination of a major emergency warning, alarm or instructing 
information, Nohrstedt (2000: 140) describes as ‘widely varying’ the likely behaviour 
of stakeholders and affected communities when ‘…some publics are traumatised 
while others can display a range of emotions from apathy to manic hyperactivity’. 
Smelser and Mitchell (2002: 40) identify a number of other emotions that can arise, 
including disbelief, denial, emotional numbing, fear, anger, guilt, and in some cases, 
mental disorders. Morrisey and Reser (2003: 56) highlight how the warning phase can 
often be more distressing than the actual impact. Interestingly, despite an often-held 
perception that panic ensues following the issue of a major emergency warning alarm, 
Nohrstedt (2000: 140) and Gist and Lubin (1989: 20) note how research demonstrates 
that panic is relatively uncommon and that people often react quite rationally even 
under extreme severe stress. Scanlon (1997: 2) agrees and states that ‘the real 
problem is not panic but the absence of panic’, when people are more likely to 
discount warnings than be panicked by them. 
 
A number of other theorists such as Shaw (2001: 5), Canter (1980: 71) and Reynolds 
(2002: 24) support the proposition that people who are exposed to a major emergency 
situation not only behave logically, but are likely to be supportive, helpful and 
altruistic. Fischer (2002: 124) describes how survivors of major emergencies are 
likely to ‘…share their tools, food, equipment and especially their time…they search 
for the injured, the dead, and they begin clean-up activities’. 
 
The conduct of communication research into people’s likely behaviour following the 
issue of major emergency warnings, alarms or instructing information needs to be 
completed, in the most-part, during the pre-crisis stage. However, an objective, on-
the-ground assessment of how publics actually react once a major emergency occurs, 
must also be completed by the MECIT in order to assist the decision-making process. 
This is especially important if the crisis stage is protracted and if secondary major 
emergency situations are likely. Once again, this important task is difficult to 
complete due to time pressures and resource constraints that arise as a result of the 
major emergency situation. The development of strong stakeholder relationships can 
assist the MECIT in this difficult task. Additionally, the use of focus groups proves 
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useful in order to receive feedback from stakeholders, affected publics, and 
significantly, the media. Engaging in such a process allows key messages and 
instructing information to be evaluated and revised if necessary, identifies any gaps in 
the current knowledge-base to be filled, helps to counter rumours, and helps to assess 
the concerns, needs and perceptions of the different audiences. 
 
Possessing useful knowledge, such as this, can greatly assist the MECIT to 
communicate effectively with stakeholders and affected communities during the final 
stage of the major emergency life cycle, the post-crisis stage. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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8 COMMUNICATION DURING THE POST-CRISIS STAGE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Nordlund (1994: 37) describes the post-crisis stage of a major emergency as the 
period that occurs ‘once the acute crisis has passed or subsided and the situation has 
begun to stabilise’. The post-crisis stage can be sub-divided into the period 
immediately following a major emergency and the longer-term relief and recovery 
period. Both of these periods involve the provision of sensitive and timely assistance 
to stakeholders and affected communities by a variety of diverse agencies both 
governmental and non-governmental, co-ordinated by the lead response organisation. 
According to the Home Office (2008:1) in the United Kingdom, the lead response 
organisation during this period is most likely to be the local authority.  
 
The major emergency communication and information team (MECIT) can greatly 
support the lead response organisation in its efforts during the post-crisis period. 
Similar to the process adopted for the pre-crisis and crisis stages, the MECIT follows 
a series of strategic-tactical steps in order to communicate effectively with 
stakeholders and affected communities during the post-crisis stage of a major 
emergency situation. These strategic-tactical communication steps are essential in 
order to restore a sense of normality as soon as possible and indicate how the MECIT 
needs to engage in proactive and sustained communication with stakeholders and 
affected communities, particularly victims and their families. The steps also indicate 
the benefits of communication in the restoration of essential services and economic 
activity for the affected communities. Significantly, during the post-crisis stage, an 
essential task for the MECIT is to improve the entire strategic communication process 
for future major emergencies. An additional task for the MECIT, described in the 
fourth strategic-tactical step, is the establishment of a communication-based major 
emergency tracking and early warning function, similar to the process described in 
the pre-crisis stage. The final step in the post-crisis stage involves closing the major 
emergency communication life cycle and placing the entire communication function, 
once again, on a pre-crisis footing. 
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Despite its importance, there has been very little written on the subject of strategic 
communication management for this important, demanding and potentially protracted 
post-crisis stage. Furthermore, it proves extremely difficult to identify any 
comprehensive, integrated strategic major emergency communication framework that 
can serve as a guide for practitioners during this stage of a major emergency event.  
 
8.2  Major emergency strategic communication in the post-crisis stage 
 
In this section, a strategic framework is proposed that provides guidance for 
practitioners responsible for managing all of the strategic-tactical communication 
functions during the post-crisis stage of a major emergency, when communication 
with stakeholders and affected communities needs to be efficient, open and 
compassionate. As with the previous two chapters, the critical communication 
functions that need to be undertaken during this period are presented in the form of a 
series of progressive steps. Figure 8.1 (over), demonstrates clearly how each of the 
five strategic-tactical steps (in pink) proposed in this framework is underpinned by 
the six strategic communication principles (in blue & green), described earlier in 
Chapter 5.  
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Figure 8.1. Major emergency communication management – post-crisis 
 
8.3 Communicating with stakeholders and affected communities 
 
8.3.1 Dealing with information demands 
Communication practitioners within the MECIT, operating from the communication 
and information management centre (CIMC), are likely to have to deal with a range 
of complex information demands from various stakeholders and affected 
communities during this stage. Consequently, the MECIT, working closely with the 
other information and communication teams within the CIMC, should begin the 
process of dealing with the post-crisis information demands of stakeholders and 
affected communities and delivering key messages in order to support the recovery 
and relief operation.  
  
One of the principal information demands at this time concerns public safety. As soon 
as is feasibly possible, the MECIT needs to communicate to publics that the current 
major emergency situation has passed and that the direct threat has receded. This type 
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of message can only be signalled by the MECIT following close consultation with the 
operational commander of the lead response organisation using clear protocols that 
have been laid down and agreed by all during the pre-crisis stage. It is imperative that 
no support or affiliate organisation issues an ‘all clear’ message that proves to be 
premature. 
 
People will look to the lead response organisation at this time in order to ascertain the 
cause of the major emergency. According to Ogrizek and Guillery: 
 
One of the core demands from stakeholders and publics is for the truth about 
the causes of the incident and legal acknowledgement or attribution of 
responsibility (1999: 60). 
 
Other types of information likely to be needed during this period include questions 
about the likelihood of secondary emergencies, safety and precautionary measures 
that stakeholders and affected communities should be taking, contact details for aid 
and assistance, measures that the lead response organisation has taken to prevent any 
further damaging events, an indication as to when normal public utilities and services 
are likely to resume, the plans in place for re-building and repairing any damage and 
an assessment of whether the community is likely to recover fully. Additionally, the 
public may also have questions relating to the provision of welfare support, 
alternative accommodation, and litigation matters. 
 
8.3.1.1 How to deal with information demands 
The MECIT needs to put in place an efficient process for gathering and accurately 
determining the information demands of stakeholders and affected communities 
during the post-crisis stage. The adoption of a comprehensive integrated 
communication and information management system, described earlier in Chapter 5, 
can assist in this regard. To accurately ascertain the requirements of different groups, 
the MECIT can employ useful communication tools such as focus groups, one-to-one 
meetings with community leaders, small group discussions, ‘town hall’ meetings, 
telephone hotlines, electronic bulletin boards, information centres, and surveys. 
However, to fully comprehend the perceptions, issues, needs and concerns of the 
victims, their families and communities, it is necessary that face-to-face dialogue 
takes place between trained community outreach and victim liaison officers from the 
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MECIT and affected publics, in order to receive first-hand feedback. An up-to-date 
stakeholder network and map within the major emergency response communication 
plan (MERCP), clearly identifying the many diverse audiences together with key 
contact points amongst these groups, can greatly assist this process. According to the 
Home Office (2008: 8), engaging in such a process also allows the lead response 
organisation to engage fully with the community and elected representatives in all 
aspects of recovery management such as building projects and how best to spend 
public donations. 
 
Once an information demand is received in the CIMC, the required information can 
be quickly processed by the MECIT, prioritised against the other information 
demands, and appropriate decisions reached as regards what should be said, who 
should say it and through what channel. A broad range of expertise, including legal, 
medical, financial, and logistical must be available to the MECIT in order to provide 
guidance and clarity on all of the information demands received. A clearly understood 
system of protocols should also exist for signing-off messages and information prior 
to releasing them to stakeholders and affected communities. It is extremely important 
that any information provided to stakeholders and affected communities that contain 
either explicit or implicit promises are followed-up and thereafter honoured by the 
lead response organisation. 
 
Through a process of comprehensive and careful strategic communication planning, 
using methods such as ‘scenario planning’ (described in Section 5.3.4.3), the many 
different types of information demands should have been envisaged, prioritised and 
recorded by the MECIT during the pre-crisis stage. Effective protocols and 
procedures should have been developed and included within a comprehensive 
communication plan in order to allow the MECIT to deal efficiently with these 
information demands. Additionally, dealing with complex information demands 
should have been rehearsed during pre-crisis integrated communication training. 
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8.3.2 Victims and families 
According to Ogrizek and Guillery (1999: 60), ‘…victim management during the 
post-crisis stage is one of the biggest challenges, if not the central challenge, of major 
emergency communication’. Effective communication with victims and their families 
during the post-crisis stage of a major emergency often requires greater levels of 
sensitivity than in the previous two stages. Consequently, it merits detailed attention 
at this stage of the dissertation.  
 
8.3.2.1 Sensitivity and empathy 
As the post-crisis stage of a major emergency situation is often associated with death, 
injury and suffering, the development and dissemination of many messages may need 
careful, sensitive and compassionate consideration by the MECIT. For example, 
specific messages may have to be crafted in order to deal with traumatised children, 
religious and cultural taboos, and informing families of the death of loved-ones who 
may be awaiting the positive identification of remains. Numerous examples have 
been reported of families of victims having experienced insensitive communication 
from response agencies that were merely following bureaucratic procedures or badly 
conceived protocols. Following the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, the lead 
response organisation acknowledged that hospitals had insufficient training and skill 
for dealing with the queries, and communicating adequately with, families who were 
frantically searching for loved-ones. This caused great distress for the families 
concerned and placed great pressures on the response organisations (EMA 2003: 11). 
It was also reported that many of the next-of-kin of victims were ‘coldly’ asked to fill 
out forms authorising authorities to ‘dispose of any tissue samples’ of loved-ones 
found at the ‘Twin Towers’ site (Bernstein 2002: 255). In another example, Boucher-
Hayes, reporting for RTE from Thailand following the 2004 tsunami, describes how 
‘excessive bureaucratic red tape’ created significant delays in the repatriation of 
victims’ bodies to their home countries, thereby generating a sense of ‘overwhelming 
anger and anguish’ amongst families (Boucher-Hayes 2005). Connors (2003) also 
describes many examples of gross insensitivity displayed by military authorities 
while communicating with families of soldiers killed in combat. In order to 
communicate to victims’ families that their loved ones are not forgotten, the lead 
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response organisation must consider longer-term issues such as creating a book or 
website of condolence, a suitable memorial design and anniversary services (Home 
Office 2008: 5). A co-ordinated response from all of the communication teams 
working within the CIMC, utilising a broad-range of knowledge, skill and experience, 
advised by ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ opinion, can greatly influence and help to avoid 
unnecessary, additional grief for the families of victims. 
 
The role of the spokesperson is crucial in ensuring that messages disseminated during 
the post-crisis stage are accurate, informative and sensitive. Likewise, all 
spokespersons for support response agencies must be fully briefed to display a similar 
level of empathy. Coordination such as this ensures that the lead response 
organisation does not appear uncaring or distant from the plight of victims and their 
families. Unfortunately, despite best intentions, one well-publicised negative story of 
insensitive treatment of a victim, or the family of a victim, by a relief and recovery 
official is often sufficient to tarnish the reputation of the entire lead response 
organisation. 
 
8.3.3 Marginalised groups 
In the aftermath of a major emergency situation, the MECIT must ensure that it 
communicates adequately with all members of affected communities. The vast 
majority of interested and affected audiences will never be more demanding for 
information than during this very difficult period. However, poorly conceived major 
emergency planning may result in marginalised groups being excluded from the 
communication process for a variety of different reasons. Consequently, their needs 
and concerns may not be assessed, their opinions not sought and important 
information may not be communicated to them. Often these groups are not identified 
in the first instance, or they are merely ignored. These marginalised publics are often 
the sector of society that most require assistance during a major emergency, and 
include people suffering from physical mobility, sensory deprivation, learning 
difficulties, and psychiatric problems. Other marginalised groups requiring special 
attention during a major emergency situation include infants, the travelling 
community, ethnic minorities, and the aged.  
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Drabek and Hoetmer (1991: 179) emphasise that the MECIT must devise a ‘viable 
programme’ during the pre-crisis stage in order to obtain and update registration of 
these marginalised groups. Norman (2004: 92) states that effective recovery can be 
achieved only through the process of community resilience. Stewart (1989: 27) 
believes that marginalised people feel less threatened and more empowered by the 
provision and receipt of information through self-help associations that are organised 
through community resilience programmes. In this regard, the MECRP should 
contain information relating to marginalised groups together with details of voluntary 
community organisations in the region that can offer them local assistance. This 
information should be updated as quickly as possible by community outreach officers 
in the post-crisis stage and all efforts should be made to improve communication 
flows to, and between, these marginalised people.  
 
Walter (2005: 106), describing information flows in South East India following the 
2004 tsunami, reports how marginalised groups such as Dalits or low caste 
‘untouchables’ were excluded from the information process. Likewise, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) communication system failed 32 elderly 
residents in a nursing home ‘who were left to fend for themselves and died in the 
floodwaters’ in St. Bernard’s Parish, New Orleans, following Hurricane Katrina 
(Gross 2005: 3). 
 
8.3.4 Post-crisis communication channels 
The MECIT of the lead response organisation in the CIMC should have considered, 
as part of the major emergency response communication plan (MERCP), optimal 
channels for disseminating critical information to stakeholders, victims and their 
families, marginalised groups, internal audiences and to the general public. In 
addition to traditional communication channels such as television, radio and the print 
media, the MECIT needs to consider a whole range of new information and 
communication technology (ICT) as potential information channels. These include 
digital media (radio and television) channels, the Internet, ‘short messaging services’ 
(SMS) text, ‘SMS push-text’, ‘wireless application protocol’ (WAP), ‘text-to-listen’ 
and ‘smart’ pagers.  
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However, despite the benefits of both traditional and new technologically based 
channels, in its planning the MECIT must consider that a major emergency situation 
can destroy many of these channels. Shaw and Sinha (2003: 41) describe how the 
‘entire telecommunication system’ was destroyed in the Gujarat earthquake in India 
(2001), thereby excluding many significant communication channels. Furthermore, 
many marginalised groups may not have access to ICT channels of communication 
(Fischer 1999: 48). Consequently, the MECIT should plan for a series of effective 
non-technical channels of communication. For example, the use of boats equipped 
with megaphone systems proved effective in passing important information to many 
of the residents of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Similarly, using non-
technical means, the posting of photos of unidentified victims on billboards allowed 
the responders in Thailand to communicate information to a large number of families 
and friends following the 2004 tsunami (Scanlon 2006: 58). In a similar way, victims 
who survived, and wished to inform their relatives that they were alive, also posted 
notices on public buildings (Berger 2004: 11). Walter (2005: 106), reports how 
community-based civil society networks, such as fishermen’s organisations using 
door-to-door visits, provided an extremely effective channel of communication in the 
post-crisis stage of the 2004 tsunami in Sri-Lanka. 
 
8.3.5 VIP visits 
The presence of community leaders / VIPs ‘is an inevitable sight at the site of a major 
emergency’ (Home Office 2008: 5). Visits of this type can provide a significant 
morale boost for both victims and responders, reinforce key messages, and places on 
the public record gratitude for the entire relief and recovery effort. In some instances 
a VIP visit provides a catalyst for badly needed fund-raising towards the relief effort, 
such as the visit of former US presidents Clinton and Bush (Snr.) to South East Asia 
following the 2004 tsunami.  
 
Any visits by community leaders / VIPs should be co-ordinated by the MECIT of the 
lead response organisation. In this regard, they should ensure that any visits do not 
interfere with the ongoing relief and recovery effort. The MECIT must also be 
cognisant that community leaders / VIPs may be obliged to answer difficult questions 
from victims and families in relation to how the major emergency was ‘allowed’ to 
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happen, or receive criticism relating to the relief and recovery effort. It is important 
that any communication with these stakeholders and affected communities does not 
appear defensive or indifferent. Community leaders / VIPs are likely to be pressed to 
make specific commitments to affected communities during these visits. Care must be 
taken not to create any unrealistic expectations and to follow through with any 
commitments given. Failure to do so may significantly damage the credibility of the 
leader and the lead response organisation in the future.  
 
8.3.6 Communicating with the media 
Many major emergency events, such as earthquakes and tsunami, are likely to occur 
and terminate within a matter of minutes, resulting in media organisations only being 
able to provide coverage of the post-crisis period. Consequently, the MECIT of the 
lead response organisation is often faced with the task of dealing with an extremely 
large media presence at multiple locations, very quickly, during the post-crisis stage. 
Effective coordination of all media activities by the lead MECIT within the CIMC is 
extremely important in order to ensure optimal utilisation of media output. The 
handling of the media once they begin to gather at the site of a major emergency was 
discussed in some detail throughout Section 5.3.5.4. 
 
The focus of media interest in the post-crisis stage often centres on finding someone 
who is culpable for allowing the major emergency to happen and criticising 
authorities for intransigence. A number of theorists criticise the media for 
propagating myths during the post-crisis stage such as ‘sensationalist’ reportage 
concerning mass panic following the 2004 tsunami (Sandman 2004(b)), dead bodies 
spreading disease (Walter 2005: 87), and mass looting and rape in New Orleans 
following Hurricane Katrina (Gold 2005: 10). According to Monbiot (2005: 15), 
media reportage during this stage often involves ‘…tales of heroic rescue teams 
battling to extract people before they die. Best of all, someone might survive against 
all the odds’. For example Chakravarti (2005: 14) reports in The Times the case of the 
12-year-old Indian boy who was ‘remarkably’ found alive on a coconut tree after 
nearly two weeks after the 2004 tsunami. The Times reported how he had kept alive 
‘eating the fruit of the palm and drinking coconut water’. 
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Due to the competitive nature of the media market and the relatively short attention 
span of the non-affected public, journalists and reporters are likely to lose interest in 
the relief and recovery effort once no new angles appear for their reportage. As soon 
as the next major emergency arises, the media is likely to shift its focus of attention 
away from the current crisis. Consequently, the general public often fails to gain an 
insight into the longer-term difficulties experienced by victims and their families, 
such as the large number of homeless remaining in South East Asia three years after 
the 2004 tsunami. As a result, the MECIT needs continuously to work with the media 
in order to ensure that any reportage benefits the longer-term relief and recovery 
operation.  
 
8.3.7 Communicating with major emergency responders and their families 
Communicating with major emergency responders and their families during the crisis 
stage of a major emergency has already received attention in the previous two 
chapters. Continuation of this crucial communication process is important during the 
post-crisis stage, particularly if response workers have been killed, injured or are 
missing. Additionally, as a major emergency that lasts for more than a few days is 
likely to impact heavily on human resources, effective internal communication 
processes can assist in ensuring that staff are available to deal with these events over 
the medium- to long-term. According to Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 153), 
emergency responders and their families are important ambassadors and messengers 
for the lead response organisation. With the ‘right information’, they believe that 
these important stakeholders ‘…can play a role in shaping perceptions throughout the 
entire community’ (ibid.). Consequently, internal communication is a critical element 
within this framework, and is an important task that must be co-ordinated by the 
MECIT throughout the post-crisis stage, regardless of how protracted this period is.  
 
Critical to the success of communication with major emergency responders and their 
families is an effective process of continuous two-way symmetrical dialogue. This 
allows an important uninterrupted flow of information between the lead response 
organisation and its internal audience. The MECIT should provide essential 
information, such as progress reports, updates of new threats, and proposed plans, 
directly to response teams and indirectly to their families, prior to releasing this 
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information to the media. This imbues the responders and their families with a sense 
that their efforts are being appreciated by the lead response organisation. 
Additionally, a process must exist that allows the responders and their families to ask 
questions and to receive honest and detailed answers. Additionally, useful 
information can be received regarding the concerns and needs of individual response 
workers, particularly in relation to occupational health issues that might require the 
immediate intervention of medical, psychological or critical incident stress debriefing 
(CISD) expertise.  
 
Particular care must be afforded by the MECIT to correctly communicating with the 
families of responders who are seriously injured or killed in the line of duty. This 
includes efficient protocols for breaking the bad news, the identification of the body, 
dealing with cultural or religious peculiarities, providing support at any funeral 
services, providing financial and social support, and dealing with the media (Connors 
2003). 
 
8.4 Communicating business continuity management (BCM) 
 
HM Government (2005(a): 75) defines business continuity management (BCM) as 
‘…a flexible framework designed to help critical businesses to continue operating in 
the face of, and following, a major emergency’. Examples include providers of 
essential utilities such as electricity, water, natural gas, and other critical services 
such as transport, shelter and food products. BCM is a process that is extremely 
germane during the post-crisis stage of a major emergency situation. Scarman Centre 
(2004: 8-31) emphasises:  
 
BCM should not be considered as merely a plan but an ongoing 
process…and is not an attempt to continue all operations in all 
circumstances, but aims to ensure continuance of critical processes in 
order to aid the wider recovery process. 
 
According to HM Government (2005(a): 90), the role of communication in relation to 
BCM in the post-crisis stage includes, communicating the rationale and significance 
of invoking the business continuity plan; a list of what constitutes a critical business; 
establishing and recording points of contact within each critical businesses; actions to 
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be taken in the event of a BCM plan being invoked; and the level of service that can 
be expected from individual businesses following a major emergency. A two-way 
flow of information between the lead response organisation and the critical 
organisations, through the liaison teams, is essential for BCM success. This type of 
open information flow allows the needs and concerns of staff within the critical 
business to become known, thereby prompting the provision of essential support and 
material that can include such diverse requests as personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and vaccinations.  
 
EMA (2003:11) describes how the implementation of a comprehensive BCM plan 
was essential to the recovery of the Manhattan region following the 9/11 attacks. The 
‘Twin Towers’ and environs housed much of New York’s financial district, law 
courts, City Hall, and other important retail and social outlets. Through a process of 
direct liaison, the authorities provided advice on the immediate re-establishment of 
many of these services in alternative locations, as they were considered critical to the 
resumption of normal economic and social activity. 
 
The MECIT also needs to consider the provision of advice to the non-critical business 
community, in relation to appropriate actions that can be taken to support the overall 
relief and recovery effort in the post-crisis stage. For example, communication 
experts advised Pepsi Cola to discontinue an advertisement featuring people surfing 
following the 2004 tsunami disaster, as it could have been perceived as insensitive 
(Adland 2005). Furthermore, the provision of information to stakeholders and 
affected communities in relation to the resumption of critical services is essential to 
restore public confidence in the lead response organisation, the government, and the 
business organisations themselves. 
 
8.5 Improvement of the major emergency communication strategy and 
plan 
 
Chapter 5 provides a description of how an effective evaluation of the entire 
communication process can greatly enhance and improve the major emergency 
communication effort, thereby helping to save lives and reduce damage. This includes 
 193
an evaluation of whether the strategic communication function has contributed to 
supporting the lead response organisation’s efforts throughout all phases of the major 
emergency. However, in order to improve objectively the major emergency 
communication process, it is necessary for the MECIT to collate the findings of the 
evaluation, revise all sub-optimal communication protocols and procedures, and to 
implement changes.  
 
8.5.1 Evaluation of all elements of the communication process 
According to Price (1989: 163), a comprehensive evaluation is ‘a necessary step in 
ensuring improvements in the competence of communication programmes’. While 
the strategic communication process involves engaging in ongoing and iterative 
evaluation throughout the entire major emergency cycle, it is likely that the most 
comprehensive communication evaluation will take place during the post-crisis stage. 
The MECIT can conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the entire major emergency 
communication strategy from a number of distinct viewpoints. Coombs (1999: 136) 
emphasises that a ‘natural link’ exists between all forms of communication 
evaluation.  Firstly, the MECIT can evaluate the efficacy of the overall 
communication strategy of the lead response organisation. This involves identifying 
any inherent weaknesses that may have become apparent in the approach taken to 
major emergency communication, or in the quality of the delivery of the 
communication strategy at any particular stage. It includes an evaluation of the 
quality of the major emergency response communication plan (MERCP), how this 
plan is implemented by the MECIT, at both individual and group level and of any 
internal or external factors that can inhibit optimal communication performance.  
 
Secondly, the MECIT can evaluate the impact of the major emergency 
communication effort. According to Sen and Egelhoff (1991: 71), this evaluation 
should also be conducted in order to ascertain the effectiveness of the strategic 
communication process. Ogrizek and Guillery (1999: 80) emphasise the importance 
of evaluating both short- and medium-term impacts of the communication effort. In 
this regard, evaluating physical impacts of major emergency situations, including 
human and environmental damage, should be a key indicator of how successful the 
communication effort actually is. A question in this regard is whether a more 
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effective communication strategy and plan, or MECIT performance, could have 
prevented or reduced loss of life or material damage. Another type of impact 
evaluation that is considered important during this stage involves determining how 
the reputation of the lead response organisation may have been affected. According to 
Coombs (1999: 140), reputation evaluation requires the measurement of pre- and 
post-crisis major emergency reputation scores. 
 
Closely linked to the evaluation of reputation is a detailed assessment of media 
coverage and output concerning the handling of the major emergency situation. 
According to Susskind and Field (1996: 211), portrayal by the media of the lead 
response organisation’s handling of the major emergency, along with the duration of 
this type of coverage, can be extremely important in creating positive or negative 
perceptions of the relief and recovery effort amongst stakeholders and affected 
communities. Media coverage, when it is negative and of a lengthy duration, is likely 
to impact adversely on the reputation of the response effort and the lead response 
organisation. A thorough evaluation of international, national, regional, local, and 
ethnic media output can assist in identifying any damage that may have occurred to 
the reputation of the lead response organisation. This type of evaluation can also be a 
catalyst for taking positive steps to raise and rebuild the trust and credibility of the 
lead response organisation amongst stakeholders, the affected community and the 
media themselves. Undertaking a comprehensive media analysis during the post-
crisis stage involves techniques such as media content and share-of-voice analysis, 
qualitative in-depth discussions with senior media representatives, and focus groups. 
Undertaking an evaluation such as this can assist the overall evaluation effort and 
offer an excellent forum for learning important lessons and improving media relations 
for future major emergency communication management. 
 
In order to evaluate effectively the efficacy of the communication strategy, the 
evaluation team from the MECIT should refer back to the strategic communication 
goals and objectives that were stated during the pre-crisis stage. Bernstein (1987: 19) 
emphasises the importance of agreeing and stating ‘clear criteria that should be used 
as a benchmark’ during the evaluation phase in order to determine whether a 
particular element of the strategic communication process can be considered a 
success or failure. Norman (2004: 95) concurs and specifies a number of criteria that 
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can be used to evaluate the success of the strategic communication process. Reynolds 
(2002: 87) suggests the use of tools such as a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats models (SWOT) in order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the 
major emergency communication strategy process. Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004: 
107) propose an appraisal of citizen feedback as a means of determining the success 
or failure of major emergency communication. 
  
Similarly, Coombs (1999: 136) states that ‘data collection is the first step in any 
evaluation process’. A principal source for evaluation data is the many records that 
should have been maintained throughout the entire major emergency period. Useful 
information can be gleaned by the MECIT through a comprehensive audit of records 
such as stakeholder contact worksheets, incident report sheets, information log sheets 
and rumour logs. Additionally, another useful method includes an evaluation of direct 
stakeholder feedback from both internal stakeholders – such as civil servants, 
members of the emergency services, and affiliate support agencies, and external 
stakeholders – including victims and the media. Information from external 
stakeholders can be acquired through the use of structured surveys, interviews, focus 
groups, internet sites, ‘blogs’, media output and media log sheets.  
 
The gathering of this type of data provides essential information concerning the 
effectiveness of many aspects of the strategic communication process and any 
shortcomings that may exist. These include, the effectiveness of notification 
processes, information flows to responders and between response organisations, 
delays in gathering or assessing information, the effectiveness of individual channels 
of communication, gaps in the supply of information, places where particular 
messages are not being understood by receivers, how stakeholder queries have been 
dealt with, and the extent of participative collaboration in decision-making. Theorists 
who have written on this subject include Fernandez and Merzer (2003: 174), 
Bernstein (1987: 139), Coombs (1999: 136), Reynolds (2002: 54), and Ogrizek and 
Guillery (1999: 80). 
 
Once information has been gathered, Mitroff, Harrington and Gai (1996: 45) suggest 
a number of variables that can be used for organising the data in order to assist the 
MECIT with the evaluation process. This involves organising the information into 
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specific categories, including the type of major emergency, the stage within the 
lifecycle, different systems and technology utilised, and various groupings of 
stakeholders and publics. Engaging in a strategic approach to evaluation, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, can greatly assist the MECIT to decide where deficits have occurred and 
how best to revise the existing major emergency communication strategy and the 
MERCP. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the evaluation process, the conducting and 
completion of an effective communication evaluation following a major emergency 
situation may prove difficult. Resources are likely to be scarce and communications 
staff fatigued. Consequently, from a practical perspective, each element that requires 
evaluation should be prioritised and an objective cost-benefit analysis conducted in 
order to determine whether it is worth proceeding. 
 
8.5.2 Revise communication strategy and plan, and implement changes 
The results of the comprehensive evaluation of the communication process should be 
collated and reported to senior decision-makers within the lead response organisation 
and other relevant and interested response organisations as soon as possible. These 
results should then form the basis for a detailed revision of the major emergency 
communication strategy, and plan (MERCP), and be used to strengthen inherent 
weaknesses within the knowledge, structure and actions of the MECIT. Darrell (2003: 
61) and Reynolds (2002: 87) emphasise the importance of ensuring that all protocols 
and policies in relation to major emergency communication plans, instructions, 
routines and exercises are revised without delay. This allows the MECIT to 
recommence effective preparation, planning and training for dealing with future 
major emergencies and to expedite the revision process before valuable knowledge 
and experience is forgotten. The use of a broad-based consultative process should 
assist the MECIT in the revision process. This ensures that as much knowledge and 
experience as possible, both ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ can be gathered and assessed, 
and then made available to rectify any weaknesses in the major emergency 
communication strategic process. 
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Once the revision stage has been completed it is necessary to implement the changes 
as quickly as possible. This involves withdrawing out-of-date communication 
strategies, plans and instruction manuals; issuing new instructions and protocols; and 
communicating information of these changes to all members of the lead response 
organisation, other major emergency response organisations, and any other interested 
parties. Coombs (1999: 146) recommends that stakeholders should also be informed 
of significant changes that have been implemented. Reynolds (2002: 87) emphasises 
that changes should be institutionalised through appropriate communication training 
and exercising.  
 
8.5.3 Institutional memory 
According to Turner (1997: 1), many major emergencies possess common 
characteristics that can be identified and provide a basis for the provision of 
experiential learning for dealing with similar situations in the future. Newsom, Turk 
and Kruckeberg (1996: 544) remark that direct experience with a major emergency, 
‘teaches more than even the best scenario ever could’. Reynolds and Seeger (2005: 
45) emphasise the importance of documenting, formalising and communicating 
lessons learned from major emergency situations. Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles 
(2006: 17), consider experiential learning a cyclical process that should be continuous 
throughout all stages of a major emergency, but is of particular relevance during the 
post-crisis stage. The key phases of a learning cycle in relation to strategic major 
emergency communication management include many of the functions described 
earlier in the evaluation, revision and implementation process. Figure 8.2 (over), 
which is based on the learning cycle model introduced by Norman, Stuart-Black and 
Coles (2006: 17), graphically depicts the key elements that need to be considered in 
the learning process for major emergency communication:-  
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Source: (Based on Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles 2006: 17) 
 
This model describes how information concerning inherent weaknesses in the 
strategic communication process should be gathered and analysed in the post-crisis 
stage of a major emergency. The analysis can provide important lessons in relation to 
improving major emergency communication policy, protocols and best-practice. 
These lessons should become embedded within the lead response organisation’s 
institutional memory, through effective documentation, communication, training and 
exercising.  
 
Toft (1992: 48) introduced the term ‘isomorphism’ to refer to the process of learning 
from past experiences. Some theorists such as Reason (1990: 214) and Kirkwood 
(1999: 33) believe that lessons learned from past major emergencies may not be 
applicable to other forms of major emergencies and may merely mislead responders. 
However, other theorists such as Toft (1992: 48) support the use of retrospective 
analysis of major emergency communication for the purposes of learning lessons for 
the future. However, according to Toft and Reynolds (2004: 88), these lessons need 
to be learned before key people leave organisations ‘and take the lessons with them’. 
Figure 8.2:   Major emergency communication learning cycle 
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In the recording of lessons learned, Norman, Stuart-Black and Coles (2006: 17) 
discuss the importance of ‘sense-making’, where contributors to the process of 
institutional memory need to have a thorough understanding of ‘the true nature of 
their previous experiences’ and how this can contribute to future situations. They 
continue, ‘…it is far more difficult for effective learning to take place if the initial 
understanding of what has occurred is seriously flawed’ (ibid).  
 
Coombs (1999: 144) considers the effective recording and storage of major 
emergency communication information and lessons learned as being a key element of 
institutional memory, stating: 
 
Storage is more than recording information; it also involves rating the 
quality of information. Key crisis information should be rated for 
accuracy and comprehensiveness when it is stored. To be of use, crisis 
information should be easy to retrieve. Retrieval involves being able to 
quickly search and locate specific details when required (ibid: 145). 
 
Elliot, Smith and McGuinness (2000: 17) identify a number of potential barriers that 
may hinder the MECIT and other response organisations from learning useful lessons 
following a major emergency. These barriers include a lack of corporate 
responsibility, mistrust, rigidity of core beliefs, pre-conceived values and 
assumptions, a focus on single-loop learning, a failure to address the quality of 
decision-making, centrality of expertise, a disregard of outside opinion and expertise, 
peripheral inquiry, and the projection of blame, including ‘scape-goating’. 
 
8.6 Link to pre-crisis stage 
 
Once the major emergency has passed, the lead response organisation should 
immediately begin to monitor and track the events and factors that are believed to 
have contributed to the negative situation. As with the major emergency early 
warning process, the MECIT once again can play a significant role in this regard. 
This important process assists the lead response organisation in preventing or 
preparing for, a recurrence of the primary major emergency and ensures that a 
secondary negative situation does not arise. Information-gathering teams working as 
part of, or closely with, the MECIT should be tasked with coordinating this important 
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role. Ogrizek and Guillery (1999: 88) describe the monitoring and tracking process as 
switching from ‘crisis unit to crisis watch’. They highlight the importance of this 
function as a large number of major emergencies reveal advance signals that can be 
readily detected and remedial actions taken. All of the information-gathering 
techniques described in Chapters 6 and 7 can be employed once again in the 
monitoring and tracking process. While a temptation may exist to disband elements of 
the MECIT once the major emergency has passed, the lead response organisation 
must ensure that the important major emergency monitoring and tracking function is 
maintained. Ongoing comprehensive major emergency information needs to be 
gathered, evaluated and disseminated to senior decision makers, together with the 
passing of relevant information to stakeholders, affected communities and the media. 
 
The monitoring and tracking function logically links the post-crisis strategic 
communication management processes to the next stage in the major emergency life 
cycle, the pre-crisis stage. Reynolds and Seeger (2005: 50) consider this link to be 
extremely important in order to ensure that strategic major emergency 
communication management is an ongoing process. A link of this kind allows the 
MECIT of the lead response organisation to use accurate up-to-date information, 
together with a revised and improved communication strategy, based on lessons 
learned, in order to begin preparation and planning for communicating to 
stakeholders and publics for the next major emergency situation.  
 
The post-crisis link to the pre-crisis stage also allows the MECIT to continue to 
rebuild and reinforce a positive corporate identity for the lead response organisation, 
thereby improving levels of public trust and credibility. Ulmer, Seeger and Sellnow 
(2007: 134) describe how this rebuilding of trust and credibility can be achieved 
through a process termed ‘a discourse of renewal’ that focuses on an instinctive, 
provisional, often value-based response to major emergency situations. This link 
highlights the ongoing and cyclical nature of the major emergency strategic 
communication process as already described in detail in Section 2.4. 
 
In the next chapter, it is shown how three leading countries, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Sweden, utilise many of the strategic communication principles 
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and strategic-tactical steps, described throughout the previous four chapters, in their 
day-to-day management of major emergency communication. 
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9 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT IN THE UK, USA 
AND SWEDEN  
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
During the past decade a number of countries have evolved as world leaders in the 
field of major emergency communication. This is due in no small way to the 
considerable resources and effort that these countries have committed to the constant 
improvement of their major emergency communication protocols, procedures and 
skills. These countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Australia, Canada, and Germany. Some other states, including Ireland, are slowly 
realising the importance of reconsidering their approach in the light of best-practice. 
Of great benefit in this respect is the various major emergency communication-related 
literature that the leading countries have been producing since 2000.  
 
Prior to analysing how the Irish government approaches the major emergency 
strategic communication function, it is fruitful to analyse the approach adopted by 
some leading countries in this field. The United States is a useful case study due to 
the significant time and resources that it invests in major emergency strategic 
communication, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 
also due to the many high-profile major emergencies that it has been obliged to deal 
with since 2001. The United Kingdom has been chosen as a result of its historical 
links to Ireland, particularly in public administration. Sweden is chosen because of its 
pro-activity in the field of major emergency communication, particularly in terms of 
producing relevant literature of a high quality. 
 
Consideration of practice in these three countries will include data collated from a 
detailed review of available official literature, including reports, manuals, guidance 
materials, websites and any relevant legislation. This data is supported by information 
gleaned from questionnaires, completed by senior communication practitioners within 
the most appropriate government agency in each case. As will be seen from the 
results, no remarkable difference exists between the management of major emergency 
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communication by the three countries examined. If anything, there is a noticeable 
convergence of the practices of the three countries - as is evidenced by a detailed 
examination of their official major emergency literature and confirmed by the 
international participants. 
 
9.2  Major emergency management 
 
9.2.1 The United States 
Since the passing of the first piece of disaster legislation in 1803, in response to a 
significant urban fire in New Hampshire, the US government has committed 
considerable resources to major emergency management. Today the US is considered 
one of the foremost countries in emergency planning and response. A proactive 
approach to this discipline has been considered necessary, as the country is prone to, 
and often experiences, many diverse categories of major emergency situations. 
Examples include high profile events such as a substantial earthquake in San 
Francisco in 1989, the high-profile terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, and major forest fires in California in 2007. 
 
Up to the late 1970s, the US government adopted a somewhat fragmented approach 
to major emergency management. However, following a number of poorly managed 
disasters, previously independent emergency response administrations and the US 
Civil Defense were then absorbed into a newly established Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), in order to improve the response effort. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, it was realised that the revised structures were 
not sufficient and that additional coordination measures would be required to 
integrate separate federal response plans into a single, all–discipline, national incident 
management plan. Consequently, in March 2003 a new Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was developed in order to implement these additional coordination 
measures (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991: 6). It employs 180,000 personnel. As part of 
this reorganisation, FEMA was absorbed into the DHS together with 22 disparate 
federal agencies. This initiative was designed to bring a coordinated approach, with a 
single line of authority, to national security, major emergencies and disasters (FEMA 
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2008(a); DHS 2008). To provide voluntary, community assistance to the response 
effort, a volunteer Citizen Corps programme has been established since 2001. This is 
coordinated by the DHS but administered locally. The Citizen Corps helps to prepare 
the US population for major emergency response through public education, training 
and outreach and includes a community emergency response team, a fire corps, a 
neighbourhood watch and a medical reserve corps (Citizen Corps 2008). 
 
FEMA is responsible for coordinating the response to any disaster that overwhelms 
local and state resources. The agency has an annual budget of approximately $5bn 
and 2,600 full time employees in ten regional offices. Its primary mission, within the 
DHS, is to reduce loss of life and property and to protect more than 300 million US 
citizens from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-
made disasters. It aims to achieve this by leading and supporting the United States in 
a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery and mitigation (FEMA 2008(a)).  
 
In relation to major emergency management, the US federal policy for response 
across all of the administrations is based on devolved responsibility at the lowest 
level possible, either local or state, through the use of an ‘incident command system’ 
(ICS) or ‘unified command system’ (UCS). These systems propose that all resources 
in a jurisdiction are made available to respond to a major emergency effort and that 
the structure should have the ability to expand to encompass other agencies and 
jurisdictions as they arrive at a major emergency scene (Ridge 2004(a): 7; Perry 
2003: 405). The systems also specify that once local resources are exhausted, State 
and Federal resources can be requested through FEMA. Both response systems are 
supported by a comprehensive coordinating framework, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) (Ridge 2004(a)), which is put into effect through the 
all-disciplines, all-hazards, National Response Plan (NRP) (Ridge 2004(b)). Major 
emergency management in the US is on a statutory basis. The US government 
introduced major emergency legislation through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707, signed into law November 23rd, 
1988. This Act constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response 
activities especially as they pertain to the DHS and FEMA. This Act is supported by 
the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). This provides the 
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necessary legislation for compliance by all US departments and agencies during a 
major emergency situation (Townsend 2006: 12). For example in relation to training 
and exercising, through Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the 
Department of Homeland Security requires all states, territories, tribal entities and 
local governments to undertake and complete annual national incident management 
systems (NIMS) compliance activities in order to achieve preparedness goals (NPG) 
for the United States. 
 
9.2.2 The United Kingdom  
Following a series of German air raids on its mainland during World War I, the UK 
government was obliged to undertake one of its earliest attempts at coordinated major 
emergency planning. A little over three decades later, fearing a nuclear attack on the 
UK at the start of the so called ‘Cold War’, more formalised planning arrangements 
were put in place through the UK Civil Defence Act 1948, which ‘remained the 
hallmark of UK emergency management up to the 1980s’ (Hills 1994: 67). Major 
emergency management was given little consideration until two detailed reviews 
were conducted in 1989 and 1991. These reviews came about following a number of 
high-profile incidents in which the response was considered unsatisfactory. The 
reviews proposed that major emergency planning and response should become less 
centralised and take place at a local level only, with support offered by the 
appropriate lead government department (LGD) only where necessary (Hills 1994: 
67). Many of the resultant changes were ‘loudly criticised’ (Handmer and Parker 
1991: 304) and many government departments felt ‘constrained’ (Beckett 2000: 
1.16). These concerns were borne out during severe flooding in 2000 and a ‘foot-and-
mouth’ outbreak in 2001. Consequently, the UK government was obliged to make 
further changes and introduced the Civil Contingencies Act (HM Government 2004) 
to do so.  
 
The Civil Contingencies Act focuses on coordinating emergency planning at both 
central government level, through the Cabinet Office, and at local levels in concert. It 
also removes all outdated legislation, re-defines emergencies, clearly identifies the 
roles and responsibilities of all participatory organisations and individuals throughout 
all stages, and introduces a mandatory regime for responders (O’Brien and Read 
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2005: 358). The 2004 Act is supported by the earlier 2003 Capabilities Programme, 
which was designed to ensure that a robust infrastructure of response is in place to 
deal rapidly and effectively with major emergency situations in terms of structural, 
functional and essential services (Cabinet Office 2005(a): 14; UK Resilience 2007). 
This infrastructure was lacking in previous major emergency legislation. Among 
other things, the Civil Contingencies Act legislates for the assessment of major 
emergency preparedness, which is undertaken through its performance assessment 
frameworks. These assessments are overseen by performance assessment bodies, 
under the supervision of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. 
 
The focal point for emergencies requiring central government engagement is Cabinet 
Office Briefing Room ‘A’ (COBRA), where the Prime Minister often chairs inter-
departmental co-ordination meetings (Cabinet Office 2005(b): 2). Lead government 
departments are pre-identified in the Act. In the event of a major emergency, the 
Prime Minister will task one lead government department (LGD) with coordinating 
the overall response effort across the nine regions and the devolved administrations, 
supported by regional resilience forums and regional resilience teams. The 2004 CCA 
framework allows for the coordination of inter-agency response at three management 
tiers, the strategic (gold), the tactical (silver) and the operational (bronze) levels.  
 
9.2.3 Sweden 
According to Nordlund (1994: 5), the Swedish authorities were ‘challenged 
significantly’ following the nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986 and ‘were found to 
be completely unprepared for such a major emergency’. According to ‘t Hart, Heyse 
and Boin (2001: 181), the Swedish authorities, press and general public, ‘…are just 
waking up to the notion of emergency management and all it entails…to break the 
widespread assumption that disasters cannot happen here’.  
Since 9/11, much attention has been given to ‘potential acts of terrorism with special 
reference to the use of chemical, biological, nuclear/radiological (CBNR) threats’ 
(Kulling and Holst 2004: 185). The Swedish government has introduced some 
important initiatives to improve its preparedness and response capabilities, 
particularly in the field of communication. Responsibility for so called ‘severe 
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peacetime emergencies’ rests with the Swedish Ministry of Defence (2008). Sweden 
adopts a ‘Total Defence’ strategy, which means that it places a high value on 
preparing for peacetime and wartime major incidents involving input from both 
military and civilian resources (Kulling and Holst 2004: 185; Swedish Ministry of 
Defence 2008). Central to Sweden’s longer-term major emergency strategy is a 1999 
report entitled A changing world, presented by a multi-party Swedish defence 
commission to the Minister of Defence. This report aims to update Sweden’s defence 
policy to 2011, especially in relation to support for peacetime emergencies (Swedish 
Defence Commission 1999: 3).  
 
According to Eksborg (2004), the new crisis management system in Sweden is based 
on a ‘bottom-up perspective’ with clearly defined roles for all. The 289 Swedish 
municipalities have local responsibility during a major emergency. Their roles 
include drawing up pre-crisis risk and vulnerability analyses, conducting major 
emergency training and exercises, and ensuring clear lines of communication to both 
regional and central level, before, during and after an emergency situation (Swedish 
Ministry of Defence 2008). Regional major emergency preparedness and response in 
Sweden is the responsibility of county administrative boards. These boards are 
supported in their work by joint central disaster committees, drawn from the 21 
regional county councils throughout the country. The role of the county 
administrative boards in major emergency management includes supporting the 
municipalities and affiliate authorities; overseeing major emergency planning; and 
prioritising, distributing and guiding central government resources to the individual 
municipalities. This is particularly important where the major emergency spans a 
number of individual municipalities (ibid.). 
 
Supporting and coordinating all of the bodies and authorities responsible for 
emergency management is the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), 
which was established in 2002. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence, 
SEMA is located within one of the Ministry’s five departments, the Department for 
Civil Defence Coordination (CIV). SEMA’s principal role is ‘to coordinate and 
integrate the new crisis management structure and to act as a driving force in 
developments in this area’ (Eksborg 2004). Significantly, SEMA is also tasked with 
coordinating resources and allocating central funding to the relevant authorities that 
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are tasked with managing a major emergency situation (Kulling and Holst 2004: 185; 
Swedish Ministry of Defence 2008). However, SEMA does not have an operational 
role and does not take over responsibility from municipalities, county councils or 
other authorities. Neither does SEMA have powers to force other authorities to 
conduct planning or exercises. However, the Swedish government is reviewing the 
oversight powers of SEMA currently and significant new powers are expected for the 
authority in 2008 (Modh 2007: personal communication). 
 
9.3 Major emergency strategic communication  
 
9.3.1 The United States 
For many years the US government has been at the forefront of major emergency risk 
and communication research, planning and development. Again, the coordination of 
all major emergency communication efforts in the US is vested in FEMA through the 
DHS (Ridge 2004(b): Pub 1). Throughout much of its official major emergency 
related literature, the US government accords considerable importance to the 
management and planning of communication and information. According to Ridge 
(2004(a): 28): 
Having systems and protocols for communicating timely and 
accurate information to the public and to fellow responders are 
critical during crisis or emergency situations. 
 
Communicating effectively with both internal and external stakeholders is stipulated 
as a strategic objective by FEMA (Allbaugh 2003: 40). 
 
As part of its strategic communication effort, the DHS, through FEMA’s public 
affairs headquarters, provides the US public with diverse, interesting and useful major 
emergency preparedness and resilience information. An example of this is the 
dedicated, user-friendly web-site portal (FEMA 2008(a)), where FEMA posts 
accessible information, both in English and Spanish, on how best to prepare for a 
wide range of potentially disastrous situations. FEMA has undertaken a number of 
other useful communication initiatives, including the publication of a personal 
preparedness guide entitled Are you ready? an in-depth guide to citizen preparedness 
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(FEMA 2004); a similar DVD entitled Getting ready for disasters (FEMA 2006); a 
family centred web-site, Ready America (DHS 2007); and a dedicated web-site 
designed to prepare and fortify children for dealing with major emergencies, FEMA 
for kids (FEMA 2008(b)). Separate to FEMA’s efforts at major emergency 
communication preparedness, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which is the 
primary federal agency with responsibility for public health issues, has produced an 
extremely useful handbook that provides both strategic and functional communication 
advice (Reynolds 2002). 
 
Despite the recent and expensive overhaul of major emergency structures in the US, 
FEMA has received much criticism in recent times for its management of major 
emergency situations, including its communication efforts. For example, its 
performance at the time of Hurricane Katrina was considered unresponsive 
(Townsend 2006: 60). FEMA was also criticised for being duplicitous when it 
arranged for staff to pose as journalists and ask questions during a news conference, 
in order to enhance its reputation at the time of the 2007 California forest fires 
(Lipton 2007: 2). 
 
9.3.2 The United Kingdom 
Responsibility for the major emergency communication function in the UK, including 
warning and informing the public, is vested in the Cabinet Office, through the 
Government Communication Network (GCN) (Cabinet Office 2005(a): 18). 
According to the UK government, effective major emergency communication must 
exist in order correctly to pass reliable information, without delay, ‘to those who need 
to know...including the public’ (Cabinet Office 2005(b): 4). The UK government, 
through GCN, defines major emergency communication as, ‘…building relationships 
with others, listening and understanding them, and conveying thoughts and messages 
clearly and congruently’ (UK Resilience 2007: 2.3). The UK government has been 
quite active over the past decade in its attempts at communicating with the public on 
issues related to major emergency preparedness and response. For example, in 2004 it 
distributed a 22-page, multi-lingual, practical guidance booklet to all 25 million 
households in the UK. This initiative was augmented by a series of high-profile radio 
and TV advertisements intended to generate interest and raise awareness. In terms of 
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providing communication management guidance for major emergency situations, the 
two key documents that support the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, Emergency 
preparedness (HM Government 2005(a)), and Response and recovery (HM 
government 2005(b)) offer some extremely useful advice to major emergency 
communication practitioners. Additionally, there are a number of useful portals such 
as Preparing for emergencies (HM Government 2006) and Local response gateway 
(CCS 2007).  
In terms of media management efforts, important UK government initiatives have 
been undertaken, including the establishment of regional media emergency forums. 
At these forums, senior UK response personnel and media practitioners can discuss, 
plan and agree in principle on the media’s role following a disaster (UK Resilience 
2005: 58). In addition, the GCN and the BBC have collaborated to produce 
Connecting in a Crisis (BBC 2008(b)). Other initiatives of the GCN include the News 
Co-ordination Centre, which can provide multi-skilled expertise to support and 
strengthen the lead responders media-handling and communication efforts for the 
duration of a major emergency. Another communication initiative involves the 
Government News Network providing media management skills and advice to the 
nine response regions. 
 
9.3.3 Sweden 
The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) fulfils an important function 
in the development, improvement and coordination of the major emergency 
communication and information function across all of the Swedish response agencies. 
Its role in this regard includes the collection of essential information; advice in areas 
such as crisis communication, strategic communication analyses and research; 
conducting post-crisis stage communication evaluation; drawing up proposals for 
mandatory communication training and exercises and overseeing its implementation 
to a very high standard. Closely supporting SEMA in the area of communication is 
the National Board of Psychological Defence: Styrelsenfor Psykologiskt Forsvar 
(SPF 2007). The latter is a central authority, the primary role of which is to offer 
guidance and advice to government ministries, authorities, response agencies and the 
public regarding how best to optimise relations with media organisations during times 
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of major emergencies. It is also involved in conducting critical media research and 
organising important media related seminars. Working closely with SEMA, SPF 
ensures government response authorities, media outlets and society are well prepared 
to deal with major emergency situations.  
 
Over the past twenty years both SEMA and SPF have been very active in producing 
some very useful major emergency communication-related literature for members of 
the public and communication practitioners. Much of this information is available in 
English. Amongst the most useful are texts produced by Nohrsetdt (2000), Nordlund 
(1994), Darrell (2003) and Modh (2003). Additionally SEMA has a dedicated website 
through which the Swedish government can raise awareness of major emergency 
issues amongst the general public (SEMA 2007). Other communication initiatives 
undertaken by the Swedish government include the establishment of 4,500 emergency 
warning transmitters distributed throughout the country and a citizen-to-responder 
alarm system (SOS Alarm 2007: 4). 
 
9.4  Comparative analysis 
 
9.4.1 Strategic communication management and planning 
Strategically managing the major emergency communication effort is considered 
important by all three agencies examined. However, while the US government 
frequently refers to many of the key principles of strategic communication 
management throughout its documentation, it was difficult to find a useful 
overarching strategic communication framework to guide the process, particularly 
within FEMA’s literature. The only strategic framework that is evident is the US 
Centers for Disease Control’s excellent five-stage framework (Reynolds 2002: 7).  
Despite the absence of a strategic communication guidance framework, FEMA has 
enshrined its strategic communication planning effort within its Strategic Plan 2003-
2008 (Allbaugh 2003). This strategic plan establishes the ‘programmatic, policy and 
management goals’ of the agency (ibid: 11). Daryl Madden, a senior public affairs 
manager at FEMA’s headquarters, states that FEMA takes ‘very seriously’ the 
process of engaging in deliberate strategic communication planning for all three 
 212
stages of an emergency situation (Madden 2007: Interview). He emphasises that a 
flexible approach is essential in communication planning and supports the use of 
‘scenario-planning’, stating ‘it allows you train like you fight so you can fight like 
you train’. Madden emphasises the importance of preparing communication strategies 
in the short-, medium, and long-term. He supports his comments by providing a score 
of 9.5 out of a possible ten when asked to rate the importance of strategic 
communication planning. 
 
Of the three countries analysed, the UK government offers what seems to be the most 
comprehensive major emergency strategic communication guidance framework. This 
framework is designed to link seamlessly with the UK’s communication planning 
function. The UK government emphasises the importance of approaching 
communication strategically and provides six insightful guiding principles in this 
regard (UK Resilience 2005: 5.1). In relation to major emergency communication 
planning, a useful seven-step communication framework is also provided (ibid: 5.3). 
The communication planning function also appears prominently in a number of 
official documents, – in particular HM Government’s Emergency preparedness 
(2005(a): Chapter 5) and London Resilience’s Strategic emergency plan (2005: 
Section 2). Carol McCall, at the Cabinet Office Communications (COC), believes 
that major emergency communication needs to be considered strategically. She 
comments that communication ‘developed in an ad hoc or unplanned way is unlikely 
to be as effective in ensuring that the public are adequately warned or informed’. 
Additionally, she highlights the importance of planning from the short- to the long-
term. She gives strategic communication planning a rating of nine out of a possible 
ten in terms of importance. 
 
The SPF in Sweden recognised well over a decade ago the importance of approaching 
major emergency communication from a strategic viewpoint when it developed its 
useful three-stage Triangle drama model in the early 1990s (Nordlund, 1994). While 
many of the communication principles were already being discussed in other 
countries, Nordlund provided a coherent framework that supported and emphasised 
the key elements. This model remains a useful reference document and has provided 
the basis for many contemporary models, including those by CDC (Reynolds 2002) 
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and Coombs (1999). According to Malin Modh, a senior communication practitioner 
at SEMA, the process of deliberate strategic communication planning for emergency 
situations ‘is extremely important’ to the Swedish government: she scores it at nine 
out of ten. Modh emphasises that the twelve-year strategic report, A changing world 
(Swedish Defence Commission 1999), focused on many aspects of major emergency 
preparedness. ‘This initiative gave us the impetus to look at communication over the 
medium- to long-term’ she states (Modh 2007: personal communication). 
 
9.4.2 Integrated communication 
All three agencies examined were asked to discuss whether the different 
communication functions, mentioned throughout Chapters 6, 7 and 8, are planned for 
and implemented in an integrated, multidisciplinary and joined-up manner. This 
includes functions such as media management, public awareness and information, 
stakeholder relationships, community outreach and victim liaison, business continuity 
communications, and public affairs. 
 
Daryl Madden states in his interview that this subject is receiving considerable 
attention in the US after Hurricane Katrina. According to Madden:  
 
Joining up all of the key communication functions ensures that no 
gaps remain in the system…gaps lead to breakdowns in information 
and can create big problems. 
 
Consequently, FEMA has devised a comprehensive integrated communication 
framework that encompasses all of the key functions (NRT 2000: 2.1). Interestingly, 
FEMA has included the information management function, usually considered an 
operational task, within the communication framework. According to Madden, 
‘…this demonstrates how the information and communication functions are 
inextricably linked’. 
 
While the major emergency communication-related literature in the UK and Sweden 
deals comprehensively with many diverse elements of the communication function, 
there does not seem to be a comprehensive plan available that integrates all of these 
diverse strands involved. Additionally, unlike the US, these two countries do not 
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embrace the information management function as part of the communication role. 
Nevertheless, both McCall from COC and Modh from SEMA describe the 
importance of integrating all aspects of major emergency communication. 
Furthermore, they both recognise considerable advantages to the development of 
much closer links between communication and information management. McCall 
believes that there is often too much emphasis placed on the ‘obvious communication 
functions’ such as media management and public information, to the detriment of 
other critical areas such as communicating with the families of victims. 
‘Communication practitioners often consider this the role of somebody else, such as 
social services’, she says.   
 
9.4.3 Model of communication  
The three agencies examined were asked to describe the model of strategic major 
emergency communication adopted by their respective countries. Daryl Madden of 
FEMA believes that the US adopts an open and transparent model of communication 
management. This is notwithstanding the fact that he considers FEMA to be quite 
hierarchical and bureaucratic. This openness and transparency, Madden emphasises, 
occurs at all stages of the major emergency life cycle. Madden believes that the 
public have a right to receive information about risks that may affect them and states 
that this would not be curtailed for fear of worrying them. Through its public outreach 
facility, Madden highlights that it is reasonably important to consult the public in 
relation to major emergency issues.  
 
Similarly, the UK government identifies openness, transparency, and engaging with 
the public, as key principles in major emergency communication (UK Resilience 
2005: 2.3). According to McQuaid (1997: 4), communication should not be treated as 
a mere ‘bolt-on’ extra, or approached solely in the context of one-way provision of 
public information’. McCall concurs and emphasises the importance of ensuring that 
regular stakeholder meetings or conference calls take place with both national 
organisers and local stakeholders. ‘Dealing with an incident cannot be effective 
without their inclusion’ she concludes. 
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The Swedish government also emphasises its open model of major emergency 
communication. According to Nordlund (1994: 5) ‘citizens in democratic societies 
have a right to information that concerns them’. Modh describes as ‘excellent’ her 
country’s openness and transparency when it comes to major emergency matters. She 
too believes that public fear should not be used as a reason for withholding important 
information. 
 
9.4.4 Broad-based deliberation (meaningful engagement with publics) 
Closely related to the previous question, all three agencies were asked to discuss 
whether they engage in dialogue with, and seek the assistance of, their publics when 
making important decisions related to major emergencies.  
 
Through the National Research Council, the US government has supported much 
significant research into methods of engaging publics in important decision-making, 
(for example Price (1989) and Stern and Fineberg (1996)). Within its strategic plan 
(Allbaugh 2003: 31; Ridge 2004(c): 56), the US government, through FEMA, 
articulates a number of core principles that clearly provide formal support for the 
public engagement process. The Department of Homeland Security reviewed this 
commitment once again following Hurricane Katrina, when they concluded that an 
augmented ‘national dialogue on shared responsibilities and expectations for 
preparedness and response’ was necessary and consequently must be pursued 
(Townsend 2006: 82). Important studies conducted within the US, such as Redefining 
readiness (Lasker 2004), have provided compelling evidence of the merits of 
engaging publics in emergency preparedness efforts. In his responses to the 
questionnaire, Madden rates broad-based deliberation in major emergency decision-
making as the second most important strategic communication principle out of ten 
individual principles provided. 
 
Taking a similar view as the US government, the UK GCN highlights its 
government’s support for meaningfully engaging the public in decisions relating to 
major emergency planning and preparedness. GCN stipulates that all government 
departments and response agencies should take ‘a proactive and inclusive approach to 
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consultation’ with stakeholders and the public on decisions related to major 
emergency planning (UK Resilience 2005: 2.9). GCN provides a number of 
principles to be followed in this regard, including ‘openness and transparency’ 
concerning major emergency information, and ‘engagement with a wide range of 
representative groups and the public from an early stage in the decision process’ 
(ibid.). UK GCN also offers a very useful detailed guide for practitioners intent on 
involving the public in major emergency decision-making (ibid: Annex D). McCall 
describes very clearly how:  
 
A broad range of stakeholders, in the recent past, played an extremely 
valuable part in the overall management plan for dealing with public 
and animal health major emergencies in the UK. The impact of their 
views and opinions cannot be underestimated.  
 
McCall provides an importance rating for the broad-based deliberation process of 8.5 
out of a possible 10. 
 
The Swedish government similarly believes that ‘they must be willing to enter into 
dialogue with the outside world and to take on board new concerns’ (Darrell 2003: 
21). This requires building relationships with stakeholders and preparing networks or 
registers, thereby ‘incorporating everyone who may potentially be involved in 
different types of emergencies’ (Darrell 2003: 18; Nordlund 1994: 41). Modh 
confirms this sentiment in her interview and highlights the many advantages of the 
process. This includes tapping into community knowledge and experience, allowing 
the response agencies to reach better decisions, providing greater transparency in the 
process thus leading to better acceptance of decision by the public, and generating 
better trust amongst the public. She provides an importance rating of 9.5 out of a 
possible 10.  
 
Despite these positive findings, all three interviewees believe that public consultation 
for major emergency situations is likely to result in delays in reaching important 
decisions. However, they all believe that with sufficient control mechanisms these 
delays can be minimised. 
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9.4.5 Management-by-objectives  
The three countries were examined to ascertain whether they put in place clear 
measurable, attainable communication goals and objectives as part of their overall 
communication process. Madden rates the management-by-objectives process as the 
single most important aspect of a major emergency communication strategy. 
Likewise, the UK GCN highlights the necessity for having ‘clear aims and objectives’ 
in relation to major emergency communication planning, in order to help them to 
‘achieve their end-game’ (UK Resilience 2005: 47). Despite the difficulty of finding 
any reference to communication goal-setting in any available Swedish literature, 
Modh in the questionnaire states that she considers the process ‘very important’. All 
three agencies emphasise the importance of ensuring that all departments and 
agencies with responsibility for dealing with major emergency situations are fully 
conversant with stated communication goals and objectives. The three respondents 
also indicate their support for ensuring that communication goals are clearly aligned 
with those of the overall major emergency effort. In particular, McCall echoes the 
sentiment of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, that major emergency 
communication planning is ‘not a stand-alone duty…and goals and objectives should 
be fully integrated into the responder’s overall emergency plans’ (HM Government 
2005(a): 96). 
 
9.4.6 Senior communication practitioner involved in decision-making at 
the highest level 
All three countries analysed indicate that the senior major emergency communication 
practitioner must be involved in the decision-making function at the highest level. 
According to Ridge (2004(a): 28) and the NRT (2000: vi), the US government 
considers the public information and communication manager as a ‘key staff member 
supporting the incident command structure’. Through the UK Civil Contingencies 
Act, it is emphasised that the senior major emergency communication practitioner 
must have ‘…sufficient seniority and personal authority to take decisions and 
command respect…and be fully involved in the strategic decision-making 
arrangements’ (HM Government, 2005(b): 47).  
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In Sweden, Darrell (2003: 17) considers it ‘almost impossible’ for an authority to 
manage a major emergency situation if the head of information and communication is 
‘not part of the decision-making process’. Madden and McCall confirm that the 
United States and United Kingdom’s senior communication practitioners are involved 
in decision-making at the highest level. Modh states that in Sweden the senior 
communication practitioner may not be actively involved in the decision-making 
process, but has access to decision-makers at the highest level.   
 
9.4.7 Knowledge base – professional education and experience 
In the US, the DHS acknowledges that professional development and education 
programmes are essential for improving the performances of emergency management 
personnel at all levels, including communication practitioners (Townsend 2006: 73). 
Supporting this view, Madden explains how: 
 
Communication in a dynamic environment is critical to the overall 
response…and should only be attempted by trained communication 
professionals in order to reduce confusion.  
 
Consequently, Madden points out that all 64 communication and information 
practitioners within the public affairs section of FEMA possess communication-
related primary degrees; a further 20% have masters degrees; and 1% have achieved 
doctoral qualifications. He also emphasises that ongoing communication training 
courses are ‘mandatory’ for all communication practitioners. 
 
The UK government also emphasises the importance of ‘developing formal expertise 
in specific areas and techniques’, in the form of communication researchers and 
additionally through stakeholder management and consultation (UK Resilience 2005: 
2.6). According to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, ‘core management skills’ are 
also identified as being extremely important (Cabinet Office 2005(b): 33). McCall of 
COC highlights the importance of educating communication practitioners in order to 
‘introduce new approaches and processes’ to the major emergency communication 
effort. To assist in the training of major emergency responders, including 
communicators, the UK government established the Cabinet Office Emergency 
Planning College (EPC) at Easingwold. The EPC provides a range of 
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multidisciplinary formalised courses for UK response agencies. Many of these 
courses include major emergency communication modules, together with 
communication and information management seminars, workshops, and off-site 
exercises.  
 
According to Eksborg (2004: 5), who is the Director General of SEMA, education, 
experience, training and co-operation are vital to the achievement of improved crisis 
communication skills and to the overall ability to respond effectively. According to 
Modh, formal education is considered an important attribute for communication 
practitioners within SEMA, with half of its communication staff possessing 
communication-related degrees. Despite this, Modh does not attach the same 
importance to formal education as she does to major emergency communication 
experience, technical communication skills, interpersonal skills and strategic 
management knowledge.  
 
9.4.8 Major emergency communication research 
The US National Response Team (2000: 1-4), acknowledges the importance of 
ongoing and iterative major emergency communication research, particularly the 
measurement of public perceptions, attitudes, needs and likely reactions in the face of 
a major emergency. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the US government 
recognises that enhanced communication research is required in order to improve 
important aspects of public preparedness and messaging (Townsend 2006: 121). With 
the added benefit of hindsight following Hurricane Katrina, Madden considers 
communication research to be particularly important for the ‘development of effective 
messages and to ensure that these messages reach target audiences.’ He provides a 
very high score, nine out of a possible ten, for the importance of communication 
research in support of the overall major emergency effort. In interview, Madden states 
that FEMA conducts ‘a condensed research process’ during the crisis stage of a major 
emergency, principally through focus groups and community liaison officers. 
 
In a similar way, the UK government emphasises that departments and agencies 
involved in major emergency management should provide evidence that ‘all relevant 
factors, including public concerns, values and attitudes have been taken into account’ 
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(UK Resilience 2005: 2.5). In practice, this task may prove extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve. A realistic objective for communication practitioners to 
achieve is a representative sample of public opinion. Useful communication research 
such as this, according to UK Resilience, is best carried out through conduits such as 
focus groups, attitude surveys and ongoing consultation with stakeholders (ibid: 5.2). 
McCall believes that focused communications research is essential throughout all 
stages in order ‘to be aware of the key requirements in each major emergency 
situation’. She provides a very high score, eight out of a possible ten, when asked to 
rate its importance in supporting the overall major emergency management effort. 
Additionally, she considers communication research important in order to establish ‘a 
clear baseline’ against which practitioners can ‘measure the effectiveness of a 
particular communication campaign.’ In-house communication practitioners conduct 
the majority of research in CCS, with larger projects outsourced to external agencies. 
 
Modh also provides a very high score of nine out of a possible ten when asked to rate 
the importance of communication research to the overall major emergency effort. In 
Sweden, Modh identifies and prioritises three types of communication research 
conducted by SEMA: identifying the state of public opinion and levels of trust in the 
response agencies; determining the public’s needs and concerns; and examining how 
the media considers the authorities’ handling of the situation. Modh states that major 
emergency communication research in SEMA is conducted by both in-house 
researchers and external research agencies. 
 
9.4.9 Major emergency communication evaluation 
When asked to rate the importance of evaluating major emergency communication, 
Madden provides a score of eight out of a possible ten. According to Madden, if 
major emergency communication efforts are not evaluated following implementation, 
‘critical information will not be received by the general public and first responders 
when it is needed most.’ He goes further stating, ‘It is not just the impact of the 
critical information that needs to be examined but the way this [information] is 
passed.’ Madden highlights that the evaluation process can only be effective if it is 
closely related to management-by-objectives activity. He also states that the 
evaluation process in FEMA takes place during all stages of a major emergency life 
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cycle. In-house communication practitioners conduct the majority of the evaluation 
activity in FEMA. The US government is committed to major emergency 
performance evaluation, including communication, through its annual performance 
plan (Allbaugh 2003: 11). In Objective 1.3 of that plan, FEMA highlights the 
importance of ‘developing a single, uniform, after-action process to capture lessons 
learned’ (Allbaugh 2003: 13).  
 
In a similar way, the UK government states: ‘it is good professional practice’ to 
evaluate the effectiveness of every communication and information campaign (HM 
Government 2005(a): 99). As with the US and Sweden, the UK GCN includes the 
communication evaluation process as a key element of its strategic framework. It 
emphasises the importance of ‘setting up arrangements’ for measuring 
communication progress, processes and achievements, identifying problems, 
monitoring stakeholders’ mood, finding out what aspects of communication worked 
and what did not, assessing cost efficiencies, and deciding whether or not involving 
the public contributed to decision-making (UK Resilience 2005: 41). According to 
McCall, the ongoing evaluation of communication programmes ‘is essential’ for 
achieving success. She provides a score of eight out of a possible ten when asked to 
rate its importance.  ‘If the effects of major emergency communication programmes 
are not evaluated’, McCall continues, ‘we will never know if what we are doing is 
effective.’ Most major emergency communication evaluation is conducted by in-
house communication practitioners, according to McCall. However, for larger 
projects this task is outsourced to external practitioners, she adds. 
 
Modh also considers the evaluation of communication, both the process of 
communication and its impact, as being extremely important. Providing a score of 
eight out of a possible ten when asked to rate its importance, she believes ‘evaluation 
is necessary to ensure that our communication is working and that the correct 
message is going out to the people we want as we would like it’. Modh indicates that 
major emergency communication evaluation is conducted at all stages, even during 
the busy crisis stage. SEMA utilises both in-house and external practitioners to 
evaluate its major emergency communication programmes. 
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9.4.10 Building trust and credibility 
Daryl Madden of FEMA highlights the importance of taking the time to build a high 
level of trust and credibility with both the public and the media. In the US, FEMA 
identifies as one of its core values the need to be ‘truthful…to listen to…and treat its 
publics with dignity’ (Allbaugh 2003: 41). According to Madden, ‘trust and 
credibility can only be gained by positive actions…as we discovered after Hurricane 
Katrina, this is easily lost.’ McCall also attaches considerable importance to the CCS 
demonstrating its trustworthiness and credibility. She also emphasises how easy it is 
to lose trust and the important role the can media play in this. McCall identifies a 
number of critical elements that are essential in building and maintaining trust and 
credibility with the public and media, including honesty, openness, willingness to 
communicate, a rapid response, and keeping promises. She believes that those 
involved in an operational capacity during a major emergency, such as veterinary 
officers and medical officers, are ‘ideally placed to build trust with members of the 
public’. According to Darrell, SEMA recognises that the lead response authority 
‘…must actively work to achieve a high degree of credibility – the most important 
concept in crisis communication’ (Darrell 2003: 13).  
 
Modh, emphasises that ‘any hint of cover-up or deceit will result in an immediate loss 
of trust’. She states that SEMA makes significant efforts to build trust and credibility 
with its public. She adds, ‘…once a major emergency happens it is too late to 
start…as we discovered to our detriment following Chernobyl’. 
 
9.4.11 Integrated communication training and exercising 
The US government emphasises the training and exercising of its responders, ‘across 
multiple levels and disciplines’ as one of its critical goals for successful major 
emergency response (Ridge 2004(c): 17). This sentiment is supported by the 
comments of Madden who believes that integrating communication into all major 
emergency training and exercising is ‘critical for success’. He states that regular 
integrated communication training and exercises allow communication roles and 
responsibilities to be understood by all. Despite this commitment, FEMA failed to 
involve fully and integrate the communication function into major emergency 
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training and exercises. This became all too apparent in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. Following this major emergency, it was recommended that major emergency 
communication procedures and guidelines ‘need to be defined, implemented, and 
practiced through ongoing training, simulations and exercises’ (Townsend 2006: 97).  
 
In the UK, HM Government (2005(a): 107) describes the necessity of ensuring that 
regular communication ‘tabletop or full-scale exercises…involving the media’ take 
place, in order to validate arrangements and to build public confidence. Additionally, 
the Cabinet Office (2005(a): 66) highlights the importance of ensuring that 
communication training and exercises are conducted jointly with the communication 
teams of other response organisations, and also integrated with training and exercises 
conducted by other operational functions. This is to familiarise all response 
organisations with each other’s communication terminology, protocols and 
procedures. McCall emphasises that ‘conducting stand-alone communication training 
has some value but does not optimise the overall preparedness effort’. According to 
the UK Health Protection Agency, major emergency training and exercising provides 
an opportunity to test, validate and assess the entire communication plan (Norman, 
Stuart-Black and Coles 2006: 53). 
 
Nordlund (1994: 41) highlights the importance of the Swedish government engaging 
in training and exercises ‘on a continual basis’ to maintain a high level of 
preparedness. This, he emphasises, must include communication training and 
exercises. Echoing McCall’s opinion in the United Kingdom, Sweden’s Modh (2003: 
24) describes the importance of major emergency communicators receiving ‘joined-
up’ training and exercises involving local and national journalists, together with 
communication officers from all other potential response agencies.  
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10 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT IN IRELAND 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
Large-scale emergencies rarely occur in Ireland, but it is still necessary to consider 
the possibility and consequences of them. The Irish government has been criticised 
for providing insufficient resources in order to prepare for such events. Following the 
events of 9/11, major emergency management received much more attention from the 
government in Ireland. Thereafter, a number of high level inter-departmental and 
agency groups were established in order to examine and improve the standard of 
major emergency preparedness and response in Ireland. This resulted in the 
production of a new strategic framework that sets out arrangements for the principal 
emergency services to work together in order to manage large-scale events. As will be 
seen in this chapter, the subject of major emergency communication was also 
examined. It will be shown, in the data drawn from interviews with key personnel 
(listed in Appendix A), that the majority of departments and agencies with 
responsibility for major emergencies believe a strategic approach to communication 
is extremely important. However, it will also be shown that the principles of strategic 
major emergency communication do not seem to be greatly understood, that very 
little central coordination of the communication planning function exists, and that 
major emergency communication, in some respects, is treated as a function that does 
not require immediate consideration. 
 
10.2 Context  
 
10.2.1 Natural major emergencies 
Despite the fact that approximately 200 million people are estimated to be affected 
annually by natural disasters worldwide, representing a threefold increase between 
the years 1990 and 2005, Ireland is not greatly affected by major natural disasters 
(UNISDR 2007). According to Brendan McWilliams:  
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Ireland’s relatively benign and fertile climate presents us with few of the major 
hazards. We do not have to endure hurricanes or large tornadoes; dust storms 
and avalanches are foreign to us; and really disastrous floods, droughts, heat 
waves or blizzards do not regularly throw our lives into chaos (McWilliams 
2006: 25). 
 
Nevertheless, Ireland has suffered some natural major emergencies over the past 
number of centuries. One of the most significant of these, and largely unknown to the 
Irish public, was the so-called ‘Great Freeze’ that occurred between 1740 and 1742, 
‘in which an estimated 480,000 people may have perished’ (Dickson 1997: 67). 
According to a recent survey, only 10% of the Irish population consider it likely that 
a tsunami will occur in Ireland (Department of Defence 2005(a)). However, 
according to Professor Mike Williams of the Geology Department, NUI Galway, 
Ireland ‘has been hit by tsunami at least three times in the past 250 years’. Despite 
presenting a low-risk, he believes, a tsunami could reach Ireland ‘within hours of a 
volcano occurring in the Canary Islands’ (Siggins 2007: 5; Williams 2007: 
Interview). Professor John Tyrrell of University College Cork confirms that there 
were at least twelve identified tornadoes in Ireland in 2006, including one over Lough 
Neagh ‘that had a track of 26 kilometres’ (McWilliams 2007: 26). According to 
Tyrrell, ‘at least one of these tornadoes measured T4-T5 on the Tornado Intensity 
Scale’. He went on to say ‘it is likely that a tornado could occur in Ireland that could 
have the potential to be devastating, with very severe damage and loss of life’ (Tyrrell 
2007: Interview).  
 
One category of major emergency with which some parts of Ireland, (including 
Fermoy and Clonmel), are very familiar is the hydro-meteorological event, or severe 
flooding. In a scientific statement issued in 2007 on the subject of global warming, 
the Royal Irish Academy warns, ‘…new parts of Ireland will become prone to 
flooding and existing flood- prone areas will be affected more often as a result of 
climate change’ (McDonald 2007: 3). Furthermore, the Office of Public Works 
(OPW) also states, ‘…it is widely anticipated that changes in rainfall patterns and 
rises in sea levels resulting from climate change may make such flooding incidents 
more frequent and severe in the future’ (OPW 2008).  
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10.2.2 Anthropogenic major emergencies 
As a result of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’, or economic boom, throughout the 1990s, 
Ireland has experienced some considerable transformations, particularly in 
demographic patterns and rates of industrial development. Despite a rapidly growing 
population, Ireland has a reasonably low overall population density of 59 people per 
Km2 (CIA 2007: 53). However, there is an ever- increasing shift towards urbanisation 
in Ireland creating clusters of high-density population (CSO 2006(a): 14). Some of 
these urban centres are located close to hazardous industrial and storage facilities, 
creating an environment for potential anthropogenic major emergencies. Currently in 
Ireland there are approximately 26 higher-risk Seveso sites, each posing a potential 
major risk to the Irish population (Tyrell 2006: Health 8). Seveso Sites are industrial 
establishments containing dangerous substances in quantities that pose a grave risk to 
the public and are listed and regulated under a 1982 EU directive. For example, a 
serious incident in any of the six top-tier Seveso sites in the Dublin Docklands area 
could result in the potential evacuation of over 20,000 people (O’Halloran 2005). On 
a related topic, despite the fact that Ireland has no nuclear generating or processing 
facilities, the country faces a significant threat from fifty-nine nuclear power plants in 
France and twelve in the UK, including the nuclear reprocessing facility at Sellafield 
(INSC 2007). According to Kenny, ‘…Sellafield itself remains operational and 
dangerous…a disaster at Sellafield would threaten both Ireland and the United 
Kingdom’ (Kenny 2003: 1). 
 
One category of major emergency that has received considerable attention since 2001 
is a large-scale terrorist attack. Minister for Defence, and Chairman of the 
Government Task Force on Major Emergency Planning, Willie O’Dea TD believes 
‘the risk of an international terrorist strike on any target here remains low’ (Brady 
2006: 3). However, Superintendent Liam King of the Garda Síochána (GS) believes 
that a serious terrorist incident ‘is not beyond the bounds of reality’ (King 2007: 
Interview). In the past two years, Garda and Defence Forces intelligence experts have 
identified approximately 24 Islamic activists in Ireland, who are under constant 
surveillance in relation to possible terrorist activities (Reid 2005: 6). A number of 
high-ranking politicians, including Minister of State for Food and Horticulture, 
Trevor Sargent TD, believe that Ireland is ‘in the line of fire’ in terms of a terrorist 
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attack, as a result of the government’s decision to allow US troops ‘to route through 
Shannon Airport’ (Dáil Éireann November 23rd, 2004: 7). 
 
10.3 History  
 
10.3.1 Background 
While Ireland has experienced many emergency-related events such as the risks 
associated with the troubles in Northern Ireland and ‘foot and mouth’ outbreaks, 
O’Riordan (1992: 43) believes that ‘emergency planning has never been awarded a 
high priority in Ireland’. Not surprisingly, therefore, the history of major emergency 
planning and management in Ireland has received little attention, and as a result is 
largely undocumented. O’Riordan (1992) in his book, Emergency planning in 
Ireland, provides the first comprehensive account of the evolution of major 
emergency management in Ireland. However, the scope of that book is quite 
restricted, dealing primarily with the period 1970 through to 1992. In recent times, 
following the government’s approval of the Major Emergency Development 
Programme (2006-2008), a number of guidance documents are slowly becoming 
available. 
 
10.3.2 The Cold War Period 
Despite O’Riordan’s assertion (11.3.1 above), the Irish government did take some 
positive steps in relation to major emergency preparedness prior to the 1970s, albeit 
in an unstructured and uncoordinated manner. For example, during the so-called 
‘Cold War’, many countries were exercised by the threat of nuclear attacks on their 
territories. From a major emergency communication viewpoint, the Civil Defence 
(Ireland) (1961) issued a nuclear safety handbook entitled Bás beatha (11.3.3 below) 
to almost every household in Ireland. Following two significant events in 1962, the 
detonation of a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb over the island of Novaya Zemlya in the 
Russian Artic and the much publicised ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’, the head of Civil 
Defence in Ireland, Gearoid Mac Pharthalain warned, ‘…we cannot assume that 
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nuclear weapons will not in a future war be exploded on our country either 
deliberately or accidentally’ (Cusack 2004: 26). 
 
As a consequence, the Irish government engaged in ‘an initial flurry of activity’ to 
prepare for a potential major nuclear emergency (Horgan 2001: 16). This resulted in 
activities such as building a concrete bunker in Custume Barracks, Athlone, equipped 
with telephones and telex machines from which the government could run the 
country. However, despite this concerted work, no comprehensive, integrated plans 
were prepared by central government or local authorities for responding to major 
emergency situations during this period. 
 
10.3.3 The Irish government’s first significant public information effort  
In an attempt to provide approximately one million households in Ireland with useful, 
practical information about how best to prepare and protect themselves and their 
families from a nuclear incident, Dáil Éireann approved the distribution of an 
insightful handbook entitled Bás beatha. This handbook was also titled, Survival in a 
nuclear war: advice on protection in the home and on the farm. It was colloquially 
termed the Home protection handbook. Bás beatha provided some detailed 
information in a format that could be assimilated by people with a low level of 
literacy, which was more common in Ireland at that time than it is today. Bás beatha 
used cartoon type illustrations that described complex subjects like the construction 
of defence shields against radiological fallout in houses and barns (Civil Defence 
(Ireland) 1961: 19), dangers to the gene-pool when breeding from animals exposed to 
radiation (ibid: 32), and dealing with fires (ibid: 50). The Civil Defence also urged 
households to read the booklet and to store it safely for future assistance. In this 
regard, they suggested punching a hole in the top left-hand corner and hanging it in a 
safe place, ‘as it could mean the difference between life and death for you and your 
family’ (ibid: 90).  
 
Despite its public communication through Bás beatha, the Irish government, at 
another level, attempted to exert a form of censorship on the media concerning 
matters relating to nuclear incidents. For example, in October 1960, Prionsias 
MacAonghusa of Radio Eireann attempted to broadcast a radio programme dealing 
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with a hypothetical nuclear strike on Ireland. The Minister for Defence at the time, 
Kevin Boland, was unhappy with the subject matter. He contacted the Director of the 
radio station and directed that the programme would not be broadcast. Radio Eireann 
acceded to his wishes (Horgan 2002: 17).  
 
10.3.4 The first comprehensive major emergency plans  
It took until 1973 for the Irish government to approve any major emergency planning 
initiatives. The Southern Health Board produced a comprehensive major emergency 
plan for its region that was completed in 1974 and this was quickly replicated by the 
other seven health boards (O’Riordan 1992: 44). Six years later, in the aftermath of a 
train crash in Buttevant, Co. Cork, resulting in the deaths of seventeen people, the 
Minister for the Environment, Ray Burke TD, directed that all local authorities 
prepare emergency plans in accordance with his department’s guidelines (Department 
of the Environment 1981). As O’Riordan (1992: 45) observes, Minister Burke’s 
initiative was met by the Department of Health with ‘a mixture of surprise and 
resentment’, highlighting a lack of coordination amongst key departments responsible 
for managing major emergencies at that time. Furthermore, in 1982 there were eight 
individual and unconnected health board plans and thirty-one local authority plans, 
containing a multitude of information that was conflicting in terms of roles, 
responsibilities and terminology. This resulted in ‘a great deal of confusion and much 
duplication of effort’ (O’Riordan 1992: 46). Following severe blizzards, in 1982, that 
almost brought the country to a standstill, Taoiseach Charles J. Haughey established 
an Inter-Departmental Committee on Emergency Planning to examine major 
emergency planning and to oversee a more coordinated approach. This provided the 
genesis for a plan for a coordinated multi-agency response to a major emergency, 
which was issued in November 1984 (Department of the Environment 1984). This 
1984 Framework for coordinated responses to major emergencies was the first Irish 
plan that provided a definition of a major emergency, outlined procedures for 
activating a response, detailed roles and responsibilities, and introduced organisation 
mechanisms such as the coordination group and the controller of operations.  
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Despite its shortcomings, the 1984 framework has underpinned major emergency 
preparedness and response capability for the past two decades and remains the 
principal reference document for major emergency response up to time of writing.  
 
10.3.5 Approach to communication management in the 1984 Framework 
Despite its title, the Framework for coordinated responses to major emergencies of 
1984 may be regarded as a comprehensive plan for response once a major emergency 
actualises, rather than as an overarching strategy framework. Many of the 
communication functions are mentioned at different stages throughout the 1984 
Framework. However, no consideration was given at that time to the consolidation of 
these functions. There is no attempt to introduce a common major emergency 
language or base terminology in this document in order to assist inter-agency 
communication. In respect to communicating the activation of the plan, the 1984 
Framework is quite vague, detailing how ‘the first agency that becomes aware of the 
major emergency’ should activate the plan (Department of the Environment 1984: 5). 
However, it gives no clear guidance as to the process to be undertaken, particularly in 
relation to contacting other response agencies. In terms of coordinating different 
elements of the communication function, there is passing reference in Section 6 to 
communication up the chain-of-command where the document mentions ‘informing 
government departments as appropriate’ (ibid: 11). Significantly, the entire plan 
devotes a mere seven sentences and four footnotes to the subject of managing 
information and dealing with the media, stating: ‘the Garda shall establish an 
information centre at the site of the emergency for use by the other agencies’ (ibid: 
14). This section also details that:  
 
Each agency shall designate an information officer…who shall act 
as a sole channel of information at the site, arrange interviews, 
publicise emergency telephone numbers, retain copies of all 
information obtained (ibid.).  
 
Providing a little more detail on the subject of technical communications, the 
document mentions that the controller ‘shall ensure that he has secure 
communications with all services and agencies’ (ibid: 13). 
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While the information provided in the 1984 Framework offers some guidance to 
response agencies, it leaves the interpretation of how the communication function is 
approached to the discretion of the response agency concerned or to the individual on 
the ground. This allows a multitude of communication approaches and standards. 
Additionally, the 1984 Framework does not provide for training or exercising of the 
communication functions or practitioners of major emergency management. 
 
10.3.6 Post-Chernobyl 
Following the major nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986, Ireland’s capacity for 
early warning, dose rate monitoring and air monitoring for radioactive fallout 
throughout the country was discovered to be poor. The response to the Chernobyl 
crisis also identified a clear requirement to ‘improve communications with the 
public…especially information on contamination levels’ (Nuclear Energy Board 
1987: 19). To improve the level of response to nuclear incidents, the Radiological 
Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII) was tasked with establishing a network of 
fourteen monitoring centres throughout the State (ibid.). The government also tasked 
the Department of Public Enterprise with producing a National Emergency Plan for 
Nuclear Accidents (NEPNA): this was published in 1992 (Nuclear Safety Section 
1992).  
 
In NEPNA, an outline is given as to how Ireland will respond in the event of a 
nuclear accident, how technical information and radioactivity monitoring data will be 
provided and what measures may be taken for the protection of the public in the short 
and long term (RPII 2007). NEPNA is now one of a number of interdependent 
national and local authority plans designed to deal with various categories of major 
emergency situations (ibid.). 
 
10.3.7 Major emergency management in the new century 
The next major milestone in major emergency management in Ireland occurred in 
March 2001, involving an animal health outbreak of so-called ‘foot-and-mouth’ 
disease in Ireland. The response by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (DAFF), particularly in relation to its communication function, was considered 
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to be of a very high standard. Following DAFF’s experience during this outbreak, 
Ireland became a reference point for dealing with ‘foot-and-mouth’ disease in Europe 
(Guinane 2006: Interview). Over the next four years DAFF produced some extremely 
useful guidance documents, including an animal health contingency plan (Gaynor and 
McAteer 2003). 
 
10.3.8 The impact of 9/11 
The events of 9/11 ‘fundamentally affected the major emergency planning agenda in 
Ireland’ (Nolan 2002: 1). According to a Department of Defence (DoD) press 
statement:  
 
It became apparent at an early stage that there was a necessity to put 
structures in place to improve coordination across the various 
existing national plans (ibid.). 
 
As a consequence, the government established a number of high-level committees to 
improve major emergency preparedness in Ireland. At the most senior level a   
Government Task Force on Emergency Planning was established, chaired by the 
Minister for Defence and his officials, in order to ‘harness the work of those 
departments and agencies with key roles in the emergency planning process’ (ibid.). 
Comprising of ministers and senior department officials, the Task Force’s principal 
role is to give policy and direction, coordinate and oversee the emergency planning 
activities of all government departments, agencies and public authorities. It promotes 
the best possible use of resources and compatibility between different planning 
requirements (Department of Defence 2007).  
 
Supporting the work of the Task Force, an Inter-Departmental Working Group 
(IDWG) on Emergency Planning was also established in 2001. This group comprises 
officials representing government departments and public authorities with lead or 
principal support roles in emergency management. This group is the ‘vehicle through 
which expertise is shared between departments and authorities on emergency 
planning’ (Department of Defence 2004: 9). An important role of the IDWG is to 
provide a forum whereby inter-departmental and agency difficulties can be sorted 
without using up the valuable time of the Government Task Force. The Chair of the 
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Inter-Departmental Working Group is the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), 
established within the Department of Defence. Not possessing any statutory authority, 
the OEP is responsible to the Minister for Defence, through governmental Statutory 
Instrument 80/46/01/0002, for the coordination and oversight of emergency planning 
and it provides administrative back up for this work (Department of Defence 2004: 
27). However, the responsibility for ensuring that emergency plans are adequately 
assessed, reviewed, exercised and validated ‘remains with the lead minister and 
government department’ (ibid.). 
 
A National Security Committee (NSC) was also established in 2001. This committee 
is chaired by the Secretary General to the government and comprises senior 
representatives of the Departments of the Taoiseach, Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Foreign Affairs, and Defence. High-ranking officers from the Garda 
Síochána and the Defence Forces are also represented on this committee. The NSC’s 
role is to advise the Taoiseach and the government on high-level security matters 
(Department of Defence 2004: 10). As will be seen later in this chapter, a number of 
other committees were also established around the development of a new major 
emergency Framework document in 2006. 
 
Central to the debate in Ireland after 9/11 was the government’s preparedness for 
defending against and dealing with two categories of major emergency. The first 
would involve a major terrorist attack, particularly that of a ‘chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear’ (CBRN) nature. Following a spate of hoax anthrax spore 
alerts in the US in autumn 2001, the Irish Defence Forces was obliged to deal with 
approximately 180 false or hoax alerts, primarily associated with mail deliveries  
(Irish Times 2001(b): 11). The second category of major emergency risk is posed by 
the UK nuclear reprocessing plant at Sellafield. High profile individuals such as Ali 
Hewson, wife of U2 lead singer Bono, led campaigns to highlight the dangers of 
Sellafield creating a Chernobyl type situation in Ireland (Hill 2002: 8). The campaign 
culminated with the sending of more than one million protest postcards to the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom (Kenny 2003: 213). 
 
In an attempt to assuage the fears of the public, the Irish government issued a 
statement in which it highlighted the existence of extensive peacetime emergency 
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plans, which are ‘coordinated at different levels and covering a variety of situations’ 
(O’Connor 2001: 1). The statement went on to discuss how the 1992 National 
Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents (NEPNA) was to be reviewed in order to 
‘address any weaknesses which have been identified’ (Irish Times 2001(c): 4). 
However, it took until 2004 before this review was eventually published (Nuclear 
Safety Section 2004).  In relation to the risk of CBRN incidents, the Garda Síochána 
produced a guidance document for both its own members and other response agencies 
to deal with any threat (GS 2003).  
 
10.3.9 Communication response to 9/11 
The Irish government’s response in the aftermath of 9/11 proved less than 
satisfactory. For example, on the September 26th, 2001, the Junior Minister with 
responsibility for nuclear safety, Joe Jacobs TD, participated in a high-profile 
interview on RTE radio with broadcaster Marion Finnucane. While much of the 
practical advice given by Jacobs was considered to be ‘not off the wall’ (Guinane 
2006: Interview), he was not well-briefed and his handling of the interview was far 
from convincing, which ‘both amused and alarmed listeners’ (Kenny 2003: 217). 
Following the interview, the media, opposition parties and the public alike pilloried 
Jacobs for many weeks. One national newspaper reported that ‘public confidence in 
the State’s ability to respond to a nuclear emergency has been dented’ (Irish Times 
2001(c): 4). According to Celina Barrett, Principal Officer in the Department of the 
Environment, ‘the damage that one man did to the credibility of major emergency 
management in this country is unquantifiable’ (Barrett 2007: Interview). Jacobs was 
subsequently replaced as a Minister of State and lost his seat in the next general 
election. 
 
Despite Jacob’s earlier radio fiasco, the Minister for Health and Children, Micheal 
Martin TD, continued to state that the government was well prepared for nuclear 
incidents. This was despite a belief that the threat of a nuclear incident occurring ‘was 
considered low at that time’ (Guinane 2006: Interview). In what was regarded by 
some media commentators as something of a public relations exercise, Martin 
attempted to reassure the public by emphasising that sufficient stocks of iodine tablets 
were available at all Health Boards. These, he said, could be issued rapidly on a 
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nationwide basis in the event of a major emergency. However, when investigated by 
journalists of The Irish Times, it was discovered that a number of Health Boards had 
no usable stock, as many of the tablets had passed their safe use-by-date (Fahy and 
Donnellan 2001: 8). This caused much embarrassment to Minister Martin and the 
government coming on top of the Jacobs issue. According to Barrett (2007: 
Interview), ‘when people talk about iodine tablets, for many they summarise our 
approach to major emergency management’. 
 
A NEPNA simulation exercise, conducted in November 2001, provided another 
public relations fiasco for the government and Minister Jacobs, who had not yet left 
office, was accused of being secretive (Irish Times 2001(a): 5). However, the exercise 
did result in a review of NEPNA (Nuclear Safety Section 1992). The review 
recommended that the arrangements for emergency public information and media 
information should be ‘fundamentally reviewed and significantly strengthened’ 
(Department of Public Enterprise 2002: 6). Following this, in March 2002, the 
Department of Public Enterprise posted an information leaflet nationwide ‘containing 
a number of key points of advice about what to do in the event of nuclear fall-out’ 
(Cusack 2002: 1). Kenny (2003: 221) describes the content of the leaflet as 
containing ‘very limited but practical advice’.  Additionally, on June 18th 2002, more 
than two million packets of iodine tablets, with instructions on how to use them, were 
distributed to households across the country. 
 
10.3.10 The 2006 Framework 
In 2004, the government gave approval for the development of a document that 
would establish comprehensive mechanisms for the coordination of major emergency 
management at a number of levels. This document was to replace the Framework for 
coordinated responses to major emergencies (Department of the Environment 1984). 
The Inter-Departmental Working Group tasked the review of the 1984 document to 
an Inter-Agency Review Working Group with a one-year time scale to produce a 
revised approach. The output of this review A Framework for Major Emergency 
Management (together with supporting appendices) was finalised and approved by 
government (Goverment Task Force on Emergency Planning 2006(a) and (b)). This 
2006 non-statutory Framework provides a universal structure for the coordination of 
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the response of the Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and local 
authorities - the Principal Response Agencies (PRA) - to prepare for, and make, a 
coordinated response to all categories of major emergencies, in what is commonly 
referred to as the ‘all-hazards approach’. These include events such as fires, transport 
accidents, hazardous substances incidents and severe weather (DEHLG 2007).  
 
In order to progress the major emergency agenda, the government approved a Major 
Emergency Development Programme (MEDP) 2006-2008 in May 2006. The limits of 
the MEDP were defined and outlined in a Project Initiation Document (PID) that was 
approved in November 2006. The PID establishes structures at three levels, national, 
regional and local, to support the implementation of the MEDP. In order to support 
the efforts of the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning and the Inter-
Departmental Working Group (IDWG), approval was given for the creation of a 
number of groups to coordinate and implement the many elements of the Framework.  
 
At a strategic level, the National Steering Group (NSG) was established to oversee 
the implementation of the two-year programme, to continue to develop, maintain and 
update the 2006 Framework based on feedback from the response agencies, and to 
report on progress to the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning (DEHLG 
2007). Supporting the work of the NSG is the National Working Group (NWG) that 
undertakes tasks and projects associated with coordinating the response of the PRA in 
the event of a major emergency. Central to the work of both of these groups (NSG 
and NWG) is the production of two separate suites of documents that serve to 
underpin the implementation of the 2006 Framework. The first of these is a series of 
guidance documents designed to provide direction to the PRA on issues such as risk 
assessment, preparing major emergency plans, training programmes, working with 
the media, and planning and staging exercises. The second suite of documents 
consists of inter-agency protocols that underpin multi-agency response to different 
categories of major emergency, including radiological and nuclear events; situations 
involving conventional explosives, bombs and improvised explosive devices; 
aviation, rail and flooding emergencies; and infectious diseases pandemics. While the 
PRA plans are guided by the Framework and the NWG, individual government 
departments are guided in their planning by an Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) 
document, Strategic emergency planning guidance (Department of Defence 2004) 
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and an additional OEP-produced protocol designed to detail the roles and 
responsibilities for each lead department and other supporting departments.  
 
Using these guidance documents, each government department is required to produce 
indigenous plans and inter-departmental memorandums of understanding, that will 
ensure optimum coordination and cooperation for emergencies that may arise. While 
many of the PRA plans are well advanced, the individual department plans do not 
seem to be as well developed. According to an independent crisis management 
consultant, John Brophy:  
 
The ‘blue light’ agencies plans and protocols are well advanced…the 
departments don’t seem to be stepping up to the plate (Brophy 2008: 
Interview).  
 
Confusingly, there also exists a crossover of membership of some of these groups 
such as the NSG the NWG and the IDWG. The roles and responsibilities of these 
groups, particularly the NWG and the IDWG are not dissimilar and also somewhat 
confusing.  
 
In order to assist the NSG and NWG to implement the Framework at regional level, 
Regional Steering Groups (RSG) and Regional Working Groups (RWG) were 
established. These groups comprise senior personnel from the Principal Response 
Agencies (PRA) within each of the eight regions. In order to ensure a robust link 
between national and regional levels, the PID also provides a mechanism whereby 
representatives of the NSG and NWG attend regional meetings and regular meetings 
take place between the chairpersons of the regional and national groups. 
 
Within the PRA, an internal structure has been developed in order to support the 
implementation of the MEDP. The 2006 Framework requires each PRA to undertake 
a series of steps, including the production of standard major emergency plans, 
engaging in training and exercising and submitting to an appraisal of its level of 
preparedness. The Framework imposes a two-year timeframe for each PRA to have 
completed these steps. However, these requirements are not underpinned by 
legislation and no clear guidelines exist as to how the PRA are to fund these 
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activities. Despite the absence of legislation, at time of writing, the PRA appear to be 
on course to achieve their targets. 
 
Comparison to 1984 Framework (operational aspects) 
The 2006, or ‘new’ Framework differs from its 1984 predecessor in a number of 
ways. The 1984 document was principally a comprehensive plan, while the new 
document is more strategically focused, adopting a five-stage systems approach to 
emergency management. Unlike the 1984 document, the 2006 Framework is 
constructed around the systems approach to major emergency management.  This is 
an iterative approach based on five stages namely, (i) hazard analysis/risk assessment, 
(ii) mitigation, (iii) planning and preparedness, (iv) response and (v) recovery. 
Significantly, the 2006 Framework outlines a hierarchy of relationships to underpin 
the up-scaling of response in the event of a major emergency. This hierarchy is based 
on an expansion of the day-to-day activities of the PRA. 
 
The 2006 document formalises major emergency preparedness on the basis of eight 
regions, unlike the older plan. The new framework introduces common language and 
terminology to facilitate inter-agency working, coordination and cooperation. The 
concept of a ‘lead-agency’ has been introduced which provides a clearer 
understanding of command and control, responsibilities. This includes clearly 
identifying the principal response agency that is pre-designated to lead each category 
of major emergency. In effect, this means that when a major emergency occurs, the 
relevant emergency plan is implemented with the most appropriate department or 
principal response agency taking the lead in its implementation. Unlike the 1984 
Framework, the 2006 document highlights the need for critical aspects of 
preparedness such as training and exercising. According to Pat O’Riordan, deputy- 
chair of the inter-agency review-working group that produced the document, ‘two key 
elements which are very different to the plan gone-by include the concept of appraisal 
and a two-year implementation period’ (Heneghan 2006: 19). It is expected that each 
principal response agency and supporting agency will incorporate the 2006 
Framework into its individual major emergency plans. Each individual plan has a 
two-year implementation timeframe. 
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Comparison to international frameworks 
The 2006 Framework compares favourably with equivalent international guidance 
documents. According to Brophy (2008: Interview): 
 
The Inter-Agency Review Working Group seem to have struck a working 
balance with an overall approach…somewhere in the middle ground of what 
is regarded as current best-practice.  
 
Examining the equivalent of the 2006 Framework document for a number of 
countries, including the UK, US and Australia/New Zealand (Sweden’s 
corresponding document is not available in English), it is clear that there are some 
similarities. For example, in relation to the size and detail of the document, the 2006 
Framework contains somewhat less detail than the guidance documents of the United 
Kingdom (HM Government 2005(a); HM Government 2005(b)). In comparison to the 
US guidance document, National incident management system (NIMS) (Ridge 
2004(a)), the new Framework is less detailed in matters relating to inter-agency 
cooperation, but contains more comprehensive data in relation to other functions such 
as information management and risk analysis. However, the new Framework is 
approximately three times the length, providing much more detail, than that of  
Australia/New Zealand’s Risk management: AS/NZS4360:1999 Standard (Australian 
Standard 1999).  
 
In terms of structure and format, the 2006 Framework has similarities to international 
equivalents. For example, the Irish document provides a mechanism for coordination 
at all levels of major emergency management (local, regional, national and 
international), defines common terminology, provides a mechanism for determining a 
lead response agency for every situation, and provides a process for linking to 
national level emergency management. As is the case with the documents produced 
by the US and the UK, guidance is provided in relation to important functions such as 
hazard analysis and risk assessment, mitigation, training and exercising, command 
and control, information management systems, dealing with casualties and survivors 
and working with voluntary agencies. Additionally, Ireland follows the lead of the 
other countries by providing a number of supporting guidance documents and 
protocols. While many of these supporting documents are still in development stage 
at time of writing, they are likely to prove essential as the new Framework provides 
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limited detail on some important areas, including the functions of business continuity 
management (BCM), building community resilience and communication. 
 
A number of other noticeable deficiencies are evident in the 2006 Framework. For 
example, there is no clear reference as to the source of funding for each principal 
response agency in order to implement the different aspects of the Framework. 
Moreover, the new Framework makes no provision for the coordination of resources 
between regional principal response agencies, thereby creating the possibility of 
either gaps or duplication. Similarly, there is an absence of direction within the 
Framework as regards the prioritisation of spending within individual agency major 
emergency budgets. For example, in the course of the interviews it was reported that 
one county manager indicated that he did not want any risks recorded in the risk 
assessment phase that would ‘cost his county too much money’ in mitigation efforts1. 
 
The approach to communication within the 2006 Framework 
The authors of the 2006 Framework acknowledge the importance of, and deal with, 
many aspects of the communication function throughout the main document and 
within the supporting appendix. Without doubt, greater emphasis has been placed on 
communication and information management in the new framework than in the 1984 
document.  
 
According to the 2006 Framework, the Chair of the local coordination centre, 
established by the lead PRA, is responsible for ‘coordinating the provision of 
information to the public’ during a major emergency (Government Task Force on 
Emergency Planning 2006(a): 67). In Section 5.4.7 of the new Framework, reference 
is made to the importance of ‘providing timely and accurate information to the 
public’, together with the merits of establishing helplines, websites, and public 
information notices ‘in order to disseminate important messages’ (ibid.). Unlike the 
1984 Framework, the 2006 document acknowledges the necessity of managing public 
perception as well as dealing with actual dangers throughout a major emergency 
(ibid.). 
 
                                                 
1 The source of this comment does not wish to be identified. 
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In terms of dealing with the media, the 2006 Framework provides some useful 
guidance. For example, it stipulates that the lead agency should establish a media 
centre at or near the site of the emergency, for use by each of the principal response 
agencies in dealing with the media once a major emergency occurs. Emphasis is 
placed on the nomination of a lead media liaison officer (MLO) both at the 
emergency site and at the local coordination centre. This lead MLO should coordinate 
the actions of all other response agency media liaison officers at both locations. 
Clearly stressed more than once is the importance of not issuing any statements to the 
media prior to receiving clearance from the on-site co-ordinator at the major 
emergency site, and the Chair of the local coordination group at the local 
coordination centre (ibid: 68). The Framework suggests that regular media briefings 
take place in order to promulgate helpline numbers and other important public 
information. It also suggests that background, ‘boiler-plate’, information sheets 
should be prepared prior to a major emergency occurring in order to form the basis of 
‘holding statements’ that can be issued in the early stages of a major emergency in 
order to fill an information vacuum (ibid.). 
 
Other important communication-related functions, that have not been considered 
heretofore in Ireland, are dealt with in varying levels of detail within the 2006 
Framework. In Section 5.4.6, an in-depth analysis is provided in relation to the 
‘information management cycle’ (ibid: 65). According to the Framework, this is a 
‘stand-alone task for trained and relatively senior managers’ (ibid: 66). The 
information management process, including a generic information management 
matrix, is described in even greater detail in Appendix 10 to the 2006 Framework. 
Guidance is provided for a number of other communication-related functions within 
the 2006 Framework, including promoting resilience amongst communities (ibid: 26); 
dealing with survivors and relatives (ibid: 80); staff welfare (ibid: 85); declaring an 
emergency (ibid: 51); public service warnings (ibid: Appendix 6); VIP visits (ibid: 
82); and common terminology and language (ibid: Appendix 3). 
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10.3.11 Major emergency public information and awareness campaign 
2005-2008 
In parallel to the development and implementation of the 2006 Framework document, 
the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) have undertaken a public information and 
awareness campaign ‘in order to reassure the public as well as counteract and 
anticipate negative perceptions on preparedness for emergency response’ 
(Department of Defence 2005(b): 1). The department emphasises that the campaign is 
designed to ‘…bolster public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its 
citizens…but unnecessary alarm should not be caused…the campaign is not in 
response to any particular threat’ (ibid.). The OEP state that this campaign will 
‘contribute to the overall long-term public information and conditioning element of 
coordinated responses to major emergencies’ (ibid.). This they consider necessary, as 
they assert that ‘ …media coverage has tended to trivialise the issue [major 
emergencies] and to highlight perceived deficiencies in government preparedness’ 
(ibid: 2).  
 
The first stages of the public information and awareness campaign were undertaken 
in 2005, with the commissioning of initial research by Millward-Brown IMS. This 
research was designed to ascertain how the public perceive emergency planning and 
the state of preparedness in Ireland. The results of this research indicate the 
following: Irish citizens consider storms and floods the category of major emergency 
that is most likely to affect them; only 10% of respondents believe that a tsunami or 
earthquake is likely to occur in Ireland; urban dwellers in Ireland are more concerned 
about the likelihood of a terrorist related incident; less than 10% of respondents 
consider Ireland well prepared to deal with a major emergency situation; 66% of 
respondents believe that the State is ill-prepared to deal with a major emergency at 
national level and 70% feel that it is not sufficiently prepared at community level; 
over 72% of respondents believe they are not properly informed about precautions to 
take in the event of a major emergency; and only 7% consider themselves well 
informed. Of this last number, 40% state they receive most major emergency 
information from television and radio, 25% believe that they receive it mainly 
through print media, and just 10% through the Internet. Surprisingly, only 25% of 
respondents stated they would like to receive major emergency information by direct 
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mail (Department of Defence 2005(a)). Notwithstanding, the Office of Emergency 
Planning decided to centre its public information campaign on a handbook that was 
delivered to every household by direct mail in May 2008. According to Brian Spain, 
head of Office Emergency Planning:  
 
This decision was taken following careful consideration of the facts and 
the belief that other media would not be able to deliver sufficient 
information, to so many people, for such a range of diverse subjects. 
 
Spain believes that the Millward-Brown IMS research results provided much 
necessary guidance for the development of the handbook, which was launched in 
Ireland in April 2008. According to Spain, the purpose of the handbook is to provide 
the public with an easy-to-understand guide in relation to the different categories of 
major emergencies to which Ireland is exposed (Spain 2007: Interview). It also 
provides useful advice as to what practical steps should be taken by the public to 
prepare for, prevent or respond to a major emergency situation (Heneghan 2007: 
107). The launch received a good deal of coverage in both print and broadcast media. 
Much of the coverage cynically focused on previously mentioned public relations 
embarrassments for the government, such as the Joe Jacobs’ radio interview and the 
issue of iodine tablets. According to one correspondent: 
 
The iodine tablets were an expensive public relations disaster that 
has forever tainted the public’s faith in government crisis 
management (Connolly 2008: 4). 
 
Much of the media coverage was a parody on the new booklet, such as a ten-minute 
sketch on RTE’s Drivetime radio programme (Boucher-Hayes 2008). Despite the 
negative criticism, the booklet is a useful document, containing pertinent information 
that is easy to access and assimilate. The 40-pages booklet deals with eight different 
major emergency categories in turn, providing easy to follow ‘what-to-do’ action 
points. It also provides general information for families in order to prepare for a 
major emergency situation, such as preparing medical kits and survival bags. 
 
Other supporting preparedness initiatives by the government included the launch, in 
April 2007, of a national major emergency website containing practical reference 
material and information on Ireland’s planning, response and management 
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capabilities across a wide range of emergencies (OEP 2007). At the same time, the 
Chairman of the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning, Minister Willie 
O’Dea TD, launched a new National Emergency Coordination Centre (NECC) in 
Dublin. The NECC is at a central location, equipped with advanced and robust 
communications and conference facilities, where ministers and senior officials can 
convene to co-ordinate the response to a major or national emergency (Coogan 2007: 
1).  
 
10.3.12 Communication initiatives by other response agencies 
Aside from central government communication-related initiatives, a number of 
departments and agencies have begun to develop their own communication material, 
primarily for their own use in the event of a required response. In its ‘foot-and-
mouth’ operations manual (Gaynor and McAteer 2003), the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF) has given considerable thought to its 
approach to the public awareness and communications functions. In Chapter 8 of that 
manual, proactive and ongoing public awareness efforts are deemed essential (ibid: 
1.1). In Chapter 9, particular emphasis is placed on stakeholder mapping, and the 
importance of ‘developing partnerships with the public to monitor opinion and to 
obtain relevant information’ (ibid: 2.8). Indeed in its 2005 Annual Report, this same 
department identified one of its strategic goals as being, ‘…to raise greater public 
interaction-awareness…to have greater interaction with professional bodies…and to 
launch a public awareness programme’ (DAFF 2005: 15). 
 
To a lesser extent, the communication elements of the National Pandemic Influenza 
Plan, produced by the Health Service Executive in January 2007, include some well 
thought-out communication elements (HSE 2007). In this plan, the communication 
strategy is given primary importance in a list of eight key elements that require 
implementation. It provides guidance to emergency planners, public health officials 
and the public in relation to positive actions that need to be taken at different stages 
of a pandemic influenza. Amongst the actions are familiarising all health staff with 
the national plan and their roles; sending out information to households via leaflets; 
commencing an information campaign through posters, print and broadcast media; 
setting up a telephone hotline; providing a list of useful home stocks to prepare; 
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ensuring the ill and disabled are looked after; and establishing a detailed up-to-date 
website (ibid: 17). 
 
10.4 Findings  
 
The interviews conducted with key individuals from a select number of departments 
and agencies provide a very useful insight into major emergency planning and 
communication efforts, particularly in light of the 2006 Framework. It is clear that the 
entire subject of major emergency management is being taken very seriously. It is 
also apparent that significant steps have been taken develop and enhance operational 
plans for dealing with major emergencies. In relation to the strategic communication 
function, the data from the interviews indicate that planning is not as far advanced as 
it is in relation to the operational function and is considered by many as ‘work-in-
progress’. Additionally, with the exception of a small number of departments and 
agencies, it is clear that there exists a limited understanding of the concept of strategic 
communication management and how it should be approached.  
 
10.4.1 Major emergency management 
All departments and agencies interviewed express their satisfaction with the new 
major emergency framework and view it as a major step forward in relation to 
coordinating the entire process. Gavin Maguire, Assistant National Director in 
Population Health for the Health Service Executive (HSE), believes that the 
Framework allows departments and agencies to ‘identify structures that allow them to 
work together in a coordinated way at national and regional level’. Brian Spain, head 
of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) emphasises:  
 
The new Framework is a vast improvement on the 1984 
document…it is better researched with more thought gone into the 
content before it [the inter-agency review working group] started its 
work. 
 
Independent crisis management consultant, John Brophy, however, identifies ‘a 
glaring omission’ within the new Framework involving ‘a clear indication of where 
the money is going to come from for all of the planning, training and exercising’. 
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Additionally, according to Brophy, the Framework ‘…contains no mention of a 
timeline for review of the document itself…consequently any glitches with structures 
or procedures will be very difficult to rectify’. 
 
When asked if the new Framework should have a statutory basis, respondents 
expressed different views. Arguing that such a basis is not required, Martin Heraghty, 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF), 
believes ‘the enabling legislation surrounding our own day-to-day remit suffices for 
us to carry out our major emergency response adequately’. Brian Spain of the OEP 
agrees with this sentiment. The Minister for Defence and Chairman of the 
Government Task Force on Emergency Planning, Willie O’Dea TD, states: 
 
I tend to think that something should only be put on a statutory basis 
if something can be gained from it – I can’t see anything to be 
gained from putting major emergency management on a statutory 
basis. 
 
Outlining practical problems with placing the Framework on a statutory basis, Celina 
Barrett, Principal Officer with the Department of the Environment, Heritage, and 
Local Government (DEHLG) notes: 
 
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the UK drafted legislation in 
the first instance and then ran into practical problems on the ground 
– so it really is a chicken and egg situation for us. 
 
While not advocating a statutory approach to the new Framework, Gavin Maguire of 
the HSE would like to see a statutory basis for national crisis management in Ireland 
generally, which would ‘…clearly define the government’s powers to declare a state 
of national emergency and provide for specific powers for the government in this 
circumstance’. Maguire would also like to see a statutory basis for inter-departmental 
planning for national emergencies with ‘clear identification of who has overall 
interdepartmental coordination and control responsibility’. He believes that the 
current lead agency concept, based on goodwill, ‘can only go so far in providing a 
basis from which we can cooperate and work together’. Agreeing with Maguire, Tony 
Colgan, Director of Advisory Services of the Radiological Protection Institute of 
Ireland (RPII), believes that major emergency management is sufficiently important 
to merit placing it on a statutory footing. He describes how getting ‘buy in’ for 
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projects in the past, such as the National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents 
(NEPNA), proved ‘very hard work’ and that a statutory basis ‘would be very useful’ 
in helping to achieve acceptance of particular programmes. Brophy, an independent 
crisis management consultant, highlights a concern that he has learned from 
individual members of principal response agencies. He states: 
 
While there is no legislation in place for the Framework, PRA are 
obliged by law [Seveso Directive, Article 11 (111)] to train and 
exercise for response to Seveso emergencies. If principal response 
agencies have to choose to spend their budget, time and resources on 
the implementation of the 2006 Framework or to comply with the 
Seveso Directive, I think they will opt for the latter. 
 
In relation to the oversight of major emergency management in Ireland, many 
departments and agencies interviewed agree that the Department of Defence (DoD), 
through the OEP, is well-placed for this role and also that it is doing a good job. 
According to Minister Willie O’Dea TD: 
 
With the expertise that we have in both the Department [of Defence] 
and the Army, we are well placed…and in view of the fact that we 
are not one of the busiest departments – it allows us to meet 
regularly and review exercises. 
 
Lieutenant General Pat Nash, former Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) of the 
Defence Forces believe that the Department of Defence is an excellent choice and 
‘holds a big stick over the other government departments’ in order to ensure results. 
Nash comments that Minister O’Dea is ‘very proactive and is driving along the 
policy’. While he believes the current system works well, Superintendent Liam King, 
head of emergency planning with the Garda Síochána, believes there may be merit in 
having a more centralised oversight role ‘at the apex…the focal point’. John Brophy, 
independent crisis management consultant agrees with King and says, ‘the closer the 
oversight role is to the centre of government, the greater the chance there is of 
pushing the agenda forward’. However, Tony Boland, Assistant Secretary with 
DEHLG believes, ‘at the end of the day if there are difficulties, they [Department of 
the Taoiseach] are there to be brought back in’. Eoghan O’Neachtain, Government 
Press Secretary, agrees with this sentiment stating: ‘If it [the major emergency] is 
serious enough, we [Department of the Taoiseach] will take over in any case.’ Derek 
Mooney, political advisor to Minister Willie O’Dea, does not dispute this point. 
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Taking a slightly different perspective on who is really responsible for the oversight 
role, Celina Barrett, Principal Officer with DEHLG, believes that in effect DoD are 
not empowered. She believes: 
 
In many respects the National Steering Group, which is overseen by 
the DEHLG, has been empowered by government to implement the 
new Framework and not the DoD. 
 
Asked whether the OEP should be given additional powers of enforcement in order to 
implement and review major emergency training and exercises, respondents differed 
somewhat. Minister O’Dea says, ‘…it is something that we can look at all right [a 
more robust role]…but right now it is working very well. The big stick is there 
anyhow if it is needed’. Brian Spain is emphatic that the government decision that 
established the OEP meant ‘it would oversee emergency planning – not take it over’. 
He also states, ‘… I can truthfully state that we have never not achieved something 
that we really wanted to because we didn’t have enough clout’. However, Ciara 
McMahon of the RPII believes that the OEP are relying on the goodwill of the other 
departments, and ‘while the goodwill exists there will be no problem’. Eoghan 
O’Neachtain, Government Press Secretary, believes the issue of giving the OEP a 
more robust role is something that should be given serious consideration. He sees 
merit in giving the OEP a stronger mandate ‘…to oblige departments and agencies to 
plan, prepare, train and respond and be evaluated in a standardised and efficient 
manner’. Supporting this view, Superintendent Liam King believes that the OEP’s 
oversight role should be ‘ …even more independent and detached than it is 
currently… and perhaps should be placed under the Department of the Taoiseach’. 
He states further that the OEP’s role should be ‘more robust in terms of the integrity 
of the auditing process’ and that ‘demarcation lines should be clearly defined’. John 
Brophy agrees with King and places particular emphasis on powers of ‘independent 
third-party vetting of plans and exercises’. However, not all departments agree. 
According to Martin Heraghty of DAFF: 
 
Speaking from our own perspective – we don’t need the OEP to 
oblige us to carry out our programmes of training and exercising – 
we do this in any case. 
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Most of the interviewees believe that a dedicated centralised major emergency 
management budget, to be administered and disbursed by the OEP, would have 
particular merit. Minister O’Dea believes a centralised budget would ‘involve a big 
step’ but would ‘certainly provide more transparency’.  
 
In response to being asked whether or not too many committees and working groups 
are involved in coordinating the major emergency effort, Eoghan O’Neachtain says 
‘this is inevitable’ given the multitude of departments and agencies involved in major 
emergency planning. Brian Spain concurs and remarks, ‘it is not a bad thing’ to have 
a number of expert committees examining particular issues as ‘you are getting the 
best possible advice’. Ciara McMahon of the RPII believes that the multitude of 
committees provides a great opportunity for major emergency planners to meet each 
other, discuss important issues and share information. These meetings allow for 
‘gaps’ in knowledge to be filled, she concludes. According to Minister O’Dea: 
 
The people who are saying this [that there are too many committees] 
don’t really understand it [emergency planning]…there are two 
committees only really. 
 
However, Martin Heraghty disagrees and says, ‘…there might be too many 
committees involved in the process…perhaps one centralised focus might be a better 
alternative’. Maguire of the HSE states that there could be some rationalisation and 
an attempt to bring some clarity to individual roles. When pressed on the issue of 
rationalising the number of committees involved, Brian Spain conceded, ‘I would 
never say no to any worthwhile suggestion.’  
 
10.4.2 Major emergency communication management 
All interviewees were asked to identify the central body that they consider 
responsible for providing strategic communication guidance and advice to all 
departments and agencies involved in the major emergency planning and 
preparedness efforts. The answers indicate that a certain amount of confusion and 
disagreement exists as to who is actually responsible. Tony Boland of the DEHLG 
describes how his department looks to the National Steering Group and its working 
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groups for general guidance. Taking a different view, Martin Heraghty of the DAFF 
states:  
 
I suppose GIS would have to be the organisation responsible. 
However, as with the number of committees involved in overall 
major emergency planning, it tends to be a little bit confusing. 
 
Brian Spain of the OEP also believes GIS is the most appropriate establishment to 
provide strategic guidance and advice on communication-related issues, particularly 
as ‘emergency management straddles all departments and they [GIS] make a good 
focal point’. Adding to the confusion, Eoghan O’Neachtain, Government Press 
Secretary, accepts that GIS are responsible for providing guidance ‘when it comes to 
media issues and coordinating messages from government level downwards’. 
However, for all other communication and media guidance, he emphasises, ‘…it has 
to be the OEP’. Gavin Maguire of the HSE comments, ‘we turn inwards…to our own 
press people’ for communication guidance. Asked whether he would turn also to the 
GIS for guidance, Maguire says ‘absolutely not…we are working in complete 
isolation from the rest of the system’. Providing an example, Maguire says ‘…when it 
comes to negotiating with national broadcasters about carrying critical information 
for an influenza pandemic…we have to do this in isolation…even though it applies to 
all types of major emergency situations’. Maguire has raised this issue with the 
Government Task Force. However, he emphasises: 
 
It doesn’t go anywhere because there is nowhere for it to go, as there 
is no legislative framework in place in order to designate clear roles 
and responsibilities.  
 
John Brophy, independent crisis management consultant, is more emphatic when he 
states:  
 
In reality the level of expert communication knowledge just doesn’t 
exist anywhere in the current system. GIS can advise on media 
related issues but after that they [the Government Task Force on 
Emergency Planning] will really have to bring in outside experts or 
else start a process of rapidly training up in-house expertise. 
 
Derek Mooney, political advisor to Minister O’Dea accepts ‘this is definitely a 
weakness’. In an attempt to provide clarity to the issue he states:  
 
 251
Ultimately it [responsibility for providing overall strategic 
communication guidance and advice] does have to head towards 
GIS. However, the difficulty is that you are pushing it towards 
somebody that doesn’t want it. So there needs to be consensus about 
where it is going to end up. Right now it is the GIS…but they are 
not too happy with it [the role].  
 
Looking to the future, Mooney emphasises that the role is most likely to fall to the 
GIS. However, he insists that this role needs to be enhanced and must involve ‘a step 
up from what it is at the moment’.  
 
Brian Spain of the OEP comments that ‘a central repository of communication 
knowledge’ should be available ‘that all departments and agencies can tap into as 
required’. Both Mooney and O’Neachtain believe that the ideal location and structure 
for a communication knowledge repository, such as this, is an expert communication 
group, which should be located within the newly established National Emergency 
Coordination Centre (NECC). This group would then provide guidance to the other 
departments and agencies. 
 
In order to ascertain whether the selected departments and agencies have a clear 
understanding of what constitutes strategic communication, interviewees were asked 
to describe, in their opinion, what makes major emergency communication strategic. 
This question seemed difficult to answer for many of the interviewees. Answers 
included, ‘ensuring that communication is properly coordinated’; ‘guaranteeing 
communication flows between all of the response agencies, and from top to bottom’; 
‘speaking with one voice and having ‘a good sound plan’. Minister O’Dea considers 
‘getting the message out…for whom the message is intended…via the media or direct 
contact’ as being a key element of strategic communication. Eoghan O’Neachtain, 
who has significant practical experience as a senior communication practitioner, 
emphasises that in order for major emergency communication to be considered 
strategic it must support the overall work of the government and the lead 
departments; it must be viewed in the short-, medium-, and long-term; and ensuring 
that communication decisions are not ‘pulled from the back pocket…they need to be 
more scientifically based’. 
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A number of the interviewees accept that the 2006 Framework does not deal with the 
longer-term aspects of communication management. Eoghan O’Neachtain believes 
the new Framework ‘is better’ than the 1984 plan, ‘however it [the communication 
function] is not as strategically focused as some of the other operational functions’. 
He also believes that the government ‘is going to have to be inventive’ in order to 
achieve a long-term focus. He believes that the use of schools and a bigger 
involvement in voluntary organisations is essential for success, particularly to 
develop strong community resilience. O’Neachtain states:  
 
The real acid test will be in about five years time, when the new 
Framework has been implemented and to see then if the 
communication campaigning continues. 
 
Brophy agrees with O’Neachtain and emphasises that a short-term focus for 
communication is ‘completely at odds with the actions of other countries’. Padraig 
McKeown, a leading independent communications practitioner, believes that the 
communication approach adopted by the Irish government ‘has no strategic focus 
whatsoever’. Emphasising the extent of the ‘catch-up’ that is underway in relation to 
major emergency management generally, Heraghty believes ‘a balance needs to be 
found’ in relation to current versus longer-term aspects of public awareness and 
communication management. Taking a similar view, Celina Barrett of the DEHLG 
explains how the new Framework document is designed ‘just to put the architecture 
in place… it can’t deal with every particular issue in depth’.  
  
Most of the interviewees believe the new 2006 Framework devotes much more 
attention to communication than did the 1984 document. However, there are mixed 
views as to whether the communication model, presented within the new Framework, 
provides an adequate structure for coordinating all of the disparate elements of the 
communication process, including information management. Many of the 
interviewees demonstrated a limited appreciation of some elements that need to be 
considered as part of the major emergency communication management effort. 
However, Lieutenant General Pat Nash and Superintendent Liam King are satisfied 
that the different elements of communication are sufficiently integrated within the 
new Framework. Celina Barrett concurs, highlighting that the information 
management system within the new Framework provides ‘the coherent architecture 
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around which all of the essential elements of communication are integrated’. Both 
Martin Heraghty and Gavin Maguire strongly disagree and believe that more thought 
and effort needs to go into this joining up of all of the different elements of 
communication. 
 
Additionally, John Brophy highlights that a number of communication projects have 
been undertaken by different departments and agencies ‘without any great 
coordination or joined-up thinking’. O’Neachtain of GIS believes that every major 
emergency communication project that is designed to guide other departments and 
agencies ‘needs to come from a sound and well-coordinated basis’. 
 
Interviewees were then asked whether the communication and information 
management functions should be amalgamated, under a single information officer 
reporting directly to the off-site coordinator. While the model proposed in the 2006 
Framework document separates the information and communication management 
functions, the US Joint Information Center model supports the amalgamated approach 
(NRT 2000: 1-6) . Martin Heraghty of DAFF sees much merit to the US approach. He 
says, ‘…from our own experience of dealing with “foot-and-mouth”, this is the way 
that communication should be managed and controlled’.  
 
Similarly, Gavin Maguire believes that ‘in a big bang major emergency, essential 
elements such as communication and information clearly cannot be treated 
separately’. Brian Spain of the OEP admits, ‘I haven’t given this much thought’. 
However, he goes on to say: 
 
It makes sense that one person has all of the information and that 
they should make the critical decisions as regards which information 
should be released and to whom – including the media.  
 
Eoghan O’Neachtain also agrees that information and communication management 
require integration in order to deal effectively with a major emergency. He 
comments: 
 
This has to happen. It is like having a stool with three legs. 
Information comes in through communication channels. Information 
is then prioritised, analysed and processed in the information hub. 
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Then it is sent out through communication channels. And you can 
see from that, both are hand in glove – inseparable. They should be 
managed accordingly. 
 
Not entirely convinced, Tony Boland of the DEHLG views information management 
and communication management as two separate, but parallel functions. He 
emphasises that his own department’s ‘schematic’ provides for a media manager who 
has the same status as the information manager and ‘both should report into the on-
site coordinator’.  
 
All interviewees agreed that the major emergency communication manager should be 
part of the decision-making process at the highest level. According to O’Neachtain, 
‘communication will add no value unless the manager is standing right next to the 
coordinator’.  
 
10.4.2.1 Elements of strategic communication management 
One of the essential strategic communication elements identified throughout this 
dissertation is the engagement of a broad base of stakeholders in a meaningful way in 
order to arrive at major emergency decisions. From the interviews it is clear that the 
majority of the interviewees are positively disposed towards the concept. Minister 
O’Dea supports this principle, saying, ‘…absolutely…consulting with the public in 
advance of a major emergency is well worthwhile considering’. Clearly from this 
comment, the minister considers engaging with the public as merely an aspiration at 
this time. This point is reinforced when the minister says, ‘but you couldn’t do it at 
the moment because the lack of basic knowledge is so bad [amongst the public]’. 
Eoghan O’Neachtain also agrees in principle with a broad-based analytic deliberative 
process. He says: 
 
I can see great value in this and I know that this is the way other 
countries are headed. This should become part and parcel of the way 
we do business for important decisions, including major 
emergencies.  
 
However, O’Neachtain believes that there may be certain difficulties in achieving 
agreement to this process. He says, ‘we have to get through a particular mindset 
[public service] that is not going to change overnight’. McKeown questions whether 
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the necessary levels of expertise exist within departments and agencies in order to 
engage in public engagement in a meaningful way. At a very practical level, in 
preparation for influenza pandemic, Gavin Maguire of the HSE admits that they have 
‘not yet engaged in any significant public dialogue to date’. However, he says that 
future communication research with members of the public will ‘…impact areas such 
as the design, content and message on the leaflet [influenza pandemic] to be delivered 
to every household… and also indicate the degree to which the general population 
will take direction during a pandemic or other prolonged national crises’. 
 
Martin Heraghty of DAFF also believes that by engaging in a broad-based analytic 
deliberative process, a mechanism is provided in order to ‘find out new ways of doing 
things or getting useful information’. Displaying perhaps a little less enthusiasm for 
the public-engagement process, Brian Spain of the OEP concludes that, ‘it depends 
on how meaningful and what type of contribution these stakeholders and publics can 
supply’. He also believes that it may be difficult to interest the public in engagement 
when the likelihood of a major emergency is low. 
 
Interviewees generally consider the process of approaching major emergency 
communication strategically as being extremely important. Martin Heraghty describes 
how DAFF ‘has learned this through experience, particularly during the “foot-and-
mouth” crisis’. Tony Colgan of the RPII emphasises that ‘all of our successes in the 
technical area can be lost if our strategic communication is bad’. According to Brian 
Spain of the OEP: 
 
Communication needs to be a slow burner…there needs to be an 
ongoing strategy. Major emergency communication cannot be 
viewed as a side-issue or a bolt-on…it must be planned. 
 
Eoghan O’Neachtain emphasises that ‘every other aspect of major emergency 
management is looked at strategically…why not communication?’ O’Neachtain goes 
further stating: 
 
We have learned some important lessons from not approaching 
communication strategically in the recent past. In some of these 
situations it was really finger-in-the-dam stuff…hoping that the 
media were going to lose interest in the issue very quickly - allowing 
us to get on with the business of the day. It doesn’t work out like 
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that though. Now we are faced with a real major emergency in the 
form of a major flu pandemic. If our communication is not 
strategically focused leading up to that – we will be in big trouble. 
 
There was general agreement amongst the interviewees that setting clear, attainable 
communication goals and objectives (management-by-objectives) is also extremely 
important in order to achieve measurable success when engaging in communication 
programmes. Superintendent Liam King rates the importance of communication goal-
setting at seven out of a possible ten, while Lieutenant General Nash provides a rating 
of eight out of ten. Without exception, all interviewees report that the alignment of 
communication goals with operational goals is essential for the overall success of the 
preparedness and response effort. 
 
There was broad agreement amongst the interviewees that all departments and 
agencies should introduce a more scientific approach to their major emergency 
communication efforts. However, it appears that in practice the benefits of 
practitioners having a good level of formal communication education and experience, 
of engaging in communication research and evaluation, and of developing and testing 
key messages, may not be fully appreciated. Additionally, the degree to which a 
scientific approach to communication is adopted by response departments and 
agencies varies considerably. 
 
Gavin Maguire of the HSE believes that communication research is extremely 
important, particularly in relation to his preparations for influenza pandemic. Eoghan 
O’Neachtain was emphatic in relation to the value of communication research. He 
asks: 
 
If the information is not evidence-based, how reliable can it be? 
There is no point in guessing or making assumptions that we know 
how people think. 
 
Brian Spain agrees with O’Neachtain and describes how, prior to the development of 
the major emergency public information campaign, he believed people would want to 
receive emergency planning information by the web. However, following detailed 
communication research this was proven ‘…to be wrong – it was way down on their 
preferred list’. Derek Mooney highlights how formal communication research was 
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conducted in order to ascertain levels of knowledge and perceptions amongst the 
public prior to undertaking the public awareness campaign process. The minister 
indicated that communication research is something he will continue. However, this 
commitment relates specifically to public awareness. Superintendent Liam King also 
considers communication research important. However, he says that the Garda 
Síochána (GS) does not engage in any research of this kind currently in relation to 
major emergency planning. Similarly, Martin Heraghty understands the significance 
of engaging in communication research. However, he says that DAFF does not 
conduct any formal communication research for major emergency management.  
 
All of the interviewees had a standard approach in terms of developing major 
emergency key messages. In the majority of cases, the department or agency press 
officer, together with a core group of major emergency planners, devise their 
respective messages. None of the interviewees report that they engage in formal key 
message testing prior to dissemination. A small number of respondents, such as those 
in DAFF and the HSE, say that they test the efficacy of some related advertisements. 
Brian Spain of the OEP states: 
 
I believe we genuinely should test messages. In our own heads we 
have a certain sense of what is right and what the public want. But 
we should get their views for what they really want. 
 
Eoghan O’Neachtain agrees and comments, ‘I think it [testing] would ensure that the 
messages work.’  
 
When it comes to evaluating the efficacy of key message development and 
dissemination, all interviewees believe the activity to be worthwhile. Eoghan 
O’Neachtain says, ‘…we need to evaluate messages…we may think it is a great 
message…but is it effective…does it achieve its desired effect?’ O’Neachtain goes 
further, observing that evaluation should involve both message dissemination process 
and impact. ‘If one or both are not working…then we cannot achieve our goals’, he 
states. Spain agrees and describes how in any process ‘you should be willing to learn 
and to admit that there are better ways of doing things’. 
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Very few of the interviewees engage in the formal testing or evaluation of the 
efficacy of their chosen channels of communication for major emergency 
communication. O’Neachtain highlights the importance of this process, particulary 
for reaching marginalised groups such as people with disabilities and Travellers. 
Heraghty says that DAFF does engage in some informal research. This, he says, 
includes investigating the efficacy of the DAFF’s channels of communication for 
reaching its target audience. DAFF conducts this research at large-scale events such 
as the annual National Ploughing Championship. Spain describes how the OEP 
research, but do not test or evaluate, channels of communication. McKeown believes 
that testing, such as this, ‘is beyond the comprehension of individual departments and 
agencies’. 
 
The interviewees were asked to discuss how important formal communication 
education and adequate experience are to major emergency communication 
practitioners in their day-to-day preparedness and response efforts. The majority of 
interviewees saw great merit in employing communication practitioners with formal 
communication education. However, in practice, very few of the departments and 
agencies choose their communication practitioners on this basis. Martin Heraghty of 
DAFF comments: ‘We don’t have the luxury of targeting and training-up our 
communication officers prior to selection.’ Lieutenant General Pat Nash emphasises 
how carefully targeting selection and formally educating communication and 
information specialists ‘is the way to go’. However, he highlights how specialising in 
a narrow field of expertise, such as communication, can be ‘career-limiting’ in 
organisations such as the Defence Forces. Gavin Maguire of the HSE views the 
selection process as a key factor. He says: 
 
In the future, I think there is a clear need to consider targeting our 
communication practitioners, choosing those with specific 
qualifications and encouraging others to undertake strategic 
communication courses. 
 
Eoghan O’Neachtain, who himself has a Masters in Communications and Cultural 
Studies (MACCS) from Dublin City University, believes that an academic grounding 
in communication is ‘very important…but of itself it is of minimal value’. He 
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qualifies his seeming paradoxical comment stating: ‘Coupled with experience, 
training and practice, academic knowledge can be a great asset.’ 
 
When asked to discuss whether the government adopts an open and transparent 
approach with publics in relation to major emergency planning, thereby attempting to 
imbue a sense of trust and credibility amongst the public, all interviewees believed 
that levels of candour have improved. According to Martin Heraghty of DAFF: 
 
From our experience, the best way to handle difficult issues is not to 
hide from them, and to give the information. However, this has to be 
balanced with not unduly worrying people by giving them worrying 
information for no good reason.  
 
Superintendent Liam King of GS is adamant about the importance of transparency 
and openness when it comes to building trust and credibility. He remarks:  
 
There is no point in deluding yourself and not telling people – they 
probably already know what is going on [in the area of major 
emergency management]. 
 
O’Neachtain notes that in relation to major emergency management, openness and 
transparency amongst departments and agencies ‘has come from a very low base- 
line’. He believes that this is due in no uncertain terms to their [response departments 
and agencies] previous levels of preparedness, and says, ‘…as we have seen in the 
past, if the Principal Response Agencies are not prepared, the media will slaughter 
them’. Heraghty believes that the government have been reasonably open and 
transparent with the public to date. Lieutenant General Pat Nash, observes, ‘… I think 
it [openness and transparency] has transformed over the past 25 years…we now have 
a certain openness, within certain limits’. Minister O’Dea is more emphatic when he 
states: ‘We have swept away all the secrecy … the media now have to have access to 
exercises.’ Eoghan O’Neachtain highlights the elements required to achieve a high 
level of trust and credibility amongst the public, 
 
…being consistent and not getting caught telling fibs. Also, it is 
important to be perceived as an expert, experienced, reassuring - and 
to use a commonality of language. 
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All interviewees agreed that a high level of public trust and credibility in the response 
agencies is extremely important. Celine Barrett states that credibility has been 
damaged by the Joe Jacobs’ interview, mentioned earlier in this chapter. King 
believes that this trust can be rebuilt once integrated exercises begin in earnest. 
During the interview, interviewees were asked specifically to discuss whether the 
public is likely to trust the HSE to manage a major emergency such as an influenza 
pandemic, in light of the reported ‘serious loss of confidence in the public health 
sector’ (Hardiman 2007: 16). Minister O’Dea agreed that this is a problem and states: 
 
The HSE is in very bad order and and an unpopular institution out 
there – there is no doubt about that and I have no hesitation in saying 
it… the lack of accountability and contact is frustrating us all, and 
the public don’t like the HSE…and this is not helpful. I know that 
the HSE are the lead agency for dealing with a pandemic but they 
are only a cog in the wheel. 
 
Most of the interviewees, including Maguire, agree with the minister’s sentiment in 
this regard. Brophy, believes that the HSE has ‘a significant obstacle to surmount’ in 
order to ‘win back the public’s trust’ should a pandemic situation occur.  
 
When asked whether or not a strategic major emergency communication model, 
which involves communicating with communities rather than merely to communities, 
is likely to work in the Irish cultural context, interviewees provided mixed responses. 
Eoghan O’Neachtain believes that within the ‘global village’, the Irish psyche is ‘not 
wholly dissimilar to that of people in other countries considered leaders in major 
emergency management’. Based on his experience with ‘foot and mouth’ 
internationally, Heraghty agrees with O’Neachtain and believes that many of the 
elements of a major emergency communication strategy ‘can be applied readily in the 
Irish context’. In the event of a serious major emergency situation, Maguire is not 
convinced that all elements of a ‘best-practice’ communication strategy can transpose 
easily to the Irish context. In the event of an influenza pandemic, for example, 
Maguire believes that many infected people will be instructed to remain at home and 
not to attend acute hospitals in order to prevent cross-infection. He continues: 
 
We can follow best strategic communication practice all we like – 
engage with publics, develop and test messages to make sure they 
work. However, Ireland being Ireland, the person with the sick child 
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who is instructed to remain at home is bound to know a person who 
knows a Garda sergeant who will make a phone call to get the child 
to hospital. So while the perfect communication model may work 
well in Sweden – it may not work equally as well in Ireland. 
 
Brophy agrees with Maguire and states that ‘a great deal of common sense needs to 
be applied to any communication strategy’. 
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11 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study has been to explore the strategic management of major 
emergency communication, with particular emphasis on how the Irish government 
approaches this important discipline. In order to examine thoroughly the principal 
research question it was necessary to scrutinise a number of analogous and 
interrelated subjects such as developments in the theory and practice of major 
emergency management both in Ireland and internationally. Semi-structured 
interviews with key personnel in both Ireland and a number of leading other countries 
were undertaken. As mentioned in Chapter 1, leading countries in this regard are 
those that are considered to be innovators in the development of major emergency 
theory and practice. These countries engage in best international communication 
practice, as discussed in Section 1.2, and include countries such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, and Australia. Major emergency literature has 
also been reviewed. 
 
It is possible to draw a number of conclusions. For ease of presentation, these 
conclusions are presented in four separate categories: major emergency management 
internationally, major emergency management in Ireland, major emergency 
communication management internationally, and major emergency communication 
management in Ireland.  
 
Based on the conclusions, the final section of Chapter 11 advances two 
recommendations for government departments and agencies with responsibility for 
major emergency management in Ireland. These recommendations have been 
developed taking into account best-practice and are offered in order to provide a 
focus for the future development of major emergency communication theory and 
practice. 
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11.2 Major emergency management  
 
11.2.1 Theory and practice  
It is evident that there have been many advances in the theory and the practice of 
major emergency management over the past thirty years, with significant changes 
occurring in the past five years. What is evident from an examination of international 
major emergency documentation, supported by data provided by interviewees, is that 
most leading countries have adopted a somewhat similar model of major emergency 
management that involves a continuous cycle of activity and that employs a systems 
management perspective. The research also highlights the fact that leading countries 
approach major emergency management largely from a strategic perspective. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this strategic approach mirrors how large corporations have 
learned to conduct business and survive in uncertain environments. Adopting a 
similar methodology, it can be concluded that countries engaging in best-practice set 
clear major emergency goals and objectives, undertake specific research, produce 
comprehensive plans and continuously evaluate, review and improve their 
preparedness and response performances. Additionally, leading countries are now 
treating major emergency management as a field of science rather than a mere 
operational task. This is evidenced by the quality of major emergency research data 
and literature available, and also by the proliferation of major emergency related third 
level courses in many countries, including the MSc in Emergency Management in 
Dublin City University. 
 
While most countries up to the late 1970s considered effective major emergency 
management principally in terms of having an efficient response capability, this study 
shows that leading countries now place equal emphasis on the planning and 
preparedness functions. This is evidenced by the major emergency structures that 
leading countries have developed and by the amount of effort afforded to 
preparedness, training and exercises. It is also evident that leading countries are 
placing considerable emphasis on managing specific risks, hazards and 
vulnerabilities, through prevention and mitigation measures. 
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In relation to the major emergency response, it can be concluded from the data that 
leading countries plan this important function on the principle of devolved 
responsibility at the lowest level possible, with higher level coordination and support 
provided by well-trained major emergency agencies. Additionally, the study reveals 
that the sequence of steps taken by leading countries in order to manage a major 
emergency situation is remarkably similar. These steps are contained within well-
developed plans that are a central element of each country’s preparedness efforts. The 
practice of leading countries indicates that major emergency plans are thoroughly 
developed, continuously updated, regularly tested and flexible enough to be able to 
deal with unexpected issues. 
 
11.2.2 Revision and evaluation of major emergency structures and plans 
It can be deduced from the research data that the many of the leading countries in the 
field of major emergency management have undergone, or are currently in the 
process of undergoing, a significant overhaul of their major emergency structures, 
legislation, guidelines, protocols and procedures. Consequently, it can be concluded 
that countries engaging in best-practice continuously evaluate, and if necessary 
revise, all elements of their major emergency management structures, processes and 
procedures. This is particularly important in the aftermath of a major emergency 
situation when inherent systemic weaknesses are likely to be exposed. The practice of 
major emergency management continues to evolve and while there is a convergence 
of theory and practice across leading countries, it is difficult to state categorically that 
these processes have been optimised at the time of writing this report. There have 
been many developments in the process of major emergency management over the 
past fifty years. It is likely that these leading countries will be utilising a different 
methodology in fifty years time. 
 
The research also reveals that leading countries see considerable merit in producing 
comprehensive, self-critical and publicly available reports, following major 
emergency situations, which are designed to improve the overall major emergency 
management effort. 
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11.2.3 Major emergency legislation 
Even though not all countries examined have major emergency legislation in 
existence (Sweden does not), it can be concluded from the research that dedicated, 
robust legislation is important in order to support and underpin the major emergency 
effort. Interviewees from the international agencies advance many justifications for 
this perspective. Foremost, in support of major emergency legislation, is that leading 
countries believe that no ambiguity should exist regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of all government departments, response organisations and 
individuals, involved in the major emergency effort throughout all stages. Other 
arguments put forward in support of robust legislation include ensuring that all 
departments and agencies have an unequivocal obligation to prepare, train and 
exercise for major emergency situations; ensuring that clear responsibility exists for 
the oversight function and for the review of performance and standards; and making 
certain that clear budgetary provision for major emergency management exists. From 
an analysis of the data, it can be concluded that most of countries the countries 
examined as part of this research have robust legislation in place to support the major 
emergency management function. Additionally, it can be concluded that effective 
mechanisms are necessary in order to ensure that the provisions of the legislation are 
being strictly adhered to and implemented. 
 
In addition to putting major emergency legislation in place, the agencies examined 
describe the importance of producing strategic major emergency guidance documents 
and clear protocols in order to integrate the work of individual government 
departments, civil servants and all of the response agencies throughout all stages. 
They include protocols for international cooperation. The data from the interviews 
highlight that international response agencies spend a considerable amount of time 
developing clear major emergency protocols and guidelines, testing their 
effectiveness, and then disseminating all relevant information to each major 
emergency response organisation. There is evidence that these protocols and 
guidelines are put into practice on a regular basis through both training and inter-
agency exercises. Without such an effort, it can be concluded that different 
departments and agencies, many of which have different methods of thinking and 
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operating, are likely to find it very difficult to work together when a major emergency 
occurs. 
 
11.2.4 Major emergency oversight 
The research data confirm that countries engaging in best-practice have put in place 
dedicated structures in order to oversee and coordinate their major emergency efforts. 
The study also concludes that the oversight function for major emergency 
management is given more emphasis in some countries than others. For example, 
many countries have established dedicated government departments that have been 
given sole responsibility for the oversight and coordination role. Others, such as the 
United Kingdom, locate their oversight role at the ‘very centre…a head office of 
government’ and play a central role in planning for emergencies (Cabinet Office 
2008). Consequently, it can be concluded from the research that the majority of 
leading countries have placed this important function as close to the centre of 
government as possible, with direct lines of access to the most senior decision-makers 
in government. It can also be concluded that by adopting such an approach, the major 
emergency management function is given greater priority amongst the many other 
important day-to-day functions of government. 
 
11.3 Major emergency management – Irish context 
 
11.3.1 Advances in major emergency theory and practice 
From this study, it can be concluded that while the threat of a major emergency is 
considered low in Ireland currently, particular categories of serious incidents, 
requiring a significant multi-principal response agency (PRA) response, cannot be 
ignored and should be prepared for. These categories include a major terrorist 
incident; a large hydro-meteorological event; a significant storm; influenza pandemic; 
a large-scale animal health incident; an anthropogenic major emergency, particularly 
from a UK or Europe based nuclear generation or reprocessing plant, or from a 
Seveso II category plant in Ireland; and a major transport-related accident. As 
described in Section 2.4.1.2.2, adequate preparation helps to limit the amount of 
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confusion once a major emergency occurs, clearly defines all roles and 
responsibilities for those involved in the response and allows each role to be tested 
during realistic training and exercises. As is happening through the roll-out of the 
2006 Framework, adequate preparedness requires structures to be put in place, 
strategies and protocols to be developed and resources made available. However, a 
pragmatic approach to the subject of major emergency communication management 
is required in Ireland. This should take cognisance of the major emergencies that are 
most likely to occur and those that are not, based on past experiences; the likely 
impact to society; and the cost in terms of money and resources. The need for such an 
approach was clearly demonstrated in December 2008 when the Irish government 
decided to recall all pig meat products both at home and abroad, and ordered the 
slaughter of over 100,000 pigs. This arose following the discovery of low levels of 
dioxins in pork products and pig feed. This decision is estimated to have cost the 
country approximately €180m and to have risked up to 1,400 jobs (Mullooly 2008; 
Leahy 2008: 8). The government’s decision was designed to communicate confidence 
in the Irish meat industry and in this case communication and operational action was 
swift and decisive. However, it was criticised by many as too hasty and an over-
reaction. While this was not a major emergency situation, it highlights the necessity 
for a clear cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken prior to taking significant decisions 
following an emergency situation. 
 
Notwithstanding, following international trends, it can be concluded from the 
research data that significant advances have been made in the entire field of major 
emergency management in Ireland since the commencement of this study in 2004. 
This is evidenced by the many initiatives undertaken by the Irish government since 
that time and it is clear that much useful work is in train currently. In line with the 
practices of countries examined as part of this research, response agencies in Ireland 
are now treating major emergencies as cyclical events that involve a continuous cycle 
of planning and action. From a theoretical perspective, much emphasis is placed on 
important functions such as risk assessment, mitigation and risk management. 
Additionally, structured and comprehensive planning guidance is provided in order to 
allow a common, best-practice, major emergency plan to be produced by all PRA. At 
the time of writing, these plans are being produced by PRA throughout the country. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that Ireland is following best-practice in relation to 
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the development and propagation of major emergency management theory. It is 
premature, at this stage to draw any conclusions in relation to whether the evolving 
methodology developed and practiced by leading countries is best suited to Ireland’s 
needs. Additionally, it is too early to pass judgement on the implementation of this 
theory (the practice) as it remains a work in progress. However, it is sufficient to say 
that PRA remain guided by the 1984 Framework and are obliged to work within the 
constraints that the process offers. While the practices proposed by the 1984 
document provide for a robust individual PRA response, they lack the integrated, all-
hazards, systems approach to major emergency management that the 2006 
Framework advances.  
 
In terms of major emergency development practice, from the research it can be 
concluded that the different groups such as the Government Task Force on 
Emergency Planning, the Inter-departmental Working Group, the National Steering 
Group, the National Working Group and the various regional groups, are very 
proactive in progressing the major emergency planning agenda. Although having very 
comprehensive and busy work schedules, they meet regularly in order to implement 
the many elements of the 2006 Framework. According to many of the interviewees, 
the results of the major emergency management effort are slowly becoming manifest 
on the ground.  
 
The research data reveal that there are mixed views concerning the multitude of 
official working groups that have been established in order to progress the wider 
major emergency preparedness and planning effort. While some of the interviewees 
believe the current structures are necessary and useful, others suspect that some 
duplication of effort exists, that the role of each group is not absolutely clear and that 
there may be merit in some rationalisation. This concern relates particularly to the 
role of the IDWG and the NWG. It is not possible at this stage to draw a conclusion 
as to which school of thought has most merit. However, as major emergency 
management in Ireland is coming from such a low base, the input from such a diverse 
range of groups can only provide positive benefits. Additionally, changing the 
structures, as they currently exist, is likely to hinder the progression of the 
implementation of the 2006 Framework. 
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11.3.2 Whether the 2006 Framework reflects best-practice? 
Taking account of the fact that the methodology for major emergency management 
adopted by leading countries is continuously evolving, and practices that constitute 
best-practice currently are constantly changing, the data acquired from a study of the 
literature, supported by detailed interviews, provide evidence that Ireland’s newly 
developed Framework for major emergency management reflects best-international-
practice. From an analysis of the data, it can be discerned that the Framework, which 
is based on a ‘systems’ and an ‘all-hazards’ approach, compares very well with 
international models. As described in Chapter 10, the 2006 Framework has followed 
a format adopted by leading countries and embraces the ‘lead-agency’ concept, 
prescribes a common lexicon of terminology and includes guidance on many key 
functions such as risk assessment, information management and working with 
voluntary organisations. In terms of size and level of detail, the Framework has 
achieved a balance with a broad approach somewhere in the centre of what is 
regarded as current best-practice. Additionally, the research indicates that the 
approach taken towards the development of the document is strategically grounded. 
The interviewees highlight that the inter-agency review-working group that produced 
the document utilised many strategic principles such as setting clear goals and time-
frames, engaging in research in the early stages, evaluating their output at various 
stages, and engaging outside expertise for particular aspects of the process.  
 
However, a close examination of the data reveals a number of shortcomings within 
the 2006 Framework. For example, no clarity is provided as to what happens once the 
2006 Framework is implemented in late 2008. This means that any deficiencies 
discovered within the Framework model will be more difficult to deal with as no time 
has been provided for a review and revision of the actual Framework model itself. As 
described earlier, leading countries constantly update and revise their major 
emergency approaches, theory and practice. It can be concluded that without such a 
mechanism being clearly stated, Ireland may be implementing and building on a sub-
standard major emergency model.  
 
The research also reveals that the 2006 Framework provides little detail in a number 
of important areas, including the functions of business continuity management 
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(BCM), building community resilience and communication. Furthermore, it seems as 
if there are no plans in place to develop guidance documents for these particular 
functions. Without comprehensive guidance on these critical areas, PRA are likely to 
ignore these important functions entirely or else may produce their own guidance 
documents that bear no correlation to those of other response agencies. It can be 
concluded that clear guidance documents are critical in order to provide direction to 
all departments, agencies and organisations involved in the major emergency 
preparedness, planning and response effort. Additionally, in the production of major 
emergency plans at national, regional and local level, the ‘blue light’ organisations 
are obliged to consult one category of guidance documents, while government 
departments are obliged to consult another. This creates a lack of coordination in the 
planning process. Furthermore, until such time as the OEP has produced and 
disseminated its guidance protocols to each government department, it is unlikely that 
a fully integrated implementation of the 2006 Framework is possible. In particular, 
this is likely to prevent any meaningful involvement of government departments in 
major emergency training and exercises for the foreseeable future.   
 
Another significant shortcoming in the 2006 Framework, identified by the study, is 
the lack of clarity in relation to budgetary allocation to individual departments, 
agencies and regions. It can be concluded from the data that this is likely to generate 
potential difficulties for an effective implementation of the Framework requirements. 
A lack of clear guidance on budgetary issues is likely to impact on the PRA’s 
capacity to purchase any necessary response equipment, put in place any significant 
mitigation measures, or engage in individual or inter-agency training and exercising.  
 
11.3.3 Statutory status of the 2006 Framework 
As discussed in Chapter 10, the 2006 Framework was approved by government but 
never passed into legislation. It can be concluded from the research that this is not in 
line with the practice of international countries examined where many of them have 
their major emergency management efforts underpinned by law. It is clear that 
opinions differ as to whether or not major emergency management in Ireland should 
be placed on a statutory basis. The data highlights that a number of interviewees 
consider the existing enabling legislation that surrounds the day-to-day work of the 
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PRA more than adequate. Others think that the current system is based primarily on 
goodwill and that this sentiment is not a strong enough premise to ensure ongoing 
cooperation with the lead response agency. 
 
Regardless of mixed views, it can be concluded that the absence of clear supporting 
legislation presents a number of difficulties for the major emergency planning 
process. Firstly, the research indicates that the PRA’s obligations to the 2006 
Framework are subordinate to their existing statutory obligations, such as their 
responsibilities regarding the Seveso Directive (Article 11 (111)) (Seveso Directive 
2008) described in Chapter 10, and also to Paragraph 15(1) of the Fire Services Act 
(1981). While the fulfilment of obligations under all three roles (Seveso, fire and 
major emergency) can be considered interchangeable and somewhat complementary, 
there remain some concerns regarding the status and priority of the 2006 Framework. 
Secondly, while there exists a significant amount of goodwill currently amongst and 
between PRA and individual government departments, there is no guarantee that this 
will continue indefinitely. The 2006 Framework is merely a guidance document, 
which is couched in non-prescriptive language, using terms such as ‘PRA should…’ 
rather than ‘PRA must…’. Consequently, if a government department or PRA is 
occupied with some other important issue or project, its obligation to major 
emergency preparedness and planning may be more difficult to enforce. Thirdly, the 
research indicates that the roles and responsibilities of groups such as the IDWG and 
the NWG tend to be blurred. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities grounded in 
legislation, for each PRA, government department and supporting group, ensures that 
no confusion or duplication of effort exists. Despite the various views of the Irish 
interviewees, it can be concluded that there are distinct advantages to Ireland 
following the practice of leading countries in this regard and placing all aspects of 
major emergency management on a statutory basis.  
 
11.3.4 Coordination and oversight role 
The results of this study demonstrate that the coordination and oversight role for 
major emergency planning and management in Ireland is vested in the Office of 
Emergency Planning (OEP). The majority of interviewees indicate that they are 
happy with the OEP, as a sub-section of the Department of Defence, discharging this 
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role. However, some confusion exists as to the precise roles and responsibilities of the 
various official working groups, including the OEP. Indicative of this was the view of 
one of the participants to the study who believes that the Department of the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DEHLG) has a de jure oversight 
mandate from government. 
 
This study also provides evidence that a number of Irish interviewees believe that the 
oversight role for major emergency management should be closer to the centre of 
power in government. This is in line with the practices of many of the international 
countries examined as part of this research. These interviewees believe that the 
oversight function should remain with the Office of Emergency Planning, but under 
the Department of Taoiseach rather than Defence. However, notwithstanding these 
findings, it can be concluded that the current arrangement, with the oversight role 
vested in the Department of Defence through the OEP, is adequate. This conclusion is 
predicated on an important finding from the study that the Department of Taoiseach 
will intervene in a major emergency situation should any resistance or difficulty be 
encountered. Furthermore, any significant structural changes at this stage of the major 
emergency implementation programme, may cause confusion or hinder progress.  
 
The research also reveals that there are mixed opinions amongst the participants to 
the study as regards whether the OEP should be given stronger oversight powers. The 
OEP itself is emphatic that its original mandate allows it merely to oversee 
emergency planning, not take it over. This sentiment is supported by some of the 
other interviewees, including the Minister for Defence. However, an ardent school of 
thought exists that the OEP should be given a more robust mandate and autonomy in 
order to compel departments and PRA to plan, train, exercise and be assessed and to 
provide ‘hard-hitting’ reports where necessary. It can be concluded that this would be 
in line with best-international-practice. However, it can also be concluded that this 
may prove difficult to implement due to the current structure and staffing levels of the 
OEP. Additionally, without underpinning major emergency legislation, there is no 
statutory obligation on agencies or departments to comply with the requirements of 
the 2006 Framework. 
 
 273
While there are mixed views in relation to bolstering the role and oversight powers of 
the OEP, the research results indicate that there is near unanimous support for putting 
in place a dedicated centralised major emergency budget, to be administered and 
disbursed by the OEP. It can be concluded that this initiative has particular merit and 
follows the trend of leading countries in the field of major emergency management. It 
is suggested here that this initiative might most profitably be considered as part of a 
much wider examination and comprehensive review of the role and powers of the 
OEP in the first instance. 
 
11.4 Major emergency communication – International context 
 
11.4.1 Improvements in the theory and practice  
The data from the research confirm a fundamental hypothesis, namely that the 
communication function is central to the success of the overall major emergency 
management process. This is clearly reflected in the increased prominence of the 
communication management function in the major emergency literature from each of 
the countries examined, together with the high scores provided by the international 
interviewees when asked to rate the importance of the major emergency 
communication function. The many communication initiatives undertaken by the 
three agencies provide further evidence of the increased prominence of 
communication within major emergency management. For example, each of the three 
countries examined has established a dedicated communication section within its 
respective emergency management agency (FEMA, SEMA and CCS) in order to 
progress this important field of endeavour. It is apparent that the three agencies 
populate their respective communication sections with well-qualified communication 
practitioners who have the ability to provide strategic communication support and 
guidance to the overall preparedness and response effort.  
 
Significant advances have taken place in the development of major emergency 
communication theory over the past number of decades. As the research 
demonstrates, a number of leading countries have made great strides in proactively 
producing guidance and information material of high quality for both their indigenous 
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communication practitioners and their international counterparts. This includes 
research data, literature for communication practitioners, businesses and the voluntary 
sector, and the dissemination of useful information for members of the public, 
including booklets, DVDs and websites. Some countries, such as Australia and the 
US, have recognised the need to produce specialised information for use by 
marginalised groups such as children and people with disabilities. Innovative 
developments such as these are an indication of how communication management has 
become progressive. Best-practice, therefore, highlights the importance of building an 
indigenous repository of communication knowledge, through research, evaluation, 
case study and experiential learning that is available to all major emergency 
communication practitioners.  
 
In relation to the practice of major emergency communication, the research highlights 
that leading countries view the senior major emergency communication manager’s 
role as more than that of a mere implementer of other people’s decisions. As 
described in Chapter 4, the major emergency communication function is utilised to 
optimum effect. The international agencies examined ensure that the senior 
communication practitioner has the ability and status to be part of the major 
emergency decision-making function at the highest level, or at least has direct access 
to senior decision-makers. The data also makes clear that the overseas agencies 
examined believe that their overall senior decision-makers have embraced the 
strategic communication principles and have accepted that the communication 
practitioner has an important role to play. Additionally, it can be concluded that 
leading countries no longer accept that major emergency communication teams are 
mere technicians but regard them as experts in media management, information 
handling, communication research and evaluation, and community liaison.  
 
11.4.2 Approach major emergency communication strategically 
It is evident from this research that leading countries are increasingly managing their 
major emergency communication function in a strategic manner rather than the more 
traditional tactical, short-term approach. Additionally, the communication literature 
reveals that major emergency communication guidance and support documents of 
leading countries are grounded in a strategic philosophy. In relation to major 
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emergency communication strategy, leading countries tend to follow a similar series 
of steps beginning with the setting of clear, attainable and measurable communication 
goals. This is usually followed by a number of other important steps such as the 
undertaking of communication research, engaging stakeholders in dialogue, planning 
and evaluation. Leading communication practitioners emphasise that the 
‘management-by-objectives’ process obliges the response agency to have a greater 
focus on achieving results or impacts than on merely implementing processes. In 
general terms, major emergency response agencies are public service organisations. 
Consequently, achieving major emergency communication targets rather than merely 
implementing communication processes may require an organisational change of 
culture and mindset. Despite this, the research clearly highlights that achieving results 
from the implementation of communication programmes makes the senior 
communication practitioner more accountable and also provides evidence of value for 
money for the government and the taxpayer. It can also be concluded from the 
research that countries engaging in best-practice ensure that they align and integrate 
their communication goals with those of the overall emergency plan, and that all 
communication goals are clearly understood by all response agencies. As 
communication management for major emergency situations is a discipline that has 
received detailed attention only in recent decades, the efficacy of approaching the 
field of endeavour strategically remains to be categorically proven through a process 
of research and evaluation. 
 
Leading countries indicate that the major emergency communication planning 
process is of fundamental importance. There is consensus amongst the international 
interviewees that major emergency communication planning allows practitioners to 
anticipate problems and to respond effectively, and helps to reduce the number of 
unknowns. A close examination of the literature reveals that countries engaging in 
best-practice employ a set of prescribed major emergency communication planning 
steps. These steps follow closely those proposed in the suggested framework 
described earlier in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which are designed to guide the major 
emergency communication practitioner throughout all phases. They include the 
planning and preparation of the communication function during the pre-crisis stage; 
implementing the communication response, including important tasks such as dealing 
with the media, issuing public warnings and delivering instructing information during 
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the crisis stage; and communicating effectively and compassionately with victims, 
families and communities in the post-crisis stage. Significantly, countries employing 
best-practice plan their major emergency communication for the short-, medium-, and 
long-term. Additionally, the data indicate that leading countries build in flexibility in 
their plans by employing some form of anticipatory planning measures such as 
scenario planning, already described in Chapter 5. All three agencies place particular 
emphasis on the necessity to consider major emergency communication plans as 
living documents that require constant revision and updating. 
 
11.4.3 Approach communication scientifically 
In addition to approaching major emergency communication strategically, the 
research data highlight that countries engaging in best-practice approach the field of 
endeavour from a scientific perspective. A critical element of this scientific approach, 
as highlighted by theorists such as Reynolds, Coombs and Darrell (discussed in 
Section 5.3.3), and supported by the international interviewees, is that their 
communication practitioners possess some form of communication-related education. 
Without adequate education of this kind, the research suggests that it is difficult for 
the practitioner to examine new communication approaches and models, engage in 
communication research or evaluation, and have sufficient credibility to be given the 
opportunity to become involved in decision-making at the highest levels. It can be 
concluded from these results that communication teams are better able to support the 
overall major emergency effort with the knowledge that communication courses can 
provide. Communication practitioners also benefit from major emergency experience, 
either through actual situations or simulated exercises. According to the interviewees, 
this is considered equally as important as possessing communication-related 
education. Best-practice indicates that communication education and experience are 
complementary and that practitioners should possess a sufficiency of both in order to 
be effective. 
 
All three overseas countries that were examined consider ongoing and iterative 
communication research to be a very important scientific element of the strategic 
communication process. The research shows that leading countries engage in some 
form of ongoing research, using both in-house and external researchers. It can be 
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concluded that leading countries allocate requisite, well-trained resources to their lead 
response agencies in order to carry out the research function. According to all three 
respondents, the majority of this communication research is conducted in the 
preparedness and planning stage. However, significantly, all three countries also 
attach considerable importance to engaging in communication research in the period 
following the actualisation of a major emergency. The data indicate that they have 
adopted a broad focus for this research, including the state of public opinion; 
measurement of public perceptions, attitudes, needs and likely reactions in the face of 
a major emergency; and levels of trust in the response agencies. According to the 
interviewees, the majority of this research is conducted through focus groups, attitude 
surveys and ongoing consultation with specific interest groups. 
 
It can also be concluded that leading countries consider the scientific process of 
evaluating major emergency communication to be very important. From the study, it 
is evident that countries engaging in best-international-practice evaluate their 
communication programmes throughout all stages of the major emergency life cycle 
and revise these programmes accordingly. Additionally, it is clear that leading 
countries evaluate both the process of planning major emergency communication 
programmes and their implementation, and also the impact that these programmes 
have on the recipients. All interviewees indicate that the communication evaluation 
process can only be effective if major emergency communication goals and 
objectives are stated at the outset. The research reveals that leading countries use both 
internal and external practitioners to conduct the evaluation activity. It can be 
concluded that these countries provide adequate, well-trained resources to their lead 
response agencies in order to carry out this important task.  
 
11.4.4 Integrated Communication 
Another significant finding that emerges from the research is that strategic major 
emergency communication is considered by leading countries to be an all-
encompassing, multidimensional and integrated discipline involving many diverse 
elements such as media management, public information, the raising of public 
awareness, internal communication, public affairs, community relations, and survivor 
and victim relations. This is a notable progression from the 1980s and early 1990s 
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when communication management was considered merely in terms of media handling 
and public information. Pushing out the boundaries of further integration, as this 
research has indicated, FEMA has recently created a single, integrated model that 
allows better coordination and flows of all categories of major emergency data and 
that uniquely joins up the communication and information management functions. 
While the interviewees from both SEMA and CCS see considerable merit in FEMA’s 
initiative, their organisations have not adopted this approach at time of writing. 
However, as this integrated model is available on the FEMA website and is 
undoubtedly discussed at international major emergency conferences, it would not be 
surprising to see other leading countries following FEMA’s lead on this matter.  
 
11.4.5 Model of communication 
Leading countries state in their major emergency literature that they have adopted 
open and transparent models of major emergency communication when dealing with 
their stakeholders and publics. This is confirmed by the information provided by the 
international interviewees and demonstrated by a willingness to produce critical 
reports following major emergency situations. All of the international interviewees 
attach considerable importance to ensuring honesty, openness and transparency when 
providing important major emergency information to members of the public, 
regardless of the anxiety it might cause. They also demonstrate a willingness to 
become involved in meaningful dialogue with key stakeholders and members of the 
public. This commitment to openness, transparency and dialogue relates to all stages 
of the major emergency life cycle. As is the case with integrated communication, it 
can be concluded that this is a significant positive change that has occurred over the 
past two decades. However, while there is clear evidence of greater openness and 
transparency, it is difficult to measure precisely how much this has improved in each 
country and whether full openness and transparency is possible or prudent. 
 
It is evident that the acquisition of formal communication-related education is helping 
practitioners to recognise the many advantages of open models of major emergency 
communication. Consequently, it can be concluded that countries engaging in best-
international-practice are increasingly adopting a two-way symmetrical or mixed-
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motive model, when managing communication with their publics and stakeholders 
throughout all stages of a major emergency. 
 
11.4.6 Meaningfully engage the public 
Leading countries are now treating their citizens as partners when it comes to making 
important decisions that may affect them. A close examination of the major 
emergency communication literature reveals that this process is becoming 
increasingly important to the success of the overall preparedness and response effort. 
It is evident from the data that leading countries perceive many advantages in the 
public engagement process, including increased public support in relation to decisions 
taken, tapping into a greater supply of non-expert knowledge, achieving greater 
transparency in major emergency decision-making processes and maintaining greater 
accountability.  
 
This study also reveals that a school of thought exists that perceives no discernible 
merit in engaging the public in major emergency decision-making. To this school, 
such a process causes delays, prevents decisions being reached, provides no 
accountability for the ‘public’ element of the decision-making process, and in many 
cases gives more weight to the opinion of the non-expert over that of the expert. 
Sceptics also highlight the difficulties in generating sufficient interest amongst a 
potentially apathetic public in order to allow a sufficiently broad base of interests and 
opinions to be represented. However, notwithstanding any disadvantages, the 
interviews with each of the three leading agencies provide strong support for the 
public engagement process. In this context, it should be noted, all of the interviewees 
highlight the importance of communication practitioners having the necessary 
expertise and knowledge to engage meaningfully with stakeholders and publics. They 
also emphasise that clear protocols and procedures must exist in order to deal with all 
of the shortcomings, such as having in place mechanisms for choosing the 
participants in the process and in the actions to be taken in the event that no 
agreement can be reached. Consequently, it can be concluded that countries that are 
considered leaders in the field of major emergency communication attempt 
meaningfully to engage their stakeholders and publics in decisions that may affect 
them, throughout all stages of a major emergency life cycle. 
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11.4.7 Building trust and credibility 
Leading countries increasingly recognise the importance of good communication in 
order to build trust and credibility amongst their publics, key stakeholders and the 
media, when planning for and responding to major emergency situations. It is evident 
that these countries spend considerable time and effort attempting to build and 
maintain levels of trust and credibility throughout all stages of a major emergency. 
Additionally, the data identifies a number of key elements that are considered 
essential to build and maintain trust and credibility in response agencies, including 
openness, transparency, truthfulness, providing a speedy communication response 
and keeping promises. It is clear that building and maintaining a high level of trust 
and credibility is a demanding process. Firstly, it is difficult to engage an apathetic 
public in matters related to major emergencies unless a disaster situation in imminent. 
This makes it difficult to promote the good preparedness efforts of response agencies 
during the pre-crisis stage. Secondly, because of the multitude of response agencies 
likely to be involved in managing a major emergency, the actions or words of a single 
member of any of these agencies can destroy the trust and credibility of the entire 
preparedness and response effort. Finally, the media, always looking for new and 
fresh angles to their reportage of major emergency issues, sometimes focus on 
negative or sensational events, such as deficiencies in the preparedness and response 
effort. This can significantly impact on the perception of public trust and credibility 
of response agencies. Leading countries have recognised problems such as these and 
as a consequence have afforded considerable resources, effort and time to the 
establishment of communication sections to help deal with such issues. It can be 
concluded from the study that a high level of public trust and credibility in the 
response organisation is extremely important for the overall success of the major 
emergency effort.  
 
11.4.8 Integrated communication training and exercises 
Leading countries are committed to integrating the communication function as an 
integral element of major emergency training and exercising. This is demonstrated by 
the involvement of communication practitioners in large-scale multi-agency major 
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emergency exercises such as ‘Exercise Topoff II’ in the United States and ‘Operation 
Hermes’ in the United Kingdom. A close examination of the data highlights that 
integrating the communication function within all types of major emergency training 
and exercising provides many benefits. Benefits include allowing potential 
responders to understand the roles and responsibilities of communication practitioners 
and to recognise the value that the communication function adds, and also to develop 
familiarity with communication terminology, protocols and procedures. It can also be 
concluded that countries engaging in best-practice participate in integrated 
communication training and exercises on a regular basis and produce comprehensive, 
publicly available, reports in order to improve overall performance. 
 
11.5 Major emergency communication management – Irish context 
 
11.5.1 The importance of major emergency communication 
This study clearly demonstrates that all Irish departments and response agencies 
examined consider the communication function a critical factor in the success or 
failure of the overall major emergency effort. However, unlike in the case of the 
leading international agencies examined, this recognition of the importance of the 
communication function is not evidenced to any great extent within the major 
emergency literature produced by departments and agencies to date, or by the 
implementation of communication-related initiatives. This is with the exception of a 
small number of initiatives already mentioned in Chapter 10, including the 
development of the user-friendly and informative OEP website, the major emergency 
handbook, and the communication sections of major emergency plans developed for 
responding to influenza pandemic and ‘foot-and-mouth’. It can be concluded from the 
study that major emergency planners recognise the importance of major emergency 
communication. However, it can also be concluded that major emergency planners 
affording a higher priority to certain major emergency functions (such as operations) 
inadvertently hinder the development of all elements of a fully integrated major 
emergency communication function. While the communication function should not in 
any way hinder the operations effort, it should be developed and implemented in 
order to allow it to support and complement operations at all stages. However, while 
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a somewhat similar model of major emergency communication is evolving 
internationally, the interviews conducted for this study indicate that any 
communication strategy that is developed and implemented in Ireland needs to take 
cognisance of the nuances of Irish culture. Practices and policies that are likely to 
work in the USA or Sweden may not necessarily be effective in the Irish context. 
 
11.5.2 Appreciation of major emergency communication 
Senior major emergency planners in leading countries refer to the practical benefits of 
strategic major emergency communication. However, with a small number of 
exceptions, it appears that within the relevant Irish departments and PRA there exists 
a limited appreciation of certain strategic communication principles and of the 
benefits of the strategic major emergency communication function. While the 
research data highlights that the majority of interviewees are quite familiar with many 
of the concepts and principles of strategic operations management, without a 
comprehensive appreciation of the key concepts of strategic major emergency 
communication, or how all of the diverse elements of an integrated communication 
strategy can benefit the overall major emergency management effort, senior planners 
are never likely to embrace fully the process. Furthermore, this is likely to impede the 
development of a fully integrated communication function within individual 
departments and agencies. This understanding can only be achieved through a process 
of education, demonstration and comparison with best-international -practice. 
 
11.5.3 Integrated communication 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, countries engaging in best-international-practice 
consider major emergency communication to be a comprehensive, all-encompassing 
and integrated function involving many diverse elements such as media management, 
public awareness and information, public affairs, community relations, and survivor 
and victim relations. A number of the major emergency planners in Ireland consider 
major emergency communication merely in terms of media handling or the one-way 
asymmetrical dissemination of messages to the public. Interviewees who have an 
understanding of the concepts of integrated communication indicate that the 2006 
Framework does not adequately provide for the integration of all of the diverse 
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communication elements. Additionally, it can be concluded that the 2006 Framework 
treats information and communication management as distinct and independent 
functions. Many Irish major emergency planners see merit in a closer integration of 
these two important functions in order to more effectively manage major emergency 
situations, in line with best- international-practice. 
 
Countries engaging in best-international-practice produce their major emergency 
communication guidance documents from one central source. For example, the 
Swedish Emergency Management Agency produces all of the communication-related 
guidance documents for that country. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, major 
emergency planners in Ireland have undertaken a small number of useful 
communication programmes designed to guide and inform communication 
practitioners from departments and agencies, and the general public. These 
programmes are being developed by individual organisations somewhat in isolation. 
For example the OEP produced the major emergency handbook with the assistance of 
an external public relations firm, while the Garda Press Office are in the process of 
producing the communication guidance document (which relates strictly to media 
handling during a major emergency and would be better titled ‘a media handling 
guidance document’). An approach such as this is not in line with best-international-
practice, and is likely to lead to a lack of cohesiveness and consistency in the 
development of all guidance documents related to the major emergency 
communication function.  
 
11.5.4 Long-term communication planning 
Countries engaging in best-international-practice prepare strategies and plans for 
major emergency communication in the short-, medium-, and long-term. This 
involves putting in place multidimensional communication strategies and plans that 
help to guide the long-term direction of the communication effort. It also entails 
building up the communication knowledge base of individual departments and 
agencies, incrementally strengthening public information and awareness, and helping 
to promote community resilience over a prolonged period. A central focus of the 
longer-term communication strategy should be to modify attitudes towards individual 
and societal protection and resilience, by fostering a sense of interest amongst the 
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public in major emergency issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, long-term 
communication strategising and planning has resulted in the implementation of 
successful community resilience programmes to help protect against hurricanes in 
less developed countries such as Haiti and Cuba. It can be concluded from the 
research data that Ireland’s 2006 Framework takes very little cognisance of the 
longer-term aspects of major emergency communication preparedness. Indeed, it is 
very difficult to ascertain any focus beyond the two-year implementation stage of the 
Framework. It cannot be determined at this time whether this omission will be 
recognised and rectified within the forthcoming communication guidance document, 
which is currently under development. The research reveals that there are mixed 
views amongst senior major emergency planners in relation to undertaking long-term 
communication strategies, plans and initiatives. Some believe that major emergency 
management in Ireland, including the communication function, has been neglected 
and that significant ‘catch up’ is required. Consequently, these participants contend 
that the focus should be placed solely on short-term communication initiatives. 
However, others believe that, without a longer-term focus, the communication 
function does not provide an adequate strategic focus, disregards best-international-
practice, and is not in the best interests of building up community major emergency 
knowledge, information, awareness and resilience.  
 
11.5.5 Departmental and agency communication practitioners 
Individual departments and agencies in Ireland do not recruit their communication 
practitioners based on their previous communication-related knowledge or 
experience. The vast majority of communication practitioners are recruited from other 
non-communication-related positions within their respective organisations. 
Additionally, very few of these practitioners have undertaken any formal 
communication education or gained prior major emergency communication 
experience prior to taking up their role as a departmental or response agency 
communication practitioner (normally the role of a press officer). Each of the Irish 
departments and PRAs interviewed emphasises that its respective senior 
communication practitioner is a well-experienced press officer who, in many cases, 
has undertaken courses of training such as media skills courses. These 
communication practitioners also participate in any major emergency training or 
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exercises that take place within individual departments and agencies. As the process 
for developing and implementing major emergency plans for individual departments 
and agencies remains incomplete, it is very difficult to ascertain from this research 
whether the process of recruiting communication practitioners to departments and 
agencies in Ireland is effective. However, when asked whether it would be better to 
target future communication practitioners within departments and agencies a number 
of years in advance, and to provide them with appropriate training and experience 
prior to taking up their posts, the majority of interviewees agreed. Nevertheless, some 
interviewees identified certain difficulties with this process, such as limiting the 
promotion opportunities of individuals who are obliged to follow such a route. 
 
Additionally, as the implementation phase of the 2006 Framework initiative is not 
sufficiently progressed, it is too early to conclude that the skill set of communication 
practitioners within individual departments and agencies is sufficient to strategise, 
plan and implement the many diverse elements of the integrated strategic major 
emergency communication function as described in Chapter 5.  
 
11.5.6 Centralised guidance structure 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 9, leading countries in the field of major emergency 
management have established dedicated communication sections within their 
emergency management agencies. Practitioners within these sections have both the 
requisite communication knowledge and experience needed to provide useful 
strategic and tactical communication guidance and advice to individual response 
agencies. A notable conclusion that is drawn from the research data is that this expert 
major emergency communication guidance medium is not available to departments 
and agencies in Ireland. It is clear that no dedicated section or agency has been tasked 
with coordinating the many disparate elements of the strategic major emergency 
communication function, to provide guidance and advice to all response agencies, to 
develop a central repository of communication knowledge for use by all departments 
and agencies, and to advance the public information and awareness agenda. 
Confusion exists amongst departments and agencies as to which organisation is 
responsible for providing this strategic communication guidance. This has not been 
clearly established within the 2006 Framework, thereby providing another example of 
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the need to assign clear roles and responsibilities on a statutory basis. While the 
majority of interviewees identify either the Government Information Services (GIS) 
or the OEP as the two obvious sources for providing strategic communication 
guidance, it is clear from the data that neither GIS nor OEP believes the 
communication guidance function is in fact theirs. Furthermore, the current 
establishments and skill-sets of both the GIS and OEP are not sufficiently developed 
to allow them, at present, to become the central major emergency communication 
guidance organisation and repository of information. A role such as that requires 
considerable resources and expertise in order to be effective. 
 
11.5.7 Greater transparency and dialogue with members of the public 
Major emergency departments and agencies in Ireland have achieved greatly 
enhanced levels of openness and transparency in their communication with members 
of the public over the past five years. This is in line with best-international-practice. 
The research data confirm that, up until quite recently, a considerable amount of 
secrecy surrounded major emergency related issues in this country. Reduced secrecy 
is evidenced by a number of recent initiatives such as the posting of many official 
documents on the OEP website, inviting the media to visit the newly established 
National Emergency Coordination Centre (NECC) and providing a commitment that 
members of the media are to become participants in major emergency exercises. 
Nevertheless, important documents such as the OEP Annual Report, which provides 
details on the performance of each individual department in respect of major 
emergency preparedness and planning, remain classified as ‘Secret’ at time of writing 
and thus unavailable for public scrutiny. 
 
From an analysis of international major emergency literature, it is evident that leading 
countries have demonstrated a commitment to increasingly involving members of the 
public in the decision-making process for major emergencies. The research data 
highlight that senior major emergency planners in Ireland provide equivocal support 
for engaging the public in decisions relating to major emergency situations. While 
many of the interviewees highlight distinct advantages to the public engagement 
process, such as acquiring useful information and achieving better compliance, the 
data reveal that there is currently no great appetite for implementing the process 
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within departments and response agencies. The reasons for this inertia include a lack 
of requisite skill to carry out the public engagement function and a hesitancy on the 
part of senior decision-makers to consider new approaches.  
 
It has been found that in order for major emergency management to be successful, 
members of the public need to have high levels of trust and credibility in response 
departments and agencies. Interviewees highlight the elements necessary for 
achieving trust and credibility - including demonstrating sufficient expertise, 
experience, openness and transparency. Public trust and credibility in the past have 
been significantly damaged by isolated events such as Joe Jacobs’ radio interview and 
the mishandling of Iodine tablets, such as those discussed in Chapter 11. The 
interview results also indicate that the public’s current negative perception of the 
Health Services Executive (HSE), based on experiences and criticisms of the health 
service, may pose a significant problem for major emergency planners in the event of 
a serious influenza pandemic occurring. 
 
11.6 Key recommendations for Ireland 
 
Four key recommendations are made in the light of these conclusions. 
 
1. Taking cognisance of the model of major emergency communication currently 
preferred by many leading countries, major emergency planners in Ireland 
should conduct research in order to determine whether a similar model, 
involving a two-way symmetrical or mixed-model of communication 
management, would prove beneficial in supporting the major emergency 
manager in the Irish context. As demonstrated in this dissertation, such a 
relational-based approach has a broad base of support across a range of 
communication sub-specialities. This includes support from contemporary 
communication theorists, including Grunig (p59), Murphy (p60), Cutlip, 
Center and Broom (p55) and Susskind and Field (p55); from major emergency 
communication theorists such as Nohrstedt (p88), Reynolds and Nordlund 
(p89); and from major emergency response organisations including FEMA, 
SEMA and CCS (Section 9.4.3). Adopting such a model of communication 
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would reflect the international shift in how major emergency management is 
approached, whereby contemporary response agencies tend to plan with 
communities rather than for communities, as discussed in Figure 2.1 (p28). 
However, as described in Section 5.3.1, this shift towards preferring a 
dialogical and relational-based model to major emergency communication is a 
somewhat recent phenomonen. In addition to conducting a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis, this model needs to be rigorously tested, both in 
exercises and also in live situations, before it can be deemed to be truly 
effective in the Irish context.  
 
2. In order to overcome the many disadvantages of engaging in tactical 
communication management, described in Section 4.3.1 (p76), response 
agencies in Ireland should study, research and test all elements of the six 
strategic major emergency communication principles, proposed in Section 5.3 
(p93), in order to determine whether they can be applied and would be 
beneficial within the Irish context. In particular, Irish major emergency 
communication practitioners need to consider a greater evidenced-base 
approach to communication information, involving research and evaluation, 
as outlined earlier by emminent theorists such as Broom, Dozier, Grunig and 
Cutlip (p83 and p84). By adopting such strategic communication principles, 
Ireland’s major emergency communication approach would be in line with 
that of leading international organisations such as FEMA, SEMA, CCS, 
EMA, and Public Safety Canada.  
 
3. As part of this strategic approach, Irish response agencies need to consider the 
management of major emergency communication as more than simply media 
management and the provision of public information. In this regard, the Irish 
major emergency communication practitioner needs to regard the strategic 
communication function as an all-encompassing and integrated discipline 
involving subsidiary important functions such as internal communication, 
community relations, survivor and victim relations, and public affairs (as 
discussed in Section 5.3.5 (p111)). At a minimum, strong links and 
coordination needs to be established between the communication practitioner 
and these subsidiary functions.  
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4. Finally, in choosing the preferred major emergency communication model, or 
in adopting any or all of the strategic communication principles presented in 
the conceptual framework, the Irish major emergency communication 
practitioner needs to consider the role of national and local cultural factors. As 
indicated by theorists such as Mars and Nicod (p48), Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky (p48), Marra (p100), and Frosdick (p100), communication 
strategies that work well for one group of individuals may not necessarily 
work for others. Regardless of what is considered best-practice, any major 
emergency communication strategy that is developed and implemented for 
Ireland will have to be tailored to take cognisance of the specificities of Irish 
culture. 
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8. Interviews and personal communication 
 
For details on all interviews and personal communication see Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX A – DETAILS OF THOSE WHO 
PARTICIPATED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
Detailed in-depth and elite interviews were conducted with key individuals 
involved in major emergency management in Ireland, while comprehensive self-
administered questionnaires were completed by three international major 
emergency communication practitioners.  
 
Ireland 
 
In-depth and elite 
Minister Willie O’Dea TD - Minister for Defence and Chairperson of the 
Government Task Force on Major Emergency Management. The interview was 
conducted with Minister O’Dea in the Minister’s office in Leinster House on 
January 23rd, 2008. The interview lasted approximately one hour. Present also on 
this occasion was Mr Derek Mooney, Political Advisor to the Minister, who 
made some relevant comments that were noted. 
 
Mr Martin Heraghty - Assistant Secretary Corporate Affairs, Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF). Mr Heraghty is also responsible for 
leading major emergency planning, preparedness and response in DAFF. He has 
had previous experience of managing the response to ‘foot-and-mouth’ in 2001. 
The interview was conducted with Mr Heraghty in his office in the Department 
of Agriculture, Kildare Street, Dublin on November 19th, 2007. The interview 
lasted one hour and fifteen minutes. 
 
Mr Tony Boland - Assistant Secretary, Department of Environment, Heritage 
and Local Government (DEHLG). Mr Boland has responsibility for overseeing 
major emergency management for DEHLG. The interview took place in Mr 
Boland’s office in the Department of the Environment, Custom House, Dublin, 
on October 30th, 2007, and lasted approximately one hour and fifteen minutes. 
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Present also on this occasion was Ms Celina Barrett, Principal Officer, DEHLG, 
who made some relevant comments that were noted. 
 
Lieutenant General Pat Nash - former Deputy Chief of Staff (operations). An 
interview took place with Lieutenant General Nash in his office at Defence 
Forces Headquarters, Infirmary Road, Dublin on September 26th, 2007, a number 
of days prior to taking up his new appointment as Operational Commander of the 
EU Force in Chad. Lieutenant General Nash provided an insight into the 
Defence Forces’ role in major emergency management. 
 
In-depth 
Mr Brian Spain - Principal Officer Department of Defence and Head of the 
Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). As Chair of the Inter-Departmental 
Working Group, Mr Spain has a central role in major emergency planning and 
preparedness in Ireland. The interview was conducted in Mr Spain’s Office in 
the Department of Defence on Infirmary Road on December 12th, 2007. The 
interview lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes. 
 
Mr Gavin Maguire - Assistant National Director in Population Health, Health 
Services Exectutive (HSE), the Director of major emergency planning for the 
HSE, and a member of the National Steering Group. The interview with Mr 
Maguire was conducted in his office in the Civic Offices, Bray, Co. Wicklow on 
December 10th, 2007. The interview took approximately one hour. 
 
Mr Pat O’Riordan - A further emergent interview was conducted with Mr Pat 
O’Riordan of the HSE Mid-West region. Mr O’Riordan is a member of both the 
National Steering Group and the National Working Group, and he wrote the first 
substantial book on major emergency planning in Ireland in 1992. The interview 
with Mr O’Riordan took place in his office in Limerick on January 17th, 2008 
and lasted approximately one hour. 
 
Mr Eoghan O’Neachtain - Government Press Secretary, Department of an 
Taoiseach. Mr O’Neachtain is also the head of Government Information Services 
and Chair of the Emergency Planning Media Unit (EPMU). The interview was 
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conducted with Mr O’Neachtain in his office in Government Buildings on 
Merrion Street on December 19th, 2007 and lasted approximately one hour and 
thirty minutes. 
 
Dr Tony Colgan –Director of Advisory Services, Radiological Protection 
Institute Ireland (RPII), with Dr Ciara McMahon, Head of Emergency Planning, 
RPII, and Ms Marie Kelly, Head of Communications, RPII. The one-hour 
interview took place in Dr Colgan’s office at the RPII headquarters in 
Clonskeagh, Dublin on January 10th, 2008. All three participants contributed to 
the interview and their comments are recorded.  
 
Superintendent Liam King – Crime and Security Branch, and head of major 
emergency planning, the Garda Síochána (GS) and a member of the National 
Steering Group. The interview was conducted with Superintendent King in his 
office at Garda Headquarters in the Phoenix Park on October 17th, 2007 and 
lasted approximately one hour. 
 
Ms Sinead McSweeney -  In the course of the interviews an emergent interview 
took place with the newly appointed Director of Communications for the Gardai, 
Sinead McSweeney. The interview took place in her office in Garda 
Headquarters in the Phoenix Park on December 12th, 2007 and lasted for 45 
minutes. 
 
Mr Padraig McKeown – Managing Director of Drury Communication, a 
leading PR firm in Ireland. The interview was conducted with Mr McKeown in 
Bewleys’ Hotel, Ballsbridge, Dublin on December 20th, 2007, and lasted 
approximately one hour. This interview provides a useful insight into how a 
leading professional communication practitioner perceives the government’s 
management of strategic major emergency communication. 
 
Mr John Brophy – Independent crisis and risk management consultant with 
specific expertise in major emergency management. Mr Brophy was interviewed 
by way of a semi-structured interview in his office in Naas, Co. Kildare in March 
2008.  
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Mr John Guinane – Former military advisor at the Office of Emergency 
Planning. Mr Guinane was interviewed using a semi-structured interview 
technique. The interview took place in a restaurant in Dublin in December 2006 
and lasted approximately one hour. He provided many useful insights into the 
workings of major emergency management in Ireland. 
 
E-mail and telephone interviews - Ireland 
In order to ascertain the likelihood of natural major emergencies occurring in 
Ireland, interviews were conducted by e-mail and telephone with the following 
experts: 
 
Prof. Mike Williams - Geology Department, NUI Galway. A number of e-mails 
were exchanged in 2005 and once again in 2007. A follow-up phone-call was 
made in October 2007. Prof. Williams provided an insight into a big freeze that 
took place in Ireland in the nineteenth Century. 
 
Dr John Tyrrell - Geography Department, University College Cork. A number 
of e-mails were exchanged in 2005 and once again in 2007. A follow-up phone-
call was made in October 2007. Dr Tyrrell provided an insight into the likelihood 
of a major storm or tornado causing a major emergency situation in Ireland. 
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Internationally 
 
Following a process of short-listing the three candidate countries for this 
research, contact was established with the government agency responsible for 
major emergency management in each country in turn. The agencies chosen 
were the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the US, the 
Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat (CCS) in the UK. Each of these agencies proposed a senior 
communication practitioner to participate in the research.  
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, it was decided to send a comprehensive self-
administered questionnaire to the three participants, Daryl Madden in FEMA, 
Malin Modh in SEMA and Carol McCall in Cabinet Office Communications 
(COC). The questionnaire was of considerable length (80 questions). The three 
questionnaires were dispatched by post in March 2007. Two of the completed 
questionnaires were received at the end of May 2007 and the third received in 
January 2008. Following receipt of individual questionnaires, two follow-up 
phone calls were made to each of the participants in order to clarify a number of 
their answers and also to probe further a number of issues. These phone calls 
were limited to twenty minutes each and the interviews recorded with the 
permission of the participants. The information was then transcribed and 
compared with the data gleaned from the questionnaires. Additionally, a number 
of e-mails were exchanged with the participants in order to address specific 
points. 
 
The details of the three international participants are as follows: 
 
The United States 
Mr Daryl Madden - Senior public affairs manager at the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters in Washington DC. Mr Madden was 
chosen by FEMA’s Head of External Affairs to participate in this research. The 
completed questionnaire was returned in June 2007. In order to receive 
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clarification on a number of points, two follow-up e-mails were exchanged and 
one phone-call made to Mr Madden in July 2007. 
 
The United Kingdom 
Ms Carol McCall - Head of UK Security, Intelligence and Resilience 
Communications/News Co-ordination Centre, at the Cabinet Office 
Communications (COC) and Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in London. 
The completed questionnaire was returned in February 2008. A number of 
phone-calls were made to Ms McCall between June 2007 and February 2008. In 
order to receive clarification on a number of points, one follow-up e-mail was 
exchanged with Ms McCall in March 2008. 
 
Sweden 
Ms Malin Modh - Principal Administrative Officer, Crisis Communication at 
the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Stockholm. The 
completed questionnaire was returned in May 2007. In order to receive further 
information and clarification on a number of points, telephone conversations 
took place in September 2007 and two e-mails were exchanged in August 2007. 
In Swedish, SEMA is known as KBM (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten). However, 
KBM maintains an English profile in the name SEMA and the English title has 
been used throughout this dissertation.
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Theorists 
 
Additionally, in order to clarify a number of theoretical points in relation to 
different elements of communication the following theorists were contacted by 
e-mail in the course of the research.  
 
Prof. James Grunig - Professor Emeritus for the Department of Communication 
at the University of Maryland, and author of a number of seminal texts on the 
subject of strategic communication management. I engaged with Prof. Grunig on 
three occasions, by e-mail, during 2006 in order to clarify a number of points in 
relation to his model of strategic communication management. 
 
Prof. Baruch Fischhoff - is Howard Heinz University Professor, in the 
Department of Social and Decision Sciences and Department of Engineering and 
Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University. I was in correspondence with Prof. 
Fischhoff on two occasions by e-mail in June 2007 in order to clarify a number 
of issues on the evolution of communication management models. 
 
Dr Peter Sandman – a former Professor at Rutgers University, Dr Sandman is a 
renowned practitioner of risk and crisis communication, and maintains a very 
useful and often cited website. I contacted Dr Sandman, by e-mail, in 2005 on a 
number of occasions in order to clarify a number of points related to major 
emergency communication theory. Through this engagement I received 
information concerning a number of useful websites and papers from Dr 
Sandman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
APPENDIX B - A RECOMMENDED OUTLINE 
STRUCTURE OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
COMMUNICATION PLAN (MERCP) 
 
 
1. Cover page: This identifies the document as a major emergency 
communication plan. Included on this page is the title, date issued, 
security classification, number of copies, and revision date. 
2. Foreword: This is a letter written by a senior official, ideally the Minister 
with responsibility for major emergency planning and response. The 
purpose of this foreword is to emphasise the importance of the document. 
3. Table of contents. 
4. Distribution list: Details who is entitled to receive a copy of the plan. 
5. Acknowledgements page: A removable page that should be signed by 
persons who are obliged to read and understand the MERCP. 
6. Record of rehearsal dates: This should include dates and the types of 
rehearsal conducted. 
7. Statement of overall policy: This is the overall mission statement in 
relation to major emergency planning, preparing, response and recovery. 
8. Statement of communication policy. This is the major emergency 
communication mission statement. 
9. Organisational structure: A wire diagram should be developed that 
clearly indicates the relationship of all key personnel and response 
organisations including, the overall major emergency commander, the 
major emergency team, the communication team, affiliate and partner 
organisations. 
10. Declaration and notification procedures: This provides clear guidance 
for declaring a major emergency and the procedures for notifying key 
personnel. 
11. Communication team contact sheet: This lists the names and 
appointments of the major emergency communication team (MECIT), 
including the team commander and deputies. The MECIT contact sheet 
should include names, addresses, particular areas of expertise for each 
team member, method of activating each individual, contact details (day 
and night), details of close relatives and neighbours, and recall 
procedures for each team member, such as a cascade system of 
notification. 
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12. Designate official spokespersons: Accredited official spokespersons 
should be chosen for each major emergency type along with day and 
night contact details, and details regarding their expertise and training 
received. 
13. Other MECITs: Contact details for communication team managers of 
partner/affiliate response agencies should be listed.  
14. Information partners: Contact numbers for major emergency information 
partners including weather, public health, radiological institute, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Public Works, university 
and hospital laboratories should be listed. This can be listed separately or 
else as part of the stakeholder network mentioned in the next paragraph. 
15. Stakeholder network: As previously described earlier, a detailed 
stakeholder network should be researched and developed and listed in the 
MERCP. This should include different groups of stakeholders, why they 
are listed as stakeholders, what the group represents and how they might 
be of use, the name of a key contact person and spokesperson for that 
group along with day and night contact details. 
16. Third-party spokespersons: A list of third party spokespersons from that 
can provide support and validation to MECIT messages should be 
researched and listed along with contact numbers. 
17. National media contact list: This list should contain information in 
relation to the national media including television, radio, broadsheet, 
tabloid, trade, specialised print and web-based media. Information to be 
listed includes a profile of their average viewer/listener/reader, names of 
key journalists and editors, mobile phone numbers, after hours news desk 
contact numbers, e-mail addresses, fax numbers. A record of when these 
numbers and e-mails were last tested should also be included. 
18. Local/regional media contact list: A list of local media is extremely 
important and due to the number and diversity of outlets, this contact list 
will be more difficult to prepare. The same details provided in para. 17 
will be required. As most local media will not have a 24-hour news desk, 
a list of mobile numbers will be important. 
19. MECIT responsibilities: Clear roles and responsibilities should be 
designated to each member of the MECIT. This avoids important roles 
being overlooked or duplication of roles. Each individual role should be 
analysed, the important tasks listed and members of the MECIT assigned 
to cover each task. The roles to be considered include the communication 
team leader, on-site liaison, media liaison, public affairs liaison, 
stakeholder/partner liaison, victim and family liaison, information 
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management, researchers, copywriters, CIMC manager, media centre 
manager, and record management. 
20. Coordination with affiliate MECITs. Clear procedures need to be put in 
place to allow coordination with each of the affiliate/partner MECITs 
listed in para. 13 above. This should include coordination of command 
and control, release of information, and processes for remaining on 
message. 
21. Major emergency strategy matrix: This matrix is a very comprehensive 
tool that plots the specific major emergencies that have been identified, 
considered likely, and placed in order of priority. The matrix should also 
specify particular problems that exist in relation to each identified major 
emergency type and describe the communication problems associated 
with each of these problems. The matrix will also detail major 
emergency communication goals and objectives for each of the identified 
communication problems, along with details of target audiences and key 
messages to be disseminated to overcome each individual problem. 
22. Information security: Clear guidelines regarding the security of sensitive 
information and proprietary information. This includes information in 
relation to state security or intelligence, trade secrets or corporate 
confidentiality, and also the names of major emergency victims before 
families have been informed. 
23. Internal information clearance/approval procedures: This should state 
who is authorised to release information to major emergency teams and 
other affiliate response organisations. Information review, verification 
and release procedures should be clearly stated with no room for 
ambiguity. 
24. External information clearance: This should include who is authorised to 
release information to external stakeholders and publics, including the 
media. Information review, verification and release procedures should be 
clearly stated with no room for ambiguity. 
25. Cooperation with partners: The MERCP should clearly state the 
procedures for operating with all affiliate and partner MECITs operating 
within the communication and information management centre (CIMC). 
26. Procedures to scale-up the communication function: These should be 
stated in case the situation dictates that there is a need to scale-up the 
entire response effort.  
27. Channels of communication: These should include a web-site, an internet 
notice board, and a 1-800 low-call phone system. The MECIT must also 
provide a mechanism for producing large amounts of quality booklets, 
leaflets, posters, bill-boards, mail-shots, graphics, and video clips. 
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Details of agreements and subsequent procedures should be stated in the 
MERCP for employing television and radio stations for carrying of 
warning and alarm messages, along with instructional information. Any 
similar agreements with mobile telecommunication operators to send 
important warning or instructional text messages to publics at risk should 
also be stated. 
28. Guidance templates: A number of templates or checklists should be 
included in the MERCP that will prove to be very useful in guiding the 
major emergency communication team. The following need to be 
included: 
a. A tick-box checklist of all steps to be taken during the first 
number of hours of a major emergency. 
b. A list of questions that the press are likely to ask which MECIT 
press officers can begin to individualise once a major emergency 
occurs. 
c. Do’s and don’ts list for dealing with the media. 
d. Media interview guide – tips for conducting different types of 
media interviews. 
e. A worksheet to guide media content analysis. 
f. Generic press releases. 
g. Guidelines for notifying next-of-kin regarding news of death or 
serious injury. 
h. Sample letter of sympathy. 
i. Sample obituary. 
j. Layout of the CIMC and media centre and a list of equipment and 
supplies required as discussed earlier in Chapter 5. 
k. Public information call-tracking log and information-request log. 
l. Communication action log to record all communications initiated. 
m. Press conference checklist. 
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APPENDIX C - A COPY OF THE SELF-ADMINISTERED 
QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETED BY A MAJOR 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION OFFICIAL IN THE 
SWEDISH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
(SEMA).  
CORRESPONDING QUESTIONNAIRES WERE 
COMPLETED BY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(CCS) AND THE UNITED STATES (FEMA).  
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APPENDIX D - A COPY OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED 
QUESTIONNAIRE USED AS A GUIDE DURING THE 
INTERVIEW WITH A MAJOR EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATION OFFICIAL FROM THE IRISH HEALTH 
SERVICES EXECUTIVE (HSE) .  
CORRESPONDING SEMI-STRUCTURED 
QUESTIONNAIRES WERE USED DURING INTERVIEWS 
WITH OTHER OFFICIALS FROM IRISH GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR MAJOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.  
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Interview with Gavin Maguire 
Health Service Executive 
 
State your full name & title and appointment in relation to major 
emergency planning 
 
Who within the HSE is considered the senior major emergency 
communication practitioner – decides the model adopted, strategy, 
policy and protocols? 
 
Major Emergency Management Framework 
 
Do you think the framework is strategically focused? 
 
Should the framework have a statutory basis? 
 
Is the DoD the best placed Department to have oversight? 
 
Is there any other Dept better placed to have oversight?  
 
What is your opinion on the oversight role of the OEP  - comment on 
its ability to oblige response agencies to plan, train, conduct 
exercises, and report on the achievement or not of their goals. 
 
Some commentators have described the planning effort as a ‘plethora 
of committes and working groups working parallel – and often in 
isolation – Do you agree? 
 
Communication Strategy within the Framework 
In your opinion –who is responsible for overseeing the strategic 
communication management role? 
 
If I told you a person within the HSE was to become a 
Communication Manager– what functions would you suggest this  
person should be responsible for? 
 
(prompt) What about any of the following: 
 
public information –  
media management –  
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information management –  
dealing with survivors –  
relatives & friends –  
vulnerable persons –  
and internal communication.  
 
Is it your opinion that the new framework offers a joined-up 
approach to all of these functions? 
 
Within the US JIC model these roles are placed under one 
appointment “information officer” – do you see merit in this? Could 
it apply to Ireland? 
 
The new framework document places significant attention on 
communication management following the actualisation of a major 
emergency: 
 
Do you think that sufficient attention has been given to the 
communication function in the pre-crisis stage – and in the post-crisis 
stage of a major emergency? 
 
Communication Strategy 
I see that the HSE in its National Pandemic Influenza Plan considers 
communication strategy to be the top of its list of eight core elements 
of a plan – why? 
 
How strategic is the HSE’s approach to ME communication? 
 
What in your opinion are the key elements of a communication 
strategy – ie what makes it strategic? 
 
Is a strategic approach important – why? 
 
Do you think that the influenza plan provides sufficient long-term 
focus? 
(probe school system etc) 
 
Do you consider the communication element of the new framework 
strategic? 
 
Why? 
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Throughout many countries - considered leaders in major emergency 
managment – a similar model of major emergency communication 
seems to be emerging. This includes– engaging in communication 
research and evaluation – testing messages – building up trust and 
credibility - and greater dialogue with stakeholders and publics, 
communicating with rather than merely communicating to those 
affected by major emergencies. Do you think this model is likely to 
work within the Irish cultural context? 
 
Communication Planning 
 
Who is responsible for communication planning in the the HSE? 
 
Is there a communication plan in place? 
 
Importance of flexibility in the communication plan? 1-10 
 
Have you heard of scenario planning? Does the HSE use it? 
 
 
Broad-based deliberation 
Participating in broad-based deliberation means engaging in a 
meaningful way with interested and affected stakeholders and publics 
in relation to decisions that are likely to affect them in some way 
throughout all stages of a major emergency. 
 
Do you support this process? For both stakeholders and publics 
 
Identify advantages to pursuing this process in relation to planning 
and response? 
 
Identify disadvantages? 
 
On a scale of 1-10 how important is this process? Stakeholders / 
Public 
 
On a scale of 1 – 10 can you rate how much the planning process 
would be disrupted? Stakeholders / Public 
 
 
Research 
Does the HSE engage in communication research into attitudes, 
concerns, opinions, needs of ? 
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Someone once described producing a communication strategy 
without communication based research as being inherently flawed – 
do you agree? 
 
On a scale of 1-10 how important is this process? 
 
Openness & Transparency 
How important is openness and transparence with the public in 
relation to major emergency management? 
 
Currently – how open and transparent is the Irish Gov in relation to 
MEM 1-10? 
 
Should the public have full access to all of the details in relation to 
information that may affect them? 
 
Is full transparency likely to cause worry or worse panic? 
 
Are politicians and civil servants afraid of another Joe Jacobs affair? 
 
Trust & Credibility 
 
What to you are the key elements of instilling trust & credibility 
amongst the public and media? 
 
How can trust & credibility be achieved? 
 
Would engaging with the public in a broad-based deliberative 
approach help in this regard? 
 
 
Key messages 
Please describe the process of developing key messages within the 
HSE 
 
Do you ever test these messages? How? 
 
Did you test any of the messages for the influenza plan – do you 
think that the information in the document is accessible to the general 
public? 
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Channels of communication 
Did the HSE conduct research into optimum channels of 
communication for its proposed communication strategy for the 
Influenza document? 
(prompt - leaflet drop – press briefings – ad campaign – telephone 
hotline – tv & radio updates) 
 
What about marginalised communities – travellers – disabled? 
 
Are these tested? When? 
 
The strategic framework makes mention of certain channels of 
communication – leaflet drop – hotline – media etc –  
In your opinion - is this sufficient to reach all types of publics? 
 
 
Evaluation of communication strategy 
Does the HSE ever evaluate the efficacy of messages disseminated? 
 
Does this evaluation assess the message dissemination process or the 
outcome – or both? 
 
If this is done – who carries it out – and briefly describe the process? 
 
Knowledge of communication practitioners 
How do you choose your communication practitioners? 
 
Do you provide professional communication training for them? 
 
Have any of them got professional education? Communications 
degrees – masters - PhD 
 
Rate from 1-10 the importance that the HSE attaches to its 
communication practitioners having a communications related 
academic qualification? 
 
Training & Exercising 
How important is training & exercising the communication function 
to the HSE? 
 
Does somebody undertake specific communication input to 
exercises? – if so who assesses this? 
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